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A  UTHOR : 


FRENCH,  J.W. 


TITLE: 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DA  TE : 


1868 


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PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

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171 
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French,   J  w 

Practical  ethics,  by  Rev.  J.  W.  French 
ed.     New  York,  Van  Nostrand,   1868. 

vi,   223  p.     tables. 


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PEACTICAL   ETHICS. 


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EEV.  J.  W.  FEEKCH,  D.  D., 

PE0FK8S0R  OF  ETHICS,   tJ.  8,   MILITAEY  ACADKMT. 


FOURTH  EDITION. 


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Ea'Tkeeu,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  jear  1S«,  by 

J.    W.    FRENCH,  D.  D^ 

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boutherr.  District  of  New-York, 


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LIEUT.     J.     T.     GREELE, 

WUO   FELL  AT  TUl 

BATTLE     OF    BIG    BETHEL, 
June  IOtu,  1861, 

IWD   WHO,   WIIKN    LIVtNG,   WAS   MOST  DEEPLY  TN'TEKESTED   IX  THIS  WOEK,   WlllCn   AIMS   TO   GTinB 

MEN  TO   LOVE  TIIEIU  GOD,   AND  THEIR  COUNTRY.   WOKE  THAN    SKl.F, 

AND  OTHER  MEN   AS  THEMSELVES, 

THESE   PAGES 

ARE     DEDICiVTJi:r)» 

WITH    ADMIRATION     FOR      HIS     NOBLE     CHARACTER, 


AMD  30KR0W  FOR  UI6  EARLY  L0B8. 


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CONTENTS. 


i 


CHAPTER  I.  rA« 

Inieodhctort. — Definition ;  Friociples ;  Divisions 1 

PABT   I. 

(a)    DUTIES    ABOVE    US. 

CHAPTER  IL 
l>utie3  and  Virtues  required  by  Authority  Divine  and  Human 13 

(I 

\h)    DUTIES    WITHIN    US. 

CHAPTER  ni. 

Duties  to  Self:   General,  to  the  whole  Life  and  Nature;    Special,  to  the 
Conscience 40 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Duties  to  the  Intellect:  Correspondent  Virtues,  Intellioexce,  Prudence 60 

CHAPTER  V. 

Duties   for  Lower  Impulses:    Correspondent  Virtue   and   Principle,   Tem- 
perance       ^0 

CHAPTER  VL 

Duties  demanded  by  things  inyesting  us:   Correspondent  Virtues,   FoRTi- 
TDDK,  Moderation,  Industry,  Economy 107 


VI 


CONTENTS. 


(c)    DUTIES    AROUND    us. 

CHAPTER  VII.  PACB 

Duties  to  Others :  Correspondent  Virtues,  Benevolence,  Justice.    Relations 

m  which  Charity  predominates 118 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Relations  in  which  Justice  predominates *35 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Same  Snhject  continued.     Domestic  and  Social  Relations 154 

PART    II. 

CHAPTER  X. 
The  Passions  :  Definition ;  Divisions ;  Treatment 113 


PART     III. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


Leading  and  Destructive  Vices:  Corporeal;  Semi-Mental;  Mental.    Con- 
clusion   ■^^^ 


PEACTICAL    ETHICS. 


CHAPTER    I. 


INTRODUCTORY. 

1.  Ethics  may  be  defined  from  the  word,  or  from  the  thing. 
(Course  on  Language ;  Grammar,  644,  &c. ;  Logic.) 

2.  As  defined  from  the  word,  it  is  the  science       Definitioii. 
of  good  habits. 

This  definition  is  drawn  from  the  word  Ethics,  because  that 
is  derived  from  a  term  (Greek,  Tjdog)  which  signifies  Habit,  oi 
Custom.  The  word  Morals  leads  to  the  same  view.  It  is  de- 
rived from  a  term  (Latin,  mos,  moris)  which  has  a  similar  sig- 
nification, Custom.  The  word  thus  indicates  Ilabi^,  as  the 
Subject  regarded  by  Ethics,  or  Morals. 

3.  Habits,  in  their  qualities  are  good  and  right,  or  bad  and 
wrong.  They  are  good  and  right  when  they  conform  to  a 
standard  of  right ;  bad  and  wrong  when  they  deviate  from  that 
standard. 

Good  and  right  Habits  are  called  Virtues :  bad  and  wron^. 

Vices, 

4.  The  standard  is  some  rule  by  which  we  distinguish  Virtues 
from  Vices,  Eight  from  Wrong,  Duties  from  Transgressions. 
The  rule  is  that  of  Eeason,  or  Authority ;  the  Authority  is 
divine  or  human ;  the  human,  collective  or  individual. 

5.  Such  are  good  habits.  They  are  the  subject  of  Ethics,  and 
thus  the  brief  definition  from  the  word  is  explained. 

6.  A  definition  from  the  thing  is  more  full  and  precise,  and 
belongs  to  another  part  of  the  course ;  to  the  second  pai-t  of 
Ethics. 


2 


Division. 


PEACTICAL   ETHICS. 


7.  The  subject  of  Etliics  is  divided  into  two 
parts.  They  are  the  Practical,  and  the  Theoreti- 
cal. 

Distinction  be-  The  distinction  between  them  is,  tnat  the  first 

Practical  and  ^^  practical  part,  relies  on  Authority,  and  merely 
Theoretical.  states  w/iat  actions  and  habits,  and  movements  of 

feeling,  are  right,  and  what  wrong.     The  second,  or  theoreti- 
cal  part,  relies  on  Eeason,  and  shows  whj/  some  of  these  are 
right,  and  w/i2/  some  of  them  are  wrono- 
■Why  the  name,  ^-  The  first  is  named  Practical,  because  it  enu- 

Practicai.  merates  simply  wliat  sliould  or  should  not  be 

^I^ir^l  practised.  It  may  be  named  actual,  because  it 
«t«aiorPo«Uye.  states,  without  theor}^  what  actually  is  right  or 
wrong ;  or  positive,  because  it  declares  j>ositwely  an  existin<r 
fact,  without  giving  reasons.  " 

TS^etoai"""*'       ^^^  **'''**'"'  '*  "''"^''^'  Theoretical,  because  it 

gives  some  theory  in  morals.  It  is  sometimes 
named  Moral  Philosophy,  because  it  gives  reasons,  and  prin- 
ciples in  morals. 

Proent  subject.         9-  Practical  Ethics  is  the  subject  now  under 

consideration. 

Habits,  the  Sab-      ^"^  ^^^^^stand  its  nature,  and  divisions,  we 
ject-Matter.         must  refer  Habits,  as  its  Subject-Matter,  to  their 

ends  and  their  sources, 

10.  Good  habits,  or  virtues,  have  a  good  end. 

It  is  the  well-being  of  a  man,  and  of  other  men, 
through  him.  Bad  habits,  or  vices,  have  a  bad  end.  They 
bring  evH  on  a  man,  and  on  other  men  through  him. 

Sources  of  Habits.       ^^'  ^^  *^  *^^^^^  sources,  habits  in  general  come 

from  repeated  actions,  and  actions  from  will 
The  source  of  Virtues  is  in  the  conscience,  as  regulated  by 
reason,  and  itself  regulating  the  will.     The  fact  that  all  these 
require  a  higher  and  divine  regulation  does  not  belong  to  this 
course,  but  to  Theology.  ^ 

^  Jie  source  of  Yices  is  principally  in  unregulated  passions, 
assions.  12.  The  Passions  are  such  movements  of  feel- 


Ends  of  Habits. 


defixition:  use:  essential  points.  3 

ing  as  Hope  and  Fear ;  Love  and  Hate ;  Joy  and  Sorrow ; 
Desire  and  Aversion ;  Anger,  Envy,  Emulation.  Tliey  may 
be  described  as  movements  of  feeling,  caused  by  vivid  im- 
pressions on  the  imagination  of  apparent  good  or  evil,  which 
impel  a  man  strongly  to  the  actions  which  give  those  pas- 
sions gratification. 

13.  Practical  Ethics  may  be  described  accord-  weg-i«--  j%e^xA 
ingly,  as  that  branch  of  Morals  which  teaches  ^^n. 

what  Virtues  are  to  be  practised ;  what  vices  are  to  be  avoided, 
and  how  passions  are  to  be  regulated  so  as  to  promote  a  man's 
well-being,  and  that  of  other  men  through  him. 

14.  The  subject  is  one  of  great  importance  for  .^j^  important 
every  man.  The  reasons  are  evident.  The  wel-  *°'  ^^  "^^"^ 
fare  of  individuals,  and  through  them  the  welfare  of  society, 
must  be  ever  dependent  on  their  virtues,  and  must  be  injured 
by  their  vices,  and  by  their  uncontrolled  passions.  Tlie  virtues 
cannot  be  attained,  nor  the  vices  avoided,  without  intention. 
There  cannot  be  this  intention  without  the  virtues  and  the  vices 
have  been  brought  under  the  attention.  Hence  this  subject  is 
important.  That  is  to  say,  welfare  is  dependent  on  the  vir- 
tues ;  the  virtues  on  intention ;  intention  on  attention ;  atten- 
tion on  the  subject  being  brought  before  the  mind  by  the  enu- 
aierations  presented  by  this  subject. 

A  theory  of  Morals  is  not  needed  by  all  men.  But  an  enu- 
meration, at  least,  of  the  actions  and  habits  which  are  riffht 
and  which  are  wrong,  must  be  brought,  in  some  way,  under  the 
attention  of  every  human  being.  If  not  secured  for,  or  by  a 
man,  in  one  time  or  place,  it  must  be  in  some  other. 

15.  The  present  course  is  limited,  and  hence  «„.  ^  ^ , 

^     ^  '  What  taken  and 

every  point  will  not  be  considered^     There  are  ^^**  omittea. 

portions  of  Practical  Ethics  which  pertain  to  Theology  strictly. 

These  will  not  be  taken. 

Those  portions  will  be  regarded  which  are  essential  for  the 

persons  for  whom  this  course  is  prepared. 

[16.  What  is  essential,  is  determined  by  the  ,^      ^  ^  , 
■-  .  .  ,  '  ^  Why  what  is 

'•onsiderations  which  follow.     They  will  also  taken  is  essential 


*  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

S^^LJ^for^'tiTe"  ^^^^  *^^  ^^^^^^^  ^^^  necessity  for  tliis  branch  of 
xoiiitary  man.     Ethics,    in  this  stage  of  the  learner's  course. 

1.  There  are  principles  required  for  the  fulfilment  of  the 
oath  taken  on  becoming  a  member  of  the  Academy.     2.  There 
are  habits  demanded  of  attention  to  regulations  and  habits  in 
study,  both  of  which  are  under  the  control  of  the  will.     3.  The 
Articles  of  War  require  in  ofiicers,  on  pain  of  dismission,  con- 
duct becoming  the  officer  and  the  gentleman.     Those  who  are 
in  training  to  be  officers,  need  the  principles,  tastes  and  habits 
which  lead  to  such  conduct.     4.  The  Articles  of  War  provide 
an  oath  for  every  officer  who  sits  on  a  court-martial,  which 
demands  moral  considerations   by  his  conscience,  when  leo-al 
considerations  fail.     The  Conscience  must  be  trained  to  regard 
those   moral   considerations,   without   which   military  justice 
cannot  be  administered.    5.  The  officer  must  preserve  a  propei 
moral  influence  over  his  soldiers,  and  often  exercise  the  samt 
kind  of  influence  over  disafiected  or  hostile  populations.     To 
do  this,  he  must  both  know  and  feel  those  moral  principles 
which  sway  powerfully  the  minds  of  men.    6.  Ehetoric  teaches 
to  write  and  speak  persuasively  and  properly.      Persuasion 
cannot  be  understood  without  a  previous  knowledge  of  the 
virtues,  vices,  and  passions.     Also,  proi)riety  and  decorum  in 
official  communications  and  transactions,  can  only  be  secured 
by  moral  cultivation.     7.  If  fundamental  moral  rules  are  not 
.learned  early,  they  are  not  learned  well. 

So  much  needs  to  be  embraced  in  the  present  part  of  the 
course  as  is  demanded  by  these  considerations.] 
What  and  where  ^'^'  The  standard  for  Practical  Ethics,  as  we 
the  standards.  j^^^g  g^^yj^  jg  authority,  divine  or  human,  and,  ii 
human,  collective  or  individual  (4).  Divine  Authority  is  found 
in  the  Scriptures.  CollectiVe  human  authority  exists  in  the 
writings  of  moralists,  before  and  after  Christianity;  in  the  decis- 
ions of  Courts  of  Justice,  both  civil  and  military ;  and  in  the 
common  consent  of  mankind,  as  declared  in  public  sentiment. 
Individual  human  authority  is  in  a  man's  natural  and  instinc- 
tive sense  of  right  and  wrong,  as  declared  by  his  conscience. 


AUTHORITIES  TO  BE  IN   COMBINATION.  5 

18.   These  authorities  are  to  be  used  in  Ethics  ,  ^^   .^    ,  ^ 

Autnonties  to  be 

— ^not  separately,  but  in   combination.      They  oombuied. 
illustrate  and  support  each  other.     A  man  is  to  be  guided  in 
right  and  from  wrong  by  the  ray  which  unites  the  light  of 
divine  authority,  of  collective  human  wisdom  and  of  his  own 
conscience.     If  he  begin  to  learn  what  is  right  or  wrong  from 
any  one  of  these,  he  needs  the  assistance  of  the  others  to  com- 
plete that  knowledge.     Thus,  if  he  begin  with  Scripture,  he 
learns  more  particulars  of  the  duty  commanded,  or  the  sin 
forbidden,  from  the  natural  law  of  conscience ;  and  yet  more 
from  moralists,  public  sentiment  and  the  laws  of  the  land.     If 
he  begin  with  moralists,  the  laws,  or  the  general  sentiment  of 
men,  he  arrives  at  a  yet  deeper  sense  of  what  is  right  or  wrono-, 
by  Scripture,  and  by  the  inward  law  which  every  man  finds 
written  on  his  own  heart.     If  he  begin  with  the  latter— with 
his  own  natural  sense  of  right— he  wants  the  additional  light 
of  Divine  wisdom  and  of  collective  human  wisdom.    We  thus 
need  in  duty  the  united  authority  of  God,  of  men,  and  of  the 
man. 

(a.)  In  some  cases,  these  authorities  may,  when  What  if  the  com- 
combined,  appear  to  be  in  conflict,  so  that  one  SSfliitT^''*^''*'* 
shall  contradict  what  the  other  asserts.  The  rule  in  such 
Eases  is  a  plain  one.  It  is,  that  the  w/erior  must  yield  to  the 
superior. 

The  superior  authority  is  divine— as  much  above  all  that  is 
human  as  God  is  above  man.  If  divine  and  human  authority 
be  in  conflict,  the  human  must  yield,  whether  it  be  collective  or 
individual,  or  both.  If  the  conflict  be  with  God  and  conscience 
on  one  side,  and  collective  human  authority  on  the  other,  the 
latter  must  yield.  If  Scripture  be  silent,  and  the  conflict  be 
between  an  individual's  private  sentiment  and  the  collective 
judgment  of  mankind— not  in  one  age,  but  in  successive  gen- 
erations—the collective  authority  is  to  prevail.  The  Deity  has 
not  spoken,  and  it  is  more  probable  that  millions  and  ages 
should  be  right,  than  one  man.  Discriminations  and  farther 
discussion  belong  to  the  other  branch  of  Ethics. 


e 


PEACnCAL   ETHICS. 


Their  separation  (^0  Those  systems  of  morals  wliicli  regard 
dangeroufl.  ^^^  ^£  ^j^^^^  authorities  only  for  every  point  in 

Ethics,  and  reject  the  others  wholly,  have  been  found,  by 
experience,  defective,  and  even  dangerous.  They  give  par- 
tial views  of  right  and  wrong,  and  these  are  always  danger- 
ous. This  result  is  w^hat  might  have  been  expected.  The 
same  divine  mind  established  them  all,  to  be  used  each  in 
its  proportion  and  place,  but  to  be  used  together.  In  morals 
they  are  not  to  be  separated,  miless  where  the  lower  appears  to 
contradict  the  higher. 

The  oombination      (^0  In  the  present  course,  they  will  not  be  ap- 

JSl^M^  k?tki8  P^^^^  *^  ^^'^^J  subject.  That  method  would 
•onrse.  make  the  course  too  extensive.     They  will  be  re- 

ferred to  miscellaneously,  as  subjects  may  appear  to  demand 
them.  But  it  is  supposed  that  every  reader  or  learner  wdll  ap- 
ply them  unitedly  to  any  important  or  difficult  question  of  right 
or  wrong  which  may  arise  in  his  own  mind. 
Authoritiee  show  1^-  These  authorities,  w^hen  applied  to  actions, 
*     ^^'  habits,  and   moral   principles,  form  a  standard 

for  judgment.  Actions,  habits,  and  principles,  tested  by  that 
standard,  are  found  to  possess  qualities.  The  quality  which 
they  possess  is,  of  course,  moral.  Quality  is  in  our  estimation 
of  things.  By  their  having  moral  quality  is  therefore  merely 
meant,  that  they  are  estimated  h/ us  sls  good  or  bad  ;  right  or 
wrong ;  useful  or  injurious.  Some  actions  have  no  moral  qual- 
ity ;  as,  crooking  the  finger.  I^ot  being  good  or  bad,  they  are 
called  indifierent. 

S^i^TD^^les,  ^^'  ^^^  Qualities  have  degrees  and  opposites. 
Extremw.  (Course  on  Language ;  Grammar,  273,  300,  706 ; 

Logic.)  It  is  so  with  moral  qualities.  They— or  more  strictly, 
the  actions  (or  habits  or  principles)  which  have  such  qualities 
— present  degrees  and  extremes.  They  have  degrees.  Thus 
of  good  actions  or  habits,  some  may  be  better  than  others.  Of 
bad  actions  or  habits,  some  may  be  worse  than  others.  They 
are  good  or  bad  in  different  degrees. 
They  have  also  extremes.    The  extremes  are  the  limits  of 


extremes:  rule  of  PROPOE'noN.  7 

the  dejrrees.  The  extremes  are  those  of  excess  or  defect.  Ex- 
tremes  are  faults  or  vices.  The  Yirtue  is  the  medium  between 
them.  Thus,  Economy  is  a  virtue,  or  good  habit.  The  two 
vicious  extremes  between  which  it  stands  are  vices  or  bad 
habits.  They  are,  on  one  side,  Stinginess ;  and  on  the  other, 
Prodigality.  The  former  is  the  extreme  by  excess ;  the  latter, 
by  defect.  So,  also.  Courage  is  a  virtue.  The  extremes  on 
each  side  of  it  are  faults  or  vices.  They  are  Fool-hardiness  and 
Cowardice.  The  former  is  the  extreme  by  excess,  and  the  lat- 
ter by  defect.  Courtesy  is  a  virtue.  The  extremes  between 
which  it  stands  are  vices.  They  are  Fawning,  and  Rudeness. 
The  former  is  the  extreme  by  excess,  and  the  latter  by  defect. 
Thus,  every  virtue  has  its  contrary,  which  is  a  vice. 

Between  these  extremes  are  degrees.  Thus,  a  man  may  be- 
come more  and  more  economical,  till  he  is  a  niggard,  and  a 
miser.  He  may  become  less  and  less  economical,  till  he  is  a 
spendthrift.  He  may  carry  his  courage  gradually  beyond  the 
bounds  of  duty  and  reason,  till  he  is  hare-brained.  He  may  be 
more  and  more  cautious  in  avoiding  danger,  till  he  is  a  pol- 
troon. 

Whether  the  extreme  be  that  of  excess  or  defect  Extremes  show 
may  be  always  known  by  considering  the  will.  Excess  or  Defect. 
Where  the  extreme  is  produced  by  excess  of  w^ill,  the  extreme 
is  that  of  excess ;  where,  by  defect  of  will,  it  is  that  of  defect. 
Thus,  a  man  becomes  a  miser  by  constantly  willing  to  lay  up 
money.  He  becomes  wasteful  by  merely  being  careless,  and  by 
having  no  will  to  resist  either  temptations  for  spending  or  calls 
for  money.  Hence,  the  first  is  the  positive  extreme,  or  that  by 
excess ;  the  latter  the  negative,  or  that  by  defect. 

21.  This  being  the  nature  of  all  moral  conduct,  R^ie  of  proportion, 
it  is  evident  that  Yirtues  can  only  be  practised  by 
observing  the  rule  of  degree  and  proportion  in  actions.  The 
actions  of  a  man's  will  must  be  proportioned  to  the  objects  on 
which  it  acts.  And  this  proportion  must  be  observed,  not  in 
regard  to  one  class  of  obligations  only,  but  in  regard  to  all,  so 
that  all  shall  be  obBCiP^d  with  proporti^ifc.     Thus,  between 


8 


PEACnCAL  ETHICS. 


the  Vices  just  named,  stands  virtuous  and  honorable  Economy. 
It  demands  that  the  will  shall  be  regulated  by  proportion,  iu 
expenditure.  There  should  be  no  stronger  will,  however,  than 
the  object  deserves. 

Also,  other  obligations  beyond  that  which  is  personal  in 
economy,  are  to  be  regarded  in  their  proportions :  as  the  claims 
of  friendship ;  of  charity ;  the  just  expectations  of  others  for 
hberahty;  the  necessity  for  self-respect,  and  the  respect  of  men, 
both  which  are  lost  by  any  meanness.  All  these  obligations, 
and  others  like  them,  receive  their  just  proportion  of  considera- 
tion. The  result  is,  that  the  will  for  saving  is  regulated  and 
tempered.  The  virtue  is  practised,  but  without  violating  duties 
to  others,  or  to  self. 

This  virtue  has  been  taken  as  an  example,  because  it  is  so 
tanuhar.  By  the  example,  the  principle  can  be  understood. 
I  hat  prmciple  is  to  be  applied  to  all  the  Virtues. 

Bfisnitiiig maxims.      ^2.  "VVe  thus  arrive  at  the  following  maxims  in 

Ethics : 

1.   Ax   ESSENTI.iL   RtlLE  FOB  THE   VlRTUES   IS   PKOPOETIOJf. 
I.    ViKTUES   HAVE  DeCKEES   in  THEIE   QuALmES. 

3.  A  Virtue  is  usually  a  Medium  between  extremes 

WHICH    EXTREMES    ARE    ViCES.  ' 

Jo'S^emeX!      ^^^  ^  ^^'^'''^  ^^<^^Y>i^on  to  this  last  maxim 
««.^but  only  of  exists  in  the  case  of  those  Virtues  which  have  an 
•  infinite  or  vast  object.     Such  are  those  to  God, 

and  to  one  s  country ;  which  will  be  the  first  examined.  The 
Deity  IS  infinite.  The  nation  exceeds  the  individual,  as  mill- 
ions  exceed  one.  According  to  the  first  ma.xim.  Virtues  require 
proportion  to  their  objects.  These  objects  are  so  great,  that  ' 
while  there  IS  an  Extreme  of  Defect,  there  is  none  of  Excess 
A  man  need  never  fear  that  he  will  be  too  devoted  to  God  or 
his  country. 

of  Motr  '^''  ^'^^"^^'^  ^^"^  "^"^  through  the  whole  Subject 

ferandi'^Jot  ,  ^^'  ^^'  '^^^^  ^'  ^'^  ^'^  ^0  the  proper  meth^ 

for  treating  the  Subject. 


divisions:  phraseology.  9 

As  each  Virtue  has  correspondent  Vices,  the  latter  should  be 
treated  in  connection  with  it.  Hence,  one  head  of  the  Subject 
will  be  the  Virtues ;  but  these  will  include  their  Contraries. 

As  the  Passions,  when  regulated,  support  the  Virtues,  and 
when  unregulated  form  Vices,  they  will  furnish  a  second,  and 
separate  head. 

But  as  some  Vices  are  greater,  and  more  dangerous  than 
others,  it  will  be  convenient  to  consider  them  specially,  apart 
from  tlieir  opposed  Virtues,  and  apart  from  the  stronger  Passions 
producing  them.  The  more  deadly  Vices  will  form  another 
head. 

Accordingly,  the  divisions  of  the  subject  will  order, 

be  these,  in  the  following  order: 

1.  The  Virtues,  with  their  Contrasts: 

2.  The  Passions: 

3.  The  leading  Vices. 


Phraseology. 


UseofsomeTonns. 


25.  A  strict  phraseology  will  not  be  used  in  the 
present  part  of  the  course.  It  is  not  needed.  Too 
close  an  attention  to  precise  shades  of  meaning,  useful  in  the 
exact  sciences,  would  here  be  out  of  place.  It  would  embarrass 
the  learner,  when  the  sole  object  is  to  point  out  his  duties,  in 
the  plainest  manner.  For  example,  the  word 
Virtue  means,  strictly,  a  Habit;  the  word 
Duty^  an  Action  due.  But  in  the  present  part  of  the  course, 
where  nice  discriminations  are  not  needed,  the  distinction 
of  Virtues  from  Duties  will  not  be  closely  observed.  The 
general  idea  of  both,  which  is  obligation,  whether  in  habit  or 
act,  whether  in  being  or  doing,  is  that  which  will  be  kept 
prominent.  The  word  Vice  is  used  in  this  subject  as  meaning 
any  deficiency  in  the  required  moral  quality  of  a  habit  or  ac- 
tion. The  noun  is  better,  for  the  habit ;  the  adjective,  vicious, 
for  the  action.  It  has  thus  a  more  general  meaning  in  the  sci- 
ence than  in  its  popular  use.  It  is  not  used  as  always  synony- 
mous with  great  transgressions.  The  word  prindple  means, 
strictly,  an  inward  rule  for  conduct ;  precejpty  an  outward  rule 


10 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


of  conduct ;  rule  includes  both.  But  the  general  idea  of  direc- 
tion will  be  sometimes  expressed  by  one  word  and  sometimes 
by  the  other.  The  subject  of  Ethics  has  been  injured  by  an  at- 
tempt to  mould  it  after  the  mathematical  and  physical  sci- 
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PAKT   I. 


VIRTUES  AND  THEIE  CONTRASTS. 


CHAPTEK    II. 
VIRTUES  WHICH  REGARD  GOD  AND  OBJECTS  GREATER  THAN  SELF. 

DUTIES    ABOVE    A    MAN. 

26.  The  Virtues  whicli  are  first  in  order  are  Obligations  above 

•^  ^  and  before  the  in- 

those  which  regard  the  Deity  and  objects,  such  dividual. 

as  Government  and  Law,  which  are  greater  than  self. 

When  these  are  not  made  prominent,  the  re-  Evils  from  put- 
ting the  individa- 
suit  is  the  absence  of  Obedience  to  God,  of  Patri-  ai  above  them. 

otism,  of  Reverence  for  Law,  of  Submission  to  rightful  au- 
thority. Selfishness  will  prevail  in  each  man's  character,  and 
through  Society,  when  individualism  is  taught  in  morals. 

[Hence,  the  Articles  of  War,  with  great  propri-  This  class  of  obli- 
ety,  place  first  the  duties  which  belong  to  these  §fe^^ticies  of 
virtues.]  ^^' 

1.  The  Deity. 


Duties  to  God. 


27.  The  virtues  which  regard  the  Deity  are 
Theological.  Their  details  are  accordingly  left 
to  Theology. 

A  summary  view  only  will  be  taken. 

The  Deity  is  a  perfect  mind :  He  is,  as  such,  to  be  revered 
for  what  He  is.  He  does  good :  He  is  accordingly  to  be  loved 
for  what  he  does.  He  teaches  man :  He  is,  then,  to  be  believed 
in  what  He  has  taught. 

The  primary  duties  toward  Him  are  thus  seen  to  be  Revbb 
ENCE,  Love,  Belief. 


14 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


DUTIES  TO  THE  NATION:   TRANSGRESSIONS. 


15 


( 


II 


r 

I 


The  vice  opposed  to  Keverence  is  Profanity  ;  to  Love,  in  its 
outward  acts,  tlie  Neglect  of  Prh'Ate  and  Public  "Worship  ; 
to  Belief,  Infidelity. 

[The  Articles  of  War  condemn  profane  swearing.  They  en- 
join attendance  on  public  worship.  They  demand  in  public 
worship  reverence  and  propriety  of  deportment.] 

Infidelity  is  the  absence  of  belief  in  divine  testimony. 

2.  The  Nation. 


IliiidB*.  vbu. 


28.  The  Dcitj  ha^  transferred  %  portion  of  Ills 
authority  to  men  OTgiuiiz<?(l  cx»llc<'livcly.    Men 
are  so  organized  in  nations. 

0tUt»tii»tii  r«-  ^.  The  Nation  is  the  Kuprcmt*  itiitltority  in 
r'rxxJm  fMt  of  ^^""g^  which  are  human.  The  cori^poiidcnt 
Iwttivrity;  oUigatioD,  iinpo&ed    by    thii  fSicI,  \%    that  of 

Allboiaxck. 

2.  Tttm  lit  fiut  80.  Tlie  Nation  has  an  Oiininic  Law,  called 
Uw;  tl>c  ConMitution.     Being  the  supremo  law,  it 

deinandi  special  reverence  and  obedience  from  all  the  rm;m* 
bers  of  a  nation.  The  ocirrrspondent  virtue  thuB  required  is 
culled  Loyalty. 

8  rr«tt  um  tux  ^^'  ^^°*^*^  ^*^  waprcmc  law,  arc  subordinate 
c^iAvt«ziitiii^:  laws  and  re^giifaUion»  in  liannony  with  it.  ThesHi 
all  require,  as  the  correi^jMJudent  obligations,  Scs^riXTF  >x>r  Law 
aad  OsKmx^'CK  to  Law. 

4.  Ttfm  um  &«€  ^^  GoTemment  i&d  Lairs  are  administered 
imiJaVtS^  ^^^  l>erMinK  clothed  with  authoritv  fur  the  pur- 
ity is  by  finiat;  poee.  The  corredpondent  obligation  is  that  of 
IwMior  to  tlwm  in  thcrir  ofiice.  The  virtue  which  ol)derveft  the 
dutv  of  manifesting  thk  honor  is  calkMl  OiutiRRVASCBL 

[In  the  niilitarj  ttcrricp  of  the  nation^  Orediexcb  to  Sopid* 
SMXBB 18  joined  with  Ob^rvance.] 

6.  Fi«a  tb*  ihA  ^^-  '^^^  Nation,  organized  bv  its  Constitution 
^Ato^Me^  an*!  Law«,  promotes  publie  and  private  good. 
F""«"*i  1.  It  sostaiuB  the  present  welfare  of  millions. 

2.  The  nation  aLo  exi.^U  through  centurieej  for  the  welfure  of 


its  members,  through  successive  generations.  3.  As  one  of 
the  family  of  nations,  it  exists  for  the  welfare  of  the  world. 
The  good  which  the  nation  thus  promotes  is  called  the  public 
good.  Private  good  is  found  in  this  public  good.  The  cor- 
respondent obligation  resting  on  every  member  of  a  nation  i», 
to  love  that  public  good  more  than  any  private  good  for  him- 
self or  others.  The  virtue  which  obj*crv(;s  this  obligation  in 
called  Pateiotism,  or  thk  love  of  country.  It  requires  that 
every  member  of  a  nation  shall  be  rcjuly  to  sncrlfu'c  his  life, 
property,  liberty  luid  iiiclliialiuu,  when  required  for  the  public 
defence  and  welfare. 

34.  For  a  nation  to  fulfil  its  great  office,  har-  ewTnsitbf  f^et 
mony  and  ti^anquillity,  amongst  it«  great  con-  {^,Sl^t^ 
etitnent  purts,  are  indispeudahle.    Heoce  reenlts  d^?«tt^fei«. 

the'oBUOATION  OF  OUARDINO  TIIK  rCBMC  rH.VCK. 

35.  Tlic  obligatioiM.  which  reguixl  the  nation  ofbUgttSiQi,  col. 
are  thus  seen  to  be  Allegiance,  Loyalty^  Re^'cr-  *^^^ 

cnce  and  ObiHlienoo  for  Law,  Obeervanoe,  Patriotism^  Self- 
Saeriiiee,  and  Care  tor  tlie  public  tranquillity. 

30.  Tlw?  fault*  oppooed  to  theee  are  Trba&on^  opoani  ikiiu  «r 
DiBLOTALTT,  RebkllioNj  Coxjfrru.xrv,  Skihtiox,  '^^ 

I>l)<KK»r>X.T  TO  SonanOBd^  SELFIBIl^EeS  OB  IxnirrKKKNCE  TO  TIIK 
PUBLIC  mSLFABB,  RkFU^AL  TO  ACT  OR  fiCFPER  FOB  TUB  PUBLIC 

ooon,  Aorr.inox  by  the  Demaooqubl 

37.  Some  of  tbc«c  have  ^^ulxlivisioriH.  Tlma  Mbdiriiicat. 
I>ii;loyalty  may  lie  negative  itfid  appear  a8  FoREiONifx,  in  % 
preference  of  other  forms  of  govemineut  t<i  tlu;  institutions  of 
oue^t$  native  country ;  or,  in  the  United  States,  may  appear  hh 
Statist,  which  le,  elevating  tlie  authority  of  a  eingle  State 
alK»ve  that  of  tlie  nation. 

Disloyalty  may  be  poojitive  in  t0O^  or  d^ed*.  It  is  positive 
in  wordd,  when  there  fe  a  constant  reviling  of  the  fundamental 
institutions  of  the  oouutrv-.  Thid  forms  Pcblic  Libku  Public 
libel  ifl  earried  to  the  extreme  degree  of  haHeneaft  and  wieked- 
nme,  when  it  ii«  perpetrated  under  foreign  influence  or  for 
foreign  gold    Disloyalty  x*^  jKi^tive  in  deeds  that  are  short  of 


! 


(I 


'      f 


ill 


|i 


I 


16 


PKACTICAL  ETHICS. 


treason, when  there  is  an  attempt  by  public  commotion  at  JS'ulli- 
FiCATioN,  or  at  Illegal  Inxovation,  or  at  Obstructioxs  to  Exe- 
cution, applied  to  some  part  or  the  whole  of  the  Organic  law. 

38.  Thns  also  selfishness  or  indifference  to  the  public  good 
may  appear  as  Faction.  Fanaticism,  Sectionalism,  Provincial- 
ism. In  all  these  there  is  a  common  taint.  There  is  a  want 
of  devotion  to  the  public  good ;  there  is  a  willingness  to  sacri- 
fice the  common  welfare  to  some  other  object,  pursued  by  one 
man  or  a  body  of  men.  When  that  object  is  the  acquisition  of 
power  or  plunder,  or  both,  and  this  is  preferred  to  the  general 
good,  there  is  Faction.  When  that  object  is  the  prevalence  of 
one  opinion  or  dogma,  and  this  is  preferred  to  public  welfare 
and  tranquillity,  there  is  Fanaticism.  When  that  object  is  to  pro- 
mote the  interest  or  passions  of  one  part  of  a  nation  to  the  det- 
riment of  the  whole,  there  is  Sectionalism.  When  the  same  in- 
tention is  carried  on  in  a  small  locality,  there  is  Provincialism. 

Such  are  the  duties  from  the  individual  to  the  nation,  and 

Buch  are  the  contrasted  transgressions. 

Obligations  from      39,  The  nation  has  reciprocal  obligations  to  its 

the  nation  recip-  .       ,  ^ 

rocal.  members.    Those  obligations  result  not  from  any 

human  contract,  but  from  the  fact  of  organization  and  exist- 
ence. As  the  reciprocal  duties  between  parents  and  children 
arise  from  the  relations  existing  in  the  family,  and  the  family 
exists  by  an  ordinance  of  the  Author  of  Nature,  so  do  the  re- 
ciprocal duties  between  a  nation  and  its  members  arise  from  its 
existence,  and  its  existence  from  a  like  ordinance.  The  full 
consideration  of  these  duties  from  the  nation  does  not  belonor 
to  this,  but  to  the  other  part  of  Ethics. 

(a.)  One  of  those  obligations,  however,  has  interest  for  those 
for  whom  this  course  is  prepared.  A  sacred  duty  for  the  nation 
is,  to  have  a  public  force,  and  to  use  it  for  the  public  defence, 
and  for  support  and  execution  of  law.  Every  member  of  that 
public  force  is  to  regard  himself  as  an  instrument  for  these 
high  purposes. 

Violation  on  one  (J.)  Any  violation  of  these  reciprocal  obliga- 
■ide  does  not  re-   ,.  1  j.      j  .      -i      ^         ^         .^ 

lease  on  the  other,  ^^^^s  by  one  party  does  not  absolve  the  other 


DTTriES   TO   THE   NATION:    PERMANENCE  I    RANK. 


17 


party  from  his  obligations.  Tlie  duties  to  the  nation  from  every 
member  of  it,  and  the  duties  jfrom  it,  remain.  They  are 
formed  not  by  a  temporary  bargain,  but  by  relatione  which  the 
Creator  has  established. 

(c.)  The  permanence  of  the  relation  and  duties  ^^^  ^^^  release 
resulting  from  it  is  not  changed  by  the  fact  that  tract  attends, 
there  may  have  been  a  contract  in  regard  to  certain  particulars. 
Thus,  the  marriage  relation  is  permanent,  and  the  relation  de- 
mands duties.  A  contract,  however,  in  certain  particulars,  has 
been  made  before  it.  Contracts  may  precede,  accompany,  or 
follow  relations,  yet  not  affect  their  permanence.  The  same  is 
tnie  w^here  permanent  political  relations  are  established,  and 
there  has  been  a  contract  in  regard  to  particular  things.  It  is 
enough,  in  the  present  part,  to  make  the  statement,  and  guard 
the  mind  against  error.  The  discussion  of  the  principle  belongs 
to  the  other  part  of  Ethics. 

[40.  The  duties  to  the  nation  are  enforced  by  Articles  of  War 
the  Articles  of  War.     They  properly  demand  re-  ^^  ^^^  Duties, 
spect  for  superiors,  and  punish  disrespectful  words  against  the 
head  of  the  nation  and  those  in  authority.     They  also  require 
an  oath  of  allegiance  and  obedience,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  se- 
cure the  fulfilment  of  these  duties.] 

41.  As  to  the  degree  in  which  these  virtues  orade  of  these 
stand  which  regard  God  and  the  public  good,  ^^*^®^- 

they  are  in  the  highest  rank.  Obligations  to  God  excel  all 
others,  as  the  Creator  exceeds  a  man.  Obligations  to  the  coun- 
try excel  those  which  are  personal  and  private,  as  millions  ex- 
ceed one,  and  as  the  centuries  of  a  nation's  existence  transcend 
the  years  of  one  human  life. 

42.  It  belongs  to   Theology  to  consider  the  Possible  Duties  to 
rank  to  be  assigned  to  the  virtues  which  look  to  t^« "World: 

the  welfare  of  the  world,  or  of  the  whole  Clii-istian  body.  But, 
leaving  the  question  to  that  science  wholly,  and  allowing  for  its 
decisions,  it  may  be  said,  that  tlie  love  of  country  is  next  to  the 
love  of  God^  and  duties  to  the  nation  are  next  to  those  to 
Him, 


18 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


I 


WASHINGTON,  ON  DUTIES  TO  THE  NATION. 


19 


i 


jCay  never  con-      43.  It  is*  evident,  however,  independently  of 

flict  with  duties    rr\       ^  1        .  .  . 

to  the  country.  Iheolo^v,  that  it  a  man  pursue  universal  philan- 
thropy— whether  for  what  he  deems  the  temporal,  or  for  the 
spiritual  welfare  of  men — to  the  violation  of  duties  to  his  coun-  * 
try^  he  is  morally  wrong.  The  Deity  has  determined  that  the 
general  good  of  mankind  shall  he  promoted  through  the  na- 
tionalities of  the  world. 

Grade  of  the  o  ^^'  ^^  *^  *^^^  grade  of  wickedness  in  the  con- 
posed  transgres-  trasted  vices  and  trans^icressions,  it  is  evident  that, 

sions.  11 

as  these  are  themselves  correspondent,  so  the 
grade  is  correspondent  (35).  Ofiences  against  God,  and  the 
nation,  have,  therefore,  the  highest  degree  of  guilt  among  trans- 
gressions (40).  Separating  those  against  the  nation,  it  may  he 
said  of  them,  tliat  the  guilt  of  such  offences  is  to  he  estimated 
by  the  magnitude  and  duration  of  the  public  evils  which  they 
produce;  by  the  character  of  the  motives  which  cause  them; 
and  by  the  grandeur  of  tlie  obh'gations  which  they  violate. 
Tliey  are,  therefore,  among  tlie  highest  of  those  which  are 
merely  human.  It  is  unnecessary  to  enumerate  them  again, 
BO  as  to  apply  this  principle  to  each  particular,  since  the  reader 
can  do  this  for  himself,  (35,  36,  37). 

45.  We  have  now  seen  what,  and  of  what  moral  degree,  are 
the  obligations  and  transgressions  which  relate  to  the  Deity, 
and  the  public  good. 

Testimony  of  ^^^  testimony  and  counsels  of  Washington  have 

Washington.  i^een  given  in  his  "  Farewell  Address,"  on  most  of 
the  subjects  contained  under  the  present  head. 

His  counsels,  as  there  given  on  these  subjects,  should  be 
observed  by  every  member  of  the  nation,  and  be  diligently 
learned  by  those  for  whom  this  course  is  specially  prepared. 

He  speaks  of  the  connection  of  duties  to  the  country  with 
those  to  God  (26) ;  of  the  United  States,  as  organized  into  a 
nation  (28) ;  of  Allegiance  (29) ;  Loyalty  (30) ;  Keverence  for 
Law  (31) ;  Patriotism  (33) ;  and  Care  for  the  Public  Tranquillity 
(34).  He  warns  against  Foreignism,  and  attempts  to  change 
rashly,  and  illegally,  the  institutions  of  the   country  (37); 


against  Faction  and  Sectionalism  (38) ;  He  also  refers  to  the 
reciprpcal  duties  of  the  nation  to  its  members  (39). 

Washington  speaks,  in  his  "  Farewell  Address," 

(a.)  Of  the  connection  of  duties  to  God,  with  those  to  the 
country : 

He  says: 

"  Of  all  the  dispositions  and  habits  which  lead  to  public  pros- 
perity, Eeligion  and  MoRALriY  are  indispensable  supports. 

"  In  vain  would  that  man  claim  the  tribute  of  patriotism, 
who  should  labor  to  subvert  these  great  pillars  of  human  hap- 
piness, these  firmest  props  of  the  duties  of  men,  and  citizens. 
The  mere  politician,  equally  with  the  pious  man,  ought  to  re- 
spect and  to  cherish  them.  A  volume  could  not  trace  all  their 
connections  with  private  and  public  felicity.  Let  it  simply  be 
asked,  where  is  the  security  for  property,  for  reputation,  for  life, 
if  the  sense  of  religious  obligation  d€se7't  the  oaths  which  are 
the  instruments  of  investigation  in  Courts  of  Justice  ?  And  let 
us,  with  caution,  indulge  the  supposition,  that  morality  can  be 
maintained  without  religion.  Whatever  may  be  conceded  to 
the  influence  of  refined  education,  on  minds  of  peculiar  structure, 
reason  and  experience  both  forbid  us  to  expect  that  national 
■morality  can  prevail  in  exclusion  of  religious  principle." 

(J).)  Of  the  United  States,  as  forming  not  a  league  of  nations, 
but  one  nation,  organized  by  one  people : 

His  words  are : 

"The  Unity  of  Government  which  constitutes  you  one 
^eopleP    He  says: 

"  The  name  of  American,  which  belongs  to  you  in  your  na- 
tional capacity,  must  always  exalt  the  just  pride  of  patriotism 
more  than  any  appellation  derived  from  local  discriminations. 

"  You  have  improved  on  your  first  essay  [the  confederation], 
by  the  adoption  of  a  Constitution  of  Government,  better  calcu- 
lated than  your  former,*  for  an  intimate  Union,  and  for  the 
efiicacious  management  of  your  common  concerns."  - 

*  The  Confederation  was  a  temporary  government  formed  by  "a  league  of  friend- 
6h»p"  between  the  different  States.    It  gave  place  to  the  present  CJonstit-ution  m  1 T89. 
2 


i^ 


20 


PRACTICAL    ETHICS. 


WASHINGTON,    ON   DUTIES   TO  THE   NATION. 


21 


(c)  Of  allegiance  to  the  Xation,  as  formed  hy  one  people  in  d 
Union : 

He  says : 

"  It  is  of  infinite  moment  that  you  should  properly  estimate 
the  immense  value  of  your  National  Union,  to  your  collective 
and  individual  happiness ;  that  you  should  cherish  a  cordial, 
habitual,  and  immovable  attachment  to  it,  accustoming  your- 
selves to  think  and  speak  of  it,  as  of  the  palladium  of  your  po- 
litical safety  and  prosperity ;  watching  for  its  preservation  with 
jealous  anxiety ;  discountenancing  whatever  may  suggest  even 
a  suspicion  that  it  can,  in  any  event,  be  abandoned ;  and  indig- 
nantly frowning  upon  the  first  dawning  of  every  attempt  to 
.  alienate  any  portion  of  our  country  from  the  rest,  or  to  enfeeble 
the  sacred  ties  which  now  link  together  the  various  parts. 

"  For  this  you  have  every  inducement  of  sympathy  and  in 
terest.  • 

(d.)  Of  Loyalty  to  the  Supreme  and  Organic  Law,  the  Con- 
Btitution : 

He  says : 

"  This  government — the  offspring  of  our  own  choice,  unin- 
fluenced and  unawed,  adopted  upon  full  investigation  and  ma- 
ture deliberation,  completely  free  in  its  principles,  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  its  powers,  and  uniting  security  w^th  energy,  and 
containing  within  itself  a  provision  for  its  own  amendment — 
has  a  just  claim  to  your  confidence  and  you?'  support.  Respect 
for  its  authority,  compliance  with  its  laws,  acquiescence  in  its 
measures,  are  duties  enjoined  by  the  fundamental  maxims  of 
true  liberty. 

"  The  basis  of  our  political  systems  is  the  right  of  the  people 
to  make  and  to  alter  their  Constitutions  of  Government.  But 
the  Constitution  which  at  any  time  exists,  till  changed  by  an 
explicit  and  authentic  act  of  the  whole  people,  is  sacredly  obli- 
gatory upon  all." 

(e.)  Of  Obedience  to  the  Laws  :  he  says : 

The  Articles  of  Confederation  were  framed  in  1777,  but  not  accepted  till  1781.    Th« 
Constitution  is  "ordained  and  established"  bj  the  whole  people. 


"  The  very  idea  of  the  power  and  the  right  of  the  people  to 
establish  government,  presupposes  the  duty  of  every  indi- 
vidual to  obey  the  established  government.  All  obstructions  to 
the  execution  of  the  laws,  all  combinations  and  associations, 
under  whatever  plausible  character,  with  the  real  design  to  di- 
rect, control,  counteract,  or  awe  the  regular  deliberation  and 
action  of  the  constituted  authorities,  are  destructive  of  this  fun- 
damental principle,  and  of  fatal  tendency." 

(y*.)  Patriotism  is  rather  implied  in  every  sentence,  than  sep- 
arately inculcated. 

The  aims  of  Patriotism  are  given,  in  speaking  of  his  own 
wishes  for  the  country : 

He  says,  he  desires  • 

"  That  Heaven  may  continue  to  you  the  choicest  tokens  of  its 
beneficence ;  that  your  union  and  brotherly  affection  may  be 
perpetual;  that  the  free  Constitution,  which  is  the  work  of 
your  hands,  may  be  sacredly  maintained ;  that  its  administra- 
tion, in  every  department,  may  be  stamped  with  wisdom  and 
virtue  ;  that,  in  fine,  the  happiness  of  the  people  of  these  states, 
under  the  auspices  of  liberty,  may  be  made  complete." 

He  thus  refers  to  that  mass  of  public  good  (23)  which  makes 
patriotism  obligatory.     He  says: 

"  The  unity  of  Government,  which  constitutes  you  one  peo- 
ple, is  also  now  dear  to  you.  It  is  justly  so,  for  it  is  a  main 
pillar  in  the  edifice  of  your  real  independence ;  the  support  of 
your  tranquillity  at  home ;  your  peace  abroad ;  of  your  pros- 
perity ;  of  that  very  liberty  which  you  so  highly  prize. 

"  While  every  part  of  our  country  feels  an  immediate  inter- 
est in  Union,  all  the  parts  combined  cannot  fail  to  find,  in  the 
united  7nass  of  means  and  efforts^  greater  strength^  greater  re- 
source^ proportionably  greater  security  from  external  danger,  a 
less  frequent  interruption  of  their  peace  by  foreign  nations." 

He  states  the  duty  of  placing  the  affections  on  the  country : 

"  The  country  has  a  right  to  concentrate  your  affections^ 

ig.)  He  thus  refers  to  care  for  the  public  tranquillity :    . 

"What  is  of  inestimable  value,  they   [the  people]  must 


22 


PILiCTICAL   ETHICS. 


"WASHINGTON   AGAINST  FACTION:    INNOVATIONS. 


23 


Mi 


ix 


I 


V 


derive  from  Union  an  exemption  from  those  broils  and  wars  be- 
tween themselves,  which  so  frequently  afflict  neighboring  coun- 
tries, not  tied  together  by  tlie  same  government,  wliich  their 
own  rivalships  alone  would  be  sufficient  to  produce,  but  which 
opposite  foreign  alliances,  attachments,  and  intrigues  would 
stimulate  and  embitter." 

He  speaks  again  of  the  need  of  care  for  the  public  tranquillity, 
when  warning  against  the  evils  of  Faction.  (38,  and  {k)  in  ex- 
tracts from  the  Address.) 

"  The  alternate  domination  of  one  faction  over  another, 
sharpened  hi/the  sjdiit  of  revenge  natural  to  party  discussion^ 
w^hich,  in  different  ages  and  countries,  has  perpetrated  the 
most  fiorrid  enormities,  is  itself  a  frightful  despotism.  But  this 
leads,  at  length,  to  a  more  formal  and  permanent  despotism. 
The  disorders  and  misei'ies  which  result  gradually  incline  the 
minds  of  men  to  seek  security  and  repose  in  the  absolute  power 
of  an  individual." 

(A.)  He  warns  against  the  combined  vices  and  their  efforts, 
which  war  against  a  true  nationality  (36)  and  devotion  to  Union : 

"  From  different  causes,  and  from  different  quarters,  much 
pains  will  be  taken,  many  artifices  employed,  to  weaken  in  your 
minds  the  conviction  of  this  truth.  This  [Union]  is  the  point 
in  your  political  fortress  against  which  the  batteries  of  internal 
and  external  enemies  will  be  most  constantly  and  actively, 
though  often  covertly  and  insidiously,  directed." 

(«.)  Against  foreign  influence,  and  citizens  led  by  it  to  be  dis- 
loyal : 

"Against  the  insidious  wiles  of  foreign  influence,  I  conjure 
you  to  believe  me,  fellow-citizens,  the  jealousy  of  a  free  people 
ought  to  be  constantly  awake,  since  history  and  experience 
prove  that  foreign  influence  is  one  of  the  most  baneful  foes  of 
republican  government, 

"  Will  they  [the  people  of  one  section]  not  be  deaf  to  those 
advisers  who  would  sever  them  from  their  brethren,  and  connect 
them  with  aliens  f 

"A  passionate  attachment  for  another  nation  produces  a  va- 


riety of  evils."  "  It  gives  to  ambitious,  corrupteJ,  or  deluded 
citizens  facility  to  betray  or  sacrifice  the  interests  of  their  own. 
country,  without  odium,  sometimes  even  with  popularity — ^gild- 
ing with  the  appearance  of  a  virtuous  sense  of  obligation,  of  a 
commendable  deference  for  public  opinion,  or  of  a  laudable 
zeal  for  the  public  good,  the  base  or  foolish  compliances  of  am 
hition,  corruption,  or  infatuation^ 

(k.)  Against  the  common  arts  and  associations  of  the  agita- 
tor, the  seditious  fanatic,  the  demagogue,  and  the  libeller  of 
the  institutions  of  the  country : 

"  All  obstructions  to  the  execution  of  the  laws,  all  combina 
tions  and  associations,  under  whatever  plausible  character,  with 
the  real  design  to  direct,  control,  counteract,  or  overawe  the 
regular  deliberation  and  action  of  the  constituted  authorities, 
are  of  fatal  tendency.  They  serve  to  organize  faction,  to  give 
it  an  artificial  and  extraordinary  force ;  to  put  in  the  place  of 
the  delegated  will  of  the  nation,  the  will  of  a  party — often  a 
small  but  artful  and  enterprising  minority  of  the  community ; 
and,  according  to  the  alternate  triumphs  of  different  parties,  to 
make  the  public  administration  the  mirror  of  the  ill-concerted 
and  incongruous  projects  of  faction,  rather  than  the  organ  of 
consistent  and  wholesome  plans,  digested  by  common  counsels, 
and  modified  by  mutual  interests.  However  combinations  or 
associations  of  the  above  description  may  now  and  then  answer 
public  ends,  they  are  likely,  in  the  course  of  time  and  things, 
to  become  potent  engines  by  which  cunning,  ambitious,  and  un- 
principled men  will  be  enabled  to  subvert  the  power  of  the 
people,  and  to  usurp  for  themselves  the  reins  of  government ; 
destroying  afterward  the  very  engines  which  have  lifted  them  to 
unjust  dominion." 

(Z.)  Against  innovations  (37) : 

"  Toward  the  preservation  of  your  Government,  and  the  per- 
manen^y  of  your  present  happy  state,  it  is  requisite,  not  only 
that  you  steadily  discountenance  irregular  opposition  to  its 
acknowledged  authority,  but  also  that  you  resist  with  care  the 
spirit  of  innovation  upon  its  principles,  however  specious  the 


U;^ 


■."'•'( 


if  II  \ 


I 


24 


PKACnCAL  ETHICS. 


pretexts.  One  method  of  assault  may  be,  to  eifect  in  the  form 
of  the  Constitution  alterations  which  will  impair  the  energy 
of  the  system,  and  thus  to  undermine  what  cannot  be  directly 
overthrown.  In  all  the  changes  to  which  you  may  be  invited, 
remember  that  time  and  habit  are  at  least  as  necessary  to  fix 
the  true  character  of  governments,  as  of  other  human  institu- 
tions ;  that  experience  is  the  surest  standard  by  which  to  test 
the  real  tendency  of  the  existing  constitution  of  a  country ;  that 
facility  in  changes  upon  the  credit  of  mere  hypothesis  and 
opinion  exposes  to  perpetual  change,  from  the  endless  variety 
of  hypothesis  and  opinion." 
(m.)  Agamst  Faction  (38) : 

"  Let  me  warn  you,  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  against  the 
effects  of  the  spirit  of  party. 

"  This  spirit,  unfortunately,  is  inseparable  from  our  nature, 
having  its  root  in  the  strongest  passions  of  the  human  mind. 

"It  exists,  under  different  shapes,  under  all  governments, 
more  or  less  stifled,  controlled,  or  repressed.  But  in  those  of 
the  jpopular form  it  is  seen  in  its  greatest  ranhness^  and  is  truly 
their  worst  enemy. 

"  The  common  and  continual  mischiefs  of  the  spirit  of  party 
are  sufficient  to  make  it  the  intei-est  of  a  wise  people  to  dis- 
coura^ire  and  restrain  it. 

"It  serves  always  to  distract  the  public  councils,  and  en- 
feeble the  public  administration.  It  agitates  the  community 
with  ill-founded  jealousies  and  false  alarms ;  kindles  the  ani- 
mosity of  one  part  against  another ;  foments  occasionally  riot 
and  insurrection. 

"  It  opens  the  door  to  foreign  influence  and  corruption,  which 
find  a  facilitated  access  to  the  government  itself  through  the 
channels  of  party  passions.  Thus,  the  policy  and  will  of  one 
country  are  subjected  to  the  policy  and  will  of  another." 

He  shows  that  parties,  whether  inflamed  by  lust  for  power 
and  plunder,  or  by  religious  or  moral  fanaticism,  or,  which 
is  frequently  the  case,  by  both  motives  combined,  are  less 
dangerous  in  other  forms  of  government  than  in  those  of 


WASHINGTON:    DUTIES   OF  AUTHORmES. 


25 


the  popular  character,  and  on  this  fact,  founds  the  most  wise 
adsTice. 

"  There  is  an  opinion  that  parties,  in  free  countries,  are  useful 
checks  upon  the  administration  of  the  government,  and  serve  to 
keep  alive  the  spirit  of  liberty.  This,  within  certain  limits,  is 
probably  true ;  and  in  countries  of  a  monarchical  cast  Patriot- 
ism may  look  with  indulgence,  if  not  with  favor,  upon  the 
spirit  of  party. 

"  But  in  those  of  the  popular  character,  in  governments  purely 
elective,  it  is  a  spirit  not  to  be  encouraged. 

"  From  their  natural  tendency,  it  is  ceitain  there  will  always 
be  enough  of  that  spirit  for  every  salutary  purpose. 

"  There  being  constant  danger  of  excess,  the  effort  ought  to  be, 
by  force  of  public  opinion  to  mitigate  and  assuage  it.  Afire  not  to 
he  quenched^  it  demands  a  uniform  vigilance^  to  prevent  its  hurst- 
mg  into  afiame,  lest,  instead  of  warming,  it  shoidd  consmneP 

{n.)  Against  Sectionalism,  and  consequently  Statism. 

"  In  contemplating  the  causes  which  may  disturb  our  Union, 
it  occurs,  as  a  matter  of  serious  concern,  that  any  ground  should 
have  been  furnished  for  characterizing  parties  by  geographical 
discriminations,  Northern  and  Southern,  Atlantic  and  Western, 
;vhence  designing  men  may  endeavor  to  excite  a  belief  that 
there  is  a  real  difference  of  local  interests  and  views. 

"  One  of  the  expedients  of  party  to  acquire  influence  within 
particular  districts  is  to  misrepresent  the  opinions  and  aims  of 
other  districts.  You  cannot  shield  yourselves  too  much  against 
the  jealousies  and  heart-burnings  which  spring  from  these  mis- 
representations. They  tend  to  render  alien  to  each  other,  those 
who  ought  to  be  bound  together  by  fraternal  affection." 

(o.)  He  also  states  the  reciprocal  obligations  of  the  Nation  to 
its  members. 

"  It  is  important,  likewise,  that  the  habits  of  thinking,  in  a 
free  country,  should  inspire  caution  in  those  intrusted  with  its 
administration,  to  confine  themselves  within  their  respective 
constitutional  spheres;  avoiding  in  the  exercise  of  the  powers 
of  one  department,  to  encroach  upon  another. 


26 


PEACTICAL   ETUICS. 


OATHS  :    PARTIES  :    EFFECT. 


27 


I 


"  Tlie  spirit  of  encroachment  tends  to  consolidate  the  powers 
of  all  the  departments  in  one,  and  thus  to  create,  whatever  the 
form  of  government,  a  real  despotism. 

"A  just  estimate  of  that  love  of  power,  and  proneness  to 
abuse  it,  which  predominates  in  the  human  heart,  is  sufficient 
to  satisfy  us  of  the  truth  of  this  position. 

"  The  necessity  of  reciprocal  checks  in  the  exercise  of  politi- 
cal power,  by  dividing  and  distributing  it  into  diiferent  deposi- 
tories, and  constituting  each  the  guardian  of  the  public  weal 
against  invasions  by  the  others,  has  been  evinced  by  experi- 
ments, ancient  and  modem — some  of  them  in  our  country,  and 
under  our  eyes.  To  preserve  them  must  be  as  necessary  as 
to  institute  them. 

"  If,  in  the  opinion  of  the  people,  the  distribution  and  modi- 
fication of  the  powers  be  in  any  particular  wrong,  let  it  be  cor 
rected  in  the  way  the  Constitution  designates. 

"  But  let  there  be  no  change  by  usurpation ;  for  though  tliis^ 
in  one  instance,  may  be  the  insti^ument  of  good,  it  is  the  cus- 
tomary weapon  by  which  free  governments  are  destroyed. 

"  The  precedent  must  always  overbalance  in  permanent  evil 
any  partial  or  transient  benefit  which  the  use  can  at  any  time 
yield." 

The  duty  of  using  Force  for  the  support  of  Law,  and  against 
the  words  and  deeds  of  Faction  (39.  a),  is  also  mentioned  by  him 

He  says : 

"  Government,  indeed,  is  little  else  than  a  name^  where  it  is 
too  feeble  to  withstand  the  enterprises  of  faction^  to  confine 
each  member  of  the  society  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  the 
laws,  and  to  maintain  all  in  the  secure  and  tranquil  enjoyment 
of  the  rights  of  person  and  property." 

On  these  important  principles,  such  is  the  instruction  of 


Washington. 

These  subjects 
give  a  standard 
for  moral  pro- 
gress. 

progress. 


46.  In  looking  back  over  these  subjects  and 
their  principles,  the  reader  will  see  that  they  give 
him  a  standard  for  estimating  his  own  moral 


He  is  morally  higher  and  nobler,  in  proportion  as  he  can  for- 
get himself,  and  live  for  objects  greater  than  self.  The  more 
selfish  he  is,  the  meaner  is  he,  morally. 

47.  He  has  also  a  standard  by  which  he  can  A  standard,  al^, 
determine  what  kind  of  moral  principles  he  ^^^^'"-^^^^ 
should  welcome  to  his  mind,  and  what  he  should  earnestly  re- 
pel. He  should  welcome  those  which  teach  him  that  the  indi- 
vidual man  lives  for  the  common  good.  He  should  repel  those 
which  lift  the  individual  above  society;  the  single  state,  or  the 
section,  above  the  nation. 

^  After  advancing  in  the  course  of  which  the  present  instruc 
tion  IS  a  part,  he  will  see  that  theories  which  elevate  the  claims 
of  the  individual  above  those  of  society,  have  been  difi'used  in 
ancient  and  in  modern  times.     They  have  uniformly  produced 
public  disasters.    In  Cxreece,  in  the  time  of  Socrates,  the  sophists 
taught  them ;  and  Athens  was  so  demoralized  by  them,  as  to  be 
brought  to  the  verge  of  ruin.    In  France  they  were  taught,  and 
produced  the  excesses  of  the  great  Eevolution.    Other  countries 
could  be  named.    In  Eome,  on  the  other  hand,  the  uniform 
teaching  in  her  advancing  period  was,  that  the  individual  waa 
to  regard  himself  but  as  an  instrument  for  the  public  welfare. 
The  result  stands  forth  in  the  glories  and  successes  of  that- 
period. 

4a  We  now  pass  to  a  solemn  transaction,  in  which  God  and 
the  Fubhc  Authority  are  united  with  the  Individual. 

3.  The  Deptt  and  the  Public  in  the  Oath. 

49.  A  combination  of  divine  and  human  au-         oatt*    ' 
thority  appears  in  the  oath. 

In  an  oath  are  three  parties.  One  is  the  Deity,  Thepartie.. 
present,  beholding,  attesting,  receiving.  The  other  is  the  Pub- 
be  Authority,  to  which  He  ha^  transferred  a  portion  of  His 
Bovereiglity.  The  third  is  the  person  taking  the  oath.  In  an 
oath  of  promise,  the  two  latter  are  the  parties  contracting.  The 
former  is  the  guardian  of  the  contract. 


f?N 


28 


PEACnCAL  ETHICS. 


oaths:  rightfulness:  obligation. 


4017 


Beal  effect.  50.  An  oatli  does  not  necessarily  create  a  new 
obligation,  but  it  does  create  a  higher  degree  of  obligation.  Not 
only  is  the  degree  higher,  but  the  highest.  It  is  the  highest, 
because  there  is  no  other  obligation  \vhich  can  rise  above  it. 

Thus,  a  man  has  a  moral  obligation  to  tell  the  truth,  before 
he  takes,  in  a  Court  of  Justice,  an  oath  that  he  will  do  so.  A 
citizen  is  under  the  moral  obligation  of  allegiance  to  the  nation, 
before  taking  an  oath  of  allegiance.  He  is  bound  to  support 
the  Constitution,  before  he  vows  to  do  so,  when  entering  on 
some  public  office.  He  is  bound  to  execute  the  duties  of  an 
office  or  a  trust  faithfully,  before  he  takes  an  oath  that  he  will 
so  execute  them.  He  is  bound  to  do  justice,  before  he  takes 
an  oath  to  that  effect,  as  member  of  a  court-martial. 

But,  after  the  oath  is  taken,  the  will  is  bound.  There  is  no 
place  left  for  hesitation.  There  is  no  motive  known  to  man, 
of  hope  or  fear,  which  may  hinder  the  fulfilment  of  that  which 
has  been  vowed.  There  is  no  other  human  obligation  which 
can  annul  this  obligation  after  it  has  been  assumed. 

It  is  therefore  erroneous  and  criminal  for  a 
man  to  stifle  his  natural  sense  of  the  saci'edness 
and  awful ness  of  an  oath,  by  saying  that  the  moral  obligation 
existed  before,  and  that  hence  he  is  no  more  bound  than  be- 
fore. He  is  bound  as  he  was  not  before.  There  are  bonds 
within  his  conscience — attached  on  the  one  side  to  the  public, 
and  on  the  other  to  God — which  fix  his  will  to  one  course  of 
conduct,  and  one  only. 

Such  is  the  natural  and  intended  effect  within  the  mind. 

51.  T\\Q  purpose  of  the  oath  is  to  produce  that 
very  effect.  Oaths  have  been  established  to 
secnre  a  fixed  will  and  intention  in  the  person  taking  them 
to  do  certain  things  which  are  essential  for  human  welfare. 
They  also  aim  to  give  to  the  minds  of  other  men  repose  and 
security  in  the  confidence  that  these  essential  things  will  be 
done.  This  security  for  the  individual's  intention  and  for  the 
public  confidence,  is  sought  by  appealing  to  the  highest  motives 
of  which  man  is  conscious. 


Misconception 
opposed. 


Purpose  intended. 


Source. 


52.  Tlie  source  of  the  oath  is  in  the  public 
authority.      That,  as  the   guardian  of  human 
rights  and  interests,  looks  to  the  purpose  stated,  and  imposes 
it,  when  necessary,  for  that  purpose. 

53.  The  rightfulness  of  oaths  may  be  based  on 

several  reasons  by  Theology.  Leaving,  wholly,  ^^^"'^°®''- 
what  is  peculiar  to  that  science,  a  sufficient  proof  is  in  the 
common  consent  and  practice  of  mankind.  Oaths  have  been 
instituted  among  all  nations,  because  needed  by  all.  This 
authority,  the  collective  wisdom  of  men,  is  a  safer  guide  than 
the  abstract  speculations  of  some  solitary  theorist.  "  Where  is 
the  security  for  property,  for  reputation,  for  life,"  if  they  desert 
ns,  and  if  "the  sense  of  religious  obligation"  desert  them! 
This  fact,  that  men  have  seen  and  provided  for  this  necessity, 
sufficiently  vindicates  their  rightfulness. 

54.  Such  being  the  nature,  purpose,  and  au-  state  of  mind,  and 
thority  for  oaths,  the  state  of  mind  and  the  con-  iTlft^.  ^^'^^^' 
duct  which  they  demand  are  evident.  He  who  has  taken  an 
oath  to  do  certain  things,  should  preserve  in  his  mind  anxiety 
and  care,  the  most  scrupulous  and  incessant,  that  no  part  of 
his  promise  be  neglected.  The  state  of  his  mind  should  be 
that  of  fixed,  unswerving,  and  single  intention.  The  outward 
conduct  is  then  to  be  made  correspondent  to  this  intention. 

55.  As  to  the  time  during  which  this  obliga- 
tion remains,  that  depends  on  the  nature  and  ligStioJIndS-S" 
circumstances  of  the  oath  when  taken.  Some  oaths,  from  their 
nature,  impose  this  highest  degree  of  obligation  only  for  a  time. 
For  example,  when  a  man  is  called  to  testify  in  a  particular 
trial  in  court,  that  particular  obligation  imposed  on  him  when 
he  takes  the  oath, ceases  when  the  trial  is  concluded. 

But  others  impose  such  obligation  permanently.  They  do 
so  when  the  previous  moral  obligation  was  of  a  permanent 
character,  and  when  no  limiting  words  have  been  placed  in  the 
oath. 

^  ^  In  such  a  case,  the  obligation  remains  upon  a  man  in  all 
times  and  places,  indissoluble  but  by  death. 


> 


do 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


MILITAItY   oath:    EFFECT:    CONDUCT. 


31 


Moral  grade  of         ^^-  The  Violation  of  an  oatli  is  attended  with 
the  violation.        ^i,^  j^j^i^^^^  ^^^^^^  ^^  ^^^^^      j^  -^  perjurv. 

"Where  the  obligation  lias  been  made  permanent,  this  grade 
of  guilt  attaches  to  a  man  unceasingly,  so  long  as  it  is  neglected 
The  consideration  of  the  punishments  which  attend  it  does  not 
belong  to  the  present  course. 

The  Military  [^7.  The  nature  and  effect  of  the  oath  of  alle- 

^^  giance  and  obedience,  taken  on  becoming  a  mem- 

ber of  the  army  and  of  the  Military  Academy,  may  now  be 
seen  from  the  principles  which  have  been  stated. 

Same  principles         (^0  "^^^^  obligations  thus  assumed  are  of  the 
appUed.  jnost  sacred  character  (50). 

(b.)  Care  and  will  should  be  constantly  applied  for  its  fulfil- 
ment (54). 

(<?.)  The  highest  degree  of  guilt  is  incurred  by  its  viola- 
tion (56). 

{d,)  Any  neglect  of  it,  indifference  or  violation,  on  the  plea 
that  the  obligation  existed  previously,  is  guilt  without  justifica- 
tion. That  kind  and  degree  of  obligation  did  not  exist  previ- 
ously. If  oaths  but  left  a  man  in  his  obligations  as  before, 
society  would  not  impose  them  (53). 

whaT^i^t,prr^  (^-^  ^^  determining  the  permanence  of  effect 

manent.  from  the  oatli,  its  parts  must  be  separated. 

The  obligations  imposed  by  the  oath  are  military  and  non- 
military.     The  non-military  are  political  and  moral. 

AU  these,  separately  and  collectively,  are  permanently  bind- 
ing, so  long  as  a  man  remains  in  the  army. 

If  an  officer  resign,  and  his  resignation  be  accepted,  then  the 
military  vow  of  obedience  to  orders  is  suspended  by  separation 
from  the  military  body.  His  political  and  moral  obligations 
remain.  He  must  still  bear  true  faith  and  allegi.ince. 
OiiNi  aad  Ond-  The  politic4iJ  and  mond  obligatioitt  impo«od 
■••^  by  tlie  oatli,  with  its  attendant  cireTiin«tam)cs, 

pecnlfarly  on  the  Cadets  and  Gniduatc*  of  the  Military  A<»d- 
enij,  are  permanent.  TIkj  relation  eataMUhod  between  tJicm 
and  the  nation  U  ineffaceable  for  thcmj  except  bj  dcatb* 


This  is  shown  by  the  int<}ntion  of  the  Government.  And 
that  intention  fixes  the  interpretation  of  the  oath,  since  the 
settled  rule  is,  that  the  meaning  of  a  promise  shall  be  deter- 
mined by  the  ii^ntion  of  the  party  impomig  it 

The  intention  of  the  Government  in  educatin^r  ^  ,    ,. 

.        ,  o  Intention  of  the 

young  men  tor  its  service,  is  to  secure  not  only  Pfrty  imposing. 

military  skill,  but  a  body  of  men  separated  from  other  ties,  to 
belong  in  a  peculiar  manner  to  the  nation,  for  its  service  and 
interests  so  long  as  they  live. 

That  this  is  the  intention  is  not  only  known  from  history, 
but  is  evident  from  the  consideration  that  other  motives  for 
the  care  and  expenditure  do  not  exist.  Military  skill  could  be 
acquired  in  military  schools  established  by  individuals  or  by 
States.  Persons  coming  from  such  schools  could  pass  exami- 
nations and  obtain  commissions.  The  common  bond  of  Allegi- 
ance belongs  to  all  citizens.  It  could  not  have  been  the  objec^t 
to  secure  what  was  already  secured.  But  in  a  bod  y  of  educated 
and  well-tried  men,  ftill  of  intelligent,  and  devoted  loy.ilty  and 
patriotism,  ready  to  serve  the  country  zealously  in  war  or 
peace,  in  the  anny  or  in  civil  life,  there  is  an  objc^-t  worthy  of 
the  meanK,  and  not  to  b(^  s( cured  so  well  by  other  ways. 

Suc^h  nppears  to  ])o  the  intt^ition  of  the  party  impoBing  the 
oath,  and  this  lixcs  its  construction. 

The  persons  named  may  accordingly  be  considered  as  be- 
longing to  the  nation  in  a  peculiar  nianiKT,  as  a  child  adopted 
belongs  to  the  person  or  family  adopting.  Ev^ry  bond  hostile 
to  the  obligation  must  \m  considered  as  permanently  severed. 

(/)  The  conduot  demanded  by  the  obhV.ution  .«v 

•  _.!..  •'  n         "   BnoMqnont  Goa- 

ls eviucnt.   A  certain  amount  of  military  wtTvice  *^<^^  domandoa, 

is  imposed   by  promise   an<l   due   by    justice.      li.>.Klgrmtion 

Bhould  not  be  offered  without  th«  most  ^veigllt7  eonsideratioiis 

8ucli  as  it  U  kuowii  wiU  be  witirfactorj  to  the  public  autliority, 

nor  slionld  the  nwignation  be  reganJcxl  as  more  than  proposed 

till  It  has  been  officially  acceptwi.    ileix:ly  to  scDd  a  raigoa 

tion,  und  act  at  once  as  if  wparatlon  trcre  oonsammafwl,  \^  not 

only  a  grave  mih'tan-  oflTence,  but  a  moral  one. 


32 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


In  war; 


In  peace. 


"No  power  can  release  a  man  but  the  Government  itself. 
When  the  resignation  is  accepted,  the  moral  effect  on  a 
graduate  is  to  suspend  the  exercise  of  certain  military  func- 
tions, but  not  to  sever  the  indissoluble  bond  which  has  been 
formed. 

So  soon  as  he  is  needed  again  for  the  public 
defence,  he  is  bound  to  re-enter  the  service. 

While  out  of  it,  he  is  never  to  forget  the  claims 
of  the  nation  oij  his  affections,  and,  when  needed, 
on  his  influence  and  his  efforts  for  averting  public  dangers  or 
promoting  public  welfare.  He  has  been  severed  from  other 
ties  that  tliis  may  be  single  and  supreme. 

Any  want  of  proper  zeal  for  the  national  welfare  or  honor, 
when  occasions  demand  it  in  word  or  deed,  is  culpable.  Any 
direct  action  against  the  nation,  has  not  only  the  guilt  which 
attaches  to  such  conduct  in  any  citizen — which  may  be  that  of 
sedition,  conspiracy,  rebellion,  or  treason,  according  to  circum- 
stances— but  that  deeper  turj)itude  which  comes  from  an  oath 
violated,  and  from  those  moral  claims  of  the  adopting  country, 
which  have  been  disregarded.*] 

Here  terminates  the  subject  of  duties  pertaining  to  that 
organized  body  called  the  nation. 


4.  The  Family. 
Parental  AuTnoKmr,  and  that  resembling  the  Parental. 


The  Family :  An- 
thority  in  it. 


Duties  to  that 
authority. 


(a.)  Parental  AuTHORnr. 

58.  The  next  organization  established  by  the 
Creator  among  men  is  that  of  the  family.  The 
authority  existing  there  is  parental. 

59.  Duties  to  that  authority,  demanded  from 
children  to  their  parents  are  those  of  Honor, 


♦  "  It  is  their  country's  voice  whose  claim  should  meet 
An  echo  in  the  soul's  most  deep  retreat, 
Along  the  heaft's  responding  chords  should  run, 
Mr  let  a  tone  there  vibrate  but  the  one." — Moobb. 


duties  to  and  from  parents. 


33 


.     Obedience,  DociLrrr.     The  opposed  faults  are  those  of  Dis  ^ 
respect,  Disobedience,  Wilfulness. 

Honor  is  obligatory  during  life.    "  Honor  thy  father  and  thy 
mother."   Obedience,  with  the  accompanying  disposition  of  do 
cility,  is  demanded  till  the  child  is  of  age,  and  released  from  pa- 
rental authority. 

In  regard  to  the  extent  of  obedience,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
suppose  extreme  cases  which  can  seldom  occur.  The  divine 
rule  is,  "Children,  obey  your  parents  in  all  things;  for  this  is 
well  pleasing  unto  the  LordP 

Individualism  gives  the  contrasted  rule.  "  If  a  child  think 
the  parent's  commands  not  right,  he  is  bound  to  disobey."  The 
mere  statement  of  the  latter  rule  is  sufficient  to  show  its  enor- 
mity. 

While  these  duties  belong  to  both  parents,  there  is  a  special 
tenderness  which  is  due,  according  to  the  common  sentiment  of 
mankind,  from  the  son  to  the  mother.  "  The  Lord  hath  con- 
firmed the  authority  of  the  mother  over  the  sons"  by  a  peculiar 
instinct, which  every  man  must  feel,  unless  he  is  brutalized. 

The  child  is  also  bound  to  support  the  parent  when  nec- 
essary. 

60.  Duties  from  that   authority,   demanded 

from  parents  to  children,  are  those  of  Mainte-  ^^"^^^  .?^°^  *^^* 

-_  Authority. 

NANCE,  J^ducation;  care  for  their  happiness. 

61.  The  neglect  of  duties  on  the  one  side  does 

Eot  absolve  from  obligations  on  the  other.     Nei-  Violation  by  one 
ther  Society  nor  the  family  are  made  by  a  con-  fe'^e^toti'e^.''' 
tract,  but  by  the  ordaining  of  the  Deity.    In 
both,  "  The  powers  that  he  are  ordained  of  GodP 

62.  The  children  and  parents  of  one  family  are 

bound  to  co-operate  together  for  common  family  ^°°^'°  *^' 
good.     Self  is  to  be  subordinated  in  the  family,  as  it  is  in  the 
nation,  to  the  weal  of  the  whole.     LTnder  good  are  included 
beta  daily  enjoyment  and  permanent  welfare. 

63.  The   magnitude   of  these  obligations   is 

great.     If  duties  in  the  family  are  well  done    ^^^^  ®^  *^®s® 
^1  .11  n  .  '  duties, 

cniidren  well   tramed,  parents   duly  honored, 


mm 


S4 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


obeyed  and  loved,  the  good  effects  are  found  in  every  depart- 
ment of  Society.  If  those  duties  are  neglected,  vast  evils  per- 
vade the  whole  community,  such  as  may  bring  it  to  ruin. 

From  the  importance  of  these  duties,  the  divine  command- 
ment enjoining  them  is  named  "  the  first  commandment  with 
promise."  The  promise  is  that  of  permanence  of  welfare 
when  the  command  is  kept. 

Other  particulars  on  this  subject,  and  on  the  similar  domestic 
relations  of  servant  and  master,  are  left  to  theology. 
Ancestors.  ^"^^  ^^^  obligation  similar  in  kind,  but  not  in 

degree,  extends  to  ancestors.  They  are  to  be 
honored  and  remembered  in  the  line  of  the  family,  without  re- 
ference to  their  social  rank  and  position.  The  effect  from  the 
fulfilment  of  tliis  duty  is  most  salutary.  Few  men  can  hope  to 
live  in  the  memory  of  the  public.  But  by  the  observance  of 
this,  a  man  may  look  to  live  in  the  memory  of  his  line.  This  ex- 
pectation will  be  a  spur  to  a  good  life,  and  a  check  in  tempta- 
tion. 

„  ..  ,    .       ^         ^'5.  Taking  now  in  one  view,  duties  to  the  na- 
Umted  view  of        .  ^  ' 

duties  to  the        tion  and  to  the  family,  the  proper  estimate  of 
family.'    ^       ^  them  both  is  determined  by  one  simple  fact: 

I^ach  individual  was  lorn  under  them,  lie  did 
not  make  them  by  any  act  or  word  of  his  own,  but  he  found 
them.     This  fact  settles  these  principles : 

1.  Theauthorittjof  Goveymmentandthatinthe 
setS^^  ^  fa^nily  are  ordained  of  God.  If  no  individu- 
al man  made  them,  and  each  man  found  them 
made  for  him,  they  come  from  the  Author  of  Nature.  What 
kind  of  parents,  and  what  kind  of  government  each  shall 
be  born  under,  may  depend  partly  on  human  will.  But  that  he 
shall  belong  to  some  family,  under  some  government,  is  the  will 
of  the  Creator.  Hence,  to  resist  such  authority  is  to  resist  the 
ordinance  of  God. 

2.  Human  rights  and  duties  Monging  to  the  individual  are 
subordinate  to  these.  These  existed  hefore  the  individual  was 
conscious  of  them.     lie  found  them  above  him.     Hence  they 


DUTIES   TO   EDUCATIONAL   AUTHORITY. 


35 


Error  removed. 


are  lefore  and  above  individual  obligations,  which  are  merely 
human. 

The  same  fact  removes  a  common  error.    It  is 
that  which  exaggerates  the  importance  of  the  in- 
dividual to  the  prejudice  of  the  rights  of  the  parent,  as  well 
as  of  Society. 

J  (b.)  Educational  Authoefty. 

^Q,  For  purposes  of  Education,  parental  au-  Authority  trans- 
thority  is  transferred  to  other  persons,  for  certain  tioT"^  ^''  ^^^'*" 
times,  and  within  certain  localities.  As  the  Deity  transfers  a 
portion  of  his  authority  to  the  nation,  and  to  the  head  of  the 
family,  so  may  those  who  receive  it  transfer  it,  for  good  pur- 
poses, to  others.  One  form  of  authority  thus  established  is  edu- 
cational.     It  may  exist  in  a  man,  or  in  a  body  of  men. 

67.  The  person  or  authorities  educatini?,  thus  r*    , 

,    „  ,  "^  place  and 

Stand  tor  the  time  in  the  place  of  the  parent,  "&^ts. 

and  with  reference  to  the  purposes  of  education,  represent  him. 
The  relation  to  the  pupil,  is  that  of  the  superior  to  the  inferior. 

68.  The  general  duties  to  educational  author-  ^  ,.       ,  ,   , 

.,  Duties  and  faults 

ity  are,  consequently,  similar  to  those  due  to  regarding  it. 

parents.  They  are  those  of  Honor,  Obedience,  Docility.  The 
opposed  faults  are  those  of  Disrespect,  Disobedience,  Wilful- 
ness. 

^These  duties  belong  to  the  authority  and  the  office,  indepen- 
dently  of  personal  feelings. 

69.  There   are  special  obligations  resulting  ^  .  , 
/.          ,  -^  o  to  Special 

irom  the  pmposes  and  means  for  education.  The  obligation. 
purpose  is  the  improvement  of  the  pupil,  by  acquisitions  in 
learning,  through  which  his  welfare  will  be  promoted,  the 
offices  of  life  will  be  performed,  and  the  demands  of  society  for 
capacity  and  acquirements  in  its  members,  may  be  met.  Hence, 
a  special  duty  for  the  pupil  is,  to  have  a  good  will  for  Leaen- 
ING,  and,  also,  Diligence.  The  opposed  faults  are  Indiffer- 
ence and  Idleness. 

He  is  to  desire  earnestly  his  own  improvement,  the  dieci- 


36* 


PRACTICAL   ETUICS. 


DUTIES  TO  AND   FKOM   VOCATIONAL   AUTHORITY. 


37 


Duties  from  it. 


pline  of  liis  faculties,  and  the  possession  of  the  various  branches 
of  learning  included  in  his  education.  He  is  to  look  constantly 
to  the  future^  with  the  sentiment  that  every  neglect  and  omis- 
sion in  the  spring-time  of  his  life  will  leave  deficiencies  which 
must  be  felt  afterward. 

He  must  avoid  all  waste  of  time. 

Among  means  for  education  are  a  fixed  order  and  certain 
rules.  These  form  the  Constitution  and  Laws  for  that  smaller 
community,  the  School.  The  duty  demanded  by  them  is  that 
of  willing  Obedience.  The  opposed  fault  is  Insubordination. 
Also,  several  learners  are  together  for  a  common  purpose.  The 
obligation  imposed  by  this  fact  is  that  of  Co-operation.  The 
contrasted  fiiult  is  that  of  Ilindrance,  whether  of  the  studies 
of  all,  or  of  any  one. 

70.  The  duties  from  that  authority  are  those 
of  Zeal,  Diligence,  and  Justice. 

Violation  on  one      '^^'  Violation  of  duties  on  the  one  side  does 

side  does  not  re-  not  release  from  obligation  on  the  other.  AVhile 
lease  on  the  other.     ,  .     ,  .  ,       ,      .       , 

the  relation  continues,  the  duties  demanded  by  it 

are  to  be  performed.  The  pupil  is  never  to  forget  the  obliga- 
tions due  to  the  office,  even  when  he  suffers  in  his  feelings 
under  injustice,  whether  real  or  supposed. 

(<?.)  Authority,  Educational  and  Vocational. 

Anthority  that  .  ^^'  ^^'^"^  ^^®  purpose  is  not  general  educa- 
trains  for  a  vo-     tion,  but  training  for  the  avocation  which  is  to 

be  followed  through  life,  the  authority  then  ex- 
isting is  vocational.  Apprentices,  clerks,  students  of  the  learned 
professions,  under  their  respective  masters,  or  collections  of 
young  men  in  institutions  for  any  kind  of  professional  training, 
are  examples  of  subjection  to  vocational  authority. 
Eeiation  and  '^^^'  "^^^  relation  is  similar  to  the  last.     The 

fh'ile'of 'Si^Edu^  general  duties  and  the  faults  on  both  sides  are 
caUon.  also   similar.     A  young  man  is  guilty  of  most 

Dnty  to  make       culpable  neglect  who  does  not  use  all  possible 

professional ac-        -,.,.  .  •        i  •         ix.  •      .i       i      . 

^uirements.  diligence  m  preparing  himself  m  the  best  man- 


ner for  his  future  vocation.  If  he  enter  on  his  life's  employ- 
ment unprepared  for  its  duties,  what  is  before  him  but  failure 
for  himself,  or  suffering  for  others,  through  his  unskilfulness  ? 
Those  who  have  young  men  in  training  are  sacredly  bound 
to  see  that  the  latter  do  not  begin  their  vocations  without 
being  fitted  to  perform  well  the  duties  to  which  they  will  be 
called. 

74.  [There  are  special  duties  under  this  head  Military  charac- 
for  those  in  training  for  the  military  profession,  attentfon't^o' 

in  an  institution  of  learning.     They  are  bound  regulations, 
to  the  most  strict  attention  to  regulations.     They  are  not 
only  bound  to  this,  as  all  others  under  such  regulations  would 
be,  but  peculiarly,  since  that  strictness  of  attention  is  essential 
for  forming  the  military  character.] 

75.  The  importance  of  these  duties  belonging  j^ponanceof 
to  both   educational  and  vocational  authority    educational  and 

1  1.  J  •         •  1  vocational 

can  be  seen  by  estimating  the  consequences  if  preparation, 
they  are  neglected.  Society  will  be  filled  with  men  untaught 
in  what  they  ought  to  know.  Life  will  be  lost  through  an 
ignorant  physician :  property  and  reputation  by  an  unskilled 
lawyer.  Defeat,  disaster,  and  waste  of  life  among  valuable 
ofticers  and  men  will  result  from  the  mistakes  and  ignorance 
of  some  one  unfit  for  military  command.  The  importance  is 
thus  evident  of  the  duties  that  have  been  named,  and  the 
criminality  of  neglect,  in  the  time  of  education  and  training. 
"  The  multitude  of  the  wise  is  the  welfare  of  the  world." 

5.  The  Yocation  Itself. 

76.    After  the  vocation   has   been   entered,  it  Virtues  in  the 
demands  duties  in  and  to  it.  ^^^^xi^n ; 

The  virtue  it  requires  is  Assiduity.  A  man  must  be  sedu- 
lous, both  to  execute  with  faithfulness^  the  separate  duties  of 
his  profession  as  they  arise,  and  also  to  secure  constant  profes- 
sional improvement.  The  opposed  faults  consist  in  being  pro- 
fessionally negligent,  or  unprogressive. 

[".ISTeglect  of  professional  duty,"  is  a  grave  military  offence.] 


^' 


38 


X 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


6.  The  Past. 


EESPECT   FOE  THE   PAST. 


39 


and  in  it  to  tli« 
past. 


r 


'7.  The  knowledge  requisite  for  every  profes. 
sion  has  come  from  the  past.  It  is  by  an  or- 
der fixed  in  nature,  that  tlie  generations  wliich  precede,  in- 
struct those  that  follow.  There  is  hence  a  respect  for  the 
collective  wisdom  of  past  generations,  incumbent  on  every 
man  in  his  profession  and  place,  as  well  as  in  all  his  opinions. 
Conservatism.  The  virtue  thus  demanded  is  Conservatism. 
^  It  is  also  according  to  the  same  natural  order,  that  each 
living  generation  shall,  during  its  existence,  add  its  own  dis- 
coveries and  improvements  for  the  advancements  which  knowl- 
^'^»^«"-  edge  merely  human,  must  require.     Tlie  action 

thus  demanded  is  that  of  Prookess.  Conservatism  and  Pro- 
gress, should  be  united,  and  temper  each  the  other.  Progress 
should  ever  be  conservative,  and  conservatism  temperately 
progressive.  There  is  a  combined  duty  in  the  present,  to  the 
past  and  the  future. 
Opposed  Against  these  wedded  vu-tues,  stands,  as  one 

Extremes.  .  t  i  -i. 

extreme,  Immobility,  from  an  excessive  regard  to 
antiquity  ;  and,  as  the  other,  Rash  Innovation,  from  an  ex- 
travagant desire  for  novelty. 

78.  Such  are  duties  connected  with  a  man's  vocation,  and 
with  the  past. 

^UVell^  ^^^^'^  '^''^^  ^^^^"S  to  the  same  head  with 
vidnai.  those  to  God,  the  public,  and  the  family.     They 

are  before  and  above  the  individual. 

s^'oS^Jranr^^^^^^  The  duties  to  a  man's  vocation  are  duties  to 
is  above  him;  Society,  and,  througli  that,  to  God.  They  pro- 
mote the  welfare  of  the  world.  Thus,  they  are  duties  to 
society.  Tlio  Deity  h  tlie  guardian  of  the  norld'd  welfare. 
Tims  they  are  retiiotcly,  duties  to  iiiiiK 

^^^^^X    'V*^  ^^''  *^'  ^^  ^^"^"^  ^  ^^^  "»«»«t  the  col 

ftbOT« 


leciWe  wisdom  of  past  ag^  is  an  unthority  ^bore 
that  of  the  opinions  of  an  individual.    A?  God,  the  nation,  and 


the  family  existed  before  him,  so  did  the  past.  The  nation  and 
the  family  are  autliorities  organized.  The  past  is  authority, 
not  organized.  But  both,  by  the  order  of  nature,  are  authority! 
They  are  guides  and  guardians  for  the  individual. 

79.  It  is  an  incumbent  duty  therefore  on  all  Resaitin^  duty 
persons,  but  especially  on  young  men,  to  check  ^""^  ^""^^  "'"''* 
.  the  natural  tendency  for  attacking  and  opposing  whatever  is 
found  to  be  existing  and  sanctioned  by  time.  Fault-finding  is 
among  the  easiest  of  human  employments.  For  some,  it  is  one 
of  tlie  most  agreeable.  It  can  never  be  just,  however,  till  he 
who  indulges  in  it  can  show  that  he  has  both  the  wisdom  for 
devising,  and  the  skill  for  establishing  something,  which,  in  its 
continmd j^ractical  worhmg,  would  be  found  better. 

^  80.  Here  terminates  the  subject  of  duties  above  the  indi- 
vidual.     We  proceed  to  those  witliin  him. 

A  view  of  both,  and  in  their  due  proportions,  is  Transition  by  the 
given  by  Lord  Bacon.    The  extract  from  him  will  Bacot'""^  '^ 
furnish  a  fitting  transition  from  the  one  subject  to  the  other. 

"  There  is  formed  in  every  thing  a  double  nature  of  good,  the 
one  as  every  thing  is  a  total  or  substantive  in  itself,  the  other 
as  it  is  a  part  or  w^emher  of  a  greater  hochj  ;  whereof  the  latter 
is  the  greater  and  the  worthier,  because  it  tendeth  to  the  con- 
servation  of  what  is  more  general.  Therefore  we  see  the  iron 
in  particular  sympathy  moveth  to  the  lodestone,  but  yet  if  it 
exceed  a  certain  quantity,  it  forsaketh  the  aifection  to  the  lode- 
stone,  and  like  a  good  patriot  moveth  to  the  earth,  which  is  the 
region  and  country  of  massy  bodies.  This  douUe  nature  of 
good,  .  .  .  .  i^  much  more  engraven  upon  man,  if  he 
degenerate  not,  unto  whom  the  conservation  of  duty  to  the 

PUBLIC  OUGHT  TO  BE  MUCH  MORE  PRECIOUS  THAN    THE    CONSERV- 
ATION OF  LITE  AND  BKING."* 


•  fi»«a    AdrasKMoent  oT  L«kn»r.jf. 


40 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


Duties  to  self. 


Why  placed 
here. 


CHAPTER     III. 

VIRTUES    WHICH    REGARD    SELF. 
DUTIES    WITHIN    US. 

1.  The  Virtues  wliich  are  second  in  order  are 
those  whieli  pertain  to  one's  self. 
^  They  occupy  this  position  because  tliej  result 
from  those  virtues  which  have  preceded  them, 
and  direct  those  which  are  to  follow  them. 

Each  human  being  is,  first  of  all,  to  love  God  and  the  pub- 
lie  good  more  than  self.  He  is,  then,  subordinatelj  to  love 
himself,  as  an  instrument  for  virtues  and  for  deeds  that  are 
good,  and  that  do  good.  He  is  then  to  love  individual  per- 
sons as  himself,  extending  to  them  the  same  chastened  and 
ennobled  affection  which  he  has  learned  to  apply  to  his  indi- 
vidual being.  The  first  of  these  duties  is  a  foundation  for  the 
second,  and  the  second  for  the  third. 

Hence,  Duties  and  Virtues  belonging  to  ourselves  form  the 
subject  next  in  order. 

Fundamental  2.  These  duties  and  virtues  have  a  fundamen- 

^^"-  tal  rule. 

We  are  to  love  and  revere  ourselves,  as  existing  for 

ENDS  greater  THAN  OURSELVES,  WHICH  ENDS  ARE  TO  BE  AT- 
TAINED THROUGH  VIRTUES  POSSESSED,  AND  THROUGH  GOOD  DEEDS 
PERFORMED. 

Duties  to  self  may  be  thus  divided  :   1.  They 
belong,  to  the  whole  person ;    or  2.   To  t/dngs 
(as  distinguished  from  persons)  con7iected  with  him. 

^  Those  to  the  whole  person  belong  to  the  whole 
life^  or  the  whole  nature. 


Division. 


Subdivision. 


QQ 

S3 

o 

a 
t^ 

03 

(—1 

w 

I— I 


m 


m 


42 


H 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Duty  to  the 
whole  life. 


1.  Duty  Eegaeding  the  Whole  Life. 

3.  The  obligation  belonging  to  the  whole  life 
applies—l.   To  the  purpose  of  life ;    2.  To  the 
virtues  required  for  tliat  purpose. 

Enle  for  the  end.       ^^'^  ^^"^  *^'^  P'^frpose  of  life,  the  dutj  may  be 

expressed  in  this  rule :  ITave  one  good  and  great 
aim  :  Devote  life  to  attaining  it. 

ctble^'lXntt  ^-  .^-^^'^  ^""^  V^o^o^^^  should  bo  nothing  im- 
geous',  satisfac-  practicable  or  chimerical,  but  one  which  can  be 
^°^-  gained  by  the  person  proposing  it.     It  should 

also  bestow  benefit,  and  at  all  times  give  the  mind  satisfaction. 
The  qualities  required  for  the  supreme  end  are  thus  manifest. 
It  should  be  practicable,  advantageous,  satisfactory. 
Highest,  left  to        ^-  Eternal  life,  the  highest  end,  is  considered 
Theology.  ^^  Eeligion,  and  is  left  to  that  divine  science, 

within  whose  province  it  belono-s 

Common  end.  ^'  Accordingly,  each  human  being  should  %x 

his  will  through  life  on  what  he  wishes  to  be, 
rather  than  on  what  he  wishes  to  do  or  to  ^have.    His  aim 
should  be  to  become  continually  letter  and  wiser. 
Why  good.  .    (*^*)  '^^^^  '"^^  practicalle  for  every  person,    {h.)  It 

is  advantageous;  since  success  in  life  depends 
on  the  possession  of  the  qualities  for  success.  All  which  one 
can  have,  and  all  which  he  is  fitted  to  do,  must  come  from 
what  he  is.  {c.)  It  is  satisfying.  The  satisfaction  from  doinc. 
right,  all  men  know.  That  from  learning,  is  among  the  mos^t 
refining  of  human  pleasures. 

[A  taste  for  science,  literature,  and  art  is  important  in  the 
military  profession.  The  duties  of  that  profession  at  times 
concentrate,  but  usually  have  unoccupied  intervals.  Without 
eome  refining  taste,  those  intervals  may  be  given  to  vices  that 
degrade  the  man,  and  injure  the  service.  But  where  there  is 
a  fondness  for  intellectual  pursuits,  there  is  a  pleasant  employ- 
ment,  not  only  gratifying  the  person  more  than  any  dissipa- 


FOR  whole  life:  a  great  aim  permanent. 


43 


Can  be  Heroic. 


tions  could  do,  but  fitting  him  to  bestow  benefits  on  his  pro- 
fession or  his  country.  A  love  of  learning  for  its  own  sake, 
should  therefore  be  cultivated.  The  words,  "Literature, 
Science,  and  Art,"  in  the  diploma,  may  be  considered  a  moni-' 
tion  to  those  who  receive  it,  that  they  should  continue  the  cul- 
tivation which  has  been  commenced.] 

T.  But  while  the  aim  should  be  thus  practical, 
and  not  unsuitable,  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  it 
from  being  grand  and  heroic.  In  w^der  to  live  with  great  aspira- 
tions,  one  may  rightly  conceive  the  most  noble  actions  in  war, 
in  public  services,  in  domestic  life,  in  the  offices  of  charity  or 
friendship,  with  a  wish  and  willingness  to  perform  them  him- 
self, if  circumstances  demanding  them  from  him  should  arise. 
These  aspirations  are  a  part  of  moral  cultivation.  We  are 
always  better  for  them.  The  forming  of  them  in  youth  seems 
intended  as  part  of  the  order  of  nature. 

When  any  one  keeps  before  his  mind  the  image  of  what  he 
wishes  to  he,  that  image  forms  a  beautiful  ideal  to  which  he 
desires  to  give  reality.  He  covets  this  more  than  any  interest 
for  him.  Such  a  state  of  mind  makes  life  a  constant  aspira- 
tion. It  tends  to  form  heroes  and  heroic  men,  and  is  the 
foundation  for  heroic  virtues. 

The  testimony  of  Lord  Bacon  on  this  subject     Authority  of 
is  valuable.  •  ^'^  ^^"°^- 

"  Of  all  other  means  the  most  compendious  and  summary  ; 
and  again  the  most  noble  and  effectual  for  the  reducing  of  the 
mind  unto  virtue  and  good  estate  is  this ;  the  electing  and  pro- 
pounding  unto  a  man's  self  good  and  virtuous  ends  of  his 
life,  such  as  may  he  in  a  reasonable  sort  within  his  compass  to 
attain.  For  if  these  two  things  be  supposed,  that  a  man  set 
before  him  honest  and  good  ends,  and  again  that  he  be  reso- 
lute, constant,  and  true  unto  them,  it  will  follow  that  he  shall 
mould  himself  into  all  virtue  at  once." 

Such  is  the  duty  relative  to  the  purpose  of  life. 
8.  (2)  The  Virtues  required  for  that  purpose  are  common 
or  heroic. 


44 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


lilii 


^ 


^^;:5' 


Tn^o'lJfp^:        '^^  ^^^^^^  Virtues  are  those  which  com- 
potie.  monly  keep  the  reason  and  the  will  fixed  on  the 

purpose  of  life.    They  are  two :  Practical  Wisdom  and  Eeso- 
lution. 

Wisdom.    '         .    '^^^  ^^^*"®  ^^^^^^^  fix^s  the  reason  on  the  end, 

is  called  in  Scripture,  Wisdom,  and  the  opposed 
vice,  Folly.  Practical  wisdom  is  accordingly  the  constant 
appreciation  by  the  mind  of  the  supreme  end.  Folly  (as  the 
term  is  used  in  morals)  is  the  reverse.  It  is  forgetting  the 
end  of  life,  in  life's  daily  circumstances.  Accordingly^  the 
divine  rule  is,  "  Get  wisdom." 

Ecsointion.         .    ^'^  "^''^"^  ^^^^^  ^^^ps  the  will  on  that  end 

is  Ptesolution.  The  will  for  good  ends  must  be 
constant.  Fluctuation  and  inconstancy  form  the  opposed 
lault— irresolution  for  what  is  good  and  great. 

Resolution  being  a  constant  virtue,  will  not  only  set  the 
will  on  the  great  end  of  life,  but  on  the  separate  actions  of 
each  day.  These  are  ordered  with  relation  to  the  chosen  pur- 
pose. The  will  should  be  fixed  to  make  every  action  perfect 
as  possible,  and  suitable  to  the  end  intended.  "Whatsoever 
thou  takest  in  hand,  remember  the  end,  and  thou  shalt  never 
do  amiss."* 

9    Heroic  virtues  are  those  which  fix  the  reason  and  will 
with  nneommon  intensity  on  the  noblest  purposes  of  existence. 

iiistinotion  of  TT/^«  •         •  ^  i./v. 

Heroic  from  Com-      ^^^^^^  Virtues  differ  from  those  which   are 
mon  Virtues.        common  rather  in  degree  than  in  kind.     They 
are  the  common  virtues  carried  to  the  highest  grades.     Exam- 
pes  of  them  are  in  men  of  extraordinary  virtue,  and  capacity, 
situated  in  great  circumstances,  such  as  the  martyrs,  saints 
warriors,  statesmen,  legislators,  who  have  the  brightest  names 
in  history  as  public  benefactors.     To  understand  these  virtues 
we  should  consider  what  circumstances  carry  the  common 
virtues  to  the  highest  grade,  and  what  names  are  given  to  the 
virtues  when  these  circumstances  unite. 


HEROIC  virtues:  duty  to  the  whole  nature. 
The  circumstances  are  the  followinor : 


45 


Virtues  belonging  to  the  whole  life  have  a  ^en  common 
higher  degree  of  nobleness  when  they  act  for  no  virtues  axe  high- 
eartbly  reward ;  and  one  still  higher  when  their        ^  ^'^  ** 
exercise  demands  great  personal  sacrifice  and  suff*ering,  or  the 
serene  daily  endurance  of  petty  annoyances  and  iiTitations. 
They  are  also  greater  and  nobler  in  proportion  as  they  act 
with  undiminished  energy  through  a  longer  time.     When  all 
these  circumstances  unite,  there  is  the  highest  moral  grade. 
All  were  united  in  the  career  of  Washington. 
He  had  a  great  aim.     He  sought  no  reward.       ^^*°^Pi®- 
He  endured  with  patience.      He  pursued  his  purpose  with 
perseverance.* 

Heroic  virtues  thus  formed  receive  the  names  ^liree  heroic 
of  Magnanbiity,  Equanimity,  Longanimity.  ^dT '"^  ^^'' 
Magnanimity  implies  that  the  soul  is  habitually  set  on  what 
is  morally  great;  Equanimity,  that  it  pursues  that  object 
equally  through  trials  of  the  feelings ;  Longanimity,  that  it  so 
acts  through  a  long  period.  There  is  a  disregard  by  magna- 
nimity of  objects  unimportant ;  by  equanimity,  of  agitations  of 
feeling ;  by  longanimity,  of  the  weakening  influences  of  time. 
Tlie  three  are  essential  for  a  true  hero.  For  example,  they  are 
needed  in  long  sieges,  and  retreats. 

Such  are  the  moral  principles  belonging  to  the     Transition, 
whole  life.     Those  are  next  in    order  which   pertain   to   the 
whole  nature. 

2.  Duty  to  the  Whole  ISTature.     ^l^\^^  *?  *^® 

whole  nature. 
1.  General, 

10.  Duties  to  the  whole  nature  are  general  or   Division. 
special. 

The  general  duty  to  the  whole  nature  is  to    General:  Order 
give  to  it  Order  and  Culture.  *°d  Culture. 


♦  Ecdus.  Til,  36. 


♦  See  Marshall's   "Life  of  Washington"— a  work  which  every  American 
should  read. 


46 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


DUTY  TO  WHOLE  NATUKE I    OKDEB. 


47 


!il 


Bubjects  for  it.         '^^^  Subjects  for  this  order  and  culture  are  the 

parts  and  powers  of  our  nature. 

By  the  parts  are  meant  the  two  natural  por- 

Jrarts  and  powers  +  •  v  •  i  .      ■•    .  -^ 

ofiumannature.  "°"*  '^'^^<^^  »'"<'  umted  in  life  and  separated  by 

death.     Tliese  are  the  soul  and  the  body.     Of 
these,  the  soul  is  the  superior  and  director.    By  the  powers 
(the  faculties)  are  meant  capacities  active  and  passive  in  both 
mind  and  body.     They  fit  human  nature  for  acting  and  being 
acted  on.    Such  are  Conscience,  Keason,  Will,  and  other  faeuf- 
ties  in  the  mind.*    Such  are  the  senses,  the  appetites,  the  pas- 
sions, belonging  to  the  body,  and  through  the  body  affecting 
the  mind.    Each  of  these  powers  has  its  proper  object.    For 
example,  Sound  and  Silence  are  tlie  objects  of  the  sense  of 
hearing ;   Eight  and  Wrong  are  the  objects  of  conscience ; 
Iruth  and  Error  are  the  objects  of  reason;  Good  and  Evil  are 
the  objects  of  will.    Each  of  these  powers  exists  in  two  condi- 
tions.   It  is  active  or  passive  in  regard  to  its  object.    Thus  the 
sense  of  sight  may  be  active  in  looking,  or  passive  in  simply 
receiving   impressions  from  light  and  color.      Conscience  is 
active  in  directing  conduct,  passive  in  receiving  impressions  of 
right  and  wrong.    The  same  fact  is  seen  in  all  the  faculties  of 
body  and  mind. 

Order  and  Culture  are  to  be  applied  to  all  these  parts  and 
powers,  both  in  their  active  and  passive  conditions, 
f^^/*'*'^*^        ^^-  ^'■'^®'"  demands  for  the  aotive  conditions 

lor  Order:  +1     f    +i  • 

1.  In  active  con-  ^"'^^  "^^  superior  parts  and  powers  shall  rule 
ditions.  and  the  inferior  be  ruled.  ' 

The  body  is  to  be  ruled  by  the  mind  as  its  director;  the 
mind,  by  conscience  as  its  director;  conscience,  by  the  law  of 
duty,  and  by  the  Divine  Law-giver  as  its  directors. 

*  The  learner  must  not  faU  into  the  common  mistake  of  mapping  out  the  mind 
acxK>rding  to  its  faculties.     The  f-.culties  are  merely  modes  of  action  in  which  t^e 

Z^U     T.  '•     Z'  ^''"''  °^^  ^'^"'  ^^  ^^^^^"^  '^^  ^-d  -to  the  twtting 
the  pulhng  the  pushm.,  the  grasping  faculty.     The  one  hand  has  the  power  of 

performing  these  functions.    So  the  one  mind  of  man  ha^  power  to  will  to  rlion 

U>  judge  of  nght  and  wrong.     We  speak  of  these  as  Will,  Reason,  CoLc  rn": 

But  ^v  e  ever  mean  one  nature  capable  of  certain  actions. 


An  illustration  for  this  duty  within  and  to  Illustration, 
ourselves,  may  be  found  in  the  first  class  of  duties  whose 
sphere  is  above  ourselves.  A  well-ordered  nation  is  a  model 
for  a  well-ordered  nature.  In  the  nation  are,  first,  its  organic 
law  with  a  body  of  municipal  and  subordinate  laws ;  next,  the 
authority  which  administers  them ;  and  next,  grades  of  au- 
thority and  subjection  reaching  to  all  members  of  the  body 
politic.  So  in  our  nature  are  to  be,  first,  the  supreme  law  of 
duty  with  its  divisions;  next,  the  administering  power  of  con- 
science ;  and  next,  the  powers  of  mind  and  body,  all  in  their 
proper  grades,  and  all  of  them  under  due  direction. 

12.  Order  demands  for  the  passive  conditions     2.  in  passive 
that    no    impressions,   however  strong,   on   the     conditions, 
lower  powers  shall  prevail  over  the  influence  of  the  higher. 

For  example,  there  may  be  the  strong  impressions  of  anger, 
hunger,  thirst,  lust,  fear,  pain.  If  these  be  allowed  to  prevail 
over  reason  and  conscience,  the  duty  of  self-command  has  been 
violated,  and  anarchy  and  rebellion  have  been  introduced  into 
the  inward  realm.  Let,  then,  every  person  determine  on  this 
rule  of  conduct :  "  In  every  action,  in  will,  word,  and  deed,  I 
will  be  directed  by  conscience  and  by  reason,  but  not  by  feel- 
ing, unless  that  feeling  shall  have  been  first  approved  by  these 
higher  powers."  Let  him  estimate  action  past  by  this  princi- 
ple :  "  Whenever  I  have  not  acted  from  judgment,  principle, 
conviction,  but  only  from  unregulated  feeling,  I  have  been 
morally  deficient." 

[This  duty  of  self-command  is  of  immense  importance  for  the 
ofiicer,  both  that  he  may  discharge  well  the  duties  of  his  pro- 
fession, and  may  have  influence  over  subordinates  and  enemies. 
To  govern  others,  we  must,  first  of  all,  govern  ourselves.] 

Order,  as  a  principle,  is  thus  seen  to  be  a  con-  j^^^^^  ^^  ^j^^ 
Btant  and  perpetual  will  to  give  every  thing  its  principle  of  or- 
due  position.  Applied  within,  it  produces  in-  ^'^'  '^' '^'^^* 
ward  regulation.  Extended  without,  it  fortifies  the  duties  of 
the  first  class,  whose  sphere  is  above  us,  by  demanding  subjec- 
tion to  law  and  authority. 


48 


PEACTICAL    ETHICS. 


$ 


1.'  i^it 


Virtue  needed 
for  its  exercise. 


DUTY  TO   WHOLE  NATUEE I    CULTURE. 


49 


Opposed  fault. 


What  for  Cful- 

ture. 


13.  The  virtue  essential  for  giving  order  to 
our  nature,  is  that  of  self-government. 

The  opposed  fault  is  Disorder,— disorder 
shown  in  an  unregulated  and  undisciplined 
nature.  It  consists  in  yielding  to  inclination,  to  feeling,  to 
imagination,  to  passion,  or  to  the  senses,— supi em acy°over 
conscience.  It  is  a  moral  feebleness,  which  grants  to  the  in- 
ferior  powers  what  is  not  due  to  them,  and  which  does  not 
give  to  the  superior  that  which  is  due. 

We  have  tlius  seen  one  general  duty  to  the  whole  nature— 
that  of  order. 

14.  The  next  general  duty  to  the  whole  nature 
is  that  of  Culture. 
1.  In  active  con-       Culture  demands  for  the  parts  and  powers  of 
|^"°'-  our  nature,  in  their  active  condition,  tliat  all  of 

them,  and  especially  the  higher,  be  unfolded  by  discipline  into 
the  highest  and  noblest  excellence  which  is  attainable  by  man. 
All  must  be  made  strong. 

Thus  the  conscience  is  to  liave  the  highest  energy  for  right; 
the  reason  is  to  be  trained  in  all  the  habits  requisite  for  a  per' 
feet  action  in  sciences,  arts,  and  the  affairs  of  life :  the  will, 
subjected  first  to  reason  and  conscience,  is  to  be  taught  firm- 
ness for  following  principle  and  good  ends.  Each  power  is  to 
be  trained,  by  applying  it  to  its  proper  object ;  the  conscience 
by  the  pursuit  of  duty;  the  intellect,  by  that  of  truth;  the 
will,  by  that  of  good,  and,  in  like  manner,  all  the  others.  ' 
2.  In  passive  oon-  1^-  Culture  demands  for  these  parts  and 
ditions.  powers,  in  their  passive  condition,  that  the  sen- 

sibilities  of  all,  and  especially  of  the  highest,  to  impressions 
from  their  proper  objects,  be  preserved  and  increased.  All 
must  be  made  susceptible. 

For  example,  the  taste  is  to  be  cultivated  so  as  to  be  alive  to 
the  impressions  of  the  beautiful  in  nature,  in  art,  in  conduct 
and  character.     Poetry,  literature,  music,  and  all  the  fine  arti 
are  to  receive  attention,  since  it  is  the  law  of  nature  and  ex- 
perience  that,  without  the  perception  of  what  is  beautiful,  no 


man's  nature  can  be  refined  and  purified.    So  the  conscience  is 

to  be  made  more  susceptible  to  impressions  of  duty,  the  reason 

to  those  of  truth,  the  will  to  those  from  real  great  and  distant 

benefit.     God  has  set  forth  the  right,  the  true,  the  good,  the 

beautiful  in  nature,  and,  through  Eevelation  in  Himself,  for 

developing  the  mind  of  man.     They  are  all  united.     To  gain 

one  fully,  we  need  the  others.     We  are  bound,  therefore,  to 

increase  our  sensibility  to  impressions  from  these  magnificent 

objects,  and  thus  to  give  culture  to  our  nature. 

16.  This  duty  of  cultivation  for  both  conditions  x.,,v  ^ 
,  1  ,,  T  ,        ,  Xiacn  man  most 

must  be  performed  by  the  individual  for  himself,   perform  it. 

Education  promotes  it,  though  by  imperfect  methods,  in  the 
life  that  now  is.  Eeligion  seeks  to  attain  it  both  for  the  life 
temporal  and  for  that  eternal.  But  neither  Education  nor 
Eeligion  can  secure  it  without  the  individual's  own  will  and 
co-operation.  This  he  is  bound  to  render  at  all  times,  but 
especially  in  youth,  when  the  whole  character  is  in  formation, 
and  the  whole  nature  pliable. 

The  first  step  for  this  duty  is  to  form  and  pre- 
serve the  conviction  that  the  work  of  self-im- 
provement is  one  placed  by  the  Creator  within 
our  own  power.  For  that,  therefore,  we  are  re- 
sponsible. The  succession  of  outward  events  no  man  may 
control,  but  every  man  has  a  control  over  the  world  within 
him. 

^  ''  I  did  ever  hold  it"  (says  Lord  Bacon)  "  for  an  Testimony  of 
insolent  and  unlucky  saying,  '  Faber  quisque  for-  Bacon, 
tunae  suae;'*  except  it  be  uttered  only  as  an  hortative  or  spur 
to  correct  sloth.  .  .  .  But  if  the  sentence  were  turned 
to  this,  '  Faber  quisque  ingenii  sui,'t  it  were  somewhat  more 
true,  and  much  more  profitable;  because  it  would  teach 
men  to  bend  themselves  to  reform  those  imperfections  in 
themselves  which  now  they  seek  but  to  cover,  and  to  attain 
those  virtues  and  good  parts  which  now  they  seek  to  have 

*  Every  man  the  architect  of  liis  own  fortune. 
t  Every  man  the  architect  of  his  own  mind. 


First  step  for 
Culture :    Con- 
viction of  our 
power  and  re- 
sponsibility. 


I 


50 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


only  in  show  and  demonstration.     Yet  notwithstanding  every 
man  attempteth  to  be  of  the  first  trade  of  carpenters,  and 
few   bind   themselves   to   tlie   second;   whereas,  nevertheless, 
the  rising  in  fortune  seldom  amendeth  the  mind ;  but  on  the 
other  side,  the  removing  of  the  stonds^  and  impediments  of  tlie 
mind  doth  often  clear  the  passage  and  current  to  a  man's  for- 
tune.    But  certain  it  is,  whether  it  be  believed  or  no,  that  as 
the  most  excellent  of  metals,  gold,  is  of  all  others  the  most 
pliant  and  most  enduring  to  be  wrought ;  so,  of  all  living  and 
breathing  substances,  the  perfectest  man  is  the  most  sus^epti- 
ble  of  help,  improvement,  impression,  and  alteration ;  and  not 
only  in  his  body,  but  in  his  mind  and  spirit;  and  there  again 
not  only  in  his  appetite  and  affection,  but  in  his  power  of^^t 
and  reason. ■'•)• 

So  does  this  great  thinker  insist  on  the  necessity  and  the 
benefit  of  self-culture. 

makf  cSt^e*""       ^^'^  ^^^^"^  ^^^p  is  to  make  the  culture  uni- 
uni  venial.  versal. 

The  body  is  to  be  included  as  well  as  the  mind.  In  the 
mind,  the  culture  is  to  be  both  moral  and  intellectual.  The 
intellectual  is  to  be  both  scientific  and  artistic  (that  is,  esthe- 
tic). The  common  fault  is  to  select  some  one  favorite  part  of 
this  field,  and  to  neglect  the  rest.  The  gymnastics  of  the  mind 
are  regarded  by  some  without  those  of  the  body.  Intellectual 
cultivation  is  carried  on,  while  the  moral  part  is  neglected,  or, 
reversely,  there  is  a  moral  training,  witiiout  that  which  is  in- 
Testimony  of  tellectual.  Of  the  latter  fault.  Lord  Bacon  says, 
^^*^^-  in  language  still  applicable :  *^  Coming  back  from' 

your  invitation  at  Eton  "  (the  letter  is  addressed  to  Sir  Henry 
Savilie),  '^1  fell  into  a  consideration  of  that  part  of  policy 
whereof  philosophy  speaketh  too  much  and  laws  too  little; 

ioZ  ^''T  ''  ^  T^  T  '^'°^'*''  ^^'''^  "^'^^^  ^^^^  ^  ^e^t^^^d  as  an  ethical 
term  It  means  here  the  .iopping.places  of  the  mind.  A  man  was  advancing 
n^orally  and  mtellectually  He  i.-  stationary.  The  cause  of  his  stopping  is  fZ 
Welf  or  rom  sornetlnng  without.  If  it  be  from  hhnself,  it  is  a '' stond."  If 
from  external  hmdrances,  it  is  an  "impediment." 
t  Bacon.    Letters,  No.  109. 


MEANS   FOR   CULTURE. 


51 


and  that  is,  of  education  of  youth.  "Whereupon,  fixing  my 
mind  awhile,  I  found  straightway,  and  noted  even  in  the  dis- 
courses of  philosophers,  which  are  so  large  in  this  argument,  a 
strange  silence  concerning  one  part  of  this  subject.  For  as 
touching  the  framing  and  seasoning  of  youth  to  moral  virtues 
as  tolerance  of  labors,  continency  from  pleasures,  obedience, 
honor,  and  the  like,  they  handle  it ;  but  touching  the  improve- 
ment and  helping  of  the  intellectual  powers,  as  of  conceit, 
memory,  and  judgment,  they  say  nothing.''-^^^ 

The  third  step  is  to  use  all  the  means  known  rm,-  ^    ♦ 
,  .  inira  step :   use 

by  experience  to  be  most  effective  for  this  uni-  all  means, 
versal  development  of  nature. 

These  are— 1st,  Keligion  ;  2d,  Opinion  ;  3d,  Example ;  4th, 
Correcting  one  affection  by  another ;  5th,  Fixed  habits. 

"  The  most  sovereign  of  all  is  religion,  which  Testimony  of 
is  able  to  change  and  transform  it "  (the  will  of  Bacon, 
man)  "  in  the  deepest  and  most  inward  inclinations  and  mo- 
tions." "Next  to  that  is  opinion  and  apprehension,  whether 
it  be  infused  by  tradition  and  institution,  or  wrought  in,  by 
disputation  and  persuasion."  "And  the  third  is  example, 
which  transformeth  the  will  of  man  into  the  similitude"  of  that 
which  is  studied  as  a  model.  "  The  fourth  is  when  one  affec- 
tion is  healed  and  corrected  by  another,  as  when  cowardice  is 
remedied  by  shame  and  dishonor,  or  sluggishness  and  back- 
wardness by  indignation  and  emulation."  "Lastly,  when  all 
these  means,  or  any  of  them,  have  new-framed  and  formed 
human  will,  then  doth  custom  and  habit  corroborate  and  con- 
form all  the  rest."t 

17  The  habitual  virtue  for  this  duty  is  Zeal  virtue  required 
FOR  Improvement.  for  this  duty. 

This  virtue  should  live  in  young  persons  as  an  unceasing 
fire,  urging  them  ever  to  a  constant  aspiration  for  advance- 
ment.    The  divine  rule  is,  "  Covet  earnestly  the  best  gifts." 

Such  are   the  general    duties  to   our  nature— Order   and  . 
Culture. 


♦  Bacoa     Letters,  No.  109. 


t  lb. 


53 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Transition  to  The  sjpecial  duties  follow.     Tlicj  are  tlie  appli- 

speciai  duties,     cations  of  Order  and  Culture  to  specific  portions 
of  our  nature. 

The  portions  of  our  nature  receiving  this  specific  application 
are  the  ruling  and  the  ruled.*  The  ruling  powers  are  princi- 
pally the  Conscience  and  the  Intellect.  Those  to  be  ruled  are 
the  lower  impulses  coming  from  or  iufiuenced  bj  the  body. 

Duty  to  the  Whole  JS^atuee. 
2.  Special, 

DUTIES  TO  THE   COXSCIENCE. 

18.  The  first  of  the  ruling  powers  demanding  special  Order 
and  Culture  is  the  Conscience. 

Conscience.  ^^  Conscience  is  meant  the  principal  directing 

faculty  which  declares  in  human  actions  what 
ought  or  ought  not  to  be  done.  Our  wills  may  be  compared 
to  the  propelling  power  in  a  vessel,  and  Conscience  to  the 
helm.  The  machinery  in  a  steamer  gives  power  to  move  in 
any  direction,  but  the  rudder,  power  to  move  in  the  one  direc- 
tion  wherein  it  ought  to  go.  So  the  Will  may  move  us  alon<. 
any  course,  good  or  evil,  but  Conscience  is  to  direct  us  alon^ 
the  one  course,  which  is  good.  ^ 

m^ual  virtue      The  virtue  demanded  is  Co^sciENrrorsNEss.    ' 
Three  duties.       ^  ^^-    Conscientiousness    acts   in   three    duties. 

These  ai'e-lst,  The  Instruction  of  the  Con- 
science  in  right  rules;  2d,  The  Application  of  the  Conscience 
to  particular  actions-past,  present,  and  intended ;  3d  The 
Execution  of  those  decisions  of  Conscience  which  result'  from 
comparing  single  actions  with  the  rule. 

Kroin  three  act6      These  three  duties  correspond  to  the  three  acts 
Of  conscience.      ,,  conscience.     Those  three  form  what  is  called 
a  syllogism.  ^  By  the  first,  we  consider  a  general  proposition 
that  a  certain  class  of  actions  is  right  or  wroncr     By  the 
second,  we  place  some  particular  action  within  the^'class.     By 

*  lu  Scripture,  tho  spirit  and  the  flesh. 


DUTY  TO  conscience:  its  instruction. 


53 


the  third,  we  conclude  that  the  particular  action  being  in  the 
class,  is  right  or  wrong.  If  it  be  future,  we  determine  to  do  it 
if  right,  and  to  abstain  from  it  if  wrong.  If  it  be  past,  we  con- 
demn ourselves  for  it  if  wrong,  and  approve  it  if  it  were  right. 
For  example,  there  may  be  some  deed  of  injustice  to  which 
we  are  tempted,  and  on  which  we  are  deliberating.  The  full 
acts  of  conscience  would  be  these : 

1.  Injustice  is  wrong. 

2.  This  action  (of  which  I  am  thinking)  would  be  injustice. 

3.  Therefore  it  would  be  wrong  (and  I  must  not  do  it). 

Or  the  injustice  may  have  been  committed,  and  we  may  be 
reviewing  it,  at  the  close  of  the  day,  in  the  tribunal  of  con- 
science.    The  successive  decisions  would  be : 

1.  Injustice  is  wrong. 

2.  Tiiis  action  (which  was  perpetrated  this  day)  was  one  ot 
injustice. 

3.  Therefore  it  was  wrong  (and  I  condemn  myself  for  it). 
The  process   will   be   similar  where    the    action  is  right 

whether  it  be  future  or  past. 

Such  are  the  three  actions  in  every  full  process  of  conscience. 
They  may  be  executed  in  the  mind  so  rapidly  as  to  escape 
analysis  at  tlie  moment,  but  they  are  performed  completely. 

Tlie  first  act  consists,  therefore,  in  forming  some  general 
moral  rule  which  can  cover  classes  of  actions;  the  second,  in 
letting  single  actions  into  one  of  these  classes,  and  thus  under 
the  rule ;  the  third,  in  deducing  a  determination  from  the  com- 
parison of  the  particular  action  with  the  rule. 

20.    The  first  duty  to  the  Conscience  corre-  ^^^  ^^^  duties 
sponds  to  the  first  action.     It  is  the  duty  of  In-  aSs.*"  ^^^ 
struction. 

Instruction  of  the  Conscience  is  the  furnishino*    l-  Instruction, 
ot  It  with  sound  moral  rules  for  determining  what  actions  are 
right,  and  what  wrong. 

We  are  to  obtain  these  rules  from  the  authorities  in  morals 
(r.  17) ;  from  Scripture,  from  moralists,  from  laws,  from  public 
sentiments,  and,  by  earnest  and  honest  reflections,  from  those 


54 


PEACTICAL   ETHICS. 


L 


inward  convictions  which  are  the  law  of  nature  written  on  tlio 
heart. 

In  forming  these  rules,  the  principles  already  given  must  be 
applied  (i.  18).     The  authorities  mast  be  combined.     The  in- 
ferior must  yield  to  the  superior.     Extremes  must  be  avoided 
(i.  20).     The  rule  of  proportion  must  be  carefully  observed 
(i.  22).     The  three  great  maxims  of  morals  must  be  never  for- 
gotten (i.  22).     Partial  and  extravagant  views  in  morals  are 
dangerous.     They  have  brought,   and  will  ever  bring,  evils 
among  men.     We  must  never  regard  that  as  right  or  indiffer- 
ent which  the  standards  of  ethics  show  to  be  wrong.     But  we 
must  be  equally  careful  not  to  condemn  that  which  they  do 
not  condemn.     Under  every  law  of  duty  are  matters  of  liberty. 
2.  Application.        21.  The  second  duty  to  the  Conscience  corre- 
sponds to  its  second  action.     It  is  the  duty  of  Application. 

Application  of  the  conscience  is  the  placing  of  particular 
actions,  before  or  after  the  doing  of  them,  in  the  class  required 
by  the  rule. 

Before  any  action,  we  are  to  compare  it  with  the  rule  of 
duty,  till  we  are  satisfied  as  to  its  moral  quality,  whether  it  be 
right  or  wrong. 

^  We  are  to  give  all  possible  distinctness  to  our  conceptions  of 
right  actions.  These  conceptions  are  to  be  ideals  of  excellence, 
to  which  we  are  to  give  reality.  The  more  glorious  and  beau- 
tiful they  are,  the  more  do  they  animate  the  mind  in  the  pur- 
suit of  virtue. 

After  any  action,  we  should  make  a  severe  and  impartial 
comparison  with  the  rule,  giving  approval  if  it  agree  with  the 
standard,  condemnation  if,  by  disagreeing,  it  was  wrong. 

The  natural  day  furnishes  a  natural  division  of  time'^fur  the 
execution  of  this  duty  in  both  its  parts.  The  actions  of  each 
new  day  should  be  planned  at  its  commencement,  under  the 
approved  rules  of  duty.  The  actions  of  each  day  past  should 
be  closely  scrutinized,  by  comparing  them  with  the  proper 
standard.  Pythagoras  made  it  the  order  for  all  his  disciples 
that  the  actions  of  the  day  Should  be  re  vie  .red  thrice. 


DUTY  TO  conscience:  execution. 


00 


Future:  right. 


22.  The  third  duty  to  the  Conscience  resulting    3.  Execution, 
from  the  third  step  is  that  of  Execution. 

Execution  is  the  full  consent  of  the  will,  with  entire  repres- 
sion of  all  adverse  inclinations,  to  perform  in  particular  actions 
whatever  is  demanded  by  the  rule  when  applied  to  them. 

Let  the  action  be  future : 

1.  If  it  have  moral  quality,  it  will  be  wrong  Different  cases : 
or  right.  As  one  case,  let  it  be  wrong.  Sup-  Future,  wrong, 
pose  it  to  be  a  falsehood  by  which  we  avoid  some  harm,  or 
gain  some  advantage;  or  an  act  of  dishonesty,  by  which  there 
is  profit;  or  of  sinful  self-indulgence,  promising  pleasure. 
When  compared  with  the  rule  of  duty,  it  is  seen  to  be  wrong. 
It  must,  then,  be  wholly  avoided,  however  strong  may  be  the 
inclination  for  it.  The  decision  of  Conscience  must  thus  be 
executed. 

2.  As  another  case,  let  the  contemplated  future 
action  be  rigU,  It  may  be  an  act  of  justice  to 
another,  or  of  kindness ;  it  may  be  an  act  of  piety,  or  one  re- 
quii-ed  by  the  obligations  of  our  condition  in  life.  Whatever 
it  be,  it  is  yet  seen  to  be  demanded  by  the  rules  of  duty.  Yet 
it  is  a  very  common  occurrence  that  inclinations  will  stand 
strongly  opposed.  In  such  a  case,  opposed  feelings  must  be 
repressed  by  strong  moral  energy,  and  the  decision  of  Con- 
science be  thoroughly  executed. 

These  are  the  requirements  of  morals  as  a  human  science. 
Religion  adds  a  demand  for  a  consciousness  of  the  presence, 
the  observation,  and  the  assistance  of  the  Supreme  Beino- 
before  entering  on  any  action.  He  aids  man  in  right,  and 
against  what  is  wrong."^ 

These  are  the  two  cases  of  the  action  contemplated  in  the 
future.  Let  the  action  now  he  past.  The  same  two  cases  will 
exist.     If  it  have  any  moral  quality,  it  will  be  wrong  or  right. 

3.   If  the  action  committed  shall  have  been 
wrong,  there  must  be  self-condemnation.     If,  as    ^^'* '  '^''^' 

*  This  aid,  however  afforded,  is  called  in  Theology,  arace:  Gratia  =  auxUmm 
Dti. 


56 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


!•! 


II 


t  le  consequence,  other  persons  l.ave  been  deceived  or  wron-^ed 
there  must  be  rectification  or  restitution.     The  wrong  done  to' 
another  n.ust  be  undone,  unless  some  impossibility  intervene. 
Kehgion  adds  the  duty  of  confession  to  the  Deity,  and  of  ob- 
taming,  througli  its  required   conditions,  forgiveness.     Thu« 
also,  must  the  decisions  of  Conscience  be  executed.  "' 

Past:  right.  *•   "^^  remaining  case  is  one  which  cannot 

Tr,V.1  ,     M      f^'f  ^  "'""■  ^"'°"°  i^"P°'-f«'^t  l»«man   beings. 

.     Tned  by  the  h.ghest  divine  rules,  no  moral  action  of  n.an  is 

wholly  r,ght,  since  imperfection  must  adhere  to  it.     But  there 

are  many  actions  which  are  good  by  the  connnon  standard  of 

thTbcV^r  ,T"'""  "  "'"''  ''"  '^~  '-^^--  <^-e 
the  be  t  wh,ch  h,s  crcumstances  and  abilities  permitted. 

In  Ins  new  calling  a  past  action  right,  the  full  satisfaction 
of  the  .nnd  should  rest  upon  the  consciousness  of  duty  con. 
eaentu^usly  do..,  and  not  on  the  hnman  conse.uLs.  D^ty 
hould  ever  stand  higher  in  the  estimate  of  the  mind  than  Z 
consequences,  whether  good  or  evil.  [The  military  man  es 
pecally  must  fallow  this  principle.  lu  disaster^.  Ids 
pecu harly  tins  consciousness:  "I  did  my  whole  duty."] 

Eel.g,on  adds  thankfulness  to  the  Almighty,  and  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  Ilim  as  the  source  of  all  go^d  done 

Thus^  also,  are  the  decisions  of  Conscience  to  be  executed. 

^o.  Of  the  three  dufcs  to  Conscience,  Execution  is  the  mo.t 
important,  because  it  is  that  without  whir.),  H..  .  ., 

fni;Mnc=      T?  •  ""°'"^^ "'<='' the  two  others  are 

fruules       Few  men  .nstruct  conscience;  fewer  apply  it •  b„t 
fewer  stdl  execute  thoroughly  its  decisions.  ' 

sentin.l  be  TT  T"""  ''"''  P''^^^'^'"^  ^"  ^^t^-'^'  one 
sentnnent  be  faxed  „,  the  convictions  of  the  mind,     ft  is  that 

Dutyualove  all  other  oljects  of  human  pursuit :  TrllZ 
^on,  the  oixe  evd  to  he  feared  and  avoided*  '•'^'^'Sres- 

It  also  den.ands  that  in  each  action  of  life  there  shall  be  a 
Bustamed  moral  energy,  issuing  both  in  watchfulness  ov^r  seh; 

*  To  iiSvov  i>opeedi;  ifiayTia—Ckrymtom. 


CULTrTATION  or  THE   AFFECTIONS. 


57 


Affections. 


and  also  in  a  sustained  good  will,  impelling  ever  to  tlie  rio-ht 
and  restraining  from  the  wrong. 

There  are  requirements  considered  by  Eeligion  which  are 
left  to  thait  divine  guide.  It  is  true  that  the  full  cure  of  men's 
natures  belongs  to  Eeligion.  Yet  moral  science  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  handmaid,  to  whose  discretion  much  has  been  left 
bj  the  divine  mistress.* 

Such  are  duties  to  the  Conscience  by  which  we  give  to  its 
actions  Order,  and  to  itself  Culture. 

The  Virtue,  as  we  have  seen,  which  is  exercised  in  these 
duties  is  Conscientiousness.  The  opposed  fault  is  Deadness 
of  Conscience.  It  exists  when  conscience  is  not  taught,  not 
applied,  not  obeyed. 

25.  For  moral  order  and  culture,  the  affec- 
tions must  also  be  cultivated.  By  them  we  be- 
come disinterested.  Without  them,  a  man's  nature  cannot  be 
unfolded  and  ennobled.  To  cultivate  the  affections,  we  must 
direct  them  on  their  proper  objects. 

These  objects  are  found  in  the  first  class  of  duties— duties 
whose  sphere  is  above  us,  and  in  the  third,  or  duties  to  other 
individuals.  The  objects  of  affection  in  the  first  class  are 
God,  our  fellow-beings,  our  country  with  its  institutions  and 
laws,  oar  parents.  These  are  to  elicit  divine,  human,  patriotic, 
and  filial  love.  The  objects  of  affection  in  the  third  class  de- 
mand fraternal,  conjugal,  parental,  and  friendly  love.  Under 
the  present  head  of  duty  to  ourselves,  it  is  sufiicient  to  express 
the  fact  that  moral  cultivation  of  our  nature  is  incomplete  if  it 
do  not  include  the  affections  as  well  as  the  conscience. 

For  if  Conscience  be  exercised  without  the  affections,  we 
may  become  too  cold  and  selfish.  History  shows  malignity 
and  cruelty  in  persecutors  whose  lives  were  yet  devoted  to 
questions  of  conscience.  If  the  affections  be  cultivated  with- 
out conscience,  conduct  may  have  too  little  regulation.     Both 

*  The  purpose  of  the  present  work  requires  that  whUe  the  connection  of  Mor- 
ality with  Religion  shall  be  never  forgotten,  and  often  suggested,  yet  Morality 
shall  be  studied  by  itself.  '  x 


h  I 


58 


m 


11 


PEACTICAL   ETHICS. 


are  Eecessary  for  the  full  development  of  the  moral  virtues. 
Tlie  aifections  must  be  as  life  to  impel ;  the  conscience,  a^  li-ht 
to  direct.  ^ 

Kesalts.  .    ^^'  ^^^^^  ^"^  instructs  his  conscience,  applies 

it,  executes  its  decisions,  and,  in  doing  this,  exer- 
cises the  most  disinterested  affections  perpetually,  his  nature  is 
kept  in  the  noblest  exercise,  and  he  is  preserving  a  foundation 
on  Avhich  all  moral  virtues  may  with  divine  help  be  erected. 

Transition.  ^^^  ^^^  ^^^  P^^^  *^  ^"^ics  to  the  Intellect, 

and  thus  to  the  intellectual  virtues.  In  the 
transition  we  should  observe  the  influence  of  tlie  moral  virtues 
on  the  intellectual. 

Moral  training  through  conscience  and  the  affections  forms  a 
good  preparation  for  intellectual  discipline.  This  fact  should 
be  carefully  noted  by  young  persons  engaged  in  study. 

Experience  shows  this.  It  is  the  testimony  of  all  men,  that 
they  never  studied,  learned,  or  thought  so  well  as  when' they 
were  most  conscientious.  This  is  finely  expressed  by  an  old 
writer.  "The  very  true  beginning  of  wisdom  is  the  desire  of 
discipline."  He  adds :  "  And  the  desire  of  discipline  is  love ;" 
that  is,  love  for  the  studies  and  exercises  which  lead  to  mental 
discipline. 

The   reason   is   evident.      Tlie  habits   of  mind  which  are 
formed  by  discipline  of  the  conscience,  by  reflection,  attention, 
the  control  of  every  faculty,— these  are  demanded  for  successful 
study.     Likewise  the  state  of  the  will  which  is  produced  in  a 
conscientious  man,--that  of  earnestness  and  singleness  of  pur- 
pose,— is  a  source  of  mental  vigor,  since  a  strong  will  to  learn 
adds  to  the  power  of  the  mind  in  learning.     Also,  the  affec- 
tions developed  under  moral  training,  include  attachment  to 
one's  duties.     Learning,— one  of  the  duties  of  life,— is  loved 
This  love  of  learning  fosters  the  glowing  action  of  the  mental 
powers :  "  The  desire  of  discipline  is  love." 
^  We  cannot,  then,  unfold  the  moral  virtues  without  promo- 
ting the  intellectual ;  but  we  may  so  cultivate  the  intellectual 
as  to  neglect  or  deaden  all  moral  virtue. 


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60 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


CHAPTER     IV. 

DUTIES  TO  THE   INTELLECT.      CORRESPONDEXT  VIRTUES: 

IXTELLIGENCE,  PRUDENCE. 


Intellectual 
Virtues. 


1.  The  general  duty  to  tlie  whole  nature  is 
to  be  applied  to  the  intellectual  powers.  It  is 
applied  bj  giving  culture  to  those  powers,  and  order  to  their 
action.  A  class  of  "good  habits"  is  thus  formed.  These 
habits  are  Intellectual  Virtues.  Every  person  should  hold  the 
conviction,  that  the  cultivation  and  the  discipline  of  his  mind 
cannot  be  neglected  without  the  violation  of  duty. 

2.  Intellectual  virtues  are  divided  into  those 
ioY  "knowledge  and  those  for  action.  The  first 
belong  more  especially  to  life  contemplative,  and  the  second 
to  hfe  active.  The  first  are  prominent  in  the  preparatory 
penod  of  life,  when  the  young  are  under  education  and  train- 
ing for  some  vocation.  The  second  are  prominent  in  the 
active  period  of  life,  after  the  vocation  has  been  entered.  Yet 
the  exercise  of  both  is  perpetually  needed  in  both  periods. 
They  are  to  be  united,  with  one  predominating. 


Divibion. 


Intellectual 
Virtues  for 
Knowledge. 


Summed  in  one. 


1.  Intellectcal  Yirtues  for  Knowledge. 

3.  Intellectual  virtues  for  knowledge  are  the 

good  habits   necessary  for   acquiring  both   the 

principles  (with  their  conclusions)  and  the  facts 

which  constitute  human  knowledge. 

They  may  be  expressed  in  one  word  :  Intelli- 
gence. 

They  are  general  or  particular. 
The  general  habits  for  knowledge  are  for  the 
general  actions  of  the  understanding. 

The  principal  actions  are  two :  reasoning  and 
rememlermg.    Between  these  is  a  third,  that  of 


Division. 


Subdivision. 


CULTURE   OF   THE   INTELLECT:    REASONING. 


61 


Beasoning. 


conceiving.  The  two  which  are  principal  demand  chief  at- 
tention. 

4.  Reasoninoj  and  rememberino:  are  easilv  dis-  ^     .  ,  ,    . 

^  ,  o  «  Special  distinc- 

tinguished.      Heasoning   supposes   at   least  two  tion  of  reason 

facts  or  propositions."^'     One  is  seen,  known,  or      °i°^emory. 
admitted.     The  second  is  inferred  from  the  first.     Memory 
does  not  necessarily  suppose  two  facts  or  propositions.     It  is 
the  recollection  of  one. 

5.  By  reasoning  is  meant  inferring  one  fact  or 
one  proposition  from  another.  For  example,  the 
first  fact  may  be,  "  The  enemy  has  taken  up  a  certain  position 
in  the  night."  The  second  fact  inferred  may  be,  "  It  is  his 
intention  to  attack  me  on  the  flank."     So  in  propositions  the 

first  may  be — Each  of  these  two  lines  (suppose  A and 

B )  is  equal  to  a  third  line  (C ^).  The  conclusion  in- 
ferred is,  that  the  two  first  (A  and  B)  are  equal  the  one  to  the 
other.  This  act  of  the  mind,  which,  from  some  one  tiling 
known  and  admitted,  draws  a  second  by  inference,  is  an  act  of 
reasoning. 

6.  This  act  of  reasoning  requires  two  habits :  ^p|.g  impUed  in 
Comprehension  for  principles,  and  Sagacity  for  reasoning, 
deductions. 

The  cause  is  apparent.  When  from  one  fact  or  proposition 
we  infer  a  second,  we  do  so  by  means  of  some  general  j[>rhwi' 
pie.  Thus  in  the  first  example,  the  principle  guiding  to  the 
conclusion  is — Every  movement  of  .my  enemy  is  with  a  delib- 
erate purpose  to  help  himself  or  harm  me.  Under  that  prin- 
ciple, I  put  the  fact^  that  he  took  a  position  in  the  night  from 
which  he  could  attack  the  flank  of  my  army.  Seeing  that  by 
such  attack  he  could  most  help  himself  and  harm  me,  I  infer 
that  this  is  his  intention.f 

Again,  in  the  second  example,  the  principle  guiding  to  the 


*  The  objects  of  intelligence  are  Things,  Thoughts,  Signs.  They  are  received 
by  us  as  facts  existing,  or  as  propositions  stated  in  language. 

f  You  may  then  apply  the  Intellectual  Yirtues  for  Action,  and  consider 
whether  vou  cannot  break  his  centre. 


62 


PRACTICAL  Ernies. 


X      Th     T ;      '"""  '^'"'  ''  '""^  ^^-"^  -^  '^q-l  to  each 

8.t.on     Each  of  the  two  things,  A  and  B,  are  equal  io  t^ 
same  third  thinff  C      TlnVrll,-  T  ^-       ^i  , 

and  P  «r« .      ,        ;  •^'     '''^^'^  '^'^  conclusion  that  A 

and  a  are  equal,  each  to  the  otlier.* 

These  being  the  acts  of  mind  required  in  reasoning,  the  two 
hab.tual  energies  needed  are:  1.  That  which  compTelends  a 
prmcple;  2.  H.at  which  draws  a  deduction.  We  thus  r- 
qn,re  Comprehension  for  principles,  and  Sagacit,  for  deduT 

Two  kinds  of  <•  There  are  two  Irinrla  ,-.<■  »«„„     •        i 

reasoning.  ^    ^.  ,  '""®  "^*  reasoning,  demon- 

strative and  probable.    In  the  first,  there  is  but 
one  side  to  ever^  question;  in  the  second,  there  a      two    id 

^.s     Examples  of  the  second  are  in  all  subjects  not  mathe- 
rnatica  ;  m  jurisprudence,  ethics,  statesmanship,  war,  in  ev    y 

^Cd  Sie'^Tfr'  ^•"''"'"" '"'-'  p-^^-^'^ties-airtrz 

balanced.     The  dehberations  of  a  council  of  war  are  the  can 

vassing  of  probabilities.     In  demonstrative  reasJng    tl   re' 

a  e  no  degrees  between  certainty  and  uncertainty.     In^'p "Ta 

ble  reasoning,  for  example  in  a  court  of  justice  hearinre, 

dence  in  a  trial  for  murder,  there  are  various  degreXm 

possibility  through  probabib'ty  to  certainty.     The  fi"  t  1 

^.ders  what  must  be;  as,  that  the  three  angles  ol"  a  t Inl' 

must  be  equal  to  two  nVlit  in<r]o<     Ti         °       "'  »  mangle 

w,      u  "      ^"g'es.     IJie  second  regards  what 

may  be  or  may  not  be-  ic,  thnt  fi,..      •  '=o<"U''  wiiat 

not  be  ..uiltv      T    !,  ;  P"'""^""  "^^y  ^"^  «»•  may 

not  be  gui  ty.    In  the  mathematics,  the  contrary  to  each  pro 

position  IS  impossible  in  thought  as  well  as  fact.    In  proWbTe 

•  Here  again  is  the  SyUogism: 

mZ'    r^f  „""""  '°  "^«  ■"""'«  "^^  equal  to  each  other. 
M1.V0R.    A  and  B  are  each  equal  to  the  same  thing,  C 
r^NCL.s,o.v.     Therefore,  A  and  B  are  equal  to  eacL  other. 

.ot':::- ~  ^ert  o^rrtr:;::'  r  ^-'^  =^- 


reasoning:  two  kinds. 


63 


reasoning. the  contrary  is  possible.     A  prisoner,  for  example, 

is  supposed  innocent  till  proved  guilty. 

In  both  kinds   of  reasonino^    there   must  be  ,^ 

^'  ^  Why  one  should 

comprehension  for  principles,  and  sagacity  for  not  be  cultivated 
conclusions.  But  the  modes  of  applying  them  "^^  ^' 
are  different.  In  demonstration  the  mind  must  consider  but 
one  side,  and  in  that  follow  a  chain  of  deductions.  In 
other  reasoning,  tlie  mind  nmst  consider  arguments  on  two 
sides,  weigh  them,  estimate  degree,  and  determine  on  which 
side  is  the  preponderance.  The  mind,  by  the  first,  increases 
its  capacity  for  inference ;  by  the  second,  its  capacity  for  sound 
judgment.  The  intellect  should  be  trained  in  both.  Both  are 
necessary  for  the  full  development  of  the  mind.  Both  should 
enter  all  courses  of  study.  But  skill  in  demonstration  alone 
does  not  imply  sound  judgment.  Demonstration,  cultivated 
exclusively,  may  mar  the  capacity  for  judgment,  since  demon- 
stration is  the  consideration  of  one  side,  and  judgment  of  two. 
Hence,  no  complete  course  of  study,  prescribed  in  an  institu- 
tion, or  planned  by  a  solitary  student,  should  include  demon- 
strative science  alone,  especially  if  preparation  be  intended  for 
any  of  the  practical  professions,  since  they  all  require  the  bal- 
ancing of  opposed  considerations.  Attention  to  the  demon- 
strative mode  alone,  with  an  entire  neglect  of  the  other,  will 
weaken  even  the  capacity  for  accurate  judgment  derived  from 
nature.  Bequiring  one-sided  mental  action,  it  will  form  the 
one-sided  man.  Hence,  a  course  of  study  must  embrace  also 
the  subjects  which  call  for  probable  conclusions,  and  those 
rules  for  them  which  are  taught  by  logic.  In  demonstrative 
science,  we  learn  one  kind  of  reasoning,  but  not  the  laws  of 
reasoninor  itself. 

8.  By  remembering,  is  meant  the  recollection 
of  any  detached  fact  or  proposition  formerly 
known ;  for  example,  the  name  of  a  town  in  Geography,  the 
name  of  a  character  in  History ;  the  proposition,  this  town  was 
formerly  fortified,  this  character  performed  certain  memorable 
actions. 


Eemembering. 


64 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


In  reasoning,  one  of  two  things  is  given  to  onr  knowledge 
and  admitted  hy  us ;  the  second  is  made  into  knowled-.e  by 
us,  because  we  see  it  to  be  implied  in  tlie  first.  B^ut  in 
remembering,  one  tliing  is  given  to  onr  knowledge,  admitted 
and  preserved.  Reasoning  is  then  a  power  additional  to 
memory.  It  implies  capacity  to  perceive  relations  and  con- 
nections among  things.  Hence,  we  are  to  expect  diversities 
among  men  m  their  capacity  for  reasoning. 

form  d  *""  ^'***  ^"*^'*'  ^'""■®^°'"^'  (demanded  for  remember- 

«■»«  ■  ing  is  Recollection.    The  word  carries  the  rule 

for  cultivating  the  memory.       To  recollect,   is  to  re-coUect. 
We  are  to  colleei  again  all  the  parts  of  that  which  is  to  be  re- 
membered, wliether  those  parts  be  facts  or  words.     AVhen  we 
do  this  perseveringly  for  a  length  of  time,  the  repeated  acts 
f.>rni  a  habit.    This  habit  is  good.    Being  good,  it  is  a  virtue 
ot  the  mind.     It  increases  the  natural  power  of  memory,  since 
habit  IS  second  nature.     If  a  person's  natural  capacity  for  re- 
membering be  small,  such  discipline  will  supply  the  deficiency 
eft  by  nature     Recollection  is,  accordingly,  a  good  mental 
labit,  an  intellectual  virtue,  which  collects  and  preserves  de- 
tailed facts  and  propositions. 

[The  military  man  needs  it.  He  should  make  his  memory 
strong  and  accurate.  To  take  one  of  numerous  examples  illus- 
trating its  necessity,  what  would  be  the  efiect  in  a  battle  if  the 
aides  did  not  transmit  orders  accurately!] 

Such  are  the  two  general  habits, 'reasoning  and  remem- 
bering. 

imaginauon.  ^-  ^^^t^een  them  is  a  mental  habit  which  may 

_  incline  more  or  less  to  the  one  or  the  other.    It 

is  that  of  Imagination. 

Acting  rightly;     .  ^"''''K''"^t'on   ''^  a  mental  power  for  reprodu- 

ciiig  sensible  objects  in  the  form  of  distinct  im- 
ages.   It  is  exercised  as  Conception  or  Creation. 
Conception,         J^^^  reproduction  may  be  with  the  same  com. 

binations  which  exist  and  have  been  seen   in 
nature.      This  is  Conception.      Conception  is  simply   vivid 


V 


IMAGINATION  :    CONCEPTIVE,    CBEATIVB 


65 


Creation. 


memory.  An  example  is  a  recollection  of  a  landscape,  a  face, 
a  transaction,  made  so  distinct  that  we  might  paint  from  the 
conception  alone.     Conception  of  places  is  mental  topography. 

The  reproduction  may  be  with  combinations 
different  from  those  existing  and  formerly  seen. 
This  is  Creation.  An  example  is  the  creation  of  an  epic  poem. 
Every  good  poet  possesses  this  faculty.  A  poet  is  "  of  imagi- 
nation all  compact."  He  is  therefore  called,  Poet,  which 
means,  maker,  creator. 

For  the  perfection  of  the  mind  both  powers  must  be  pos- 
sessed, that  of  conception  and  that  of  creation. 

Imagination  is  thus  seen  to  be  a  middle  power  between 
Memory  and  Eeason.  Conception  is  intense  memory.  Crea- 
tive imagination,  as  seen  in  the  Iliad,  the  ^neid.  Paradise 
Lost,  is  akin  to  reason,  its  combinations  being  guided  by  some 
law.  Great  scientific  discoveries  like  those  of  Kepler  ever 
demand  creative  imagination,  that  new  combinations  may  be 
formed. 

[The  military  man  needs  especially  the  power  of  vivid  con- 
ception. The  creative  power  is  needed  when  new  and  start- 
ling combinations  are  to  be  formed  in  a  battle  or  campaign. 
But  if  he  have  naturally  a  creative  imagination,  let  him  beware 
of  its  illusions  and  delusions,  lest  he  mistake  bis  fancies  for 
facts.     Napoleon  possessed  both  powers. 

Those  in  training  for  the  military  profession  should  educate 
the  mind  to  conceive  of  countries  and  places  given  in  Geo- 
graphy, as  if  they  were  travelling  over  them,  and  of  battles 
described  in  History,  as  if  they  saw  them  from  the  beginning 
to  the  end. 

Also,  when  any  one  military  combination  is  given  to  them, 
they  should  reduce  it  to  its  elements,  and  create  in  thought 
new  combinations  from  those  elements.  Thus  a  conceptive 
and  creative  military  imagination  may  be  formed.] 

These  are  two  good  habits  of  the  imagination :  Conception, 
guided  by  memory;  Creation,  guided  by  reason  and  sound 
judgment. 


66 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Acting  10.  The  opposed  evil  habits  are  formed  by  re- 

imagmation.    Kemovii.g  the  first,  we  have  illusion :  and  re- 
moving  the  second,  delusion.     Tlie  person  under  illusions  mis- 
takes his  fancies  for  facts.    For  example,  he  is  an  unreliable 
witness  in  a  court  of  justice.    The  person  under  delusion  has 
formed  new  combinations  in  which  he  mistakes  the  satisfaction 
m  viewing  his  own  creations,  for  the  satisfaction  resulting 
from  the  approval  of  reason  and  judgment.     Such  minds  form 
speculative  nien,  and  appear  among  speculative  races,  like  the 
(Grecian.    They  are  good  in  their  place  and  sphere.    But  they 
are  unreliable  for  organizing  government,  framing  laws,  plan- 
ning campaigns  or  battles.    Tlieir  systems  of  government  are 
Utopias ;   their  laws,  ftinaticism  ;*  their  plans  of  battles  and 
campaigns,  theories  on  paper,  without  attention  to  the  details 
which  must  influence  the  result.     Such  a  mind  is  under  this 
perpetual  delusion  :  "  My  theory  is  perfect.     Facts  and  results 
onght  to  conform  to  it.    Therefore  they  do."    Genius,  and 
specially  when  moved  by  strong  passions,  is  liable  to  such 
delusion.    Napoleon  never  made  mistake  in  his  military  ar- 
rangements.   However  new  and  daring  Jiis  combinations,  they 
--^  -"„d     But  in  his  political  plans  for  Europe  and  the 
world,  fascinated  by  his  dream  of  universal  empfre,  he  was 
extravagantly  deluded.     He  not  only  weakened  himself  in 
Spain,  and  lost  a  great  anny  in  Russia,  but  afterward  rejected 
just  and  liberal  arrangements  for  peace.f 

Duties :  ^  1-  There  are  important  duties  connected  with 

these  habits  of  mind. 

memo.;'*"""""'  .   ^^-^  ^''^'''^  ^""^  *^"''*^«  fonnded  on  the  prevalence 

remem'berin.  "  ""  ^  "''""  ^'  ^'^  ^^^^^^^^  ^^  ~-g  - 

Tlie  minds  of  men  may,  i„  this  view,  form  three  classes. 

By  conjecture,  and  speaking  without  attempt  at  precision,  we 

t  See  Tliiers^s  "Consulate  and  Empire." 


DUTIES,    AS    ENDOWilENTS   DIFFER. 


67 


may  say  that  out  of  every  one  hundred  persons,  about  three- 
fifths  will  have  capacity  for  both  reasoning  and  remembering 
well,  if  that  capacity  be  developed  by  education  and  self-cul- 
ture. These  may  form  one  class.  But  about  one-fifth  will  be 
found  so  feeble  in  the  reasoning  power,  that  no  educational 
training  can  form  comprehension  for 'principles  or  sagacity  for 
deductions.  These  are  a  second  class.  About  one-fifth  will 
have  strong  reasoning  powers  with  little  aptitude  for  clear  and 
lasting  memory.     These  form  a  third  class. 

The  duty  for  one  of  the  first  class  who  possesses  both  powers 
is  to  cultivate  both. 

But  as  few  in  this  class  will  possess  those  powers  in  an 
equal  degree,  it  is  a  duty  to  cultivate  specially  the  power 
which  is  weakest.  Thus  he  who  is  fond  of  reasoning,  but  dis- 
likes the  tasks  of  memorizing,  should  exercise  his  memory 
enough  to  remove  the  incapacity  or  disinclination.  He  who 
shrinks  from  reasoning,  because  for  him  it  is  more  onerous 
than  committing  things  to  his  memory,  should  set  himself 
tasks  of  deduction,  till  he  has  unfolded  the  latter  power.  The 
deficiencies  from  nature  should  thus  be  removed  by  Culture. 

The  duty  for  the  second  class,  whose  power  of  reasoning  is 
deficient,  is  to  cultivate  those  branches  of  knowledge  which  do 
not  require  reasoning.  When  an  inherent  defect  from  nature 
•s  found  to  exist,  by  the  absence  of  all  deductive  power,  time 
should  not  be  wasted  in  attempting  to  get  those  acquisitions 
which  imply  strict  reasoning. 

[Tlie  duty  of  one  who  has  entered  the  Military  Academy, 
and  who  has  then  found  himself  deficient  in  the  reasoning 
power,  is  to  resign.  The  sciences  cultivated  there,  demand 
mathematical  reasoning.  War  requires  that  a  commander 
shall  be  able  to  draw  conclusions  wisely  from  facts.  The 
absence  of  such  a  power  thus  unfits  alike  for  the  Academy  and 
for  higher  grades  in  the  Army.  But  in  so  resigning,  no  one 
should  feel  disgraced  or  discouraged.  He  may  have  taste  and 
talent  for  other  studies,  or  for  another  profession.  He  is  sim- 
ply not  adapted  to  specific  studies  for  a  particular  profession.] 


68 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


The  duty  for  the  third  class  is  similar.     It  is  to  follow 
nature,  by  preferriug  those  studies  and  choosing  those  voca- 
tions which  require  reasoning,  rather  than  those  which  require 
accuracy,  completeness,  and  durability  in  the  memory. 
As  to  imagina-  _    (2-)  There  are  duties  founded  on  the  prevalence 

in  one's  nature  of  the  power  of  imagination. 
The  duties  are,  on  the  one  hand,  to  give  culture  and  order 
to  the  imagination  ;  on  the  other,  to  restrain  its  excesses  We 
give  culture  to  it  by  reading  and  imitating  works  of  the  imagi- 
nation. We  give  order  by  restraint  from  memory  in  all  staL 
ments  of  fact ;  by  restraints  from  reason  and  judgment  in  esti- 
mating the  practical  value  of  our  own  inventions. 

We  restrain  its  excesses  by  checking  conscientiously  the 
tendency  to  overstate  or  understate  when  the  illusions  of  fancy 
are  awakened  by  feeling.  We  restrain  ourselves  from  delu- 
sions by  submitting  our  inventions  to  the  judgments  of  other 
men,  or  by  laying  them  aside  till  the  glow  of  creative  action 
has  subsided,  and  then  applying  our  own  cool  and  severe 
judgment. 

Such  are  the  general  habits  for  knowledge. 

Transition.  ^^'  ^^  ^^^  next  to  consider  those  which  are 

particular. 

Tlie  particular  are  those  required  for  a  good  student. 
13.  Before  the  habits  of  studv,  we  need  to  determine  the  re^ 
quirementa  for  study. 

Kequirements  The  requirements  for  study  may  be  summpd 

for  study:  ;„      7.7        /         7      7  J  J    uc  suiiimea 

m^tiberal  and  adequate  arrangements, 

1.  In  Subjects;        ^^'^  ^'^^^  ^^'^^^^^  ^e  liberal  arrangements  as 

regards  suhjects. 

If  any  thing  be  fixed  by  the  universal  experience  of  man- 
kind,  It  IS,  that  general  education  must  precede  professional 
The  experiment  has  been  tried  repeatedly  in  all  countries,  to 
have  the  second  without  the  first,  to  give  special  trainin<.  for 
one  profession  without  general  culture  before  it.  Uniformly 
the  experiment  has  produced  evil  consequences  for  the  indi- 
viduals,  the  professions,  and  the  public.     The  individuals  are 


GENERAL  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  EDUCATION. 


69 


special  and  mechanical  in  their  professional  views.  The  pro- 
fessions— Law^,  Medicine,  Theology,  War,  Statesmanship — 
sink  to  routine.  The  public  sufiers  by  not  having  men  in  the 
different  posts  of  society  adequate  to  the  demands  made  upon 
them.  In  England,  at  one  time,  the  idea  was  entertained,  that 
the  way  to  make  a  good  lawyer  was  to  cut  off  the  university- 
course,  and  to  put  the  youth  as  apprentice  to  a  lawyer.  The 
miserable  results  were  sufficient  to  indicate  the  greatness  of 
the  mistake. 

Accordingly,  in  all  civilized  countries,  some  course  of  liberal 
and  general  culture  is  provided  before  the  study  of  the  great 
professions.  In  ancient  Greece  a  general  course  on  the  sci- 
ences and  arts,  called  a  course  of  philosophy,  was  given  by 
lecture.  The  same  general  plan  is  adopted  on  the  continent 
of  Europe,  and  most  systematically  in  Germany.  There  the 
university  follows  the  gymnasium,  and  precedes  professional 
study.  In  England  is  the  university  course,  with  ample  ar- 
rangements for  reading ;  and  in  the  United  States,  the  colle- 
giate. Such  arrangements  declare  the  common  conviction 
and  the  uniform  experience  of  human  generations.  Whoever 
attempts  to  disregard  this  experience  will  find  that  he  has 
made  a  fatal  mistake.  He  will  discover  that  professional 
knowledge  without  general  culture  is  a  sword-blade  without  a 
handle.  It  is  general  education  which  furnishes  the  handle  for 
the  weapon. 

(2.)  There  should  be  liberal  arrangements  as 
regards  time.  Learning  should  begin  early  and 
continue  long.  Then,  habits  of  study  begin  with  the  first 
periods  of  life,  and  a  taste  for  learning  is  formed.  The  late 
learner  is  liable  to  the  contrasted  obstacles.  For  all  the  great 
professions  the  training  should  continue  long.  Wherever 
there  is  a  choice  to  be  made  between  a  longer  and  a  shorter 
time,  the  longer  should  be  always  preferred  when  practicable. 
The  reason  is  evident.  Society  demands  good  attainments  in 
all  professions.  The  primary  duty  in  planning  a  course  ot 
study  is  to  look  to  this  public  interest.     There  is  no  danger  on 


2.  In  time. 


70 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


the  side  of  length,  since  men  cannot  be  too  well  prepared. 
There  is  danger  on  the  side  of  abbreviation,  since  men  unpre- 
pared at  starting  have  seldom  the  ability  or  will  to  supply 
deficiencies  afterwards.  In  elder  countries  the  age  for  com- 
pleting preparation  for  the  higher  professions,  is  about  twenty- 
eight.  A  man  who  fulfilled  every  requirement  for  the  most 
responsible  positions  in  the  French  service,  would  have  at- 
tained nearly  to  that  age.  In  the  United  States,  the  age  has 
been  about  twenty-one,  but,  taught  by  sad  experience,  the 
country  is  approaching  twenty -five. 

14.  The  duties  corresponding  to  these  facts  are  on  the  part 
of  the  student:  to  welcome  general  attainments,  and  never 
voluntarily  to  deprive  himself  of  the  time  necessary  for  a  per- 
fect traininor. 

Haying  seen  the  requirements,  we  now  come  to  the  habits* 
in  which  these  duties  will  be  incorporated. 
Habits  for  the      ^^'  The  habits  required  for  the  student  are: 
student :  Strong  Purpose,  Attention,  Reflection,  Meth- 

od, Industry,  Constancy. 

1.  strong  (1.)  There  must  be  Strong  Purpose,  because 

purpose;  j^^  ^^,^^  i^^^.^^  ^^jj  without  a  good  will  to  learn. 

(«.)  He  who  studies,  must  kindle  his  will  by  making  the  future 
present.     This  rousing  of  the  will  should  take  place,  not  only 
at  the  beginning  of  terms,  or  after  glances  at  the  world,  or 
after  letters  from  home— times  when  most  students  make  re- 
solutions-but  daily,     (b.)  This  good  will  is  to  be  applied  not 
only  to  those  studies  for  which  he  has  an  inclination,  but  to 
those  which  he  likes  less.     Unless  he  have  a  want  of  capacity 
from  nature,  he  should  bend  his  faculties  to  those  subjects  for 
which  he  ha^  less  affinity,  that  he  may  work  out  (accordinc.  to 
Lord  Bacon),  "  the  knots  of  the  mind."    (c.)  He  should  value 
alike  the  general  studies,  and  those  strictly  professional,  since 
the  latter  without   the  former  are,  as  before  stated,  like  a 

A  I'^r^jf  !n!'^  r^r^  ^^^°  ^^'^'^^  mentioned  as  duties  under  Educational 
Authonty  (68,  69).     They  are  now  to  be  regarded  as  belonging  to  Self-improve- 


HABirS   FOR  A   GOOD   STUDENT. 


71 


Contrasts,     t 


2.  Attention;   j 


sword-blade  without  a  handle,  (d.)  The  will  should  be  sus- 
tained through  the  whole  course  appointed.  The  curtail- 
ment of  that,  by  one's  own  act,  for  some  temporary  purpose, 
without  compulsion,  is  a  wrong  to  himself.  It  is  sacrificing  the 
future  to  the  present.  It  is  a  wrong  also  to  the  profession,  and 
to  society. 

The  contrasted  faults  are  Aversion  to  study; 
Indifference;  Self -indulgence^  yA\\{^  makes  ap- 
plication only  to  favorite  subjects ;  Carping,  the  depreciation 
of  all  or  a  part  of  the  subjects  embraced  in  education ;  Im;pa- 
tience,  which,  for  a  temporary  purpose,  cuts  off  a  part  of  the 
essential  course  of  preparation. 

(2.)  There  must  be  Attention,  the  concentra- 
tion of  thought  and  will,  without  distraction,  on 
the  subject  under  examination.  JSTo  man  can  learn  without 
attending  to  that  which  he  is  to  learn.  He  learns  best  who 
gives  most  of  that  attention. 

The  contrasted  fault  is  Inattention.  Its 
causes  indicate  the  remedies:  {a.)  This  maj 
come  from  want  of  will.  The  remedy  is  then  from  the  last 
duty.  A  strong  purpose  must  be  formed  by  bringing  up  the 
proper  motives,  ip.)  Inattention  may  come  from  past  habits, 
unfavorable  to  the  concentration  of  thought.  The  remedy  is 
then  the  same,  but  with  the  addition  of  writing  an  outline  ot 
the  lesson  studied,  {c.)  Inattention  may  come  from  distract- 
ing objects  that  have  engrossed  the  mind.  Will  to  banish 
them,  and  writing  an  outline  of  the  lesson,  will  give  relief  to 
every  zealous  student. 

(3.)   There  must  be  Eeflection,  because  no 
man  learns  well,  who  does  not  turn  the  subject  in 
his  own  thoughts.     Mental  food  must  be  digested  and  made 
part  of  one's  self.     After  a  lesson  has  been  read,  it  must  be  re- 
viewed, and  gone  over  in  the  thoughts. 

The  opposed  fault  is  unwillingness  to  tJdnJc, 
This  fault  comes  from  mental  indolence.  Amono^ 
its  fruits,  it  produces  skimming.     Skimming  is  adopting  some 


Contrast. 


3.  Beflection; 


Contrast. 


72 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


4.  Method ;  ^^•)  ^I'ere  must  be  Method,  and  that  the  best 

Ace    di::,^:;"""  "-^'  -  -^  "'>--K  that  whi.h\s  .od! 
general  and  thl  !     1  ^'^  '"'"'  ^""^  P'^"^  *'«••  «t"dy  in 

^        uj  reaaing ,  it  is  active  bj  writing 
Accordingly,  there  should  be  a  blmV  h.A   t 

of  stnd,,  in  .hich  the  lean.o  r^il  tl  ^.t?"'  "'^■"* 
cises,  or  questional  nr  t.,1    *  •  analysis,  or  exer- 

fami liar  e  "ami  L  "  7'^""''^'  "'^"^  ^'^'^'^  l^^^"-    A 

Geograph  , T  „  hat  ol"  ^?'^^.  ^^  f  "^'-^'ic,  or  in  that  of 
that°its'p;obL:s  t^tL^:^:^^°7^  ,^-  requires 
drawn:  the  other    tl.of  '  ^'""■'  *'"^*  ^'^Ps  be 

The  sums,  th  tl  ^  ^e^^^^^^        "  *""'^''°"^  ^^  -'«-• 
hand,  whi  h  make    L         ."■'''  "''  ^'"'"'^'^  '^''"^  V  the 

-Wthesuy::tu  :;Ltr^^   -^^  ^^^?^™-^  - 

be  extended  to  all  sul.ip.f  ^      T,        ,  ^'''''^'  ''  '""P'^  to 

active  as  well  as  ^C  '  ''^  ™'"'  ^"'  ^^  -'^-™'3^ 

desT/tlr^^'  '^"'  '  '^"°"  ^""^^*''°^^^^'  -<^ 

«.inda8try;  (^O   There  must  be  Indcstet.    Without  in 

c.a»t  ''''«  "I'l"""'  f»«lt.  .r,  indolence  «nd  wast,  of 

.r.e  subjec.  •    """  ""'"'^  '='»"»  •»  "•«>'"■  b~oh  rf 


INTELLECTirAL   VIRTUES   FOE   ACTION. 


73 


Contrast. 


Contrast. 


(6.)  There  must  be  Constancy.  A  temporary 
application  of  the  mind,  under  some  momentary  '  ^^^  *^*^* 
impulse,  is  not  sufficient  for  sound  learning.  Steady  persev^e- 
rauce  is  demanded.  Continuity  is  requisite  for  acquisition. 
In  some  studies,  continuity  from  day  to  day  is  tlie  important 
element.  This  is  the  case  in  languages.  Ten  minutes  a  day, 
with  unbroken  continuity,  given  to  one  language,  will  secure 
its  preservation,  and  even  admit  advancement  in  it.  This  has 
been  proved  by  experiment.  It  is  the  plan  of  nature  for  the 
child  in  learning  to  speak.  Those  who  leave  intervals  may 
give  much  more  time  and  effort,  but  as  there  is  a  w'ant  of  con- 
tinuity, the  most  valuable  element  for  acquisition  is  absent, 
and  their  efforts  are  like  the  steps  of  one  who  is  climbing  up  a 
hill  of  sand.  Continuity,  the  indispensable  ingredient  for  lan- 
guage, is  required,  but  in  differing  proportions  by  all  subjects. 

The  opposed  faults  are  fitfulness  and  dram- 
ming. The  one  is  study  by  fits,  when  the  humor 
seizes  the  mind  ;  the  other  is  crowded  acquisition  under  some 
spur,  such  as  that  of  an  approaching  examination.  Cramming 
burdens  the  mind  without  feeding  it. 

These  are  the  special  habits  required  for  a 
good  student.  With  them  terminates  the  sub- 
ject of  Intellectual  Virtues  for  Knowledge. 

The  next   subject  is  that  of  the  Intellectual  Virtues  for 
Action. 

2.  Intellectual  Virtues  for  Action. 

16.   Intellectual  Virtues  for  Action   are  the  intellectual  Vir- 
good  habits    necessary  for   attaining   proposed  ^^^^  for  Action, 
ends  by  the  wise  observation  and  use  of  means. 

They  are  included  in  the  Virtue  of  Prudence.    Summed  in  one. 

Prudence  (according  to  Varro)  is  from  porro  Definition  from 
and  vid^ns^  and  means  literally  seeing  afar.    Ac-  '^^^^^ 
cording  to  the  word,  its  office  is  to  look  afar  into  the  future, 
and  to  estimate  the  consequences  of  actions. 


Transition. 


't 


74 


PEACTICAL  ETHICS. 


INTELLECTUAL   VrRTCES  FOE  ACTION. 


75 


Division 


1.  Parts. 


Definition  from  Prudence  (trora  the  thing)  is  a  virtue  intel- 
tiie  category.  ^^^.^^^  ^^^  jpracticol,  giving  counsel  in  single 
actions;  directing  in  t/ieni  what  should  he  done,  or  left  undone, 
to  attain  good  and  avoid  evil  consequences. 

17.  The  divisions  are:  ihQjparts  of  Prudence, 
and  the  suljjects  of  Prudence. 

The  parts  are  the  particular  virtues  into  wliich 
prudence  can  be  divided.    An  example  is  Cau- 
tion.    It  is  a  special  virtue  under  the  head  of  Prudence. 

The  subjects  are  the  persons  whom  pnidence 
direct*.  Tho^  ixir^oos  are  imlividual  <»r  colleo- 
tl  ve.  An  example  of  t!ic  <iret  is  a  pmdcnt  nuui ;  of  the  second, 
A  congrw,  a  pariiamcnt,  deUbcrating  on  a  law,  and  niakiii^  if 
wiVljr,  ^ 

IS.  The  partk-tihir  virtue*  under  prudence  refer  «i>ociaJly  U 
tJie  rtsMlts  of  an  action ;  tlio  cireutn^ianees  or  the  meang. 

fiftieour  vir.      ^"^  *®  ^"^^^^  ^'»^  «^'"^  ^  Vommn ;  for 
totti^undir  ftu-  the    circiir.^tanceB,    CracrM.-<r>xTiox ;    fur    the 

meiui*,  SoiJcm:i«.  Foreright,  eirtMiDwpectiou, 
folicitude  arc,  aoeordinglv,  tliivc  partkuliir  virtue*  under 
prudence. 

[TIk'j  are  of  pecuhar  and  immense  value  in  the  niilitar? 
profcwion.] 

W9tmiighL  ^*'  '^^^  ^'''^"^  Monging  to    tlie  result  or 

end  of  an  a«:l3on  ig  FoEKwoirr.    It  U  the  habU 
of  viewhff  future  coimyuenets  as  if  present, 

Tliis  habit  is  ei^ntial  fur  wi«c  action,  J^cci^^  a^J^  ^^  {^ 
act4<m  tciat  jnuncijpUi  art  in  Inotd^Ifff.  Thev  are  the  general* 
from  which  parthiulnrB  result  From  principles,  dearly  iiccn, 
we  infer  oondusions.  &>,  from  ends  clearly  foreseen,  wo  infeJ 
meana.  In  leaaoaiog,  Uie  prineiplee  wlwn  diatinetly  c^>iiccived 
suggest  their  proper  eonclu^on*.  Corre.sjxmdentlv  in  action, 
the  reenlts  (neoejaary,  pn,biible,  ami  poeaiblo),  bkng  clearly 
conceived,  will  «iggeat  tlte  proper  mean*  for  the  result.  Tlio 
•ct  of  mind  by  which  we  conceive  of  futnro  coQBequenoea  at 


O^otTvrt. 


clearly  as  if  they  were  existing  facts  is  an  act  of  Foresight. 
The  act  repeated  forms  the  habit. 

In  recent  times,  Napoleon  I.  presents  a  strik- 
ing example  of  Foresight.  His  mind  conceived 
the  results  of  proposed  battles  and  campaigns  as  strongly  as  if 
they  were  present  or  past.  Keeping  those  results  steadily 
before  liim,  as  a  reasoner  keeps  his  principles,  the  great  man 
went  from  them  link  by  link  to  the  means  adequate  for  those 
proposed  ends. 

The  oixiinary  acting  of  hicu'k  intniU  U  tber»> 
vcTK>,    The  futnie  re^tdts  they  conoeive  India* 
tinetly.    Tlie  pnhient   filln  and  ovcri>owcr8  them.    But  the 
niiiid  can  and  should  be  trained  in  youth  to  thL*  action. 

SO.  CiBCOMBfiarrioM  U  the  hnbit  of  attending 
to  all  the  circum^^tancos,  which  can  have  any 
bearing  on  the  action  and  the  result.    In  the  circunutanoesare 
the  materials  from  which  meana  are  to  be  ftdocted. 

Ctreumapcction  ii^clndcs  OBSEBvjinox  of  what 
k  pre^it ;  Mumoky,  for  what  is  p^kst ;  Teacua- 
BLfc2iE38,  for  tlie  retulta  of  observations  by  others;  and  Cac- 
Tiox  again«^t  dangers. 

Obeurvation  ik  to  Ik?  applied  to  prrnon^  and 
(hinfjs.  We  mnst  know  peraon&,  hecaujte  Uicy 
can  ]>runiotc  or  hinder  our  deaigna.  TbiB  knowledge  of  men  i.i 
obtained  in  general  by  an  under.staudiug  of  human  nature  at 
large,  and  a  special  study  of  the  pereons  who  will  co-operate  in 
tlic  action  piopeeed,  or  oppoie  it  Wo  minit  ondcaror  to  know 
people  not  as  they  seem  to  be,  but  as  they  really  are.  With* 
out  this  insight  of  men,  tlicre  can  bo  no  consnmmate  prudence. 

Tliis  knowledge  of  men*  may  be  obtained  in 
particular  casca,  by  our  own  observation,  or     ^^'^2to*^  ^' 
throogb  otiier  personsw    It  may  be  obtained  br 


^  The  mbttenco  of  tlit  r«miHc«  co  U»  kao«lk|g:c  of  mie  U  ia  Bacon    Tbo 
(^asriBtloo  of  sua  U  oftt n  z«eded  in  o  coart'BiMtiil,  whca  tng^ii^  rrtdsoco. 


Ito  Slvlitd&t. 


Otaflmtlea. 


76 


PRACnCAI,  ETHICS. 


i 


the  personal  observation  of  them  :  first  as  thev 
1.  In  particular  .  .      ,       .  .^^^  "^ 

cases.  appear  at  any  single  time.     We  should   then 

trust  countenances  and  deeds  rather  than  words 
and  in  words  trust  more  to  sudden  passages  and  surprised  ex- 
pressions unintentionally   produced   by   strong  passions   and 
affections,  than  to  words  set  and  premeditated. 

Secondly,  this  knowledge  of  men  from  personal  observation, 
may  be  drawn,  not  from  a  single  interview,  but  from  their 
natures  and  their  fixed  objects  of  pursuit.  "The  weakest  sort 
of  men  are  best  interpreted  by  their  natures,  and  the  wisest  by 
their  ends."* 

Again,  this  knowledge  of  men  may  be  derived,  not  by  per- 
sonal observation,  but  at  second  hand  from  other  persons. 
"  Men's  weakness  and  faults  are  best  known  from  their  enemies, 
their  virtues  and  abilities  from  their  friends,  their  customs  and 
times  from  their  servants,  their  conceits  and  opinions  from  their 
familiar  friends  with  whom  they  converse  most.^f 

But  beside  this  knowledge  in  particular  cases, 
one  may  need  a  general  system  for  the  observa- 
tion and  study  of  men.     [Such  a  system  is  often  needed  by  an 
ofiicer  in  command,  and  specially  in  time  of  war,  and  most  of  all 
when  he  must  direct  at  once  military  operations  and  diplomatic 
negotiations ;  because  for  success  he  must  understand  his  subordi- 
nates and  his  enemies.]     For  this  system,  three  means  are  use- 
ful.    The  first  is  to  use  those  who  study  and  understand  human 
nature  most.     Unworthy  agents  are  often  employed.     Among 
the  agents  may  be  included  calm  men,  of  patient  observation"^ 
versed  in  the  business  of  this  or  that  vocation.     And  it  should 
not  be  forgotten  that  a  man  of  the  highest  personal  honor  and 
principle  is  often  the  best  for  penetrating  men,  through  his  own 
delicate  moral  instincts.     But  the  special  need  is  to  have  some 

♦  Bacon.    Advancement  of  Learning. 

f  Bacon.  Advancement  of  Learning.  But,  on  moral  grounds,  this  spying  out 
of  men  can  only  be  justified  where  an  accurate  knowledge  is  necessary  for  impor- 
tant  human  interests. 


INTELLECTUAL  VIRTUES   FOE   ACTION. 


77 


2.  By  a  system. 


one  sincere  friend,  well  versed  in  the  several  kinds  of  men, 
who  will  never  betray  a  secret,  with  whom  one  may  have  con- 
sultation and  free  discussion. 

The  second  is  to  observe,  in  one's  own  deportment,  a  happy 
medium  between  too  much  openness,  and  too  much  secrecy. 
Openness  and  secrecy  can  be  thus  used  at  discretion  only  in 
matters  which  the  other  party  can  know  or  penetrate  at  the 
moment,  or  soon  after.  Frankness  then  produces  liberty  of 
'  speech  on  the  other  side,  and  thus  much  is  learned.  Napo- 
leon, in  his  diplomatic  negotiations,  often  used  this  means 
with  success.*  But  it  is  also  observed  that  secrecy  kept 
by  us  in  matters  which  the  other  party  has  penetrated, 
will  invite  his  confidence  in  communicatino:  to  us  other 
matters.f    He  sees  closeness.     He  gives  reliance. 

The  third  is  to  resolve  that  in  every  conference  and  transac- 
tion we  will  observe  as  well  as  act ;  that  beyond  effecting  some- 
thing, we  will  learn  something.  For  executing  this  purpose  a 
man  must  subdue  himself  to  a  watchful  and  serene  habit  of 
mind  which  he  will  carry  into  all  transactions.  Metternich 
was  an  example. 

Such  are  some  of  the  modes  for  acquiring  a  knowledge  of 
persons, 

With  the  knowledge  of  persons  must  be  joined  that  of 
things. 

For  the  knowledge  of  things  it  is  indispensa- 
ble that  there  be  observation  of  all  things  that 
will  have  influence   on   the  proposed   action. 
This  observation  must  be  complete  as  to  its  quantity,  and  accu^ 
rate  as  to  its  quality. 

*  See  Thiers's  "  Consulate  and  Empire,"  passim. 

f  These  rules  in  "  the  affairs  of  this  life,"  are  drawn  in  their  substance  from 
Lord  Bacon,  and  given  because  the  need  of  some  counsels  of  the  kind  is  so  appa- 
rent, specially  in  the  military  profession.  They  are  rules  of  prudence.  They  can 
be  turned  into  rules  of  cunning,  if  a  man  do  not  "  keep  the  paths  of  uprightness." 
The  writer  protests  against  such  abuse  of  them. 


.-o  cxxc«u      Observation  of 
^  things. 


78 


PRACTICAL    ETHICS. 


[A  military  man,  for  example,  must  carefully  studv  the 
ground  It  he  study  it  from  an  accurate  map,  he  should  con- 
ceive of  It  as  f  he  saw  it.  If  he  study  it  by  observation,  on 
the  ground  itself,  he  should  fix  the  image  of  it  in  histhou4ts 

ory  alone.    This  was  the  habit  of  mind  in  the  first  Napoleon.] 
Memcay.  (^'^  Memoet  is  to  be  applied  to  all  past  events 

which  furnish  causes  to  promote  the  efi-uct  pro- 
posed, or  precedents  to  guide  the  course  of  action.  Thus  a 
commander  directing  an  attack  on  a  harbor,  should  see  if  th;re 
be  not  some  old  survey  proving  the  existence  of  a  ne<.lected 

should  thmk  over  all  the  military  precedents  in  which  the  dr- 
cumstances  ..ere  similar.     For  a  lawyer  or  physician  the  course 
IS  the  same.    So  ,t  is  in  all  transactions  of  business. 
Teadubienea^  ^^'^  Teachableness  (but  without  credulity) 

IS  to  be  applied  to  information  derived  from 
other  persons,  whether  by  verbal  communications,  by  corre- 
spondence orm  books.   ByTeachablcnessisheremeant,  aptness 

fu  e  to  hear  and  examine  the  reports  of  those  who  bring  him 
valuable  information,  or  who  would  not  believe  well  grounded 
statements,  simply  because  they  contradicted  his  preconceived 
opinions,  would  commit  a  great  folly.  He  would  be  foolish 
through  obstinacy.  Tl.is  good  habit  of  prudent  docility  stands 
between  the  extremes  of  obstinacy  and  credulity. 
Caution.  (*•)  Caution  is  to  be  applied  to  dangers,  alike 

those  actual  and  visible,  and  those  conceivable- 
It  was  the  rule  of  great  Captains  like  Cresar  to  "leave  nothin. 
to  fortune"  (nothing  which  could  be  controlled  through  ca„° 
tion).  It  was  the  habit  of  Napoleon  I.  to  estimate  all  the 
contingencies  and  chances  of  a  battle,  favorable  and  unfa-  . 
Torable,  and  to  be  secure  in  each  single  one  over  which  he  had 
control  He  would  number  them ;  speaking  of  them  for 
example,  as  thirty  on  one  side,  and  seventy  on  the  other 


rNTKLLECTUAL    VIBTITES   FOR  ACTION. 


79 


Solicitude. 


These  are  the  habits  of  mind  required  for  the  circumstances 
of  actions ;  habits  in  which  all  persons,  and  specially  the  young, 
should  train  their  minds.  Though  military  illustrations  are 
used,  the  idea  should  not  be  formed  that  these  and  others 
which  follow  are  only  requisite  for  one  profession.  They  are 
general.  They  are  needed  in  all  employments  and  transactions. 
21.  The  end  thus  being  seen  by  Foresight,  and  circumstances 
by  circumspection,  the  ri/jht  use  of  means  is  to  follow.  This 
right  use  of  means  demands  Solicitude,  third  of  the  great  di- 
yisions  of  Prudence. 

SoLicrruDE  is  the  habit  of  mind  requisite  for  a 
sustained  and  earnest  use  of  means,  till  the  end 
is  secured. 

For  the  use  of  means,  there  are  two  evident  requirements. 
First,  they  must  be  carefully  selected.  Secondly,  they  must  be 
earnestly  applied. 

Solicitude  includes  two  habits  for  the  selection  of  means; 
they  are  iNVEjaTVENESs  and  Judgment  :  two  for  their  applica 
tion  ;  they  are  Energy  and  Yigilance. 

(1.)  Inventiveness,  in  practical  matters,  is  the 
hah  it  of  seeing  readily  in  every  thing  hiown,  its 
capacity  to  produce  results.  It  is  sometimes  called  presence  of 
mind,  sometimes  shrewdness,  sometimes  fertility  of  resource, 
sometimes  practical  sagacity.*  The  French  call  it  in  military 
affairs,  coup  d'mil^  the  eye-glance  of  a  commander,  by  w^hich 
he  sees  at  once  a  condition  of  things,  and  all  its  capabilities. 
In  very  recent  times,  it  was  shown  by  Todleben,  in  the  defence 
of  Sebastopol.  But  of  all  military  men  that  ever  have  lived, 
Hannibal  possessed  it  in  the  highest  degree.  He  saw  capabili- 
ties in  things  which  to  the  eyes  of  other  men  presented  noth- 
ing available.  Driven  to  the  country  of  Antiochus,  and  having 
a  sea-fight  impending,  he  bethought  him  of  the  serpents  which 
filled  the  region,  and  had  them  enclosed  in  earthen  jars,  to  be 

*  In  virtues  for  knowledge,  sagacity  is  applied  to  deductions ;  in  those  for  action, 
to  means. 


Inventiveness. 


80 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


flung  from  the  masts  on  the  deck  of  the  enemy,  to  embarrass 
hem  at  he  moment  of  the  hand-to-hand  attack.    He  secured 
the  wonderful  victory  of  Cann^,  by  using  dexterously  the  pe- 
cuhar  d,spos.t,on  of  one  of  the  Roman  consuls;  by  selecting, 
near  the  sea,  a  field  of  battle,  which  should  seem  a  place  of  l^l 
refuge  for  desperate  men,  and  yet  be,  for  the  Roman  army  an 
enclosed  trap  from  which  they  could  not  withdraw;  by  sour- 
ing a  time  when  the  wind  from  Africa  blew  the  sea-sand  strong 
over  the  heads  of  his  men  into  the  faces  of  his  foes ;  and°by 
postmg  Ins  men  so  that  they  could  not  be  broken,  and  yet  could 
act  more  and  more  on  the  flanks  of  his  enemy 

This  quickness  of  Invention,  though  a  gift  of  nature,  can  be 
developed  to  a  certain  extent,  by  training.     Let  a  man  con- 
ceave  m  sohtude  of  the  circumstances,  with  all  their  eombina- 
t.ons  m  winch  he  will  be  called  to  act,  and  then  think  what 
could  and  should  be  done.     The  mihtary  man  should  study  the 
exploits  of  Hannibal,   imagine  himself  in  his  position,   and 
try  to  conc-e.ve,  step  by  step,  the  workings  of  that  creative 
gemus,  till  his  own  thoi.ghts  begin  to  act  in  a  similar  inventive 
manner.     He  may  then  do  tl»e  same  with  other  great  captains. 
Rut  when  becomes  to  his  profession,  let  him  follow  precedents 
ne^er  wuh  servile  imitation,  but  rather  with  emulation,  as  if 
tlnnkmg  what  would  these  great  men  do  if  they  were  in  my 
place  ?    For  this  there  must  be  Judgment,  the  next  habit. 
Jadpnent.  ^^"^  Judgment,   in   practical    matters,   is   tke 

power  of  estimating  and  graduating  means  ao- 
cordtng  to  thetr  value  for  the  proposed  end.  Judgment  deter- 
mines the  relative  importance  of  all  instrumentalities.  In  acts 
ot  sound  judgment,  the  essentials  for  the  end  are  to  be  put 
first,  and  kept  first ;  to  be  secured,  and  to  be  defended  against 
all  contmgenoes.  The  attendant  and  subordinate  means  are 
then  to  be  provided  for  in  their  proper  degrees.* 

*  The  analogy  with  the  process  learned  in  Grammar  of  analyzing  a  sentence  by 
usefuUy.     In  action  and  m  speech,  we  need  like  habits  of  mind. 


INTELLECTUAL   VIRTUES   FOE  ACTION. 


81 


[Wellington  and  "Washington  are  examples  in  recent  times  of 
commanders  in  whom  judgment  predominated.  The  crowning 
habit  of  Wellington's  military  genius,  was  judgment  in  seeing 
and  securing  the  essential  things.  This  was  seen  both  in  his 
position  at  Torres  Vedras,  and  at  Waterloo. 

In  military  matters  the  judgment  of  Napoleon  I.  was  equal 
to  his  wonderful  inventiveness.  It  was  in  political  affairs,  or  in 
those  where  military  measures  were  subordinate  to  political  de- 
signs, that  he  showed  the  absence  of  wise  discretion.  There  his 
great  political  conceptions,  creations  of  his  inventive  faculty, 
dazzled  and  overpowered  his  judgment.] 

This  habit  of  judgment  can  also  be  developed  to  some  extent 
by  self-culture.  In  any  proposed  course  of  action,  let  a  man 
conceive  of  all  the  unfavorable  circumstances  which  could 
arise,  and  then  consider  what  means  will  be  certain  to  defend 
him.  Let  him  ask  himself,  what  is  that  one  thing,  with  which 
there  can  be  no  failure,  and  without  which  success  is  uncertain. 
Let  every  one  remember  that  his  resources  are  not  so  much  to 
be  numbered  as  weighed. 

Invention  and  judgment  have  a  mutual  influence.  They 
often  tend  to  counteract  each  other.  The  inventive  man,  led 
away  by  his  own  creations,  is  liable  to  be  wanting  in  a  sound 
cool  judgment.  The  man  of  discretion  and  judgment  is  liable 
to  depreciate  the  real  value  of  new  resources  which  inventive 
men  may  suggest  to  him.  Care  must  be  used  to  prevent  this 
counteraction.  Every  person  should  endeavor  to  cultivate  both 
powers,  and  so  to  possess  one,  as  not  to  obstruct  the  perfected 
action  of  the  other. 

Such  are  tlie  habits  for  selecting  means:  Invention,  that 
none  may  be  overlooked ;  Judgment,  that  the  best  may  be  best 
secured. 

After  means  have  been  selected  out  of  the  mass  of  circum- 
stances, they  are  to  be  applied  by  execution  of  plans.     The 
plans  will  be  of  two  kinds :  those  already  fixed,  and  those 
required  by  new  occasions.     The  first  demand  Energy  ;  the 
6 


\ 

I 


82 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


second,  ViGiLAi.cE.    Both  extend  to  the  most  minute  details  of 
execution. 

Energy.  (^•)  Eneegt  in  general,  is  force  in  action.    It 

is  thorough  working  power.    In  a  less  general 
sense,  it  is  activity  in  the  details  of  execution.    As  here  distin 
gnished  from  Vigilance,  it  is  activity  in  the  execution  of  each 
detail  of  the  plans  foreordained  by  Invention  and  Judgment 

For  example,  a  pontoon  bridge  is  to  be  thrown  over\  river 
at  a  certain  hour.  Assiduity  will  extend  to  preparation,  in  the 
supply  and  transportation  of  tlie  materials  and  men  within  the 
required  time ;  and  then  to  every  particular  in  the  performance 
01  tile  measure. 

Viguance.  ^^'^  Vigilance  is  energy  in  unexpected  occa- 

sions,  using   those   which   are  favorable,   and 
thwarting  the  effect  of  those  which  are  unfavorable 

As  an  example  of  the  favorable,  tlie  enemy  have  mistaken 
the  pomt  of  passage  of  the  river,  and  assembled  at  another 
place.  Every  advantage  to  be  drawn  from  this  unexpected 
Circumstance  must  instantly  be  secured. 

As  an  example  of  tlie  unfavorable,  there  has  come  a  sudden 
change  of  weather,  and  cakes  of  ice  will  be  drifting  rapidly 
down  tlie  stream  before  and  at  the  time  of  crossing.  Means 
must  be  at  once  devised  to  prevent  disaster. 

Vigilance  must  include  Secrecy.  Every  avenue  of  informa- 
tion  for  those  who  would  oppose  must  be  carefully  closed. 

Such  are  the  habits  of  mind  requisite  for  successful  Action: 
Foresight  for  ends;  Circumspection  for  circumstances;  Solicitude 
for  means  and  for  the  execution  of  measures.  These  are  the 
parts  of  Prudence-tlie  special  virtues  into  which  it  may  be 
divided.  Kext  are  the  subjects  of  Prudence. 
Subjecu  of  pm.         22.  Tlie  subjects  of  Prudence  are  the  persons 

directed  by  it  (ch.  iv.,  17),  and  these  are  indi^ 
vtauals,  or  men  collectively. 

indmdual  Pru-         (L)  The  individual  may  use  the  habits  already 

enumerated,  for  his  own  direction,  and  to  attain 


prudence;  personal. 


83 


his  personal  purpose.  Such  use  forms  Personal  Prudence.* 
An  example  is  the  course  of  life  laid  out  for  himself  by  a  man 
in  any  profession  to  insure  success. 

(a)  For  this  Personal  Prudence  which  aims  Its  requirements : 
at  success  in  life,  the  first  and  essential  require-  ^®  ^^^' 
ment  is,  the  perpetual  amendment  of  one's  own  mind.  Ee- 
moval  ''  of  the  impediments  of  the  mind  will  sooner  clear  the 
passages  of  fortune,  than  the  obtaining  fortune  will  remove  the 
impediments  of  the  mind."t  Wealth  and  means,  reputation, 
[rank  and]  honors,  may  be  rightly  sought,  and  used  as  instru- 
ments for  still  farther  success.  But  the  most  common  fault  of 
men  is  to  fly  to  their  ends,  when  they  should  have  care  for  the 
beginnings.  They  put  their  thoughts  on  these  objects,  instead 
of  first  heeding  their  own  personal  qualities,  and  improving 
them.  Prudence  and  heroic  principle  (ch.  iii.,  6)  thus  lead  to 
the  same  rule.  The  will  should  be  fixed  for  life,  on  what  we 
wish  to  be  rather  than  on  what  we  wish  to  do  or  to  have. 

(^.)  The  next  requirement  is  that  a  man  esti- 
mate justly,  both  his  own  powers  within  him, 
and  his  circumstances  around  him.  As  to  his  powers,  let  him 
attempt  nothing  to  which  he  is  by  nature  wholly  unequal.  A 
man  of  bungling  hand  should  not  be  a  surgeon.  A  lawyer 
■jrith  no  gifts  of  speech,  should  rather  devote  himself  to  con- 
reyancing  than  pleading. 

(c.)  As  to  circumstances,  one  should  frame  the 
mind,  where  principle  is  not  involved,  ''  to  be 
pliant  and  obedient  to  occasion."  In  war,  the  plans  must  vary 
with  the  circumstances.  The  policy  of  Fabius  was  good,  as 
against  Hannibal,  at  the  time.  Afterward  it  was  out  of  place. 
As  any  profession  advances,  and  the  public  mind  changes,  the 
elements  for  success  in  that  vocation  are  modified.  It  is  needful 
that  the  "  inner  wheels  of  the  mind"  move,  in  matters  of  prin- 

*  Named  "  Henarchy"  by  old  writers,  meaning  the  government  of  one  {tv  aoyri)  • 
but  the  term  is  not  strictly  classical.  ^^m 

t  Bacon. 


The  Second ; 


The  Third. 


u 


PKACnCAL   ETHICS. 


cple,  harmoniously  with  the  will  of  the  Author  of  the  universe 
(as  an  astronomical  clock  with  the  apparent  motion  of  the  stars) 
and  m  matters  of  mere  expediency  harmoniously  with   the 
wheels  of  circumstances.* 

The  Fourth.  ^^■\  '^'*®  "^^*  requirement  is  to  know  the  evil 

arts  of  one's  own  profession ;  not  to  use  them,  but 
to  overcome  them.  Every  honorable  mind  will  despise  the  foul 
ways,  the  "short  cuts"  to  success,  which  are  known  in  familiar 
language  as  "tricks."  Eventually  every  one  will  find,  that 
the  longer  way  around  is  the  shorter  home,  and  that  honesty  is 

surely"'    ^'''°^'      ""'    *''"    ^^^^''^    ''P"^''*'^'   ""^^^^'^ 

Dnty,  above  all         J"   ^"    *^''  ™'''  ""^  P™'^^"''^   '"  temporal 

other  objecto.         attairs.  It  should  never  be  forgotten  that  success 

,,.,,,        '"  ^'^^  '^  °o'  the  great  end  of  life.    It  is  better 
to  tail  nobly  than  to  succeed  dishonorably. 

Collective  Pru-  ^^"^  ^''"  """^  organized  collectively,  in  Govern- 

deuce.  ments,  in  Armies,  in  Famil  ies,  and  in  various  sub- 

ordinate, less  lasting  associations,  such  as  Socie- 
t.es  and  Corporations.  The  virtues  already  named  are  here  to  be 
applied  for  the  direction,  not  of  one,  but  of  many.  Exercised, 
they  form  Collective  Prudence.f  Special  names  are  given,  ac- 
cording  to  the  association  directed. 

Practical  wisdom  in  directing  a  government  in  political 
measures,  ,s  called  Political  Prudence ;  and  in  framing  laws  for 
and  under  the  government,  Jurisprndence.  The  one  belon<.s  to 
the  Statesman,  the  other  to  the  Lawyer.  The  art  of  government 
>s  the  greatest  of  all.  Such  wisdom  in  directing  armies  and  mil- 
itary organizations  of  all  grades  and  kinds,  on  land  or  sea,  is 
Military  Prudence.    This  belongs  to  the  Soldier.^  Such  wisdom 

muZrcl'mTs -"" '°  '  "^'^^P'"-'-  '"«  -^3  "  Tempera  mutantur.  et  no3 

^^-^::^t^::zi:^i^--^^^ .  .e 

_^Us.g  the  word  Soldier  in  its  most  general  sense,  so  as  to  include  the  naval 


EULES  FOE  GENEEAL  PEUDENCE. 


85 


in  directing  families  is  Domestic  Prudence.  This  belongs  to  the 
Father  and  Mother,  and  as  between  the  two,  specially  to  the 
Husband  and  Father.  Such  wisdom  in  directing  associations, 
is  Administrative  Prudence.  This  belongs  to  the  officers  of  all 
Societies  and  Corporations. 

23.  There  are  certain  general  halits  needed 
both  for  Individual,  and  for  Collective  Prudenno   *"^'"  ^"  *«*  ""i- 

m  -11  .       ,  «cuvc.   leetiveandlndi- 

1  hey  are  miscellaneous  in  their  character,  and  "^"»i  Prudence : 
partake  more  of  the  nature  of  rules  than  habits.  Hence  they 
are  placed  here,  rather  than  under  the  systematic  divisions  of 
Prndence. 

(1).  The  first   rule  is  appropriate    Secrecy. 
This  is  wanted  both  for  individual  and  for  col-  "^^ 

leetive  prudence.    In  his  personal  affairs,  one  must  learn  to 
keep  much  in  his  own  mind.    If  he  be  too  communicative,  he 
Will  be  thwarted  by  other  men ;  competitors,  enemies,  busy- 
bodies,  or  lovers  of  mischief.     This  rule,  so  valuable  for  indi- 
vidual  success  and  tranquillity,  becomes  more  important,  as 
part  of  collective  prndence,  where  a  mass  of  great  interests  is 
afi-ected.     Tims  in  political  prudence,  specially  in  the  adminis- 
trative part,  as  in  negotiation  with  other  powers,  any  viola- 
tion of  secrecy  may  cause  failure.    But  in  military  prudence 
^ecrecy  is  essential  perpetually.     An  officer,  therefore,  must  be 
habitually  reserved  in  regard  to  all  official  matters.     And  when 
he  18  with  those  to  whom  he  can  properly  speak  of  such  as 
have  a  confidential  character,  let  him  habitually  consider  what 
other  ears  can  by  possibility  hear  him.     Battles  have  been  lost 
and  votes  in  courts-martial  known  and  avenged,  by  indiscretion 
in  not  looking  first  outside  of  the  tent,  or  around  the  place  of 
conversation. 

(2).  Another  rule  is  to  provide  for  some  advan- 
tage under  all  contingencies.     We  are  "  to  imi-         *°'"^' 
tate  a  nature  which  does  nothing  in  vain."    Let  the  plans  be 
so  arranged  that  if  one  advantage  cannot  be  gained,  a  subor- 
dinate one  may  be ;  and  that  if  there  be  an  entire  failure  ia 


86 


PEACnCAL    ETHICS. 


"r  a^d  that  Y'";r  *'  '"P"^"""^  '"^^  ^^^<^'  --^thing 
else    and  that  ,t  nothing  can  be  gained  in  the  present  yet  a 

seed  may  be  put  for  something  future;  and  that  if  subs'tantial 
benefits  cannot  be  secured,  yet  good  will  and  good  opinion  may 
be  obtained  to  bnng  forth  their  fruits.     Thusfin  political  pru 
denee   R„ss,a  has  made  great  sacrifices  in  one  reign,  from 
which  she  has  reaped  benefit  only  after  two  or  three,  Z  several 
reigns  following;   according  to  the  maxim,  "Influence  first 
and  territory  afterward."    We  may  take,  as  an  illustration  in' 
imlitary  prudence,  any  successful  retreat  after  defeat,  or  the 
efforts  of  Ney  on  the  retreat  from  Moscow;  and  in  profession- 
al prudence  the  example  of  a  lawyer  defending  a  criminal,  or 
of  a  surgeon  with  a  wounded  man,  determining  the  extent  o< 
amputations.     In  all  such  cases  we  learn  what  we  must  sacH 
Jice,  and  consider  what  we  can  save. 

Important  Supposing  our  means  to  be  arranged  as  re- 

Method.  quired  by  sound  judgment,  the  essentials  bein« 

first,  and  the  subordinates  in  different  degrees'" 
then  the  operations  of  our  thouglits  under  this  rule,  follow  an 
order  directly  the  reverse  of  that  described  under  judgment. 
For  in  the  use  of  judgment,  looking  to  success,  we  provide  for 
essentials  first  and  most ;  and  then  subordinately,  for  tlie  less  im- 
portant means.     On  the  other  hand,  in  this  case,  and  under 
this  rule,  we  suppose  not  success,  but  failure  in  our  main  desi<r„ 
Conceiving  our  essentials  lost,  we  consider  successively,  in  our 
subordinate  means,  what  can  be  saved,  down  to  the  last  and 
least.    Tlie  rule  should  be  carefully  observed  by  the  statesman 
in  negotiations,  and  in  lines  of  policy. 

Third;  (^)-  -Another  rule  is  to  provide  for  Safety 

under  all  contingencies.  It  is  similar  to  the  last. 
A  man  should  not  commit  himself  to  any  thing,  though  it 
«  seem  perfectly  safe,  without  having  an  opening  through 
which  he  can  fly,  or  a  pathway  along  which  he  may  retire.  He 
should  not  put  forth  his  hand  so  far  that  he  cannot  draw  it 
back.    Lord  Bacon  iUustrates  this  by  the  fable  of  the  two 


EULES.  FOE  GENEEAL  PEUDENCE. 


87 


frogs,  whose  pool  was  dry.  They  consulted  about  the  place 
whither  they  should  go.  One  said,  "  Let  us  go  down  into  a  pit, 
for  it  is  not  probable  that  tlie  water  in  it  will  dry  up."  The 
other  answered,  "  True,  but  if  it  should,  how  shall  we  get  out 
again  ?"  Andrew  Jackson,  seventh  President  of  the  United 
States,  seemed  to  common  beholders  so  bold  that  he  was  rash. 
But  those  who  knew  him  best,  observed  that  in  all  his  plans, 
military,  political,  or  personal,  however  daring  they  might 
ai)pear,  he  always  held  some  reserved  measure  for  essential 
safety.  This  rule,  applied  in  military  affairs,  requires  that  the 
line  of  retreat  be  secured. 

(4.)  Another  rule  for  both  private  and  pub- 
lic prudence  is  moderation  in  the  words  and         ^''°^' 
deeds,   both  of  friendships   and  enmities.      This  is  embod- 
ied in  the  saying  of  an  ancient  philosopher :  «  Love,  as  if  you 
might  afterwards  hate ;  hate,  as  if  you  might  one  day  love." 
This  maxim,  however,  must  be  accepted  for  caution  and  mod- 
eration in  private  and  public  friendships  and  enmities,  not 
lor  cunning  and  treachery  in  either  private  or  public  relations. 
For  example,  an  individual  whose  former  friend  had  become 
alienated,  would  regret  the  indiscreet  confidences  made  during 
the  previous  friendship.     Or,  needing  the  good-will  of  one  who 
had  previously  been  hostile,  he  would  have  good  reason  to 
deplore  the  infliction  of  injuries  that  could  never  be  forgotten. 
So  a  nation,  coming  into  hostile  relations  with  a  power  to 
which  imprudent  concessions  had  been  made  under  a  previous 
intimate  alliance,  would  be  compelled  to  see  arrayed  against  it, 
the  resources  which  it  had  itself  bestowed.     In  like  manner  a 
nation  which  had  given  no  bounds  to  its  vengeance  against  a 
particular  enemy,  will  cause  a  resentment  ineffaceable  for  gen- 
erations, and  will  find  in  its  own  need  or  weakness  that  it  can- 
not obtain  the  friendship,  or  even  neutraUty  of  the  other  power 
Thus  important  in  both  individual  and  collective  prudence,  is 
the  rule  for  moderation  and  caution  both  towards  friends  and 
enemies. 


88 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


g,„,„^  Such  are  the  Intellectual  Virtues  for  Action  in 

their  parts  (as  belonging  to  the  end  tlm  -,;     ' 
stances,  and  the  means),  and  in  Lw  suZZtJ^  /T' 
n.en  collectively),  all  reducible  to  Prudence         ^      ^"  ^^  '  " 

Contrasts.  Oj.    tu 

negative  extreme  Iv  '"''  "Z"'"^  '"  ^""^*^°^«  ^'•'^'  ^^  the 
from  dctccfrf  !i,!  T"  "'  ^^«"«----  They  come 
Thoseon  heposSj':  ""-^  T""^""  '"^^  "'^'ff^- 
The,  aris  f  r  ;  o7" -r  ,"""''  ''""^'  ^"^  ^«-- 
of  means.    (•  ,7a)  '"■"'"""=  ''^^  unscrupulous  use 

Special  Ex-  f^"    ^"  individual  prudence  is   a   positive 

ueme.  extreme,  which  is  Fvn,=.cc,        c-  P"''iii^e 

_       ,^  WHICH  JS  iiXCESS  OF  SoLicrruDE.*      It 
consists  m  immoderatp  anri  *„  i     • 
•personal   interests    or  f..r   ^      ^^^  ^"'^  torturing  care  for 

families     Tliista  f    Z     ^     '"^P"''  *^*"   "'^'•^^'^•^  «-  0"r 

stro,  sewLiU  ;iv:  i-rd'  ^r"-^"^^  ^^  ^^  ^^- 

It  comes  from  dispropor  .  ned  ^H      17 ,      'Z''  ''"  '"^^'• 
reliance  on  Providen!r  P  f  °"'*^  ''^  '''''"'"^'^-ted  ^^^ 

exist  incollec  hxt".  T"''  °'  ^"''^'''^^^  '^^  ^^^4 

is  in  pern       is  ;„  'm      ^    .  "'""  "'"^  *^^  "^^  ''  others 
P«ni,  It  IS  an  obligation  to  spare  no  efforts  and  «^  c      • 

fice,  even  to  that  of  life  itself.  ®^*'"" 

ter  .„  the  active  duties  of  life.  eaucation,  the  lat- 

We  now  pass  from  duties  which  regard  the  mind   f    .1 
whose  obiect  is  f,.„„,i  :     .i     ,    ,       °  '"'"'*'  *<>  those 

upon  Him,  for  He  careth  for  you     TrZtin  f^VT"^'    ^"'""^  ""  ^'^  ''^^^ 
war  unto  the  Lord.     I„  every  ttin.h  "^  '"'*  ""  ^^-^^     Commit  thy 

%,  let  your  request,  be  tnad    kno;n I^G  J""'  "^P'"""°»  '""'  ""-"^S-- 


Duties  to  the  Lower  Nature. 


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90 


PEACnCAL    ETHICS, 


CHAPTER   V. 
VIRTUE   AND   PRINCIPLE,    TEMPERANCE 

^tinction  Of       The  body  will  mean,  then,  the  animal  vitality 
Irrational  from   and  the  material  Arfr<.,„v„f         j.  yi    ,  ^' 

Bationai  Part.    •       ,  .    "f  <'"*^  Organization  of  flesh  and  blood 

m  which  the  mind  is  placed      TTn^^,  •♦     a-   . 

on  the  mind  are  included  all  .1.     •        ,  .         ^'  ^^^^*' 

,r.;.,^  •  included  all  the  impulses  which  affect  thp 

rnrud  in  consequence  of  its  union  with  the  body     ^  im 

acts  of  the ttior:  iiTd     b!  Zd  •'  ""''^^^^f^^^  ^-" 
rational   tlnVl-  ™"''-     "^^  "^^nd  is  meant  the  spiritual, 

and  mil        t"^"  '"'''"''  ^^''"'''^  '^  P'^'^^d  ^'tl"»  this  bod^ 
and  made  subject  to  its  impulses.    The  distinction    then   is 
that  the  higher  is  directed  by  reason.     The  body  ai^d  its  im 

Win,!?::  S2  natrTu^"  r^°'  ^'^-"-^  ^"^ 

nature  belonged  ^  Z:Ztu^::'Z:t'lT' 
nature  are  the  present  euhject.  ^  ^'^''' 

Parts  of  \    Rational ;      \   Spiritual   ) 

human  nature;  1     ,  /r^'^"     [  * ^P'"*' 

'   I    Irrational:    j    Animal   ]  Active, Soul 

In  the  first  we  resemble  Pod  •  ,•    h  '     ^  ^^'''''^' ^^^^• 

exampleofthelastZli:^'^^^^^^^^^  in  the  third,  plants.   An 

second,  from  the  ether-  of  the  hTrd  frf       7  "'  "  '""  "^^  ^^'*^'  ^^*^« 

from  the  popular  divi.on  ^  ^  L^^^^^^  ^^^    ^^  ^^  ^epa.ed 

text.    I  have  therefore  used  there  ^Z^TT  "^"'"^  e-Planation  in  the 

part.  eusedthere    bodj  for  the  irrational;  "mind,"  for  the  rational 


DUTIES  TO  LOWER  NATUEE  I    IMPULSES. 


91 


Duty. 


Duty  to  the  whole  nature  must  include  the  lower  as  well  as 
the  higher. 

2.  Duty  to  the  lower  nature  requires  that  we 
give  to  it^  as  to  our  whole  being,  cultii/re  and 
order. 

Duties  relative  to  the  lower  nature  are,  then,  naturally  divided 
according  to  their  objects  ;  which  are,  1,  tiie  lody,       \ 
with  its  immediate  surroundings ;  and,  2,  the  im--     ^^"^^^ 
pulses  arising  from  it. 

1.  Duties  which  refer  to  the  Body  and  ns  Circumstances. 

3.  The  requirements  for  the  body  and  its  imme-  Body:  require, 
diate  surroundings  are  regimen  2^n&  propriety.  n^e^ts. 

By  regimen  there  must  be  care  that  the  body  be,  1,  kept  in 
health;  2,  made  vigorous  by  exercises;  3,  made  pliant  and 
graceful  by  accomplishments.  By  propriety,  there  must  be 
care,  1,  for  bodily  cleanliness ;  2,  for  appropriateness  in  dress, 
and  (except  under  the  necessities  of  labor)  for  neatness ;  3,  for 
order  in  the  things  around.*  It  should  be  observed  that 
aiDpropriateness  in  dress  extends  to  labor  as  well  as  rest  (since 
in  labor,  the  working-dress  is  appropriate),  and  also  to  station 
and  profession,  since  the  dress  should  correspond. 

[These  requirements  show  in  the  correspondent  military  reg- 
ulations and  customs  their  excellence  and  their  utility.  Those 
for  personal  neatness,  for  the  uniform,  for  order  in  the  room, 
tent,  and  camp ;  for  constant  military  exercises,  requiring  both 
strength  and  activity,  are  not  only  demanded  by  military,  but 
by  moral  and  sesthetical  principles.] 

2.  Duties  which  refer  to  Lower  Impulses. 

4.  The  requirements  for    the  Impulses  are,     For  impulses: 
Restraint,  and  Direction.     The  lower  nature,  in     Di?ecti?n: 
all  its  improper  working,  must  be  restrained  by  the  higher;  and 
in  all  its  proper  working,  must  be  directed  by  the  higher 

♦  Order  is  here  mentioned  only  as  a  part  of  propriety  in  appearance. 


02 


PRACrnCAL   ETHICS. 


Batnre  For  this  restraint  and  direction,  there  must  be  a  habit 
whaeh  te,nj>ers,  both  all  in^pulses  within  us,  and  also  their  ex 
temal  manifestations;  givin<r  inwarHlv  Ja  .  '""  "'^'"^  ^x- 
and  deeoru..  Such  'a  tbit  i:"Cre  (LT  o^ald 
enlarged  sense  of  that  word),  signifying'  that  which  Z^  Z, 
Hence,  Temper,  gives  proportion.  That  is  to  say,  the  impulses  de- 
and  th!.  f  tempering  through  restraint  and  direction, 

and  this  tempering  requires  Temperance. 

X-errc."'       J-  '^''T'^^^'"'  ^'^^^  t'-^^ed  to  its  origin  has 

two  meanings,  one  restricted,  the  other  enlarged. 

TEMPEEANCE  AS  A   TIKTIJE. 

A.  Virtue.  .  ^-  temperance,  in   its  restricted  sense    is  a 

ing  their  ..W^.''^'^'^^'^"'''^^^^''"^^-'-^-^^^^^^ 
These  impulses  are  of  two  kinds;   1.  those  implanted  by 
"r^S;        "'^^^f^r  ^^^  P>-eservation  of  the  individual  {L 
«jd  u^o,.io        by  food),  or  of  the  race  by  new  generations :  2 

or  of  the  race.  S:i  :trr':  T''  "'''''  '''''''^ 
and  the  second,  the lll^T^.l^ '''^'  ''''''''  ''  ^^^^^^^ 

H.W  tiey  act.  J\^^  ''''°  <='^*«es  of  impulses  act  with  violent 
words  and  d^ds  '  tl"  ^'^  ^^^^^^ts,  and  subsequently  in 
pulses,  and  toThe  effcSr^"^"^  ''  '"  ''  ''''^'  *"  ^^«  - 

f.S'ai.  ^Pf  ^-/^^--e,  demands  Abs^ekoe,  S^bek- 
D.™™,  and  W  '^'  "  "^^^^''^  ^^  ^^-^-^. 

Sin^r^rcarSi::  ^— t  r -unts^r ' 
r-t:;.^t^t^ettt^r.-^^^^^^^^^ 

videdbvPn^  o  r  *''.^""»*"^'.'"""age  is  the  limitation  pro- 
viaea  by  (rod  and  society,  and  haa  in  Ua  ^«     •    • 
limitations.  '  permissions  proper 


TEMPERANCE   AS   A   VIRTUE:    CAUSES   SELF-RESTRAINT.         93 

The  last  two  vices,  drunkenness  and  lust,    ,,.  -     , 

'  '    Desire,  in  whom 

peculiarly  beset  and  endanger  young  men.  strongest. 

8.  Temperance  applied  to  the  second  class  of  impulses,  the 
irascible  passions,  demands,  when  we  are  excited, 
the  repression  of  excessive  Anger,  of  Cruelty,    ^^^  the  second, 
and  of  Eevenge,  by  Mildness,  Clemency,  and  Placability. 

It  also  requires  the  subjugation  of  hatred  and  malice.     But 
those  subjects  will  be  considered  under  duties  to  others. 

Violent  anger  is  one  of  the  common  faults  of  the  young, 
though  by  no  means  limited  to  them.     Cruelty, 
when  found  in  boys  and  young  men,  seems  to  wvfnge?Tn"^' 
result  from  their  want  of  reflection,  and  the  con-  '^^'*'^' 
sequent  lack  of  sympathy  with  suffering,  and  not  from  an  in- 
herent  deficiency  in  kindness  of  heart ;  since  they  are  naturally 
warm-hearted.     Eevenge  in  its  first  violent  impulses  is  found 
in  the  young,  but  in  its  deadly  perseverance  in  the  old,  or  the 
middle-aged.     All  these  impulses   are  to  be  constantly  and 
vigorously  restrained. 

9.  Temperance,  applied  to  both  classes  of  impulses,  demands 
that  the  restraining  power  be  specially  applied 

to  the  Jlrst  causes  and  beginnings  of  those  im-  be  restSned  in 
pulses.  '  ®**^^' 

As  an  example,  one  passion  of  each  class  will  be  taken  ;  from 
the  first.  Lust,  and  from  the  second,  Anirer. 

10.  The  first  causes  of  lust  are,  for  the  bodv,     t-  ♦ 

n    '         ^  .  .  'J^ '      First  oanses  m 

superfluity  of  nourishment  or  stimulant,^  and  for     ^^^y  and  mind. 

the    mind,    imaginations,   either    self-acting,   or  excited    by 
•reading,  by  pictures,  or  by  living  objects. 

He  who  governs  his  senses  uses  safeguards  against  both. 

(1.)  Safeguards  for   the  body  have  for  their    Safegnards  fcr 
purpose  the  prevention  of  those  secretions  by    the  body: 
which  the  blood  affects  the  animal  life,  and  that,  the  rational 
mind.     They  are  sought  in  regulations  tor  food,  for  sleep, 
and  for  exercise. 

'For  food  (including  fluids),  moral  regulation  requires  that  in 

*  Sine  Baccho  etCerere  friget  Venus 


94 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


In  sleep ; 


flM;  ""  ?»«"tilj  Uiore  be  no  ™«  (7),  ,ud  In  the 

.re  known  bv ",   '^'-         ""^  '°'"'"°"'  '"  ""^  "Wol 

...e/;:ri.:cr.i^  S '"-"»-  '^»^' 

2""0».    A.«e,io,  ,»n.cienti„n,  b„,  iLnfo  Jed  „!     Z  '5 
PV«e..  and  n,.„,  Zfl  t».:  ^SJC  '"^Lr 

;Td'o  'zr;:r .  i;  r  "^  "-r"-- »- 

ri;ff«ro„^  f  *"®  ^*™<'  substances  vary  in 

diflerent  temperaments  and  ages.  ^ 

For  *^..^  tJie  time  of  rest  should  be  the  short- 
and  never  1    T         f     "^^'^  '"'"  ""^^'  '^^  covering  hght 

:=s:rr;:t:::^^^^^^ 

For  e^ercue,  there  should  be  within  each  twenty-four  hours 

In  exercise.         "J^'f ;  ^'^'^  t^at  which  calls  for  strength,  anj 

that  which  calls  for  activitv      A^fl,,.       *• 
qniek  walking,  running  and  all  wJ    I  "*'°°''  ^* 

tion  of  thP  h^l  /      "'  ^"'^  ''^"'^  *  '«P'd  circula- 

come  unt;  le.';  '""'^  '^^"''''  ^^  ^'-"  ''^^  -  sickness 

%  such  abstinence  in  food  in  rlrmt       ^  •      i 
such  hardness  and  activity t;  the  Todv  !o  "         ''  "'  '^ 

=:rnd-^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

[Tliese  moral  safec^uard*?  rliVfof^^  u 

♦  Th.  F  .  '  ^  ^^  ""^^'^^  ^^^  experience, 

*  The  Emperor  Justinian  often  slent  h„f  «..!,. 

years  old.  '^^  ^"*  ^^^  ^°"^.  ^^  lived  to  be  eighty-tiiree 

f  Ecclus.  ixii.  22. 


SAFEGUAKDS  AGAINST   IMPULSES. 


95 


illustrate  the  excellence  of  the  routine  of  a  military  school,  a 
routine  not  belonging  singly  to  one  country,  but  found  in  the 
military  schools  of  all  countries.  Those  of  Egypt  under  Sesos- 
tris,  those  of  Sparta,  of  Crete  in  its  period  of  glory,  of  Eome  in 
the  camp,  and  those  of  chivalry,  present  the  same  great  outlines 
with  those  of  modern  times.  The  soldier  must  rise  early,  sleep 
on  what  is  hard,  have  plain  food,  and  give  a  part  of  every  day  to 
bodily  exercises  which  demand  strength  as  well  as  activity.* 
He  must  "  endure  hardness,  as  a  good  soldier."  This  "  hard- 
ness" promotes  at  once  professional  training,  purity  of  feeling, 
and  soundness  of  constitution.  A  young  person  should 
welcome  with  exhilaration  the  discipline  which  averts  from 
him  that  effeminacy  which  undermines  the  health  and  weakens 
the  mind.] 

Such  are  safeguards  for  the  body. 

(2).  Safeguards  for  the  7ni7id  have  for  their 
purpose  the  prevention  of  impure  imaginations.  thfS?  ^°' 
For  this,  there  should  be  constant  and  earnest  ^°^*^' 
employments.     Idleness  is  the  parent  of  vices.     Also  he  whose 
imagination  is  haunted   by  impurities  must  avoid  solitude. 
The  evil  influences  from  books,  pictures,  and  living  objects 
should  be  avoided  by  following  the  rule  in  the  Bible.     "  I 
made  a  covenant  wath  mine  eyes."t 

Such  are  the  moral  restraints  in  the  body  and  the  mind 
against  this  passion. 

(3.)  Those  influences  which  are  spiritual  are  left 
to  Theology.     It  teaches  that  without  a  divine        Spiritual, 
influence  passions  cannot  be  uprooted. 

11.  The  causes  of  Anger  are  ^redUj>osing  or  immediate. 
The  predisposing  are  mostly  internal  from  the     ^,^,.  ^. 

.     _  xirst  cSiTues  or 

l^odyor  the  mind.     The  immediate  are  mostly     ^^ger. 
external  from  persons  and  circumstances.     An  example  of  an 
internal  cause  from  the  body  is  in  a  state  of  irritability  from 

*  Under  Sesostris,  a  good  run  was  required  before  the  morning  meal.    See  Sir 
Oardiner  Wilkinson's  works  on  Egypt. 
t  Job  ixxi.  1. 


96 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


stimulants  on  the  one  side ;  or  on  the  other,  from  pain,  hunger 
and  s,ckness.  [Those  who  govern  n.en  L  mihtary  or  d  ,' 
r:r:;;  ''^^\--^-'-  ^^-  -tatin^  are  privaL:  z 

stat  i       •';  1^7  '  ''  '"  "*""*'  ^^"-  fro-  tie  mindl  a 

PC  t.  „r  T  '  ".•''  '^'"^"  ''^"^  ^-«  ^-  -  ^-p 

ternal  ca„;  f      "  ^      ^''°"  '"  '"^"-     ^"  ™P'«  "^  -  ex- 
lord   oTaTt  r"?  "  *'"  "^'^•""-"  P~t'-  from  the 
^  ord.  or  acfons  of  another.    An  example  of  an  external  cause 

rom  ccu^stances  is  the  arising  of  disasters.     These  areTm 
mediate  and  emergent  occasions  for  anger. 

Eemedie.,  J^'^  .^^  eo"'>teract  the  predisposing  canses  an 

of  irritation  toff  T  "'^''"^  '"  ''•^"'^  '^^  ""'"^  fr^n^  ^  ^'^te 
ot  irntafon  to  a  kind,  cahn,  and  cheerful  temper. 

(^.)  To  resist  the  immediate  canses  there  must  be  an  en- 
Korai,  °f  *^<f  to  «"'^d"e  tlie  first  motions  of  anger,  when 

wh  n.  tl       •  1    ^^^   ^^'"'  """^  ^'^  ''^'^^'''  fro'n  speech  or  gesture 
^Inle  the  violent  action  endures.    There  should  also  be  prl 
-ousl^the  foresight  of  occasions,  and  the  guardin.  ofTe 
mind  against  their  influence.     A  man  shoull  expect  and  b 
prepa  ed  for  untoward  circumstances  in  every  thin,  which  he 

them  «  th  a  serene  disposition.    An  earnest  and  impulsive  man 

in  nations.    A  man  energetic  and  methodical,  using  eve.v 
a^ailable  means  for  good  results,  but  preparin..  for  dislppoh  t 
-ents,  is  prepared  to  be  patient  when'evHs  ari^e  ''     '' 

all  relations,  alike  those  toward  inferiors  and  superiors  it  is 

norha^'        T"     ^^^'"''  '"^  """^  ■'•"^^""g  obstacles,  could 
not  have  won  his  victories  without  an  unalterable  sweetness  of 

^arituai.  .  ^^'^  ^^t  the  influence  of  religion  is  alone  sufii- 

cient  for  complete  control  of  this,  as  of  other 
passions. 


TEMPERANCE   AS   A  PKINCIPLE  :   GIVES   PEOPOETION.  97 


In  the  same  manner  are  all  the  other  bodily 
receive    restraint    in    the     first    impulses    of 
tlumght. 

12.  The  same  restraint,  from  Temperance  as  a 
to  be  applied  to  all  the  words  and  to  all  the  actions, 
which  result  from  any  violent  bodily  impulses. 
Particulars  will  appear  under  the   next   head. 
Temperance  as  a  principle. 


appetites  to 

Same  rales  for 
other  impulses. 

principle,  is 

Bestraint  to 
extend  to  word*, 
as  well  as 
thoughts. 


TEMPERANCE   AS  A  PRINCIPLE. 

13.  Temperance,  in  the  enlarged  sense  of  the  word,  is  a 
principle,  belonging  to  ali  the  virtues  and  their  Temperance  as 
actions,  and  giving  to  aU  these,  proportion.  perf^gSl.'""' 
(Chap,  i.,  22.) 

Tliis  sense  is  seen  in  the  kindred  words,  derived  from  the 
same  source.  For  example,  the  Latin  word,  temperies,  means 
«  a  tempering  or  mixing  of  diflbrent  things  in  due  proportions." 
In  English,  we  speak  of  tempering  a  sword-blade,  and  giving 
tools  a  jnst  temper;  of  the  prevailing  temperature  of  the  air, 
and  of  the  Uynpcramsnts  of  men.  In  all  these  is  the  same 
fundamental  idea,  that  of  division*  into  right  proportions. 
Temperance  is,  therefore,  as  a  principle,  that  which  gives  moder- 

*  The  original  root,  Dm,  means  to  divide.    This  sense  is  preserved  in  Gr., 
Tspvw,  to  cut,  and  L.,  fempas,  time,  both  from  the  idea  of  dividing. 

From  this  general  sense,  spring  two  classes  of  secondary  meanings.  The  first  is 
that  of  giving  wMsun  and  proportion,  as  the  effect  of  division.  This  is  seen  in  the 
Gothic  family:  as  English,  deem,  doom;  Sax.,  dom,  judgment;  Dan,  doan,  etc  •  in 
the  Slavonic  famUy,  as  Russ,  dumayu,  to  think,  and  duma,  or  dumya,  a  thought- 
m  the  Classic  family,  in  the  words  quoted  above,  to  which  we  may  add  L  damn^ 
condemno,  and  Greek,  ri^r),  honor.  See  Wel^ster  on  the  words  deem,  and  dooh' 
AU  good  judgment  and  estimation  imply  proportion.  William  the  Conqueror's 
"<to»^sday.book,  was  weU  named  as  apportioniw,  lands.  This  idea,  proportion, 
from  division,  passes  into  the  general  meaning  of  temperance. 

The  second  derived  meaning  is  that  of  restraint,  as  the  result  of  division  This 
.8  seen  in  the  English  word  tan>e;  in  Gr.,  Sa^xd,^,  to  tame;  in  L.,  dorno,  dominu.,, 
domtna,  domitio;  in  Goth,  tamia,  and  G.  zlihme.  In  all  these  is  the  same  sense 
that  of  taming  by  breaking.  Thus  we  say  to  tame  a  horse  is  to  b,-eak  him' 
Breakmg  means  at  first  to  divide.  This  sense  of  restraining  belongs  to  Temper^ 
•nee  as  a  virtue;  the  other,  that  of  proportion,  to  Temperance  as  b.  principle 


98 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


ation  and  proportion.     As  a  virtue  it  restrains,  as  a  principle 
It  directs.  ^   ' 

Observes  pro-  I*-  Temperance,  as  a  pnncijile,  directs  to  the 

v^o^-  obser^-ance  oi  proportion  in  the  mind,  the  manr 

ners,  the  ac!:/o«»,  tlie  words.     It  tempers  all. 
(1.)  The  effect  in  the  mind  is  what  is  commonly  called  «  a 

S^dal-^Sa  ;:'"-^"'^"'=^'^  '"•"'J-"     Tlie  particular  disposi- 
•  tions  or  virtues  which  it  includes,  are  the  follow- 
ing. 

(«.)  The  first  is  Decornm.    By  this  is  meant  a  constant 

1.  Decorum :         f  "^  °^  ^*"^''  """^  '''^'''-     ^'^^  *>PP»«<^d  negative 

I'iolt  IS  indifference  to  Propriety.     The  fault  con- 
sists m  insensibility  to  the  proprieties  demanded  for  persons 
times,  places,  circumstances,  relations.     The  positive  extreme' 
IS  the  exaggeration  of  trifles.  ' 

(b.)  The  second  is  a  higli  and  delicate  regard  to  personal 

Hoar""''  ,""*"■*    ^'"'°PP'''^'<^"^i?*t'^e  fault  is  meanness, 

.1  /  1  •  .  ,  ^""'"gness  from  hope  or  fear  to  submit  to 
that  which  demeans  us.  TJ.e  positive  excess  is  Inordinate 
be IfEs  eem.     In  consequence  of  this  weakness,  young  and 

untaught  persons  often  imagine  humiliations  when  none  reaUy 
exist.  "^ 

(c.)  The  third  is  Modesty.    This  is  a  modification  of  the 
8.  Modesty:        ^!;'*-    ^"'^^stj  '^  self-respect  modified.     It  is 

the  habitual  dread  of  consenting  to  any  thin<r  to 
any  thought,  word,  or  deed  unworthy  of  ourselves  or  of'ur 
rdations  to  others.  This  is  the  enlarged  and  old  sense  of  the 
word ;  deference  to  mode,  to  customary  moral  sentiments.  The 
taidtm  excess  is  Modishness,  that  from  defect  is  Immodesty. 

The  derived  and  modern  senses  of  the  word  are  principally 
two,  the  one  as  opposed  to  impurity,  the  other  as  opposed  to 

"In  aU  things  wUIing  to  live  .o.e.Uy."    ZliU  TZ^T  T      I, 

thincy«"nrf>,«  7.        J        .,  **«wm  to  ave  with  a  sense,  "in  all 

^,lSe^"^  ''^  -d  due  fro.  other,  t..ughu.  U>^^^^ 


EFFECTS   FROM   TEMPERAN^CE   AS   A   PRINCIPLE. 


99 


presumption.  Thus,  according  to  the  first  we  speak  of  a  mod- 
est woman,  and  according  to  the  second  of  a  modest  young 
man.  The  suggestions  of  impurity  are  dreaded  by  the  one  as 
unworthy.  The  suggestions  of  presumption  are  dreaded  by  the 
other  as  unworthy.  The  derived  and  common  meanings  thus 
unite  in  that  which  is  primitive. 

(d.)  The  fourth  is  the  will  for  Moderation  in  all  things. 
Moderation  as  here  used  is  rather  a  principle  ex- 
tending to  all  virtues  than  a  special  virtue.  *•  ^<^«atwa- 
Moderation  is  a  principle  restraining  excess  in  all  things.  To 
this  is  opposed  Immoderateness  in  any  feeling,  any  desire,  any 
pursuit. 

(e.)  The  fifth  is  Tranquillity  with  Contentment  preserved 
under  external  annoyances.     To  these  are  op- 
posed Querulousness,   and   Peevishness    under    5- ^^a^l^iiiity. 
personal  discomforts. 

[The  latter  faults  must  be  carefully  shunned  by  an  officer. 
From  the  necessities  of  his  profession  he  must  endure  much, 
and  often  endure  long.  He  should  accordingly  repress  the 
expressions  of  discontent,  and  thus  govern  himself,  avoid 
breaches  of  discipline,  and  set  an  example  to  those  under  his 
command.] 

The  effects  of  this  principle  extend  from  the  mind  to  manners. 
(2.)  Manners  will  spontaneously  receive  certain  qualities 

from  these  dispositions  in  the  mind.     They  should     ^4^  ^ 
,  •/  JLizect  on  man- 

nave  propriety,  dignity,  refinement,  gentleness,     ^«"' 

pleasantness ;  as  the  results  of  the  mental  dispositions  enumer- 
ated. The  correspondent  faults  to  be  avoided  are  carelessness 
in  deportment,  unseemliness,  vulgarity,  boisterousness,  mo- 
roseness.  Shakspeare  includes  all  in  the  comprehensive  rule, 
"  Give  no  disproportioned  thought  his  act."*  The  farther  con- 
sideration of  manners  belongs  to  duties  to  others. 

(3.)  Actions  are  to  receive  the  impressions  of 
these  mental  dispositions.  ^^®^*  ^^  actioM. 

Actions  of  solitude  are  to  be  directed  as  if  the  world  were 

*  Tragedy  of  Hamlet. 


100 


5*EACTICAL   ETHICS. 


looking  on  ;*  actions  of  business  with  system,  deliberation 
and  energy ;  habitual  actions  by  a  settled  order.  In  solitude' 
avoid  improprieties  and  secret  sins.  In  affairs,  do  not  mar 
them  by  confusion,  precipitation,  or  inefficiency.  Let  your 
system  of  lite  be  regulated,  and  let  that  regulation  extend  to 
all  the  things  around  you,  and  to  all  employments.!  ' 
(4.)  The  effects    in    speech    are    restramt    and  direction 

arect  on  words.       ,'"'^/  'P"''^°  ^'^  ^""'^n  ^^^  to  be  restrained 

and  directed.     The  subject  requires  a  more  full 
consideration. 

TeMPEEANCB  Ef  LanGITAGE,    or   SELF-RE^Amr  A^D  DiEEC- 

TioN  IN  Speech. 
15.  This  subject  is  of  peculiar  importance.     The  reason  is 

uSe^  "'  •^''''  '*  ''^^''*'  ^^^'^  'P^^''^  <^*"  <^"t7.  and  all  our 
,„!  ■ ,  '"'''■'*''•  ^'  ^ff'^*^*^  <i"t'^  above  us,  because  in 
our  words  we  may  transgress  against  God  and  human  author- 
"j;  duties  withm  us,  because  he  who  can  govern  himself  in 
-ords  IS  prepared  for  self-government  in  all  things  ;|  duti " 
around  us  because  in  the  great  mass  of  wrongs  to  ofh  rs,  there 
are  more  by  words  than  deeds.  It  affects  ouf  interests  n  t 
world    and  ,n  another.    It  does  so  in  this  world,  since  the 

fruits   of   imprudence  in   language.     It  does  so  in  another 

be  justified,  and  by  thy  words  thou  shalt  be  condemned."    For 
these  reasons  it  requires  special  attention 

form  t  wT  '''"  ?  '"  '  ^^"'^'  '""P^'^--    ^--  of  men 

that  I  sin  not  with  my  tongue."     Psalm  x.,iT  '''"'  '^  "'  ^"'^ 


TEMPEEAN-CE  IN  LANGUAGE:  IN  QUALrTT ;  QtJANTITT.      101 

16.  The  primary  rule  for  temperance  in  speech  is,  Let  your 
words  (like  your  thoughts,  like  your  actions), 
reflect  the  higher  jprinciples  of  action,  never  the        *"^'- 
low  and  unworthy  impulses  of  your  nature. 

Three  streams  are  to  be  made  mirrors  of  what  is  noblest  in 
principle ;  the  stream  of  a  man's  thoughts,  the  stream  of  his 
actions,  and  the  stream  of  his  words.  You  would  not  approve 
an  unworthy  thought  or  action.  Then  do  not  permit  an  un- 
worthy word. 

This  rule  requires  restraint  and  direction,  1.  Generally  in 
all  speech;    2.   Specially  in   its  quantity  and   „         ^  .  , 

quality,  and  direction. 

(1.)  Tliere  must  be  general  restraint  and  direction.     This 
requires  Eeflection  before  speaking.     We  must 
consider  carefully  what  we  speak,  for  what,  to        ^®''®''*^- 
whom,  of  whom,  how,  in  what  relations  (whether  personal, 
social,  or  official),  the  place,  the  time,  and  the  possible  conse- 
quences.    The  opposed  fault  is  Eashness  in  speech. 

(2.)  There  must  be  special  restraint  in  the  quantity  of  speech. 
The  virtue  required  is  that  of  Proper  Taciturnity.       g  ^^.^^  .^ 
Divine  and  human  testimony  commend  this  re-       quantity, 
serve  in  speech.     The  divine  testimony  is,  "  In  the  multitude 
of  words  there  wanteth  not  sin."     Human  testimony  is  in  the 
recorded  experience  of  mankind,  which  declares  that  the  power 
of  keeping  silence  promotes  tranquillity,  and  both  mental  and 
moral  improvement.     For  this  reason,  Pythagoras  prescribed 
a  silence  of  ^yq  years  on  his  pupils,  and  many  religious  orders 
impose  habitual  silence  by  vow  on  their  votaries.     In  the  con- 
templative life,  whether  given  to  study  or  devotion,  this  may 
be  fully  observed.     But  in  active  life,  intercourse  with  others 
requires  that  this  reserve  be  tempered  by  Sociability.     Yet  the 
power  of  keeping  silence  in  particular  matters  must  still  be 
carefully  cultivated  and  preserved.     In  common  life,  therefore, 
the  negative  extreme  is  Unsocial   Eeserve,  and  the  positive, 
loquacity.     Between  these  stands  the  virtue  of  Proper  Taci- 
turnity. 


102 


J'EACnCAL  ETHICS. 


(3.)  There  must  be  direction  in  the  ^ualUy  of  speech.  The 
special  in  qnai.  ^*"''^  *<>  ^e  banished  from  it  are  Falsehood  Im 
i^'«,S.  *•  P""'^'  ^^"ffoonery,  Slander,  Tale-bearing,  fi'ltter- 
tl,.c  A  ^^'!'  "^^^  ^'^^"■^"^g'-esses  in  all  spheres  of  duty 
tifthT.  /°?  ''"■'  •'"  *^"''-  to  ourselves;  the  fourth  and' 
hfth  in  duties  o  ourselves,  and  to  others  absent;  the  sixth  in 
duties  to  ourselves  and  to  others  present 

(a.)  Falsehood  is  the  violation  of  truth.     Theopposed  virtue 
Falsehc»d:         ''  Truthfulness.    Falsehood  is  an  offence  as  re- 

gards    obligations    above    us,   within    us,    and 
around  us.    Above  us,  it  is  against  the  demands  of  God  a,  d 
-ciety,  smce  both  require  truth  in  our  words.    Within  us  ^ 
IS  agamst  self-respect,  since  every  one  feels  degraded  b^  Tl'l 
and  IS  also  against  self-culture,  since  Insincerity  poisons  the 
whole  character.    Around  us,  it  is  against  the  ri^ts  of  each 
iellow-man,  since  we  wrong  him  by  deception.     Th^  most  strict 
observance  of  Truthfulness  is  hence  incumbent  on  ar;;;:; 
It  must  extend  to  promises  as  well  as  statements.  ^ 

[Truthfulness  is  part  of  the  honor  of  a  soldier.     Strata-rems 

other     i,t,        ,^^  ^,^^^^  ^^^^^^^^  ^  ^  j^^^.       ^^^ 

Also  the  whole  system  of  military  discipline  is  deran  J    f 
^here  cannot  be  perfect  reliance  on  personal  and  offieiafsUtl 

Hot  imn    ""  ""'  '"'''  '°  '"""''■^  ^^^^  ^  ^'^  P'-o^'-^^'on.  who 
IS  not  unfaltering  in  veracity.] 

ness,  and  by  heir  sensitiveness  to  the  reproach  of  having  inten- 
tiona  ly  spoken  falsehood.  The  most  brave  and  free  are 
usually  most  truthful.  Among  those  who  speak  the  Engl  sh 
WiSTt    ;;r  ""'*  *'^  '^"^  "^  ^^^  "^  -'ther,  «  you  lie." 

10  be  truthful,  we  must  avoid  exaggeration. 


INTEMPERANCE   IN   SPEECH  :    SINS   OF   THE   TONGUE.         103 

(h.)  Impurity  is  the  introduction  in  speech  of  ideas  gratifying 
pruriency.  It  has  been  named  under  Temperance 
as  a  virtue.  It  is  an  offence  against  others,  as  l^^P^ty: 
suggesting  evil  thoughts,  and  against  ourselves,  as  giving  ex- 
pression to,  lower  impulses.  This  offence  receives  gigantic 
proportion  in  writings,  when  an  author  composes  works  on 
purpose  to  address  the  evil  passion  just  named.  The  rule  is, 
"Let  no  corrupt  communication  proceed  out  of  your  mouth." 
A  writer  should  leave  "no  line  which,  dying,  he  would  wish 
to  blot."  , 

(<?.)  Buffoonery  is  mirthfulness  in  excess,  that  excess  being 
in  matter  or  manner.     It  is  an  offence  against 
decorum,  a  violation  of  self-respect,  or  of  respect      ^^^^^ry: 
to  others.     It  stands  opposed  to  Asperity  as  the  opposite  ex- 
treme.    Between  these  extremes  is  the  social  virtue  of  Cheer- 
fulness. 

(d,)  Slander  is  depriving  another  of  his  proper  reputation 
and  honor  among  men  by  statements  injurious  to 
him.     Viewed  as  an  injury  to  a  man's  neighbor,        Slander: 
this  fault  pertains  to  the  next  division  of  duty,  that  to  others. 
But  when  the  passions  are  considered  which  find  gratification 
in  slander,  its  place  is  in  this  division.     The  malevolent  pas- 
sions of  Envy,  Hatred,  Anger,  and  Malie    have  expression  in 
Slander.     As  speech  should  reflect  only  the  higher  principles 
of  our  nature,  and  slander  is  the  expression  of  lower  and  un- 
worthy impulses,  it  is  an  offence  not  only  against  others,  but 
ourselves.     The  rule  of  the  Bible  is,  "  Speak  evil  of  no  man." 
Let  the  reader  remember  this,  when  he  speaks  of  rivals  and 
competitors.      The  restraints  on    Slander    are  Justice  and 
Charity.     These  belong  to  the  next  division  of  duties. 

(e.)  Tale-bearing  is  a  violation  of  the  tacit  or  expressed  con- 
fidence of  another  person,  by  improperly  report- 
ing what  we  have  heard  or  seen  when  with  him.     ^^^^-^eariagr, 
It  is  forbidden  by  divine  authority,  and  execrated  by  the  gen- 
oral  sentiment  of  mankind.     "  Thou  shalt  not  go  up  and  down 
as  a  tale-bearer  among  thy  people"  (Lev.  xix.  16).     "  A  tale- 


104 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


clTIT  '"""'''  '■  ^"'  ^'  *'^^'  '^  «f  *  f-"'f«I  spirit  eon- 

cealeth  the  matter"  (Pro.,  xi.  13).     "The  word*  o^  a  tX 

theTthT  """".'^'"  ^^"^-  -^^"'-  «)•     "  ^^-  -  wood  t 
there  the  fire  goeth  out ;  so  where  there  is  no  tale-bearer  the 

8  nfeceaseth"  (Prov.xxvi.20).    I„  the  first  of  thes.  palis 
forb.dden  ;  ,n  the  second,  its  nature  is  said  to  be  the  rL  a, 

ng  of  secrets;  in  the  third,  the  disgust  of  n^ankind  is  stated  • 
an  the  las,,  the  efi-ect  of  it  is  declared  to  be  strife.  The tl' 
fidenee  placed  in  us  ,na,  be  tacit.  This  is  the  fact  in  convel 
sa^o-.  and  m  whatever  is  heard  or  seen  in  another's  dwellini 
place  To  report  on  trifling  matters  n.a,  be  a  trifling  fauU 
Bu  to  report,  w.thout  .noral  necessity,  what  will  injL  him 
or    a„se  pa,n  or  enn^ities  for  others,  is  shameful  and  culpabC 

imposed,  and  pro.n.se  given.    The  ofi-ence  is  then  aggravated 

If  thou  hast  heard  a  word,  let  it  die  with  thee ;  and  be  bold 
n  w.11  not  bu.t  thee."    "  A  fool  travaileth  with  a  word,  as  a 
woman  m  labor  of  a  child"  (Ecclus.  xix.  10  11)    . 

As  this  fault  is  very  common,  the  maxims  of  prudence  require 
us  to  guard  ourselves  against  it.  "Consult  not  with  a  Ll  • 
for  he  cannot  keep  counsel.  Do  no  secret  thing  before  a 
stranger,  for  thou  knowest  not  what  he  may  bring  forth.  Open 
not  tlnne  heart  to  every  man,  lest  he  requite  thee  with  a 
shrewd  turn"  (Ecclus.  viii.  17,  18,  19). 

Akin  to  tale-bearing  is  griping.'    Tliis  fault  consists  in 
0^,j,^  improperly  and  constantly  making  other  persons 

*"^  *'>«!'•  affairs  the  topics  of  conversation.  It  is 
the  pecuhar  fault  of  villages  and  of  small  communities  \o 
one  can  comnut  ,t,  without  feeling  that  he  is  violating  at  once 
his  own  self-respect,  and  the  rights  of  his  neighbor.  Employ! 
ments  hterature,  and  religion  should  so  filMhe  mind  a  fo 
furn.sh  other  topics.  If  they  do  not,  silence  is  better  han  a 
/ault  so  contemptible. 

•    Slander  and  tale-bearing  must  be  eschewed  in  military  life 
camps,  garrisons,  and  stations.  ^       ' 


INTEMPERANCE  IN   SPEECH  :    SINS   OF   THE   TONGUE.         105 


Eitterness. 


(/.)  Bitterness  is  cruelty  to  another  in  the  matter  or  manner 
of  the  language  addressed  to  him.  It  is  a  fault 
mostly  committed  towards  inferiors,  and  those 
from  whom  nothing  is  to  be  feared.  "  Let  all  bitterness  be 
put  away  from  you,  with  all  malice,  and  be  ye  kind  one  to 
another"  (Eph.  iv.  31).  The  most  common  instances  of  this 
fault  among  all  mankind  regard  the  poor,  and  the  wife.  In 
Scripture  these  are  specially  mentioned.  "  Whoso  mocketh  the 
poor,  reproacheth  his  Maker"  (Prov.  xvii.  5).  "  Condescend  to 
men  of  low  estate"  (Rom.  xii.  16).  "Husband,  slove  your 
wives,  and  be  not  bitter  against  them"  (Col.  iii.  19). 

These  are  the  duties  and  offences  connected  with  speech. 

With  them  terminates  the  subject  of  duty  to  the  whole 
nature. 

Next  to  duties  which  relate  to  the  whole  man,  are  thefts 
which  regard  things  immediately  investing  him. 


Duties  relatiye  to  Things  inseparable  from  Self:  regard 


OHAPTER     VI. 

DUTIES    DEMANDED   BY   THINGS    TO   BE    BORNE,   PURSUED,    AND 
USED.    CORRESPONDENT  VIRTUES;    FORTITUDE,   MODERATION 
INDUSTRY,  ECONOMY.  ' 

1.  Among  duties  pertaining  to  self  must  be  included  those 
which  regard  the  things  that  permanently  invest  Duties  re  ardin 
every  man.     For  example,  no  man  can  exist  with-  things  that  per 
out  time.     In  the  use  of  time  he  may  fulfil  or  *^^  *° ""' 
violate  an  obligation. 

Duties  to  self  were  divided  into  those  belonging  to  the  whole 
man,  and  to  things  investing  him.  The  previous  chapters 
have  embraced  the  first  division.  The  second  remains  for  the 
present  chapter. 

2.  Things  which  immediately  invest  us  may  form  three 
classes:  things  to  he  home ;  to  he jpursxied ;  to  he 

used.  Division  of  them. 

3.  Things  to  be  borne,  are  the  external  evils 

of  life.  The firstdivision. 

4.  The  virtue  required  by  external  evils,  is  Fortitude.     It 
should  be  observed,  however,  that  the  word  is  virtue  demand- 
here  used  not  in  its  loose  popular  acceptation,  ed :  Fortitude, 
but  in  its  old  signification,  as  employed  in  Ethics. 

5.  Fortitude  may  be  defined  from  the  w(yrd,  by  referring  to 

the  near  and  the  remote  primitives  from  which     ^  «    ;,  ^ 
.    .    J     .  ^  iiennedDroni 

It  IS  derived.  Its  nearest  primitive  is  the  Latin,  word. 
fortis,  strong.  Its  remote  primitive  is  the  radical  syllable  from 
^^Anhfortis  itself  is  derived.  That  root  means  to  bear  (Sansc, 
VAE  or  bhak;  Gr.,  <;&£pw;  \.2X,,fero;  English,  hear,  etc.,  etc) 
Combining  the  sense  of  both,  we  have  an  accurate  and  satis- 
factory etymological  definition.     Fortitude  is  strength  to  hear^ 


108 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


In  its  etymologJcal  sense  it  is  rather  a  principle  than  a  virtue 
As  a  pr^ncple,  it  is  firmness  and  constancy  of  mind  ^^ 
actions,  applied  to  all  virtues. 

6.  As  defined  from  the  thing,  Fortitude  is  amoral  virtue  so 

De^^  from  the   elevatinff  reason  and  conscience  aiove  the  feelings 

created  by  external  ecUs,  as  to  give  "  strength  to 
hear"  them.  "^ 

7.  Reason  and  conscience  are  to  be  so  sustained  by  the  hi-^hest 

^S^     rT^:"  'f  ""''''''  ™""^^^-    ^  '™«  soldier 

his  countrv"   ,     .  f  ''  ^'""'^  ^^""'<^  ^"'''^  *«  ^^e  cause  of 

Ins  country  which  he  sustains,  and  to  the  principles  of  public 

justice  and  order  which  he  defends 

8.  Fortitude  is  easily  distinguished  from  the  other  virtues 
mstuiction.  "J  considering  its  object— External  Evils  Tpm ' 
^mother  moral  perance  deals  with  what  attracts  natural  desires' 

en  •  A-  .  .  """^"^  "^  ""^^  apparent  good  which  is  so  near 
so  immediate,  that  it  disturbs  the  proper  action  of  reason  Ind 
conscience,  and  does  so  through  desire  for  instant  graZtio^ 
Temperance  counteracts  that  disturbance.  Prudence  is  oZ- 
P.ed  with  good,  which  is  real,  but  which  is  so  distant  in  tTm^ 
.s  o  removed  by  intervening  media,  that  reason  and  conscienl 
nnless  directed,  will  not  sufficiently  appreciate  and  Z  le   t 

I  urn  sen  interest,  that  reason  and  conscience  un- 

io^n  ;::  :  r'^^^^^^-^  *"^"-  J-^-efu^ishes  such  dir  . 
tion.  Fortitude,  ,n  contrast,  is  occupied  with  evils  present  and 
immediate,  tending  to  disturb  the  proper  acting  of  reZ  and 
conscience  through  suffering  and  fear.  Fortitude  counteracts 
^.disturbance.  It  thus  stands  distinguished  from  the  otht 
Tirtues  by  having  a  special  object 

As  a  moral  virtue  it  is  distinguished  from  the  intellectual 
Fromthe  intel-    Virtues  for  knowledge,  since  they  cultivate  the  in- 
tellect directly,  while  this  prevents  the  disturbance 


FORTITUDE  I    ITS   CHARACTER  :   DIVISIONS. 


109 


When  Divine, 


Subdivisions. 


of  reason,  as  the  director,  under  conscience,  of  the  will.     These 
are  its  distinctions. 

It  agrees  with  all  the  virtues  in  being  an  energy  in  the  soul, 
habituallj  exercised.     Fortitude  carried  to  the  how  it  agrees 
highest  action  becomes  heroic  virtue.     When  the  ^^^^  *^®  others, 
moral  principles  sustaining  fortitude  centre  in  God,  it  becomes 
the  manifestation  of  the  divine  virtues  of  faith, 
hope,  and  charity ;  a  moral  virtue  emanating  from 
the  spiritual  and  divine  energies  of  the  soul.     It 
is  manifested  by  Christian  heroes,  dying  for  coun-  ^^^^^  l^eroic, 
try  in  battle,  or  for  faith  in  martyrdom. 

9.  Fortitude  is  active  in  Courage,  passive  in  Patience,  active 
and  passive  through  a  length  of  time,  in  Perse- 
verance. Its  subordinate  virtues  are  thus  seen  to 
be  Courage,  Patience,  Perseverance.  In  all  these  is  found  the 
original  sense  of  the  word.  Something  is  to  be  I}or7ie,  By 
these  virtues  the  mind  is  strong  in  bearing. 

(1.)  Courage  is  active  fortitude  in  opposing  dangers,  espe- 
cially those  which  are  immediate,  and  which  threat- 
en, as  in  battle,  instant  death.  It  is  sustained  by  ^°^*&®J 
conscience  through  a  sense  of  duty,  and  directed  by  reason 
through  a  perception  of  results.  It  represses  all  those  emotions 
awakened  by  danger,  which  prevent  the  energetic  action  of 
tliose  higher  faculties,  reason  and  conscience.  Prim  aril  3^,  it 
represses  the  sense  of  fear  and  suffering ;  secondarily,  the 
animal  impulses,  or  the  blind  desire  for  distinction,  which  seek 
danger  without  a  reasonable  object.  Its  action  is  so  full  of  the 
highest  energies,  as  to  give  an  elevating  pleasure  to  the  mind, 
even  when  anger,  anxiety,  and  pain  are  felt  in  the  conflict.* 

As  a  virtue.  Courage  stands  between  two  extremes.  The 
extreme  by  excess  is  Rashness  ;  the  extreme  by 
defect  is  Cowardice.  Both  are  faults  from  the 
same  cause;  permitting  mastery  to  the  feelings.  Eashness 
yields   unreasonably  to  impulses  impelling   towards  danger. 


Its  contrasts. 


♦  "The  joy  which  warriora  feel,"  etc. 


110 


PEACrrCAL  ETHICS. 


Cowardice  ^elds  unreasonabl,  to  impulses    repelling  fro. 

be  energed  ir  1    V^-^  '"^  '^"^"■'  '"^"  »'  ^^-''  '«  to 

defence  of  f^KK  '*'  ^'■'"*"'"  ^P^^-^^^  ^^e  seen  in  the 

de  ence  of  faith  bj  martyrs,  and  of  country  by  warriors 

(2.)  Paxx^o.  is  passive  fortitude  in  tl  e'durance' of  „„. 
Pauence.  and       ^^"'^"^'^  «^i'«.  ^^'h  a  mind  elevated  above  un- 

reasonable  dejection  or  irritation. 
[In  mihtary  life  its  exercise  is  constantly  demanded.] 

Contrwu.  ;'^  ^f '•erne  by  excess  is  Impatience,  and  by 

defect,  LvsENsiBiLnr  •'^ 

require.  »     "  "^ ^^wweaJ,  with  the  virtues  which  they 

10.  Things  to  be^.w  are  the  common  objects  of  human 
^^^U^.     pur^iit;  Such  are  Mn^,  pJr,  WealtCZ 

^^e.  .,  -^   .  ,^  ^^"^  ^^  ^*  causes  the  vices  exhib- 

Xzr  ' '"'  '^""'' ''--'  -^'»^'  -^ 

(1.)  The  first  rule  for  this  moderation  is  to  make  these  objects  ' 
rer.r      !:;t'"f  *«  «-  -P-me  end  of  life.     £ 
long  to  the  whole  liS.  '"''  """'^^^^  "^"^^^  ^"*-  -^^<^^  be- 
Second  rule.  ^^-^  ^l'^  °ext  rule  for  moderation  is  to  look 


moderation:  jts  objects. 


Ill 


Third  rule. 


quantity  than  such  as  is  consistent  with  our  primary  duties  to 
God  and  society,  to  ourselves,  and  to  others. 

(3.)  The  next  rule  for  this  moderation  is  to  limit  our  expec- 
tations by  the  natural  limitations  of  our  position. 
These  limitations,  fixed  by  nature,  are  of  two 
kinds,  outward  and  inward.  The  outward  limitations  are  in 
the  order  fixed  by  God  and  Society.  According  to  that  order, 
all  men  cannot  have  all  things.  Tliese  objects  must  be  pos- 
sessed by  different  men  in  different  degrees.  The  inward 
Hmitations  fixed  by  nature  are  in  the  diversities  of  capacity 
among  men.  According  to  these  diversities  all  men  are  not 
fitted  for  all  things. 

By  such  rules,  moderation  can  be  applied  in  human  pursuits. 

The  faults  and  vices  produced  by  the  want  of  that  modera- 
tion will  appear  under  these  objects  separately. 

12.  Honor  is  favorable  regard  from  others  to 
some  real  or  supposed  worthiness  in  ourselves.      ^°^®^' 

The  vice  produced  by  an  excessive  sense  of  our  worthiness, 
is  Pkide.    The  opposed  extreme  is  Pusillanimity, 

^1068  &iid  virtufis 

the  absence  of  a  proper  self-respect.     Between  relative  to 
these  extremes  is  Virtuous  Aspiration,  a  desire  ^®^°^* 
not  so  much  to  be  honored  as  to  become  more  and  more 
worthy  of  that  honor.     On  the  one  side  of  this  virtue  is  Self- 
Kespect,   a  just  estimate  of   ourselves;   and   on  the  other, 
Humility,  a  just  estimate  of  our  deficiencies. 

Pride  is  thus  inordinate  self-esteem,  and  Pusillanimity,  in- 
ordinate humility.  Degeneracy  is  the  absence  of  proper  as- 
piration to  be  more  and  moreVorthy. 

This  honor  from  men  is  given  by  them  in  thoughts,  in  words, 
or  in  things :  in  thoughts,  by  Esteem ;  in  words,  by  Praise ; 
in  things,  by  Distinctions. 

(1.)  Esteem:  Desire  for  the  esteem  of  men  is  commendable 
when  a  person  seeks  that  esteem  as  the  outward  principles  in  re- 
echo  to  the  inward  testimony  of  a  good  conscience.  &*^^  ^  Honor. 
Such  a  desire  is  praised  in  Scripture.    "  A  good  name  is  rather  to 
be  chosen  th^.n  great  riches,  and  loving  favor  rather  than  silver 


112 


PBACnCAL   ETHICS. 


and  gold"  (Prov.  xxii.  1).  It  is  culpable  when  we  seek  tl>«f 
e2.at:on  as  a  guidance  in  the  place  of  conscience  L' 
ample,  when  we  pursue  the  estimation  of  bad  men  b;  cl  1: 
hat  correspond  with  their  opinions.  It  is  plainly  inte' d  d  y 
the  Creator  that  .nan  shall  be  guided  hy  his  own  conscSice 
and  by  the  public  conscience  united  ;  prifnaril,  and  un S 
by  h.s  own,  secondarily,  by  that  of  the  public.    The  two  ml 

tion  18.)       '         '"""'  ""'  '"°^  '"  ^'""^'^'-     (See  Introduc 
The  desire  of  great  men  for  the  esteem  of  posterity,  for  a 
"memory  m  after  ages,"  through  good  work^  or  wo  d      is 
audable.     [The  wish  of  the  soldier  for  that  memoryTvh-ch  1 
a  Is  glory,  .s  just  and  right.    It  is  a  desire  for  the  esteem  d 
to  him  for  duty  bravely  done.] 

(2.)  Phaise:  n,e  fault  produced  by  inordinate  sensibility  to 
Praise.  ^".^''^  ^""^  "ot^ee,  is  that  of  Vanity,  with  the 

kmdred  fault  of  Affectation 
(3.)  DxsTiNCTioKs:    The  vice  produced  by  the  immoderate 

Dfatmction,.         ,^  ^"^  distinctions,   is  that  of  Inordinate 

Ambition. 

Distinctions  of  Honor  are  to  be  first  deserved- 
then,   rather  received   than   sought.    Seek  not 
them,  but  let  them  seek  you.    A  regulated  esti- 
mafon  of  them  is  Propek  Ambition. 
[The  rule  of  Scripture  is  the  best  for  the  soldier.     "  Let  each 
esteem  ot  .r,  better  than  themselves.    Look  not  every  man  ol 

Le  ti       , '  ^-  ,  "^"^^  ^'  **"'^'  ^^'^''f""^  -°d  zealously. 

Let  there  be  with  it  or  from  it,  no  inordinato  selt^esteem.    Let 
lienors  and  rank  then  be  received   as  assigned   by  PuW  c 

on:'  0^'-      ;'  "'"'  ^  "°  ^"'"P'^'"''"^"'  -  ?--aUons  S 
one  »  0.V  n  great  personal  merit  is  overlooked.  The  Spartan  is  the 

nnhtary  sentiment,  "Sparta  has  many  a  worthier  son  than  L" 

A  proper  ambition  being  the  virtue,  and  inordinate  ambition 

the  vice  on   the  positive  extreme,  the  opposed 

vice  on  the  negative  extreme  is  Recklessness. 


puEsurr  OF  power,  wealth,  pleasure. 


113 


Principle. 


Virtue. 


Contrasts. 


[This  fault  of  Recklessness  is  often  seen  in  young  men  of ' 
ability  and  promise.     They  are  irritated  by  what  they  deem 
injustice,  or  made  despondent  by  their  own  neglects  and  the 
consequences.     They  then  rush  on  in  desperation,  seeking  the 
worst.] 
Such  are  some  of  the  moral  views  belonging  to  Honor. 
13.    Power,   as    here   regarded,   is   influence  | 

among  men.  An  example  of  one  possessing  it  is  ^^^^^' 
the  statesman.  The  same  moral  principles  apply  as  to  Honors. 
There  is  here  also  a  proper  ambition,  the  virtue  of  y^^^  and  the 
Public  Spirit,  when  a  man  is  conscious  of  great  contrasted  Vices. 
abilities  for  great  trusts,  of  powers  for  power,  and  when  he  wishes 
to  use  power  for  public  benefits.  There  is  a  culpable  ambition 
for  rising  unworthily  by  improper  means,  for  getting  power 
without  fitness  to  use  it,  and  for  abusing  it  to  personal  or 
factious  ends,  or  to  tlie  injury  of  the  public.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  here  also  a  Pusillanimity  shown,  when  a  man  having 
fitness,  and  called  to  power,  refuses. 

14.  Wealth  is   a  proper  object  of  human  pursuit  when 
sought    under    the   requisite    moral    restraints. 
These  are,  that  it  be  acquired  in  the  legitimate  '^®*"^' 
operations  of  a  lawful  calling,  and  that  in  every  transaction 
there  be  spotless  integrity. 

Wealth  is  never  to  be  loved  for  its  own  sake.  It  is  a  mere 
instrument  for  necessities,  duties,  and  benefits,  principles re- 
This  love  of  money  irrespective  of  its  proper  uses,  warding  it. 
is  Covetousness.  It  is  this  love  of  money,  and  not  money 
itself,  which  Scripture  declares  to  be  "  the  root  of  all  evil." 
The  ouposed  fault  is  Improvidence.  Between  these  is  care 
for  the  future;  our  own  future  and  that  of  our  families  and 
friends. 

[The  love  of  money  must  be  banished  from  the  mind  of  every 
man  who  enters  the  military  profession.] 

15.   Enjoyment,  as  the  term  is  used  in  Ethics,  is  also  a 
proper  object  of  human  pursuit  when  it  is  sought 
under  the  requisite  moral  restraints.  Eiyoyment. 

8 


lU 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Bj  Enjoyment,  or  Pleasure,  is  here  meant  gratification  which 
,^^^^  refreshes  the  mind  and  body,  and  fits  both  for 

meeting  the  recurrent  duties  and  cares  of  life. 

The  restraints  are,  that  the  pleasures  be  innocent  and  pure, 
Principles  re-  and  that  they  be  enjoyed  with  moderation.  Such 
^ding  It.  pleasures  are  found  in  proper  amusements,  in  the 
beauties  of  nature  and  art,  in  bodily  exercise,  in  travelling,  in 
the  manifestation  and  reception  of  affections  domestic,  sodal 
and  divine,  llie  highest  pleasures  are  in  the  exercise  of  divine 
affections. 

This  unbending  of  the  mind  is  necessary  and  reasonable. 

It  is  necessary  according  to  experience. 

It  is  said  that  St.  John  the  Evangelist  was  visited  in  his  old 

Why  necessary,     "f  f  ^J  ^  ^'^^''"^^"'  ^'^"^  ^^^^'^"^  ^^gJ«"«>  ^^O  came 

hlled  with   veneration   and   high   expectations. 
I  he  traveller,  to  his  surprise,  found  tlie  venerable  apostle  play- 
mg  with  children,  and  manifested  his  feeling  in  his  counte- 
nance.    When  his  sports  were  ended,  St.  John  took  an  unstrun- 
bow  from  the  hand  of  his  visitor,  and  asked  him  if  it  should  be 
kept  always  strung.     The  traveller  said  "No;  it  is  nseless  if 
not  sometimes  unbent."    "  And  so,"  said  the  Apostle, "  is  man, 
a  bow  that  must  be  unbent  to  bo  able  to  roach  itB  aim." 
It  is  reasonaUe,  according  to  tho  end  of  our  creation. 
Man  is  made  for  happiness  as  he  is  for  goodness,  and  Wm 
end  of  his  being  ia  to  be  regarded  in  each  minute 
portion  of  life. 

[Those  in  c6mmand  on  land  or  sea  have  found  licalth  and 
discipline  promoted  among  their  men  by  the  permission  of 
regulated  amusement.] 

The  virtue  thus  cultivated  is  ChccrfulneR^.  Tlje  ntf^vc 
nj^ei         extreme  id  Moru*cnc8b;  tbcoUier,  IinmodemteneflS 

nxM  diTiridB.         ^^'  ^^  ^^^"^  ^  ^  ^*^^^  ^^^  examples  are  Time 

luid  Incoene, 

17.  Tiino,  ID  the  view  of  Etlii«,  is  a  universaLl 
poeseaflioii  for  univmal  ude.    For  \U  u*t^.M  men 


industet:  economy. 


115 


Why  reasonable. 


are  accountable,  whether  above  them  to  God  and  the  public, 
or  within  them  to  conscience,  or  around  them  to  principle  for  its 
other  individuals.  xwe. 

Tlie  right  use  of  time  demands  a  special  virtue, 
that  of  Industry.  ^he  virtue : 

Industry  is  the  earnest  and  sustained  applica- 
tion of  our  faculties  to  our  works.     •  induBtry. 

Its  negative  extreme  is  the  common  one ;  it  is  Indolence. 
The  positive  extreme  is  not  so  common  where 
individuals  have  conen>l  of  their  time.  It  is  e.\-  *'**^'**^ 
cess  of  toil.  It  coDBiflts  in  do  working  a^  to  injure  the  healtli, 
shorten  the  life,  nnd  bj  the  wa»te  of  the  vital  powcnc,  to  en- 
danger reason,  or  to  unfit  a  jaded  nutunj  for  8elf-<jontrol. 
Earnest  men  in  all  pureuite  commit  tliis  fault.  But  it  is  pain* 
fully  common  among  tlio«j  who  work  from  nccecsity  under  the 
employment  ami  direction  of  othcre,  and  who  tluw  have  not 
control  of  their  time.  He  or  tliej,  who  bj  insufficieDt  wages 
or  by  direct  command,  will  imi>o«ie  guch  labor,  excq)t  for  some 
imminent  public  neceit^ty,  mu&t  be  recounted  culpable 

18.  Income  h  property  &&  liable  to  expenditnnx    It  may  bo 
in  the  form  of  wage^  of  salary,  of  w^-cnne  from 
(•state,  of  protJtjj,  of  fpfts,  or  in  any  other  funn, 
Buch  that  it  can  be  ]>ropcTlj  expended  vrithin  a  certain  time. 

The  virtue  which  regulate*  expenditure  by  moral  principlct, 
ift  Economy.     The  word  orii'inallv  mc^ins  honse-  ^.^  ^ 
law.    It  16  law  in  the  tt^ulation  of  a  houaehold,  s««o««v. 
and  thus  of  it«  cxpcnditupe.    From  families,  u^ago  has  trans* 
femjd  it  to  individnala. 

The  virtue  of  Economy  appears  a»  one  of  two  virtuea  ae- 
cviding  to  the  amonnt  of  income  when  compared 
uith  want.s.     If  that  amount  be  a«lativcly  wnall,  ^'^"^ 
Kconomy  must  incline  to  Fbcoaixty;  if  that  be  relatively 
lar)*e,  to  Lchkralitt  ;  and  \f  verj'  lai^^  to  MAoviPfcsNOK. 

Tlic  extremes  opjxwKjd  to  true  Economy  arc  on  the  side  of 
Frugalily,  Niooardlixes*,  and  on  that  of  Liberality,  Prooi- 
OALiTT.    Avarice  and  Prodigality  both  imply  exceef^  one  in 


116 


i 

rlBHB 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


the  desire  for  saving  and  acquiring ;  the  other  in  the  desire 
for  spending. 

[In  the  military  profession,  the  rule  given  for  the  soldier  of 
the  cross  is  best  for  the  soldier  of  the  country,  "  Owe  no  man 
any  thing." 

But  while  keeping  from  debt,  a  true  soldier  must  avoid  the 
love  of  money.  If  the  root  of  all  evil  among  mankind  gener- 
ally, it  is  utterly  opposed  to  the  military  virtues.  He  must 
be  honorable,  just,  liberal,  incapable  of  being  corrupted,  and 
with  public  treasures  passing  through  his  hands  be  above  temp- 
tation, and  never  liable  to  suspicion.] 

These  are  duties  relative  to  things  investing  us ;  which  are 
to  be  borne,  pursued,  or  used. 

After  duties  within  us,  the  next  in  order  are  those  around 


DuTiBS  TO  Others:  Classified  by 


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118 


PKACTICAL   ETHIC5S. 


chakity:  subject:  object:  source. 


119 


chapter     VII. 


DUTIES    AROUND    US. 


DUTIES    TO   OTHERS  :    CORRESPONDENT   VIRTUES :    BENEVOLENCE, 

JUSTICE. 

1.  The  third  sphere  of  duty  is  around  us.  It  indudes  obli- 
Third  sphere  of  gations  to  other  individuals—"  duty  to  our  neigh- 
Duty,  bor."  Duties  to  men  organized  collectively  in 
society  belong  to  the  sphere  above  us,  and  have  been  ex- 
amined. 

It  is  third  in  order,  because  the  two  others  form  for  it  a 

necessary  preparation.      Duties    above  us  and 

Why  third.  within  us  prepare  for  "  duty  to  our  neighbor," 

by  the  principles  which  they  inculcate,  the  virtues  which  they 

cherish,  the  faults  which  they  repress. 

2.  Our  duties  to  others  may  be  classified  by 

Principle  of  Clas-     ,         .  ,  .  ,  ^  •        x  • 

siflcation:  by  the  Virtues  which  are  most  prominent  in  our  re- 
Virtues.  i^^.^^g  ^^  ^Yiem, 

3.  The  two  virtues  which  enter  into  all  these  relations,  are 
Charity  and  Justice.  Charity  is  expressed  in  tlie 
divine  rule,  "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as 

thyself;"  and  Justice,  in  the  rule,  "  "Whatsoever  ye  would  that 
men  should  do  to  you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them."  There  are  no 
relations  to  others  in  which  both  these  virtues  do  not  apply. 

They  need,  however,  a  few  explanations,  though  the  eluci- 
dation of  their  primary  principles  belongs  to  the  other  branch 
of  Ethics. 

CHARrrr. 

4.  Charity  from  the  word  {carit<iSy  cams*)  means,  etymolo- 

♦  This  word,  charity^  belongs  to  a  large  group  of  stems  in  the  different  families  of 
the  Indo-European  languages,  all  belonging  to  the  common  root,  Gr,  whose  primary 
physical  idea  is  that  of  revolving  spirally  around  a  centre.  This  is  applied  men- 
taUy  in  cura,  care,  and  in  cams,  dear. 


Two  virtnes. 


gically,  the  affection  which  makes  another  d^ar  charity  from  the 
to  us.     He  is  dear  to  us  from  something  in  him,  ^o^^* 
from  our  feelings  to  him,  or  from  both.     The  result  of  Ins  being 
dear  to  us  is  a  good-will  to  him. 

Charity  (as  the  term  is  used,  not  in  Theology,  but  in  this 
branch  of  Ethics)  may  be  defined  from  the  thing-,  j)efined  from  the 
as  universal  good-will  to  men,  arising  from  a  per-  *'^^^* 
ccption  of  obligations  above  us  and  within  us,  which  good- will 
is  manifested  in  benefits  conferred. 

(1.)  Taking  this  definition  by  its  parts,  the  seat  of  charity 
in  our  nature  is  in  the  will,  the  will  acting  to 
confer  benefit.     The  will  is  directly  moved  to  ^-^^^^J^^ 
do  good  by  the  affections.     The  affections  and  will  are  directed 
by  reason  and  conscience.     Thus  the  will  is  rendered  good^ 
and  charity  becomes,  as  in  the  definition,  "  a  good  will." 

(2.)  The  ^5/V<?^^  of  Charity  (as  the  term  is  used  in  this  branch 
of  Ethics),  are  men  ;  meti  capable  of  receiving     2.  its  object, 
lenefiL 

(3.)  The  source  is  in  the  sphere  of  duty  above 

us  and  within  us.     It  comes  from  a  perception 

of  obligations  above  us,  through  a  sense  of  commonness  be 

tween  us  and  other  men.     Lookin^j  above  us  to  ^ 

"  From  the  sphere 

God,  we  see  that  we  and  they  are  cliildren  of  one  above  us,  a  sensa 

T,  ,1         1      .1  •  n      '\  T>         •    •        .1  •     of  commonness, 

rather,  brethren  in  onelamily.  rerceiving  this 
commonness  we  are  bound  to  have  cjood-will  to  them  as  fellow- 
creatures.  Looking  above  us  to  the  nation,  the  family,  and  the 
various  aggregations  of  society,  we  may  see  them  to  be  fellow- 
countrymen,  or  of  the  same  kindred  or  association.  "When  we 
perceive  such  common  tie,  there  is  a  natural  sentiment  of  kind- 
ness and  good-will. 

It  comes  from  obligations  within  us  through  a  sense  of  fit- 
ness.   As  we  have  affections,  it  is  befitting  to  use  ^     ^^      ^ 

'  ^         °  From  the  sphere 

them,  and  men   are  the  proper  objects.     Also  within,  a  sense  of 
whatever  improves  our  nature  is  befiittng  for  it. 
Disinterested  good- will  unfolds  and  ennobles  one's  being,  while 
selfishness  contracts  and  degrades.     Thus  universal  good-will 


3.  Its  source. 


;. 


120 


PRACTICAL    ETDICS. 


4.  Its  Effect. 


comes  from  obligations  above  and  witliin  us ;  from  the  one  by 
a  sense  of  commonness,  and  from  the  other  by  a  sense  of  fitness. 
(4.)  The  effect  is  in  actual  benefits  conferred.  Charity  is 
imperfect  if  there  be  only  intention  without 
action.  "  If  a  brother  or  sister  be  naked,  and  be 
destitute  of  daily  food  ;  and  one  of  you  say  unto  them,  Depart 
in  peace,  be  ye  warmed  and  filled ;  notwithstanding,  ye  give 
them  not  those  things  which  are  needful  for  the  body ;  what 
doth  it  profit  V 

5.  The  term  Charity,  so  defined,  is  to  be  distinguished,  how- 
Listinction  of  ^^^^  ivom  its  theological  and  common  accepta- 
E^ae'^mthe  *^''"'-  ^^  Tlieology,  it  means  much  more,  being 
theological  and     there  the  perfected  love  of  God,  with  all  its  causes 

which  are  far  higher  than  human  power,  and  all 
its  consequences  which  are  far  beyond  life  mortal.  In  its 
common  and  popular  use,  it  means  much  less,  being  restricted 
to  some  of  the  outward  effects  of  good-will ;  such,  for  example, 
as  the  giving  of  alms. 

6.  The  negative  contrast  to  Charity  is  Selfishness ;  an  in- 
diff*erence  to  the  welfare  and  happiness  of  others. 
The   active   contrasts   are  Malice   and  Hatred: 

Malice,  the  desire  to  inflict  evil ;  Hatred,  dislike  to  individuals. 
^^,.    ,.  The  obligation  which  is  imposed  by  this  virtue, 

IS  that  ot  preservmg  a  constant  and  effectual 
desire  to  do  good  to  men. 

It  is  evident  that  this  virtue  of  Charity  or  Benevolence  must 
Why  in  all  hu-  enter  into  all  relations  and  all  actions  belonging 
man  relations,  to  other  men,  while  in  those  not  fixed  by  strict 
Justice  it  must  predominate.  Literally  there  must  be  "  in  all 
things  charity,"*  because  everywhere  will  be  found  this  com- 
xiionness  and  this  fitness. 


Its  Contrasts. 


iostice. 


Justice. 

7.  Justice  requires  the  explanation  of  the  words, 
jiist^  oUigation^  and  right 

♦  "  In  omnibus  caritas."— 5^.  Aug, 


just:  obligation:  eight:  justice. 


121 


Just,  in  its  primary  sense,  is  relative  equality.     A  ''just 
weio-ht"  is  equal   to  the  standard  for  weights,  what  we  mean 
They're  is  equality  between  the  thing,  and  the  ^yj^*- 
standard  ordained  for  it. 

An  obligation  relative  is  a  duty  to  another  enjoined  by  some 
rule.     A  right  is  the  reciprocal  claim. in  the  what, by obUga- 
other  party.     A.  owes  money  to  B.     The  obli-  tion  and  right, 
gation  of  A.  is  to  pay  ;  the  right  of  B.  is  to  be  paid. 

Obligations  and  rights  are  thus  seen  to  be  relative  and  re- 
ciprocal terms.  Obligations  are  duties  to  another,  enjoined  by 
some  divine  or  human  rule,  imposed  on  one  party,  and  cor- 
respondent  to  rights  in  a  second.  Rights  are  the  resulting  and 
just  claims  in  a  second  party,  correspondent  to  rights  in  the 
first.  The  mutual  correspondence  forms  the  relative  equality. 
contemplated  in  the  term.  Justice. 

Justice  is  a  moral  virtue  which  inclines  the  Definition  of 
will  to  execute  uniformly  and  perpetually  all  the  J^^^^^^- 
obligations  demanded,  under  a  common  standard,  by  the  righU 

of  another. 

Let  us  take  the  parts  of  this  definition.     Justice  Explanation  of 
is  a  "  virtue''  because  a  good  habit ;  and  a  "  moraV  t^^^  definition, 
virtue,  as  requiring  the  application  by  conscience  of  moral 
principle.     It ''  inclims  the  will,''  since  he  is  not  j ust  who  knows 
but  does  not  execute  justice.     The  will  must  be  "  uniform  and 
perpetual,"  since  in  every  hour  wherein  we  consent,  even  in 
thought,  to  injustice  we  are  unj  ust.    It "  executes  the  obligations'^ 
which  correspond  to  the  "  rights  of  others,"  and  thus  produces 
equality.     It  determines  those  rights  and  obligations  by  "  a 
standard."     The  standards  are  the  "  common"  rules  of  action 
established  among  men  for  collective  and  individual  welfare. 

The  material  for  Justice,  therefore,  is  in  the  relation  of  two 
parties,  the  one  having  a  right  and  the  other  a  correspondent 
obligation.  Its  due  form  is  given  by  the  forming  of  equality 
between  the  right  on  one  side,  and  the  action  or  thing  rendered 
by  obligation  on  the  other,  as  in  the  payment  of  a  debt.  The 
seat  (subject)  of  Justice  is  in  the  will,  which  must  be  constant 


122 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


justice:  divisions:  contrasts. 


123 


and  perpetual  in  desiring  that  equality.  The  end  of  Justice  is 
the  common  good ;  of  universal  Justice,  the  good  of  the  universe ; 
of  human  Justice,  the  good  of  society,  and  of  the  individuals 
composing  it. 

A  more  brief  definition  of  Justice  may  be  frequently  em- 
ployed.    "  Justice  is  a  Virtue  which  renders  to  all  their  dues." 

If,  however,  we  analyze  this  definition,  we  shall  be  led  over 
the  same  ground.  What  is  "  due''  implies  an  obligation  in  one, 
and  a  right  in  another.  These  must  be  Just,  by  being  equal 
to  each  other,  and  by  being  equal  to  the  standard.  The  stand- 
ard must  be  established  and  commanded*  by  some  authority. 
Division  of  Jus-  ^-  Justice  is  divided,  according  to  the  parties 
^^'  exercising  it,  into  public  and  private ;  according 

to  the  principles  of  it,  into  commutative  and  distributive. 

In  Public  Justice,  public  authority  is  the  a^ent 
Public;  •   .     .       A  ,      .      , 

or  recipient.  An  example  is  the  trial  or  con- 
demnation of  a  culprit  in  court. 

In  Private  Justice,  private  individuals  are  the 
parties.     An  example  is  the  payment  of  a  sum 
due,  or  the  fulfilment  of  a  promise  made  by  one  to  another. 

The  distinction  of  Commutative  and  Distributive  Justice  re- 
sults from  the  two  modes  of  making  that  equality  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  is  the  foundation  of  Justice.  Equality  is  simple 
or  relative.  It  is  simple  between  one  thing  and  another. 
For  example,  twelve  inches  are  equal  to  one  foot.  It  is  relative 
in  proportions.  For  example,  the  number  two  is  to  six,  as 
three  to  nine.  Simple  equality  forms  the  one  division  of 
justice,  and  relative,  the  other. 

Commutative  (reciprocal)   Justice  is    simple 
Commutative;  Vi.     •     xi    i.      i  •  i  ^  , 

equality  m  that  which  one  renders  to  one ;  equal- 
ity between  thing  and  thing.  An  example  is  a  sum  paid  ex- 
actly equal  to  the  value  of  a  thing  bought. 

Distributive  Justice  is  equality  in  that  which 
Diatributive.  j        ^  it.,. 

one  renders  to  several.      It  is  relative  equality  ; 

*  If  we  trace  the  word,  jus,  no  higher  than  the  Latin,  we  have  the  idea  of  com- 
mauiing;  if  above  the  Latin,  to  the  root,  that  of  establishing. 


Contrast. 


that  between  portion  and  portion.  An  example  is  the  distri- 
bution of  an  estate  among  creditors.  If  the  estate  be  equal  to 
one-half  of  the  sum  of  the  claims,  distributive  justice  requires 
that  each  creditor  shall  receive  half  of  his  claim.  Other  ex- 
amples of  relations  requiring  distributive  justice,  are  those  of 
parents  to  their  families ;  magistrates  to  applicants  for  Justice ; 
officers  to  subordinates  under  their  command ;  administrative 
authority  of  all  kinds,  to  those  under  it. 

Four  combinations  result  from  the  union  of  Commutative  and 
Distributive,  first  with  Public,  and  then  with  Private  Justice.* 

We  have  thus  seen  its  nature  and  its  divisions. 

9.  The  vice  opposed  to  Justice  is  Injustice. 
The  fault  opposed  to  Distributive  Justice  is 
Partiality,  "  the  Acceptance  of  Persons." 

10.  The  general  active  obligation  imposed  by 

^  ^     „  ,  Obligation. 

Justice,  is  the  fulfilment  of  all  contracts  express 

or  implied.     If  it  be  express,  keep  your  promise  perfectly.     If 

it  be  implied,  meet  the  just  expectations  of  the  other  party  as  if 

they  were  your  own. 

Such  are  the  two  virtues  entering  all  human  relations. 

11.  In  those  relations,  however,  they  apply  one  or  other  pie- 
not  equally,  but  unequally.     In  some  relations  dominates, 
one  predominates,  and  in  some  the  other.     The  j^.^.^.^^^ 
natural  division,  therefore,  of   these  relations 

and  the  correspondent  duties  is  into  1.  T/wse  in  which  Charity 
is jpredominant.attendedhy  Justice;  2.  Those  in  which  Justice 
is  predominant,  attended  hy  Charity. 

Tlie  reader  fixes  this  in  his  mind  by  conceiving  two  insepa- 
rable forms  as  appearing  in  all  the  scenes  of  human  intercourse, 
but  in  contrasted  positions :  in  the  one  position.  Charity  pre- 
cedes Justice ;  and  in  the  other.  Justice  precedes  Charity. 

I.  Eelations  in  which  Charity  predominates. 
12.  The  relations  in  which  Charity  predominates  are  divided 
according  to  its  objects. 

♦  1.  Com.  Pub.:  2.  Dist.  Pub.:  3.  Com.  Priv  :  4  Dist.  Priv. 


124 


PEACnCAL   ETHICS. 


Division  of  those 
relations, 

1.  All  men.   2. 
Suffering  and 
needy. 


Philanthropy. 


Men  as  the  objects  of  Charity  (or  Benevo- 
lence), have  two  divisions :  1.  Men  considered 
universally;  2.  The  mffering  and  needy. 

1.   MEN   UNIVEfiSALLY. 

Men  in  capacities,      l^-  Taking  men  universally  we  mav  reo-ard 

characters, actions.   4-1^ „^    *     t.\    '  ...         ,.  J       g     ^ 

them,  m  their  capacities,  their  characters,  their 
actions.  In  all  these  views  they  demand  or  may  demand  Be- 
nevolence. 

In  capacities  to  be      W  "Viewing  them  morally  in  their  capacities 

happier  or  better.    ^^^  •  j  t     ,     ,  ' 

we  consider  what  they  may  be.     They  may  be 
made  happier  or  better ;  and  this  collectively  or  individually. 

14.  A  constant  good-will  to  make  them  col- 
lectively happier  and  better,  forms  the  virtue  of 
Philanthropy. 

Kindness.  .  ^^'  ^  Constant  good-will  to  make  them  in- 

dividually happier  or  better,  is  Kindness.  Phi- 
lanthropy and  Kindness  are  thus  divisions  of  Charity,  appH- 
cable  to  men  universally. 

Bnt  wedded  to  ^^-  But  the  attendant  and  primary  virtne  of 

Justice.  T.,«4.'  1  r  J  ^  yjL 

J  ustice  may  never  be  separated  from  their  per- 
fected action.  Philanthropy  and  Kindness  must  be  accom- 
panied  by  Justice,  public  and  private. 

17.  Public  Justice  is  separated  from  Charity  when  in  exer- 
cising philanthropy  and  kindness,  we  disregard  national  or 
municipal  obligations. 

There  may  be  philanthropy,  to  any  extent,  for  the  spiritual 
or  temporal  welfare  of  men,  but  it  must  not  violate  national 
obligations  in  other  nations  or  in  one's  own.  This  would 
be  separating  public  justice  from  Charity.     (Ch.  ii.,  43.) 

There  may  be  kindness  to  individuals,  as,  for  example,  to 
prisoners  of  war,  or  to  enemies,  in  all  tender  charity,  but  not  in 
any  particular  contrary  to  laws,  or  orders,  or  custom  of  war. 
This,  again,  would  be  separating  public  justice  from  Charity.  ' 

An  example  of  the  separation  of  private  justice  from  philan- 


CHAEITT :     PHILANTHROPY  I     KINDNESS. 


125 


thropic  or  kind  actions,  would  be  leaving  stolen  property  in  the 
hand  of  another,  when  we  had  it  in  our  power  to  restore  tho 
property  to  its  owner. 

In  all  these  relations  Charity  but  predominates.  Justice  can 
never  be  absent.  "When  the  latter  has  departed,  the  form 
which  remains  is  not  a  virtue,  but  a  semblance  of  it,  wrapped 
in  its  mantle  and  assuming  its  name. 

18.  Philanthropy  and    Kindness    have  two  „^  ^    ,^., 

^•'  ^  Effects  of  Philan- 

special  eflfects.     One  of   these  is  external  to  thropy  and  Kind- 

ness  * 

ourselves.     It  is  the  prevention  of  discord,  and 
the  promoting  of  peace.     Our   Saviour  com-  1.  Peace, 
mends  it.     "Blessed  are  the  peace-makers." 
The  opposed  transgression  is  said  in  Scripture  to  be  a  thing 
which  "  the  Lord  hates,"  and  the  offender  is  "  an  abomination 
unto  Him ;"  even  "  he  that  soweth  discord  among  brethren." 
In  all  communities  of  men,  inward  peace  is  necessary  for  order, 
and  order  for  welfare.     Accordingly  in  civil  life,  the  disturber 
is  put  under  bonds  "  to  keep  the  peace."     [In  the  military 
body  its  peace  is  considered  so  important,  that  the  ordinary 
rules  of  command  are  suspended  for  its  restoration.     The  27th 
Article  of  "War  says,  "  All  officers,  of  what  condition  soever, 
have  power  to  part  and  quell  all  quarrels,  frays,  and  disorders, 
though  the  persons  concerned  should  helong  to  another  regi- 
ment, troop,  or  company,"  &c.] 

It  is  interesting  to  see  Theology,  Civil  Law,  and  Military 
Law,  uniting  with  Ethics  in  the  enforcement  of  the  same  prin- 
ciple :  "  Follow  peace  with  all  men." 

19.  The  other  effect  is  upon  ourselves,  in  our 
manners.  Philanthropy  and  Kindness  form 
Courtesy^  and  thus  the  true  gentleman. 

Courtesy  is  the  application  of  Benevolence  and  source  and  quail- 
Justice  to  the  forms  of  social  intercourse,  so  as  to  ^'^  °^  Courtesy, 
produce  politeness  with  kindness.  It  is  the  effect,  on  manner, 
of  the  two  cardinal  rules  :  "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as 
thyself,"  and  "  "Whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to 
you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them." 


2.  Courtesy. 


126 


PRACTICAL  Ernies. 


He  who  IS  courteous  never  gives  pain  to  another  unnecessa- 
ril7,and  then  only  in   the  matters  and   forms  demanded  by 
Jiistice,  as,  for  example,  in  correcting  some  fault  in  a  friend 
He  never  forgets  Observance,  that  is,  a  regard  to  what  is  due 
to  others  in  tlieir  several  stations.     Courtesy  banishes  from  the 
deportment  incivility,  bluntness,  rudeness,  and  violence  •  and 
from  the  words,  carelessness  and  malice.     It  produces  for  all 
persons,  consideration ;  and  for  those  with  whom  it  is  not  un 
suitable,  cordiality.     It  forms  the  quality  indicated  by  the 
word,  -gentleman,"  that  o^gentl^ne^.    Gentloocse  results  from 
the  c^mbitiiMl  oonscion.oftis  of  what  \s  becoming  for  self  and 
cJne  to  oth^rB.    (Cli.  v.,  U,  (2).)    Coartesy  induces  care  for 
pt^i^ual  iipi>caran<H>.     Thi«  has  been  mentioned  under  Duties 
to  SeJr.     (Ch.  V.)     It  ri^ult..  uUo  fn>m  duties  to  otli<.r6,  since 
nothing  disagreeable  should  be  presented  to  Ibcm.     True 
emirt^y  b  mMMj  conventi'oTial.     A  right  exists  in  every 
c^immunity  to  e^itublisii  the  appr,>vcd  forms  of  politeness.     As 
we  take  frum  society  the  fomis  of  language,  fixed  bv  n^^  ^ 
we  leeetvc  from  the  same  anthority,  thoe^c  of  nnmner.     Every 
tnio  geatleman,  tlieixrfore,  eonfonii*  in  his  manner  to  the 
conventional  rKiuirements  of  tluit  ^ocfety  in  whirh  he  lirea. 

But  here,  m  ever,  the  ftui<himental  cthieul  rule  of  i>»x.portion 
(ch.  J.)  sIm>uI<1  not  be  ncgrect<Ml.  If  manner  be  wholly  con- 
veiition^l,  it  degenerates  into  formality  and  insinccrirV.  If 
not  properly  eonrentional  it  prwcnts  Kingularitv  or  rmlenesa. 
To  be  complete  it  must  liavc  both  matter  and  form.  By  tlie 
one,  courtesy  Hill  be  sincere,  and  by  the  other,  cnstomar^-. 

Thus,  raiding  men  as  universally  capable  of  being  made 
happier  or  btfttcr,  ire  have  phiUnthropy  and  kindnes^  which 
produce  thdr  appn>j)riate  effects, 

jjjihttidr  ^  SO.  (b,)  Viewing  men  morally  in  their  qu<du 

ties  of  chaindm,  we  consider  what  they  are. 
Ihey  arc,  uiuvcnwdly,  imjierfect  beings. 

A»  impeifKt.      ./"  ^"^^"^  ""^ ^^"'^  ^^*^>  Scripture,  Olwenation, 

3l<mihfts,  Satirists,  Dramatists,  all  nnitc.    Tlie 
divine  mind,  and  the  human  mind  both  concur  in  their  tcsti- 


rORBKAJJAKCE,   LIKE  TUE  DIVINE. 


127 


mony.    If  any  man  be  compared  with  a  proper  moral  Ktiuulard, 
he  is  found  to  full  short  of  it. 

21.  On  tluK  faet,  which  is  universal,  arises  an 
obligation  which  is  universal.  It  is  Forhearance  ^  **'  ^**^  ** 
like  that  whwh  in  divine*  This  it$  demanded  by  Justice  and 
Cliarity.  This  is  due  to  men  in  their  relations  to  us,  since  they 
and  we  share  a  comujon  nature,  and  arc  uliki!  iinptM-liMft.  It  is 
just  to  give  to  all,  the  tenderness  which  we  ^\:from  all.  It  is 
also  demanded  by  Charity  as  IxM'ng  due  to  men  in  their  and 
our  ccminum  relattons  to  God,  since  lie  is  kind  and  forbearing 
to  IB  and  to  them. 

*^  Tic  tnalceth  His  sun  to  rise  on  the  evil  and  on  tlie  g^xxl, 
and  sendeth  rain  on  the  just  and  on  tlie  tinjiu^t  He  is  kind 
unto  the  nnthmnkful  and  to  tlie  evil.  Be  ye,  theretbre,  merci- 
ful as  yomr  Father  aUo  is  mercifur*  (St  Matt  r.  45 ;  St  Luke 
vi.%  35>  36). 

The  iirst  effect  of  Forbearance  is  in  the  mind.  £5e:t9  ta  yw- 
The  perception  of  imj)crfc>etion,  nnvrorthincass,  and  ^*«»«««« 
wit:ke<lue.<:S  <^n)<^i)g  \\\<ir\^  should  not  deelToy  good-will  to  them. 
We  are  to  accept  impertei'tion  in  our^lvcas  and  others,  as  the 
common  and  inevitable  <H>nd  it  ion  to  which  wo  and  all  are  born^ 
and  in  which  we  and  all  cxi«t 

The  next  ctTcct  of  Forlicaranoe  Is  In  tlie  words.  We  are  to 
**  speak  evil  of  no  man.^'  Faults  and  imjx?rrc<.ttions  «xjn  in 
aiH>ther  arc  t^i  be  piUMtt!  over  in  silifuee,  unless  some  claim  of 
public  or  private  ju^tioe  sliall  require  speaking  of  them. 

Tl)e  next  effect  of  Forbearance  i*  in  actions.  The  iH!rcH!ption 
of  unwurthEneas  and  wiekednees  is  not  to  prevent  actions  of 
kindnese.  Tlie  unworthy  and  wicked  arc  to  receive  kindness 
and  relief,  though  they  may  rec^ve  thon  in  a  less  degree  than 
othei^of  a  different  duuracter :  **  Never  turn  tlij  faee  from  any 
poor  man." 

Tlic  contract  to  Forbearance  is  seen  in  the  eflbets  from  its 
abaenoQ.  * 

23,  Tlie  aWnce  of  Forbearance  from  the  mind  producee 
some  common  faults. 


11 


123 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Faults  to  be 
Shonned. 


:ii 


One  is  Moral  Scepticism  ;  distrust  in  Morality 
and  Keligion.     An  imperfection  is  attributed  to 
these,  wliich  belongs  only  to  the  person  and  to  the  human  nature 
guided  by  them. 

Another  is  Misanthropy ;  the  hatred  of  men  because  they  do 
not  correspond  to  our  standard  for  them. 

Another  is  Cen seriousness ;  the  habitual  employment  of  con- 
versation for  slander,  for  satires  and  sarcasms,  and  for  exaggera- 
tions of  the  faults  of  men. 

^  23.  These  faults  are  partially  corrected  by  the  proper  sen- 
timent of  Forbearance,  and  may  be  fully  corrected  by  Religion. 
Knowing  all  men  imperfect,  we  expect  them  still  to  be  so,  in  Tome 
degree,  under  the  remedies  of  morality  and  Religion.  Expect- 
ing always  to  find  them  below  their  and  our  moral  standard 
for  them,  we  do  not  hate  them  for  being  imperfect,  unworthy 
and  wicked.  This  effect  of  Forbearance  extends  to  language,' 
and  restrains  censorious  words  against  them. 
Men  in  their  24.  (c.)  Viewing  men  in  their  actions  we  con- 

sider what  they  have  done,  by  inflicting  wrongs 
upon  us. 

Every  person  may  receive,  or  suppose  himself 
to  have  received  injuries  from  other  persons. 
Tlie  wrongs  may  be  real  or  imaginary,  and  in  all  grades  from 
the  little  to  the  great. 

Duty  resulting.     ,  f.^*  ^'^"^   ^^''  ^^^^  ^^^^"   """"''^^S  arises  an 

obligation  :  Forgiveness  like  the  divine, 

Tliis  does  not,  however,  forbid  resistance  to  wrong.     For- 
giveness to  the  wrong-doer  is  what  is  required. 
How  learned :  2^-  A  partial  disposition  to  Forgiveness  mav 

1.  Partially.  ^^  produced  by  the  principles  of  morality  as 
derived  from  reason.  Tliis  is  shown  by  facts.  Examples  of 
clemency  and  of  generosity  towards  enemies,  have  been  ex- 
hibited in  the  histories  of  all  civilized  nations.'  Reason,  apart 
from  Revelation,  may  teach  us  that  in  forgiving,  we  are  ful- 
filling  a  duty  to  God  who  forgives  us,  to  society  whose  peace 
18  promoted,  to  mankind  by  the  example  of  remitted  vengeance, 


actions. 


May  have 
wronged. 


FORGIVENESS,    LIKE   THE   DIVINE. 


129 


and  to  ourselves  by  conquest  over  resentment.  A  man  reflect- 
ing on  these  principles  may  thus  see  forgiveness  to  be  right, 
noble,  and  useful. 

But  a  complete  spirit  of  Forgiveness  is  to  be 
learned  from  Religion.  Tlie  inculcation  of  this  ^'  ^^^^P^^t^^y- 
duty  is  one  of  the  peculiar  glories  of  Christianity.  "  Forgive, 
if  ye  have  aught  against  any,  that  your  Father  w^hich  is  in 
heaven  may  forgive  your  trespasses"  (St.  Mark  xi.,  26).  "  If 
ye  forgive  not  men  tlieir  trespasses,  neither  will  your  Father 
forgive  you  your  trespasses"  (St.  Matt,  vi.,  15).  "  Forgiving  one 
another,  even  as  God  for  Christ's  sake  hath  forgiven  you" 
(Eplies.  iv.,  32).  "  Love  your  enemies,  bless  them  that  curse 
jou,  do  good  to  them  tliat  hate  you,  and  pray  for  them  which 
despitefully  use  you  and  persecute  you,  that  ye  may  be  the 
children  of  your  Father  which  is  in  Heaven."  Not  only  does 
Christianity  teach  it,  but  by  its  Spirit  forms  it. 

27.  The  transgression  opposed  to  Forgiveness,    contrast, 
is  Retaliation  by  Revenge. 

Reveno-e  is  ao-ainst  oblisjations  above  us,  both  those  to  the 
Deity  and  to  Human  Society.  It  is  against  Him,  because  He 
has  said  ''Yenojeancebelono^etli  unto  me."  It  is  aorainst  Human 
Society,  because  the  punishment  of  WTongs  is  delegated  to 
Societv,  and  is  taken  from  individuals.  Yensjeance  is  aojainst 
obligations  within  us,  because  it  is  giving  sway,  as  w^e  have 
seen,  to  passions  wliich  duty  to  ourselves  requires  us  to 
restrain.  It  is  against  obligations  around  us,  since  it  inflicts 
sufterings  on  others ;  and  retaliation  carried  from  party  to  party 
will  of  itself  break  up  families,  societies,  armies,  and  the  whole 
order  fixed  by  human  law\ 

[Hence,  tlie  Articles  of  War  with  great  propriety  forbid 
duelling :  Articles  25th  and  26th. 

Duelling,  in  the  ordinary  military  view,  is  an  act  of  ven- 
geance for  insulted  honor.  It  ^r'l&es partly  from  not  observing 
proportion  (ch.  i.,  21,  22)  and  rule  in  the  military  virtues.  A 
soldier  is  to  resrard  dutv  and  true  honor  above  life.  From  this 
truth  is  drawn  the  sophistry,  "  I  must  risk  life  to  avenge  per- 
9 


130 


PEICTICAL    ETHICS. 


I', 


sonal  l.onor."  It  is  a  sophistry,  because  tLe  very  obligations  on 
which  honor  is  founded  belong,  primarily,  above  the  individual- 
to  God,  and  his  country.  No  duty  to  himself  or  others  can  ri.e 
above  them.  His  life  is  not  his  own,  nor  is  that  of  his  adver- 
sary. Tlie  risk  of  life  in  personal  combat  is  against  these  obU- 
gations. 

Duelling  arises  principally  from  the  natural  desire  for 
vengeance,  seeking  justification  in  the  sophistry  to  which 
reference  has  been  made. 

Duelling  in  another  part  of  the  moral  view  is,  as  we  shall 
see,  mnrder  in  intention  or  act. 

It  is  an  obligation  on  all  Governments  to  forbid  it  in  their 
Mil.tary  and  Xaval  codes,  both  on  grounds  of  principle,  and 
of  expediency.  Duelling  is  a  crime,  and  is  against  the  interests 
01  the  service.] 

TransiUon.  ^"''''  "'"•'  «^'''R<''tion8  to  men  as  they  exist  uni- 

versally  ;  in  view  of  what  they  may  lecome,  of 
what  they  are,  and  of  what  they  may  iMve  done.  Duties  to 
the  sufi-enng,  and  to  those  who  are  in  need,  next  follow 


MERCY,    PITT,    STMPATHT. 


131 


Duties  to  the 
afflicted  and 
destitute. 


Ground. 


2.    THE   SUFFERING   AND   NEEDY. 

28.  The  next  relations  in;wrliich  Charity  pre- 
dominates,  are  those  which  belong  to  the  suffer- 
ing and  needy. 

The  ground  of  these  relations  is  in  the  common 
evils  of  life.  Those  evils  belong  in  common  to 
onrselves  and  to  others.  The  duties  to  ourselves  required  by 
them,  have  been  considered.  The  duties  to  others,  imposed  by 
them,  form  the  present  subject. 

Nature  oitha  These  common  evils  are  positive,  by  the  inflic- 

tion of  pain,  and  negative,  by  the  absence  of  some 
necessary  good.  By  -  the  suffering"  those  are  meant  who  endure 
pain  of  mind  or  body.  An  example  of  pain  of  mind  is  in 
affliction  for  the  loss  of  friends,  and  for  that  of  body,  in  the 
endurance  of  wounds  or  sickness. 


By  "  the  needy"  those  are  meant  whose  necessary  wants  for 
food,  shelter,  and  clothing  are  not  supplied.  An  example  is  a 
very  poor  man. 

On  this  fact,  obligations  are  founded. 

29.  These  evils  demand  for  those  subject  to  what  t>^ey  de- 
them,  the  exercise  of  Mercy,  Pity,  and  Sympathy.  °^ad. 

Mercy,  Pity,  and  Sympathy  are  obligatory. 
They  are  natural.  To  withhold  them  is  to  thwart  ^* 
human  nature,  and  to  degrade  it  towards  the  brute.  They  ^re 
right.  All  the  authorities  in  morals  command  and  commend 
them.  The  principles  of  Morals  require  them.  They  are  the 
spontaneous  effects  of  Charity.  They  are  demanded  by  Justice, 
since  it  is  but  just  to  render  to  others  what  we  ourselves  may 
need  at^ny  moment  to  receive  from  them.  They  are  reason- 
able. Death  and  pain  result  from  nature :  destitution,  from 
the  organization  of  society.  "  The  poor  ye  have  aZwaijs  with 
you."  It  is  then  unreasonable,  uniformlv  to  reocard  misfortunes 
as  faults,  to  reproach  the  unfortunate,  and  to  withhold  kindness 
from  them.  It  is  reasonable,  to  conform  habitual  sentiment 
to  that  fixed  order  of  nature  and  society  under  which  there  must 
be  suffering. 

Mercy,  Pity,  Sympathy  are,  therefore,  to  exist  in  the  mind. 

30.  They  are  to  be  manifested  to  "  the  suffering"  in  kindly 
and  sympathetic  deeds  and  words. 

Among  the  sick,  the  wounded,  the  dying,  the  sorrowing, 
Mercy,  Pity,  and  Sympathy  should  be  cordially  and  carefully 
exercised. 

[In  the  soldier's  profession,  the  customary  attentions  to  the 
sick  and  wounded,  respectful  care  for  remains,  military  honors 
for  the  dead,  care  for  their  personal  effects,  the  transmission  of 
tidings  and  messages  to  relatives,  should  be  never  shunned. 
They  should  be  accepted  with  personal  gratification,  and  should 
not  be  hindered  in  subordinates  except  under  the  extreme  ex- 
igencies of  service.  Neglect  of  these  duties  is  against  moral 
principle,  custom  of  war,  the  feelings  of  friends,  and  the  common 
senliment  of  mankind.     Such  duties  are  not  trifles.     He  who 


132 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


» 


by  extreme  devotion  toliis  profession  maj  havcrisen  above  human 
sympathies,  should  remember  that  all  these  proprieties  afFect 
the  best  interests  of  the  service;  internally,  by  the  feelin<^  of 
soldiers  and  men,  externally,  by  tiie  public  sentiment  tow^ards 
the  military  body.  The  sentiments  of  every  people  in  every 
nation  to  its  armies,  should  be  those  of  afiection,  admiration 
and  respect.  ' 

In  a  military  funeral  every  prescribed  point  of  respect  for 
the  dead  should  not  only  be  observed,  but  should  receive  such 
attention  by  preparation  made  before,  that  decorum,  solemnity 
and  order  may  not  be  marred.] 

31.  These  sentiments  are  to  be  manifested  to  « the  needy  » 
by  doing  them  good. 

This  is  the  duty  to  which  the  Founder  of  Christianity  was 
devoted.     "He  went  about  doing  good." 

32.  To  the  destitute  classes,  and  individuals  in  them  this 
duty  of  doing  good  is  to  be  applied,  externally  and  mUm'ally 

It  is  to  be  applied  externally,  by  Relief.  This  is  to  extend 
to  the  body  by  relief  for  their  immediate  wants,  and  to  the 
conditzm,  by  relief  (as  through  settled  employment)  for  those 
wants  which  Are  prospective. 

It  is  to  be  applied  to  the  destitute  internally,  in  the  feelings 
the  intellect,  the  character,  the  whole  soul.  ' 

It  is  to  be  applied  in  « the  feelings,"  by  giving  no  unnecessary 
pain  to  poor  men.  They  are  to  be  spared  reproachful  and 
outrageous  words.  «  Honor  all  men ;"  «  condescend  to  men  of 
low  estate." 

It  is  to  be  applied  in  « the  intellect,"  by  educating  the  poor, 
never  above  their  station,  but  to  and  for  it.  This  includes 
teaching  them  some  honest  trade  by  which  they  can  support 
themselves. 

It  is  to  be  applied  in  "the  character,"  bj  restraining  vices, 

nd  fostering  virtues.     For  this  result,  the  causes  of  vice  should 

be  removed  or  abated.    Among  the  causes  of  vice  in  the  laboring 

classes  is  the  desire,  coming  on  after  toil,  and  after  the  mental 

tnals  of  their  condition,  for  some  relief,  or  solace,  or  enjoyment. 


CAEES  FOE  THE  NEEDY  I   TEANSITION. 


133 


They  should  have  innocent  gratifications  and  amusements  which 
may  cheer  them.  When  they  find  in  what  is  simple  and  in- 
nocent, the  refreshment  which  they  sought  in  vices,  the  first 
cause  of  craving  will  be  removed. 

It  is  to  be  applied  to  the  "  whole  soul"  by  the  instructions 
and  influences  of  Religion. 

Such  arc  some  of  the  duties  to  the  suffering  and  needy. 

The  relations  in  which  Charity  predominates  have  been  con- 
sidered. 

Those  follow,  in  which  Justice  preponderates. 


J 
1 


IL  Relations  in  which  Justice  predominates, 
attended  bj  Charity: 


RELATIONS   WITH   JUSTICE   IN   PREDOMINANCE. 


135 


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CHAPTER  VIII. 
RELATIONS    IN    WHICH    JUSTICE    PREDOMINATES. 

1.  The  relations  in  which  Justice  predominates 

may  be  classified  as  1.  Eelations  for  Distributive  ^®^*^^'"^^^®^' 
Justice;  2.  Eelations  for  Keciprocal*  Justice;  3.  Eelations 
Domestic  and  Social. 

2.  Eelations  for  distributive  Justice  are  the  Distributive 
public  and  i\iQ  private,  divided. 

3.  In  distributive  public  Justice,  the  most  im- 

,      ,  ,      .  ^      /»  .       .  .    .,  Distributive 

portant  example  is  a  court  of  justice,  civil  or  pubUcinaCoirt 

military.  «^  J^^ice. 

{a.)  The  duty  of  one  acting  as  a  judge  is 
impartially  without  fear,  favor,  or  affection,  to  ^^^y  of  a  Judge; 
declare  the  law  whicli  belongs  to  the  case.  His  very  name 
expresses  this  obligation.  The  word  judge  is  from  judex^  and 
this  from  jus  dico,  I  speak  the  law.  The  judge  is  to  declare 
the  law,  not  make  it ;  to  state  what  it  is,  not  what  he  thinks  it 
should  be. 

(5.)  The  duty  of  one  acting  on  a  jury  is  im- 
partially to  determine  whether  a  fact  be  or  be  ®^*J^™'»' 
not  proved  by  the  evidence  presented.     He  is  not  to  determine 
by  his  private  opinion  or  knowledge,  but  by  the  proofs  sub- 
mitted. 

[Members  of  a  Court-Martial  act  both  as  judges  and  as  jury- 
men. Both  these  duties,  those  to  the  law  and  the  fact,  belong 
to  them.] 

(c.)  The  duty  of  a  prosecutor  is  to  omit  no 
point  of  law,  of  evidence,  or  formality  belonging  O'^^osecutor; 
to  the  side  of  the  prosecution. 

{d.)  The  duty  of  an  advocate  is  the  same  on 
the  side  of  tlie  defence.     He  is  to  enter  into  the  Of*^^^^<>cate; 

*  "Reciprocal"  and  "commutative"  are  two  terms  used  for  the  same  division  of 
Justice. 


136 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


interests  of  his  client  as  if  thej  were  his  own.     He  is  never  to 
betray  the  coniiJential  communications  made  to  him 
_   Both  prosecutors  and  advocates  are  instruments  for  present- 
ing fully  the  law  and  evidence  on  both  sides.     Both,  therefore 
may  act  in  that  capacity  without  being  deterred  by  a  contrary 
persona  opinion  concerning  the  case.     An  advocate  defending, 
the  guilty,  is  not  promoting  injustice,  but  assisting  public 
justice  to  a  complete  e.^amiuation  of  the  question  of  <.uilt  or 
innocence.     The  scruples  of  casuists  on  this  question  Imve  not 
been   sustained  by  the  conviction   of  mankind.     In   Europe 
those  scruples  have  caused  the  punishmentof  many  innocent  per! 
sons,  by  deterring  advocates  from  undertaking  their  defence 
An  advocate  should  feel  it  to  be  one  of  his  duties  to  "see  that 
sucli  as  are  m  need  and  necessity  have  right." 

[In   a  Court-Martial  one  functionary"  performs   the  three 
oaces  of  a  judge,  a  prosecutor,  and  an  advocate.     That  is  the 
Judge-Advocate.     He  is  a  judge  declarative  of  the  law  to  the 
court.    He  ,s  a  prosecutor  on  the  part  of  public  authority.     He 
IS  at  the  same  time  an  advocate  for  the  prisoner.     There  is  no 
human  office  in  which  it  is  more  necessary  that  the  virtue  of 
JustKte  should  be  completely  enshrined  and  embodied.    He  is 
to  regard  himself  as  a  mere  mirror  to  reflect  law  and  evidence 
Ue  IS  to  declare,  direct,  and  correct,  because  he  is  the  mere 
nmnster  of  law.     But  the  court  de<-ides  and  executes.     He  is 
therefore  not  to  invade  their  functions,  but  to  fulfil  completely 
his  own.]  ■^       ■' 

OfaWitnes,-  ^'''^  '^^  *'"'>'  **^  »  y^'^tmss  is  to  declare  the 

'  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth. 
J^o  personal  feelings  or  interests  are  to  prevent.  Duties  to  the 
public  soar  above  all  that  are  private.  Human  laws  usually 
except,  however,  confidential  communications  made  to  an  ad- 
vocate, or  to  a  minister  of  religion  in  his  official  capacity.  It 
IS  thought  better  that  son.e  portion  of  evidence  be  wanting  in 
individual  cases,  than  that  one  accused  shall  be  deprived  oFthe 
light  of  human  justice,  or  of  the  directions  and  consolations  of 
religion.     It  is  here  that  Charity  tempers  Justice.     For  like 


RELATIONS    FOIi    Dt;^TUIUtlIVE    AND   COMMUTATIVE. 


137 


Of  one  accused. 


reason  the  laws  do  not  require  Ironi  a  witness,  testimony  crimi- 
nating or  degrading  himself. 

(/.)  The  duty  of  one  accused  is  (at  least  under 
all  laws  administered  in  this  language),  to  plead 
guilty  or  not  guilty.  He  is  not  to  stand  mute.  His  plea  is 
not  a  statement  of  fact  in  one  way  or  another.  It  is  merely 
withholding  or  giving  consent  to  the  process  of  being  tried  by 
God  and  his  country.  The  refinements  of  solitary  casuists  are 
again  to  be  regretted.  They  require  that  every  one  accused 
shall,  if  he  think  himself  guilty,  confess  before  the  judge  or  be 
mute.  But  standing  mute  obstructs  at  once  the  wliole  ma- 
chinery of  justice,  and  was  formerly  punished  by  the  courts 
with  great  severity. 

4.  In  these  duties  connected  with  public  justice,  j^^j.^^  ^^  ^^j^ 
Charity  is  to  enter.  All  proper  courtesies  and  J^tice. 
kindnoss,  not  inconsistent  with  the  ends  of  justice,  should  be 
exercised.  Abusive  lans^uasre  to  the  accused  or  the  witnesses 
is  a  moral  and  a  judicial  offence.  A  court  of  justice  should  be 
as  a  tcmj)le.     Such  are  rules  for  j9t^^/?*<?  justice. 

5.  Distributi  vejpriva^  Justice  is  between  Supe-  Distributive 
riors  and  Inferiors.  private. 

Superiors  in  age  and  station  are  to  be  treated  with  honor, 
and  inferiors  with  kindness.  Tliese  principles  are  to  be  mani- 
fested in  the  appropriate  manners  and  language. 

Distributive  private  Justice  is  very  strikingly  violated  in  the 
distribution  of  estates  by  offended  and  vindictive  parents  when 
making  their  wills.  If  a  child,  or  a  relative  justly  entitled  to 
a  portion  of  the  distributed  property  shall  have  offended,  it  is 
not  right  to  carry  resentment  beyond  the  grave.  Charity 
must  here  also  temper  Justice.  One  about  to  pass  into  eternity 
must  forgive  as  he  hopes  to  be  forgiven. 

[An  officer  must  have  a  constant  and  perpetual  will  for  dis- 
tributive Justice  among  all  under  his  command.  He  is  to  "  do 
nothing  by  partiality."  Official  Acts  belong  to  public,  and 
personal  action,  to  private  distributive  Justice.] 

6.  Relations  for  comrnutative  Justice  include  the  rights  and 


138 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


SSf  *^''*'       obligations    beloiicring  to  property,  reputation 

person,  virtue.     These  are  objects  of  Rights  and 
Obhgations. 

To  these  objects  every  man  has  right,  though  in  some  of 
tliem,  mdividual  rights  are  modified  by  the  superior  claims  of 

oocietj. 

The  protectors  of  these  rights  are  nations  and  their  mnni- 
cipal  authorities.  Where  they  cannot  act,  the  Deity  is  the 
guardian.  "^ 

Objects  of  rights  ^e  take  these  objects  of  rights  and  obligations 
andobngat.ons.  ^^  the  order  which  proceeds  from  the  more  ex- 
ternal to  the  more  internal,  and  hence,  1.  Property  ;  2  Rep- 
utaton;  3.  Person;  4.  Virtue.  In  each  we  consider,  1. 
the  right  with  its  immediate  obligation.  2.  The  offence^ 
against  the  right.  3.  The  duties  which  fulfil  the  obligation^ 
and  avoid  the  oflences.  ' 


eight  to  property. 


Sight  to  prop- 
erty. 


Source  and 
nature. 


7.  Right  to  property,  primarily  in  God,  and  by 
transfer  from  Ilim  in  Society,  exists  in  individuals 
through  common  consent,  and  natural  necessity. 
That  outward  thing,  a  right  to  which  the  law 
vests  in  any  man,  is  his  property. 

Therightdivided.    .^^""^  ^'^  therefore  over  property,  1.  The  divine 

rights;  2.  The  public  rights;  3.  Private  rights. 
Divine  right  over       8.  The  divine  right  applies  to  that  portion  of 
property.  property  which  is  needed  for  the  support  of  re- 

ligion, and  the  relief  of  poverty.  Religion  is  evidently  a  divine 
interest.  Poverty  is  under  divine  protection,  by  the  declara- 
tion of  divine  mercy.  The  poor  are  so  regarded  both  in  the 
Old  and  mw  Testaments.  Also  the  same  appomtment  results 
Irom  Justice.  Society  is  ordained  of  God.  The  necessary 
eltect  of  the  organization  of  society  is  to  produce  a  class  in 
poverty.  "  The  poor  ye  have  always  with  you."  He  who  has 
ordained  the  system  which  produces  superfluity  in  the  rich  and 


obligations  and  rights  regulating  property. 


139 


destitution  in  the  poor,  has  also  ordained  by  His  Justice  that 
the  superfluity  shall  yield  enough  to  relieve  the  necessity. 
The  same  duties  thus  result  from  Justice  which  were  before 
deduced  from  Charity  (ch.  vii.,  28  to  32). 

9.  The  public  right  applies  to  taxes,  to  cus- 
toms, and  to  the  alienations  of  property  by  judi-         °  "^    * 
cial  decisions  whether  these  be  civil  or  criminal.     Society  has 
also  an  indirect  right  to  the  benefits  in  public  prosperity  re- 
sulting from  private  wealth. 

10.  Private  right  applies  to  all  property  which 

a  man  lawfully  possesses.  The  forms  of  prop-  *^  "^ 
erty  are  two :  the  movable,  for  example,  money  ;  and  the  im- 
movable, as  land.  The  modes  of  obtaining  property  are  two : 
from  ourselves,  or  from  others.  If  from  ourselves,  it  is  by 
personal  but  lawful  acquisition.  If  from  others,  it  is  by  gift 
or  by  inheritance ;  and  if  by  inheritance,  it  is  through  a  law- 
ful will,  or  without  a  will,  by  law  regulating  the  division  of  an 
estate. 
Such  are  the  rights.     The  obligations  corre-  obUgations 

spond.  correspondent. 

11.  The  obligation  correspondent  to  the  divine  ^^  ^^^  divine 
right  is  to  give  a  portion  of  income  annually  for  ^i&^t  • 
religion  and  poverty.  The  general  consent  of  mankind  has 
appropriated  one-tenth  of  income  for  God's  service  and  for 
charities.  But  for  this  rule  to  be  followed  there  must  be  no 
debt.  The  rule  of  morals,  of  law,  and  of  reason  is  expressed  in 
the  common  saying,  "We  must  be  just  before  we  are  generous." 
The  door  by  which  Charity  goes  forth  to  give,  must  be  opened 
by  Justice. 

12.  The  obligation  correspondent  to  the  public 

right,  is  to  render  the  public  dues  without  deten-    ^    ®^^    °* 
tion  and  without  fraud.     Every  man  should  willingly  contri- 
bute to  the  support  of  Government.     "Render  to  all  their 
dues,  tribute  to  whom  tribute  is  due." 

13.  The  obligation  answering  to  private  Y\^t  to  the  private 
is,  for  i\iQ  public,  protection.    The  obligation  ou  "5^** 


140 


PEACTICAL   ETHICS. 


FJBAUDS   IN   BUYING   AND   SELLING. 


141 


Offences. 


individuals  is  to  abstain  from  taking  or  using  tlie  property  of 
another  witliout  tlie  owner's  free  consent.  Justice  demands 
negatively,  forbearance  from  all  wrong.  Charity  requires  ad- 
ditionally  a  positive  will  to  make  the  pecuniary  interests  of  our 
neighbor  like  our  own. 

We  have  seen  the  rights  and  obligations.     Offences  follow: 

14.  The  common   offences   against  rights  of 
property  are  Robbery,  Theft,  Fraud. 

They  all  agree  in  this,  that  they  are  the  unjust  taking  of 
property.  Also  every  offence  against  even  private  property 
How  they  agree:  involves  a  wrong  to  the  public.  Their  differences 
How  differ.  ^re  in  the  manner  of  taking.  Unjust  takin*^  may 
be  with  force.  This  forms  Robbery.  It  may  be  without  force 
and  without  the  owner's  consent.  This  is  Theft.  It  may  be 
without  force  and  with  the  owner's  consent  unjustly  obtained. 
This  makes  Fraud. 

Bobbery.  ^^'  ^^^^^^  ^^J  ^^  ^itli  nolence  to  the  per- 

son, the  dwelling,  or  both.  Examples  are  High- 
way  Robbery  and  Housebreaking.  The  crime  of  Robbery  is 
of  an  aggravated  character,  since  it  includes  complicated 
wrongs.  There  is  a  wrong  against  property  through  the  thing 
taken,  and  against  the  person,  and  against  public  security! 
'It  is,  therefore,  severely  punished  in  all  countries. 
.^^  1^-   Theft  is  distinguished  from  Robbery,  by 

the  absence  of  violence  to  persons;  and  from 
Frauds  by  the  absence  of  consent  from  the  owner.  It  is  the 
act  of  stealing.  An  example  is  the  picking  of  a  pocket,  or 
carrying  away  any  piece  of  property  in  the  absence  of  the 
owner.  It  is  punished  in  some  countries  by  death,  as  a  crime 
against  the  public. 

There  are  some  persons  who  by  education  or  by  nature  have 
a  strong  propensity  to  this  disgraceful  crime  of  stealing.  The 
annals  of  schools,  of  families,  and  of  communities  show  a  certain 
proportion  of  individuals  with  a  settled  disposition  to  commit 
theft.  Such  persons  should  banish  themselves  voluntarily  from 
all  places  and  all  associations  which  furnish  temptations  and 


Frauds. 


facilities  for  the  crime.  When  they  will  not  do  so,  they  should 
be  expelled  and  made  known. 

[If  among  those  who  wish  to  enter  the  military  profession 
are  any  who  have  this  tendency,  they  should  know  that  it  alone 
is  sufficient  disqualification.  An  officer  must  not  only  be  free 
from  what  is  so  disgraceful,  but  untainted  by  suspicion.] 

17.  Fraud  is  distinguished  from  Robbery  by 
the  absence  of  violence ;  and  from  Theft,  by  the 
consent  of  the  owner  or  of  his  representatives  being  given. 
It  is  an  unjust  taking,  because  an  equivalent  for  the  property 
or  for  its  use  is  not  returned.  It  is  unjust  because  it  is  with- 
holding from  another  his  right. 

18.  Examples  of  Fraud  are  1.  In  buying  and  Distinct  ex- 
selling,  2.  In   miscellaneous  acquisitions,  and  3.  ^jnples. 

lu  the  abuse  of  Trusts.  All  these  offences  are  aggravated  wJien 
they  include  the  violation  of  a  confidence  reposed  hy  the  person 
wronged  in  the  wrong-doer, 

19.  Frauds  in  buying  and  selling  are  perpe-  i.  in  buying  and 
trated  when  the  seller  gets  more,  and  the  buyer  s^iii^g* 

gives  less  than  a  just  price. 

By  the  just  price  is  meant  that  which  is  equal  -wTiat  the  just 
to  the  value  of  the  thing  sold.  That  alone  is  a  P"^®* 
just  price,  since  Justice  requires  equality  (ch.  vii.,  7.)  This 
price  which  is  equivalent  is  fixed  by  law,  or  by  general  custom. 
The  one,  the  other,  or  both  form  the  standard  price,  or,  as  it  is 
frequently  called,  the  market  price.  The  equivalent  is  deter- 
mined by  the  common  judgment  of  men  (which  is  one  of  the 
authorities  in  morals),  and  not  by  individual  caprice  or  cupid- 
ity. (Pretia  rerum^  non  ex  affectUy  7iec  utilitate  singulorum^ 
sed  cominuniterfunguntur^*  The  common  saying, "  The  price 
of  a  thing  is  what  it  will  bring,"  is  morally  atrocious. 

20.  There   may,  however,  be   transactions   in  AUowancefor 
which    peculiar  circumstances   will   require,  in  circumstances, 
order  to  preserve  the  equality  required  by  Justice,  a  deviation 

♦  Prices  of  things  are  made  not  by  the  feelings  or  interests  of  individuals,  but 
by.  tlie  community. 


t 


%\ 


142 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


m 


from  the  standard  price.  For  example  a  horse  is  to  be  sold  to 
oblige  a  neighbor.  The  seller  we  suppose  suffers  injury  in 
parting  with  the  thing  sold,  and  the  buyer  gains  much  ad- 
vantage. In  this  case  it  is  jnst  that  the  buyer  should  offer  and 
the  seller  accept,  in  addition  to  the  standard  price  an  equiva- 
lent  for  the  injury.  This  is  just.  But  to  impose  on  the  buyer 
an  exorbitant  price  in  consequence  of  his  necessity  would  be 
unjust. 

2.  In  misceiiane-      21.  Frauds  in  miscellaneous  acquisitions  are 
ou.  acuons.         committed  by  obtaining  money  or  gains  of  any 
kmd  under  false  pretences.    The  modes  of  doing  so  are  called 
in  common  language  professional  tricks.     In  every  avocation 
of  society  these  are  found.    The  more  gross  and  dangerous  are 
punished  by  law.     Others  are  checked  by  public  sentiment  as 
dishonorable.    But  there  still  remain  many  not  banished  by 
law  or  opinion  which  morality  condemns,  and  to  which  no 
conscientious  man  should  descend.    They  are  advocated  in  the 
different  trades  and  professions  as  necessities  for  a  livelihood 
But  there  is  no  such  necessity.     Honesty  is  eventually  the 
best  policy.    If  there  were  such  necessity,  it  would  be  better 
to  suffer  in  temporal  interests  than  to  do  wrong. 

8.  In  tnirts.  ^^'  ■^"■^"^^  '°  ^'■"**^  ™^y  ^^  considered  under 

Debts  and  Uses. 

OM«nw  of     •      Trust,  as  the  name  implies,  is  an  intrusting. 

It  is  an  intrusting,  a  confiding  of  property  to* 
another  on  certain  conditions.     The  condition  may  be  repay- 
ment within  a  certain  time.     The  acceptance  of  the  property 
under  that  condition  forms  the  obligation  called  Debt.     The 
correspondent  right  in  the  party  lending  is  that  of  being  paid 
according  to  the  conditions.     Or  the  condition  may  be  use  in 
some  specified  way,  for  example,  to  use  money  for  a  child's 
education.     The  acceptance  of  the  money  or  other  property 
imposes  the  obligation  of  Use,  commonly  called  the  obligation 
of  Trusteeship.    The  correspondent  right  in  the  party  intrust- 
ing IS  to  have  satisfactory  evidence  that  the  money  or  other 
property  has  been  used  in  the  way  prescribed.    If  any  thing 


FRAUDS   IN   USES. 


143 


Debts. 


remain  after  tlie  use,  it  forms  a  debt  wliich  the  person  in- 
trusted is  under  obligation  to  pay,  and  which  the  person  trust- 
m<^  has  the  right  to  demand.  These  principles  apply  equally 
to  small  and  large  amounts,  to  petty  transactions  and  to  those 
cuarded  by  strict  legal  formalities,  to  the  debts  and  trusts  ol 
individuals,  corporations,  or  nations.  Such  is  the  Ethical  view. 
Debts  and  uses  may  in  the  legal  view  be  regarded  as  con- 
tracts between  two  parties,  of  which  in  most  cases,  public 
authority,  acting  through  law,  is  the  immediate  guardian. 
Where  the  law  cannot  or  will  not  act,  this  guardianship  is  in 
the  Deity. 

23.  Debt,  therefore,  is  an  obligation  to  repay 
to  another  intrusted  property  or  its  equivalent  at 
or  within  a  certain  time.  And  a  fraud  in  regard  to  debt  is  a 
voluntary  withholding  of  such  payment.  A  refusal  to  pay  a 
debt  is  an  unjust  retaining  of  the  property  of  another  person. 
There  is  the  absence  of  the  constant  and  perpetual  will  to 
render  to  every  one  his  right. 

[It  is  part  of  an  officer's  military  honor  to  pay  his  debts. 
Failure  to  do  so  is  conduct  unbecoming  an  officer  and  a  gentle- 
man.    As  such  it  is  punished.] 

24.  A  use  (now  commonly  named  a  trust)  is 
an  obligation  to  apply  for  another  his  intrusted 
property  to  certain  uses.  An  example  is  an  officer  having 
public  money  in  his  hands  for  a  particular  purpose,  such  as  the 
payment  of  troops.  Another  and  common  example  is  a  trustee 
holdinor  in  trust  for  children  an  estate  w^hich  he  is  to  use  for 
their  support  until  they  are  of  age. 

25.  There  is  fraud  in  regard  to  a  Use  or  Trust,  when  fraud  in  a 
1st.  When  the  Trustee,  the  party  intrusted,  uses  ^^' 

the  property  for  ^ny  other  purposes  than  those  prescribed  by 
the  party  intrusting ;  2d.  When  he  appropriates  to  himself  the 
property  or  any  part  of  it ;  3.  When  he  does  not  render  to  the 
party  intrusting  satisfactory  evidence  by  accounts  showing  that 
the  trust  has  been  faithfully  performed. 

26.  Tlie  following  rules  accordingly  should  be  observed  by 


Uses. 


144 


PEACTICAL   ETniCS. 


M' 


M. 


Bules  ^^^  pei-sons  to  wliom  property  is  intrusted  for  use. 

They  are  necessary  to  guard  against  fraud,  and 
against  temptations,  mistakes,  and  suspicions.     1.  Learn  with 
exactness  the  conditions  specified,  whether  they  come  from  a 
law,  from  a  will,  from  an  order  written  or  spoken.     If  the 
order  be  spoken,  have  it  committed  to  writing,  or  secure,  il 
possible,  some  capable  witness.     If  discretion  be  left  to  yon, 
liave   that   distinctly   specified    under    the   same   safeguards! 
Then  in  the  use  of  the  trust  observe  strictly  the  conditions,  and 
use  no  discretion  which   is  not  clearly  granted.     2.  Preserve 
the  intrusted  property  in  a  position  which  prevents  it  from 
being  mingled  with  personal  affairs.     If  the  law  shall  compel 
the  placing  of  it  somewhere  under  your  personal  name,  then 
by  exact  accounts  preserve  the  separation  in  your  own  esti- 
mates.     3.  Keep  accounts  with  exactness,  and  vouchers,  and 
render  them  in  the  forms  fixed  by  law  and  experience. 
Some  sources  of        2^-  The  sources  of  frauds  in  trusts,  where  there 

was  no  primary  intention  to  be  unjust,  will  be 
found  in  the  neglect  of  these  rules.  The  person  intrusted 
either  does  not  know  the  conditions  fixed  and  the  discretion 
left  to  him,  and  he  is  thus  unfaithful ;  or  the  property  intrusted 
to  him  being  mingled  with  his  own,  he  uses  it  under  some 
temporary  necessity  with  the  expectation  of  returning  it;  or, 
his  proceedings  having  been  upright,  he  does  not  give  'that 
evidence  by  legal  accounts  to  which  the  other  party  has  a  right 
by  law  and  justice. 

[As  ofiicers  of  the  Army  have  public  money  frequently  in- 
trusted to  them,  they  are  bound  to  observe  these  rules  carefully. 
Specially  they  should  shun  no  labor,  no  drudgery,  in  keeping  or 
in  learning  how  to  keep  exact  accounts.  They  should  ""not 
trust  implicitly  to  subordinates.  Their  honor,  their  property, 
their  own  happiness,  and  that  of  their  families  are  all  en' 
dangered  by  any  neglect.] 

Precept  for  right  -^-  Such  are  the  obligations  which  reo-ard 
of  property.  another  in  his  property.  They  are  comprehended 
in  the  Eighth  Commandment,—"  Thou  shalt  not  steal." 


DUTIES   REGAKDING  PROPEKTY. 


145 


29   After  offences,   we    next    consider    some 

,^,  r.  Duties  regarding^ 

special   duties    required   for    the    fumlment  oi  the  right  of 

Justice  and  Charity,  as  applied  to  relations  of  P^°P®^*y- 
property. 

30.  The  first   duty   applies   to   our   habitual 

.1.        A  A-        •;•        %•      •  A  1.  In  thought; 

thoughts  and  dispositions  ot  mind. 

There  should  be  "  a  constant  and  perpetual  will"  to  hold 

nothing  in  possession,  great,  or  small,  to  which  we  have  not  a 

perfect  right  by  the  laws  of  God  and  man ;  to  acquire  nothing 

throuirh  life  by  any  fraud  or  injustice ;  to  restore  with  full 

compensation  everything  unjustly  taken  from  another  party 

and  put  into  our  possession,  whether  it  came  by  our  own  act, 

or  by  other  persons  giving  or  bequeathing :  in  all  transactions 

to  guard  others  from  wrong  and  deception,  as  carefully  as  we 

would  wish  ourselves  to  be  guarded.     After  these  restrictions 

it  is  right  for  any  man  to  accept  and  acquire  such  fortune  as 

is  the  natural  result  from  industry  in  his  vocation.     Fortune 

so  acquired  is  a  benefit  not  for  self  alone,  but  for  families  and 

the  community  ;  an  instrument  for  the  good  of  men,  and  the 

service  of  the  Maker.     Public  wealth  is  promoted  by  that 

which  is  private. 

31.  The  second  duty  applies  to  our  words, 
whether  spoken  or  written.  Ko  fraud,  no  false-  '  ' 
hood  may  be  spoken  or  written  for  gain.  This  rule  is  to  ex- 
tend not  only  to  deceptions  which  the  law  punishes,  but  to 
those  which  it  cannot  reach.  An  example  is  .the  case  where 
our  words  literally  taken  declare  the  truth,  but  as  we  know 
they  will  be  taken  by  the  other  party  convey  a  falsehood. 
Whether  there  be  always  a  wrong  in  silence  concerning  defects 
in  a  thing  sold,  is  a  question  often  discussed.  The  law  of  the 
twelve  tables  in  Kome  did  not  punish  the  seller  for  silence 
about  defects  in  the  thing  sold,  but  it  did  punish  him  for  saying 
it  was  what  it  was  not. 

But  the  civil  law  of  Kome  required  that  in  transfer  of  real 
estate,  as  of  a  farm  or  house,  the  seller  should  declare  all  the 
faults  which  he  knew.     If  this  were  not  done,  the  contract  was 
10 


146 


PBACTICAL    ETHICS. 


fraudulent  and  void  (Cic.  De  Off,  L.  iii.  IC).    It  is  evident  that 
the  rule  must  change  according  to  tlie  tiling  sold,  the  law,  and 
the  consequent  expectation  of  the  buyer.     If  the  buyer  'have 
the  thing  submitted  to  his  full  examination,  if  the  defects  are 
80  evident  that  he  can  perceive  them,  if  he  know  from  law  and 
custom  that  he  must  rely  solely  on  his  own  examination,  and 
if  the  price  demanded  be  only  a  just  equivalent  for  the  thin<. 
with  its  defects,  then  silence  is  permitted  because  no  wrong  h 
done,  or  if  done,  not  intended.     An  example  is  a  house  with 
broken  doors,  or  a  horse  with  one  eye.    But  silence,  where  all 
IS  reversed,  where  the  qualities  of  the  thing  cannot  be  seen  or 
not  estimated  by  the  buyer,  where  from  the  nature  of  the  case 
he  puts  contideuce  in  the  seller,  where  the  price  is  as  if  the 
thing  were  not  defective,  is  highly  culpable.     An  example  is  a 
house  with  an  undermined  but  apparently  secure  foundation 
(S.  Thom.  Aq.,  ii.  2 :  Quest.  77,  Art.  3). 

In  cases  where  the  question  is  doubtful,  from  the  apparent 
equivalence  of  reasons  on  both  sides,  the  decision  should  be  in 
favor  of  the  stricter  side  of  the  rule.  The  mind  should  turn 
to  that  course  by  which  Justice,  Charity,  Honor,  and  a  good 
conscience  will  have  their  demands  fulfilled.  It  is  better  to 
lose  some  gain,  than  to  incur  the  risk  of  staining  the  con- 
science,  or  of  doing  injury  to  another  person.  Eight  is  above 
profit. 

Another  obligation  connected  with  words  is  to  keep  all 

..  promises,  verbal  or  written. 

3.  Inactions.  „       _ 

rfa.  Ihe  next  duty  belongs  to  Actions. 
All  dealings  are  to  be  true  and  just.    They  are  to  be  so 
directed  as  to  guard  equally  rights  in  others  and  in  ourselves. 
I  hey  are  neither  to  violate  Justice  nor  Charity. 

General  rule  ^"'"  ^  ^^'''ccting  actions,  the  general  rule  is 

natural  and  simple.  It  is  to  accept  the  just  re- 
turns produced  by  one's  own  labor  and  skill,  or  by  invested 
property,  but  to  receive  no  remuneration  nor  gain,  without  the 
combined  sanction  of  conscience,  of  law,  and  of  the  sentiments 
ot  upright  and  honorable  men.     This  is,  in  fact,  the  common 


* 


l\       K 


WHAT   AEE     JUST   ACCUMULATIONS. 


14:7 


coarse  pursued  by  conscientious  persons  in  all  the  avocations 
ol*  Society. 

33.  By  taking  some  examples,  we  can  see  with  special  appiica- 
more  particularity  what  is  to  be  done,  and  what  ^ion. 

is  to  be  avoided.     With  this  purpose  we  may  consider:   1. 
What  are  just  accumulations    and  returns:    2.    What    are 
moral  restrictions  on  them. 
(1.)  What  are  just  accumulations?  What,  just ac- 

34.  Examples  may  be  found  in  Labor,  in  Land,  cumulations:  by 
in  Traffic,  in  Capital. 

By  "  labor"  is  meant  work  of  hand,  of  head,  j^^bor  Land 
or  of  both,  rendered  by  a  man  in  his  vocation  for  Traffic,  Capital, 
producing  something  which  is  needed  by  the  common  wants 
of  society.  An  example  is  the  work  done  by  a  day-laborer,  a 
mechanic,  a  physician,  a  lawyer.  By  "  land,"  is  here  meant 
real  estate,  including  things  immovable,  things  which  are  con- 
sidered by  law  to  be  attached  to  land,  as  houses,  trees,  springs, 
mines,  and  like  objects.  By  ''  traffic"  is  meant  barter,  including 
both  the  local  transfer  and  tlie  sale  of  commodities  needed  by 
the  common  wants.  An  example  is  in  the  transactions  of  a 
merchant.  By  "  capital"  is  meant  accumulated  wealth,  whose 
purpose  is  use,  whether  that  use  be  for  labor,  or  land,  or 
traffic.  The  term  "Capital,"  is  usually  applied  to  money. 
But  in  its  enlarged  sense,  the  word  includes  any  accumulation 
for  use.  Tlius  the  professional  education  of  a  lawyer  or  me- 
chanic is  his  capital. 

All  these  are  essential  to  human  Society.  As 
to  the  first,  there  could  be  no  public  prosperity  ^^^^  * 
without  the  labor  of  the  different  avocations.  As  to  the 
second,  lands  and  houses  must  be  owned  and  used.  As  to  the 
third,  the  operations  of  commerce  are  essential  for  men,  for 
nations,  for  the  world.  As  to  the  fourth,  capital,  in  some  form, 
is  demanded  by  the  three  others.  They  all  require  some  ac- 
cumulation for  use,  and  this  accumulation  forms  Capital. 

Whatever  is  essential  to  human  Society  is  entitled  to  sup- 
port by  just  remunerations.    Those  are  just  remunerations 


)1 


■; 


148 


PEACTICAL   ETHIC3. 


which  cause  no  wrong  to  individuals,  nor  to  society,  and  which 

violate  neither  morality  nor  the  law  of  the  land. 

Pa^e»tfor  35.  Eve.y  man,  therefore,  may  justly  receive 

•  payment  both  for  work  done  in  his  vocation  and 

This  right  to  payment  for  work  is  so  sacred  that  Scripture 
req„,res  pay,aient  to  be  given  to  the  laborer  when  the  work 
done.     "The  wages  of  him  that  is  hired,  shall  not  remain  ,W 
thee  all  mght  until  the  morning."     "At  his  day  thou  shaU 
gu-ehnn  h:s  lure,  neither  shall  the  sun  go  down  upon  it,  fo 
he  .s  poor,  and  setteth  his  heart  unto  it."*    The  same  rule 
extends  to  the  wages  of  servants,  to  the  fees  of  physicians,  and 
to  all  hke  cases.     "Woe  unto  him  that  useth  his  neighbor's 
.orvice  without  wages,  and  that  payeth  him  not  for  his  work  "f 

X^V'"""     .   '^^'''^  """"'"^  '^""^^  ^""^  ^o"«es  are  entitled 
r  m    \  "■'"'  ^"^  *''^  "'^  ""^  t'^^'"-    Those  enga<.ed  in 

traffic  have  a  right  to  a  price  for  things  sold  which  wllfe'll 

foln'aj::*""      T  °".'^  '^'"'  '^^''''''  '°  ^""g'"S  them  to  a 
•  place  for  sale,  but  which  will  give  support  to 

them  and  the.r  families.  Those  possessing  Capital  in  the  fonn 
Zi^  Of  of  money  are  entitled  for  its  use  to  a  just  remu- 

•  neration  in  the  form  of  legal  interest.    In  such 

c  ses  no  nght,  private  or  public,  is  invaded.  Private  and  pubhc 
prosperity  are  promoted.  Justice  and  Charity  are  obeyed  and 
not  v,o,,,,,.  s„^,  ^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  ^J^^  returTswh  h 
lorm  income. 

S'todf'"  '^   ,  '^^^  '^"^  ™'^'  ^PP'^  *<>  t'^e  sale  of  any  thing; 

•  the  sale  of  what  is  made  by  labor;  the  sale  of 
land  or  house ;  the  sale  of  movable  objects  of  traffic  •  the  sale 
of  invested  capital.     The  seller  is  to  asi  and  the  bu^L  to  gT 

8old  shall  have  enhanced  in  the  hand  of  the  seller,  he  (under 


WHAT  RESTJRICTIONS   ON   ACCUMULATION. 


149 


the  restrictions  to  be  immediately  stated)  is  entitled  to  tlie 
gain.    If  the  tiling  shall  have  depreciated,  the  buyer  (under 

like  restrictions)  is  entitled  to  the  advantaore. 

,^ ,  ,rn  1  .    .  "^^^t  *'®  the 

36.  (2.)  W  hat  are  moral  restrictions  on  accu-  restrictions  on 

1  ^  -  •  „  accumulation. 

inulation. 

Kestrictions  on  these  returns  are  not  only  placed  by  morality, 
but  usually  by  law  and  by  public  sentiment.  The  restrictions 
arc  founded  on  this  plain  principle:  Every  one 
may  have  the  prices  or  profits  produced  by  the  ®®^^*^* 
Order  of  Nature  and  of  Society,  provided,  that  in  seeking  or 
receiving  them,  he  inflict  no  injury  on  the  public,  nor  on  in- 
dividuals, nor  on  his  own  honor  and  conscience.  The  principal 
restrictions  may  be  reduced  to  three. 

1st.  There  must  he  7io  combination  for  artfjir  special- 1st 
dally  affecting  prices  to  excess^  hy  raising  or  de-  Restriction. 
pressing  them. 

The  following  examples  give  illustration.  A  combination  of 
workmen  may  be  formed  in  order  to  compel  an  excessive  rate  of 
wages.  Or  a  combination  of  employers  may  be  made  on  the 
other  hand  to  depress  wages  below  what  is  just  and  needful.  A 
combination  may  be  established  to  enhance  or  reduce  exorbi- 
tantly the  prices  for  real  property  or  rents.  Bread  is  of  primary 
necessity.  A  combination  may  be  created  to  raise  extrava- 
gantly the  price  of  its  material,  and  thus  to  oppress  the  poor ; 
or  it  may  be  made  in  order  to  depress  the  price  inordinately, 
and  thus  to  oppress  the  farmer.  A  combination  of  capitalists 
may  be  effected  to  elevate  exorbitantly  the  value  of  money. 
In  all  these  cases  there  is  an  interference  with  the  natural 
equilibrium  of  prices,  with  the  common  order  of  Society.  In 
most  of  them  there  is  a  breach  of  law.  A  public  necessity  is 
artificially  created  for  private  gain.  By  that  necessity  indi- 
viduals, and  these  usually  of  limited  means  or  in  poverty,  are 
made  to  undergo  much  suffering.  Such  a  course  is  wrong.  It 
is  against  Justice  and  Charity.     Gains  so  made  are  iniquitous. 

37.  The  practical  check  on  such  wrongs  is  by  universal 
competition.     Arrangements  for  a  fair  combat  with  competi- 


150 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


or,  are  not  condemned  bj  morality.  But  in  the  cases  supposed 
there  .s  the  endeavor  to  extinguish  all  competition,  and  to 
compel  the  public  by  necessity  and  suffering  to  give  more  than 
-  just,  or  to  sell  for  less  than  is  just.  And  if  this  lies  t 
iniquity.  It  is  therefore  right  for  the  law  to  protect  the 
members  o  Society  from  such  wrongs.  Where  the  law  does 
not,  mdividual  conscience  must  furnish  that  protection 

The  2d  restriction  is,  there  may  he  no  wr<nu,  inflicted  <m 
other  men  through  their  necessities  and  ignorance. 
2d  Eestriction.        f^'  ^^e^fdingly  no  undue  advantage  may  be 
_  taken  of  public  necessities  even  when  not  artifi- 

dS  Tt     ^'  "".'"'  ''^""'^°"  ''  '"^^"^  '^'  ^«'"»tary  ad- 
dition  of  suffering.     For  example,  a  famine,  a  war,  or  a  sLe 

may  raise  to  an  extravagant  height  the  necessaries  of  life     If  I 
xnan  have  these  necessaries  in  his  possession,  can  receive  for 
hem  a  just  price,  and  yet  holds  them  back  from  a  starving  popu- 
lation in  order  to  enhance  his  profits  to  the  highest  degree,  he 

wifw      t  'f "'  ""'"    ^^  --  -fi-"g.  -d  he  chores 
without  pity  to  increase  it  for  his  own  gain.    To  such  cases 

the  words  of  Scripture  apply.     «  He  that  withholdeth  corn,  the 

people  shal  cui-se  him  ;  but  blessing  shall  be  upon  the  head  of 

iiiin  that  selleth  it''  CProv  xl    9fi^      Ti,^  .  •     .  i 

^  •'  ^^^     ^^^  s^'»^  principle  applies 

to  public  necessity  for  money.  A  war  or  public  disasters  may 
enhance  its  value  inordinately.  But  to  oppress  the  Govern- 
ment,  or  individuals,  by  withholding  loans  at  such  a  time  is 
liighly  culpable.  Morality  condemns  all  those  increased  gains 
which  can  only  come  through  increased  distress.  They  are 
violations  of  both  Justice  and  Charity. 

39.  For  a  like  reason  no  undue  advantage  may  be  taken  of 
Whh^  zgnorance.  For  example,  a  fleet  is  bearing  supplies  to  a 
p.ace  distressed  by  famine.  Its  approach  is  known  to  one,  and 
one  only,  who  has  the  same  commodities  for  sale,  and  who  has 
been  keeping  a  part  back  for  higher  prices.  He  sells  wh,t 
remains  at  the  famine  price  of  the  day,  though  he  knows  that 
in  twenty-four  hours  the  value  will  be  reduced  one-half  He 
has  taken  iniquitous  advantage  of  public  ignorance. 


NO   DISHONORABLE   GAINS. 


151 


40.  Tlie  case  is  much  stronger  where  loth  necessity  and 
ignorance  are  united  in  the  persons  wronged.  An  example  is 
familiar  to  all  who  travel,  in  the  impositions  of  the  drivers  of 
hackney-coaches.  Travellers  as  a  class  are  ignorant  of  local 
rights  and  customs.  In  arriving  at  a  place  they  are  usually 
under  the  necessity  of  having  themselves  and  their  luggage 
transported.  They  are  thus  between  painful  alternatives.  If 
they  do  not  pay  an  exorbitant  demand,  property  or  health 
will  be  endangered.  If  tliej^  do  pay  an  unjust  demand,  they 
are  robbed  as  much  as  if  a  club  or  pistol  had  been  used.  The 
law,  therefore,  interposes,  and  protects  the  traveller  by  fixing 
prices  which  may  not  be  exceeded. 

41.  This  example  is  valuable,  as  fixing  certain  principles 
both  in  law  and  morals.  It  shows  the  perfect  propriety  of  all 
those  laws  which  limit  prices  in  the  cases  w^here  experience  has 
shown  that  the  necessities  or  ignorance  of  persons  will  expose 
them  to  wrongs  if  the  law  do  not  protect  them.  Such  are  the 
laws  limiting  the  rate  of  interest  for  money  loaned,  which 
among  their  other  benefits  protect  widows  and  orphans  in  their 
estates.  The  law  may  righteously  interpose  to  restrain  prices 
in  all  cases  where  experience  has  shown  that  without  law 
Justice  would  be  violated  and  wrongs  inflicted.  Mere  finance 
may  say  the  law  should  never  interfere.  But  Justice  is  a 
greater  interest,  and  is  the  foundation  for  financial  prosperity 
itself. 

42.  The  principle  of  the  law  shows  the  rule  of  morals. 
Every  gain  is  unjust  which  wrongs  another  through  his 
necessity  or  ignorance.  This  is  to  be  applied  to  all  selling  and 
buying.  We  may  not  pay  less  than  is  just,  nor  get  more  than 
is  just,  because  our  neighbor  is  not  free  or  not  intelligent. 

43.  3dly.  1^0  man  may  receive  any  remunera- 
tion or  gain  wJien  the  reception  thereof  would  he 
dishonorable.    That  is  dishonorable  which  men  do  not  honor. 
That  which  they  will  not  and  do  not  honor  may  always  be 
known  by  settled  custom.     For  example,  among  the  Eomans 
it  was  thought  dishonorable  for  the  lawyer  to  receive  fees  from 


152 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


a  client.  This  is  not  tlie  sentiment  of  modern  times.  But  in 
every  hnman  avocation,  there  are  practices  which  by  common 
consent  are  deemed  dishonorable.  Whoever  makes  gain  bv 
them  loses  the  respect  of  others  and  consequently  his  own 
It  IS  therefore  the  duty  of  every  man  to  conform  his  sentiment 
to  this  prevailing  usage,  and  to  accept  nothing  which  that 
usage  condemns. 

[It  is  so  among  military  men.     For  an  officer  to  buy  any 
thmg  at  one  point  for  the  mere  purpose  of  profit  by  selling 
It  at  another,  is  considered  "  conduct  unbecoming  an  officer 
and  a  gentleman."     Custom  and  sentiment  authorize  the  sale 
of  furniture  and  effects,  as  no  intention  of  trading  entered  into 
their  purchase.     But  the  purpose  and  practice  of  trading  are 
considered  inconsistent  with  the  military  character.      Some- 
times  a  commanding  officer  may  secure  an  accumulation  of 
petty  gams  by  courses  not  suitable  for  an  officer  nor  for  a 
gentleman      When  a  temptation  of  this  kind  arises,  it  should 
be  bamshed  by  the  thought,-What  is  the  gain,  compared  to 
mj  honor,  and  the  honor  of  the  service  ?] 

Becapituiation.         ^""^'^^  ^'"^  ^^^^  restrictions  both  on  income  and 

on  profits.  There  must  be  no  artificial  disturb- 
ance of  settled  prices.  There  must  be  no  wrong  through  the 
necessity  or  ignorance  of  another.  There  must  be  no  dishonor- 
ab  e  acquisition.  We  have  thus  seen  the  subdivisions  of  obli- 
gations  m  thoughts,  words,  and  actions,  with  reference  to 
property. 


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154 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


CHAPTER     IX. 


RELATIONS  IN  WHICH  JUSTICE  PREDOMIN5.TE2^-CONTrNUED 

DOMESTIC   AND   SOCIAL   RELATIONS. 

Eepntatioa:  Its         1-    Tlie    next    right    is    tliat     to     Eeptitsttioh. 

"*  "*•  Eeputation  is  a  good  name  anion  <r  men  in  life 

and  after  death.  To  appreciate  tlie  riglit,  we  sho-ild  estimate 
the  value  of  the  possession.  It  is,  as  we  have  seen  under 
Duties  to  Ourselves,  a  proper  object,  under  moral  limitations 

It,  quality.        f,  '''""'*°  P"""'"''  (^^-  ''■)■    The  esteem,  con- 

tidence,  and  affection  of  cur  fellow-men  are  bene- 
fits so  great  that  many  prize  them  more  than  property  or  life 
and  make  them  subordinate  only  to  Virtue  ;  of  which  they  are 
the  shadow  and  the  sign.  This  sentiment  is  sustained  by 
Scripture  in  words  before  quoted :  "  A  good  name  is  rather 
to  be  chosen  than  great  riches,  and  loving  favor  rather  than 
silver  and  gold." 

[Tlie  sentiment  is  essential  for  tho  spirit  and  efficiency  of 
the  military  body ;  and  every  true  soldier  gives  that  lofty 
place  to  his  deserved  reputation,  his  unstained  honor.] 

to?£*l'^^'"'         ^'  ^°"^^P°"^«°t  to  Reputation  is  the  mani- 
'*~'-  festation  of  respect  from  others  in  personal  in- 

tercourse. 
Such  is  the  object  of  the  right. 
Public  rights  re-      ^-  Public  right  over  this  object  is  direct  or  in- 
g^^ding  Eeputa-  direct.    It  is  a  direct  right  in  public  authority  to 

inflict,  by  process  of.  law,  the  loss  of  reputation 
and  respect  as  a  punishment  for  crime.  Punishments  which 
imply  dishonor  and  disgrace,  and  which  remove  from  personal 
intercourse  tlie  common  marks  of  respect,  are  an  exercise  of 
this  nght.  The  indirect  right  of  Society  is  to  the  public  bene- 
lits  and  honor  resulting  from  individual  reputations.    Some 


EEPUTATION  :    OFFENCES   AGAINST. 


155 


nations  have  deemed  the  reputation  of  its  great  and  good  men, 
its  warriors,  statesmen,  philosophers,  discoverers,  poets,  philan- 
thropists, as  the  most  valuable  of  all  their  possessions,  because 
making  their  national  glory.  These  live  when  an  empire  has 
passed  away.  These  it  can  present  before  the  eyes  of  other 
nations,  and  transmit  to  distant  ages.  The  name  of  Alfred  is 
an  imperishable  possession*  for  England,  as  is  that  of  Wash- 
ington for  the  United  States  of  America. 

4.  The  private  right  to  his  reputation,  and  to 

,  IX'  J.         •  J.     •  Private  rights, 

the  common  marks  oi  respect,  exists  m  every 

man  till  forfeited  by  his  own  misconduct.     Such  is  the  riglit. 

5.  The  obligation  in  public  authority  is  to  pro- 

,  .  .    ,  T  1  •       1  T         Correspondent 

tect  that  private  right.     It  executes  this  obliga-  obligations : 

tion  through  its  courts  of  justice.  ^  ^^' 

6.  The  individual  obligation  correspondent  to 

the  individual  right,  is  to  injure  no  man's  repu-  ^  ^^^ 
tation,  and  to  withhold  no  proper  respect  from  any  man.  The 
divine  rules  are :  ^'  Speak  evil  of  no  man."  "  Honor  all 
men."  Justice  demands  this.  Charity  requires  us  to  regard 
our  neighbor's  reputation,  and  his  feelings,  wounded  as  they 
will  be  by  rudeness  and  disrespect,  as  if  that  reputation  and 
that  natural  sensibility  belonged  to  ourselves.  Such  are  the 
obligations.  ' 

7.  Offences  against  deputation  are  violations  offences:  their 
both  of  the  private  and  public  right.     They  are  division. 

of  two  classes :  those  which  deprive  a  man  of  general  esteem : 
those  which  dissever  friendship. 

8.  Of  the  first  class  are  the  offences  under  ^     ,  .       . 

Depriving  of  es- 

Detraction.  Detraction  is  a  wrong  to  another  teem  by  Detrao- 
by  injurious  words  that  lessen  and  blacken  his 
reputation.  It  has  been .  previously  considered  as  slander 
under  sins  of  the  tongue  wdth  reference  to  the  passions  vented 
by  it.  It  is  here  considered  as  a  wrong  to  one's  neighbor. 
The  effect  of  calumny  is  injury  to   reputation.     This  effect 


*  Krfjaa  fg  dcec, — Thucydides. 


156 


PEACTICAL    ETHICS. 


THE  person:  eights. 


157 


follows,  whether  it  be  or  be  not  intended.     In  some  cases,  this 
is  deliberately  proposed.     In  the  mass  of  injurious  words  daily 
spoken,   and  in  this  country  daily  printed,  there  does  not 
appear  so  much  an  active  intention  to  injure,  as  an  entire  and 
thoughtless  disregard  of  the  sacred  private  and  public  rights 
belonging  to  reputation.     Detraction  by  calumny  and  slander 
is  a  sin,  an  offence  of  aggravated  character.    Estimating  the 
offence  by  the  value  of  the  thing  taken,  its  enormity  is  beyond 
that  of  theft.-^    This  is  the  case  where  the  injury  is  to  the 
most  obscure  private  individual.     Where  the  person  wronged 
is  a  public  man,  the  pubhc  rights  are  invaded.     In  a  coun'try 
like  this,  where  reverence  for  public  authority  is  indispensable 
for  the  preservation  of  the  institutions  of  the  United  States, 
the    constant    railing    against    public    men,    the    unsparing 
censures  and  detractions  to  which  they  are  subject,  are  full  of 
wrongs  in  the  present,  and  of  dangers  for  the  future. 
Depriving  of  ^-  The  offence  against  Friendship  is  by  whis- 

endship.  pering  evil  insinuations,  whose  effect,  whether 
intended  or  not,  is  to  alienate  those  who  were  friends.  "  A 
whisperer  separateth  chief  friends."  (Prov.  xvi.,  28.)  The 
enormity  of  the  offence  is  to  be  estimated  by  the  value  of 
friendship,  one  of  the  greatest  blessings  of  mortal  life. 
Offences  against  1^-  Offences  against  Bespecl  are  Contumely, 
Eespect.  Mocking,  and  Cursing.     All  are  forms  of  insult, 

and  violations  of  the  duty  of  charity  and  of  that  of  honor  to 
all  men.  They  usually  spring  from  the  irascible  passions. 
Contumely  is  insult,  under  the  provocation  of  anger,  and  with 
the  assumption  of  superiority.f  Mocking  is  insult  with  ridi- 
cule. Cursing  is  insult  with  imprecations  of  evils  from  the 
Divine  Being  on  the  person  cursed.  Cursing  adds  an  offence 
against  God  by  profanity,  to  an  x)ffence  against  man  by 
cruelty,  and  to  off^ence  against  one's  own  nature  by  permitting 
the  unrestrained  flow  of  the  malevolent  passions. 

*  "Who  steals  my  purse,"  &c.—Shakspeare. 

t  Tumto,  to  sweU:  Contumelia,  swelUng  against  or  by  the  side  of  another. 


11.  Cursing  another,  under  the  incitement  of 
ajio-er,  involves  transgression  in  these  three  re- 
lations. If  it  be  deliberate,  the  sin  is  aggravated.  If  several 
unite  to  glut  their  malevolent  passions,  and  mutually  to  in- 
crease them,  by  emulous  imprecations  on  those  whom  they 
hate,  each  off'ender  is  severally  guilty.  If  such  collective  im- 
precations are  made  in  the  names  of  religion  and  morality, 
they  are  in  the  highest  degree  of  moral  turpitude.  St.  James 
speaks  of  the  terrific  contrast  when  the  same  organs  of  speech 
''  bless  God,  even  the  Father,  and  curse  men  who  are  made  in 
the  similitude  of  God."  These  high  grades  of  guilt  are 
attained  when  we  consider  in  our  neighbor  only  the  fact  that 
he  is  a  man  made  after  the  similitude  of  God.  But  ever  ad- 
vancing degrees  arise  as  the  relations  violated  become  nearer 
and  holier,  those  of  country,  friendship,  relationship.  Among 
the  terrific  and  revolting  spectacles  of  the  w^orld  are  parents 
giving  and  bequeathing  curses  to  their  children. 

Such  are  some  of  the  offences. 

The  duties  have  been  stated  under  those  to  ourselves. 

KlGHTS    OF    THE    PeESON. 

12.  The  next  rights  are  those  of  the  Person,  f^^^^^  *^® 
The  object  of  this  right  is  the  body,  in  its  life, 

in  its  members,  in  our  use  of  it.  Under  the  ^®°  * 
person,  therefore,  we  include  life,  limb,  and  liberty, 
objects  are  of  immense  value  individually  and  socially, 
value  to  individuals  is  easily  estimated  by  conceiving  our- 
selves to  be  deprived  of  any  one  of  them.  Their  social  value 
is  evident  from  History.  There  can  be  no  civilization  where 
these  objects  are  not  respected ;  and  the  civilization  of  com- 
munities advances  in  proportion  as  these  are  protected.  So- 
ciety is  specially  organized  for  the  protection  of  individual 
rights  of  the  person. 

13.  Eights  of  the  Person  are  accordingly  di-  Resulting  di- 
vided  into  those  of  life,  limb,  and  liberty. 


Tliese 
Their 


vision. 


158 


PRACTICAL  ETmcS. 


Divine  right.       rr,,^\^'^  ""'"'"^  "S'^*  o^^r  tl'ese  is  primary 
..i.    .1-         .-^''"^'■''^^'^'-^^I'o  gave  may  take.    He  may  dele^ 
gate     Ins    pnmary   right   to  men,   by  special   command    or 
t  rough  the  aw  of  nature.    He  Las  also  a  right  to  the  serv ic 
of  men    and  to   ascriptions  both  for  the  possession  of  lif 
m.b,  and  hberty,  and  for  the  virtues  and  good  deeds  of  whi  h 
men  ai-e  capable,  through  such  possession.    He  is  tl»e  Supr  m 
P  otector  ot  hmnan  rights  of  the  person,  specially  in  ca!  s  to 
v^nch     „n.an  law  cannot  or  will  not  reach,  as    n  that    f 
B  ngle  stranger  on  a  desert  shore.     He  is  the  direct  guard! 
ot  those  nghts  and  an  avenger  against  all  who  violate  them! 
PubUcj  ^,  1^;^I'"1>1'«  rights  over  these,  as  derived  from 

tlie  Creator,  being  delegated  to  Organized  So- 
cety,  are  d,rect  or  indirect.  Tl.e  direct  right  ov^r  tl^  hY 
hmb  and  hberty  of  individuals  exists  in  pubHc  aut  1  '  ' 
-h-ch  may  take  these  away  through  law,  under  the  reo  J  ^ 
n.ents  and  necessities  of  public  justice.  A  nation  may  Tr  . 
ice  us  members  in  war,  and  expose  them  to  death,  mutation 
and  capfv.  y,     war  being  an  occasional  public  la^  for  the  d  ! 

comts  of  just.ce,  it  may  take  life,  or  limb,  or  confine  offender! 
for  crimes,  administering  i„  this  case  law  permanent  The 
..^e....  public  right  extends  to  the  social  public  benefits  d 
...to  the  security  and  prosperity  which  result  from  the  i-es  r 
vation  of  these  rights  of  the  person,  and  which  are  in^Cd Ty 
ti.e  violation  of  those  rights.  Hence,  every  such  vijati^t 
not  only  a  private,  but  a  public  wrong. 

ftivau.  .^^■'^^  private  right,  the  right  of  the  indi- 

vidual  to  life,  limb,  and  liberty,  only  subject  to 

theTigZ!""  ""^"^"""' '  "°"™^'^^  ^"^^  p-^-*  T^'::  a!: 

"bffi^""'      J^^  7^^P"^^'■«  obligation,  carrespcmdent  to  the 
mS'c;""-       f  ^^«^   ^^'^^.  is    to    protect   these  with    the 

deepest  solicitude.  Nations  and  their  municipal 
anthorities  are,  under  the  Deity,  the  consecrated  guardians  of 
these  natural  rights  of  men.    They  are,  tlierefore.'not  o";  l 


THE  person:  obligations. 


159 


Individual : 


redress  and  punish  particular  wrongs  as  tliey  arise,  but  by 
proper  laws,  and  by  their  administration,  to  diffuse  through 
the  whole  mass  of  the  community,  and  in  every  individual's 
thought,  a  sense  of  perfect  security. 

18.  The  individual  obligation,  correspondent 
to  the  private  right  in  every  other  individual,  is 
to  respect,  and  never  to  invade  these  rights  of  the  person  in 
his  neighbor.  As  you  have  a  right  to  life,  limb,  and  liberty, 
every  other  man  (unless  as  the  agent  of  law)  is  under  obliga- 
tion not  to  take  these  away.  If  he  do,  the  law  will  punish 
him.  You  are  under  the  same  obligation  to  every  other  man. 
You  must  be  punished  by  the  law  if  you  forget  his  right,  and 
inflict  on  his  person  a  wrong. 

19.  Lawful  correction  and  confinement  for  discipline  ap- 
plied to  those  under  authority,  do  not  violate  these  obligations. 
The  parent,  or  the  person  to  whom  he  delegates  his  authority, 
as  in  education,  is  the  minister. of  law  divine,  or  natural,  or 
human,  by  one  of  which,  or  by  all  combined,  he  is  clothed 
with  that  authority.  Masters  of  vessels,  and  those  in  similar 
relations,  have  so  much  authority  over  their  subordinates  as  is 
o-iven  by  law.  By  the  Koman  law  the  parent  had  the  right 
to  inflict  any  severity  on  his  child,  or  to  take  his  life.  And 
such  a  riffht  was  extended  to  other  relations.  But  in  Christian 
States,  and  in  this  country,  all  excess  in  the  kind,  or  degree 
of  punishment,  is  forbidden.  Cruel  and  unusual  punishments 
may  never  be  inflicted  by  individuals  or  tribunals. 

20.  Tlie  individual  obligation  correspondent  to  the  direct 
puUic  right  is,  to  acquiesce  in  the  deprivations  produced  by 
the  order  of  public  justice.  He  who  is  doomed  by  judicial 
sentence  to  the  loss  of  life,  limb,  or  liberty,  should  show  his 
reverence  for  law  and  justice  by  submission.  He  who  suifers 
in  war,  should  regard  himself  as  enduring  for  the  cause  of  his 
country. 

Such  are  the  rights  and  correspondent  obligations  regarding 

the  Person. 


160 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Offences:  •    ^^-  ^'"^  Principal  offences  to  be  here  consid- 

ered are  forms  of  personal  violence. 
Mnrderj  Murder  is  the  voluntary  and  unlawful  taking 

oi  hfa     It  is  a  crime  against  God,  against  So*^ 
cietv    against  the  individual  slain,  against  his  relations  and 
Inends.     It  is  so  high  a  crime,  and  such  a  perfect  bar  to  all 
m-ihzation,  that  when  Noah,  with  his  sons,  went  forth  after 
tl)e  deluge   to  establish   nations,  it  was  specially  forbidden 
The  rule  was  made  for  all   men   and  codes.     "  Whosoever 
{i.  e    indiv  dually)  sheddeth  man's  blood,  by  man   shall  his 
blood  be  shed."    Eeverence  for  life  was  required  trom  all 
inen.       In  the  image  of  God  made  He  man."    «  At  the  hand 
of  every  man's  brother  will  I  require  the  life  of  man."     (Gen 
IX.,  5  and  6.)  ^ 

22.  Under  ilurder  we  may  include  here  an  offence  directly 
against  self,  but  incidentally  against  others-that  of  Suicide. 
Suicide,  ^"'•''*^^  '"  self-murder.     It  is  a  voluntary  and 

unlawful  taking  of  one's  own  life.    It  is  a  crime 
against  God,  because  the  primary  right  over  life   exists   in 
the  Creator.    Ue  assigns  the  time  and  mode  of  terminating 
existence,  through  the  laws  of  nature  and  of  society.    Suicide 
IS,  therefore,   a   crime  against  Ilim.    It  is  a  crime  against 
society.     Society  has  a  right  to  the  lives  of  all  its  members 
which  it  does  not  ordain  by  law  to  sacrifice.    It  is  a  crime' 
agamst  one's  self.    It  is  an  unmanly  yielding  to  the  pressure 
on  the  feelings  of  present  evils.    It  is  a  refusal  to  trust  in  the 
mercy  of  a  Divine  Providence  for  the  future.     It  is  a  crime 
against  the  friends  to  whom  one  is  bound  by  the  ties  of  nature 
and  affection.     There  are  yet  other  and  far  higher  aggravations 
ot  the  crime  considered  by  Theology. 

Duelling.  ^^-  ^"^"'"g    is  murder  complicated.     It  is 

complicated  because  there  is  the  will  to  take 
another  s  life  unlawfully,  and  also  the  will  to  sacrifice  one's 
own  life  unlawfully.  There  is  also  the  guilt  from  the  indul- 
gence of  the  darker  passions.  It  includes,  therefore,  both  the 
guilt  ot  the  murder  of  another  person,  and  the  guilt  of  Suicide 


THE   I'EESON  :    DUTIES. 


161 


Duties. 


All  the  aggravations  enumerated  in  the  two  previous  heads 
are  accumulated  and  complicated  in  Duelling. 

24.  After  the  ofFenc*^R,  we  consider  the  duties  by  which  we 
avoid  and  prevent  deeds  of  violence. 

The  first  duty  is  to  restrain  the  passions  which 
produce  injuries  to  the  person  of  another.  Such 
are,  Revenge,  Anger,  Hatred,  Envy,  which  have  been  consid- 
ered under  duties  to  ourselves.  This  duty  lies  in  the  thoughts. 
*'  Out  of  the  heart  proceed  murders."  (Matt,  xv.,  19.)  It  is 
here  that  Charity  is  to  make  its  influence  felt,  as  the  attendant 
on  Justice.  Those  passions  are  to  be  repressed  by  Justice, 
since  Justice  leads  us  to  wish  to  do  that  to  another  w^iich  w^e 
would  wish  another  to  do  to  ourselves.  We  are  to  repress 
them  by  Charity,  which  leads  us  to  love  others  as  ourselves. 

The  second  duty  is  to  exercise  self-restraint  in  the  words  and 
manners  which  commonly  lead  to  deeds  of  violence.  We  are 
to  "  leave  off  contention  before  it  be  meddled  with."  (Prov. 
xvii.,  14.)  "  A  fool's  N^s  enter  into  contention  ;  and  hisr 
mouth  calleth  for  strokes."  (Prov.  xviii.,  6.)  Here,  also, 
duties  to  ourselves  prepare  for  duties  to  others.  Here,  also, 
Justice  and  Charity  will  prevent  the  words  and  ways  that 
kindle  strife.  The  natural  effect  of  Justice  and  Charity  is  to 
produce  courtesy  unbroken  in  manner  and  matter,  even  in 
moments  of  high  excitement.  By  them  there  is  the  sense  of 
what  is  due  to  another,  and  there  is  a  feeling  as  if  he  were 
another  self.  Governed  habitually  by  these  principles,  you 
will  not  w^ound  another  in  his  self-respect,  or  in  the  point  of 
honor.  You  will  not  utter  scornful  or  contemptuous  words  to 
inflict  the  stings  which,  when  felt,  urge  to  the  shedding  of 
blood.  It  is  well  said  :  "  Cast  out  the  scorner^  and  contention 
shall  go  out."     (Prov.  xxii.,  10.) 

The  third  obligation  is  to  avoid  all  unauthorized  deeds  of 
violence.  Restraint  on  self  is  to  be  applied  to  the  first  clutch- 
ing of  the  fist,  the  first  grasping,  or  drawing,  or  lifting  of  the 
weapon.  No  man  is  to  suffer  himself  to  act  from  blind  and 
brutal  passion.  Here,  also,  duties  to  self  prepare  for  duties  to 
11 


162 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


others.    Here  Justice  and   Charitj,  speaking  tlirongh  calm 
reason,  must  restrain  and  direct. 
Such  are  obligations  in  thought,  word,  and  deed. 

Eight  of  Virtue. 

BiS-it  0/  Virtue.      !f  •  '^^^  """'  '■'■g'^t  's  that  to  our  Virtue. 

By  our  Virtue  is  here  meant  the  habitual  pos- 

«rr'         T'"".  T    ""''''''  "^  *''^  '^^^^  '"<>'--l  principles 

•  It  "'^-'"des  all  the  particular  virtues.     Some  ethi" 

cal  wnters  use  for  the  same  idea  the  term   Character  Z 

fied,  unfolded,  and,  at  last,  perfected.     By  this  possession  one 
attains  good  and  avoids  evil  here  and  ever.    By  I  the  Deity" 
er..d  an     honored.    By  it,  society  and  its  m'embe.  reSvl 
W  hat    ';  -T       ""'  "''  i-P-shable  than  property, 

lorever.  It  ,s  above  reputation  and  honor,  bein-.  the  sub 
stance  o  which  they  are  the  shadow  cast.  t  is  more  t  lan 
l.fe  bod>Iy,  being  the  life  of  the  soul  in  its  noblest  form  I  " 
more  than  our  nien.bers,  or  physical  freedom.  It  is  the  soul's 
mtegnty  .v^thout  mutilation.  It  is  man's  true,  perfect  and 
unalienable   reedom.     Such  is  the  object  of  this  ri^ht.      ' 

eiveJ;  l^cT'Z  "''  /'"  ^'•'^"""^  ^^J"^''*  -«  -l"^o«t  exclu- 
Bively  in  God  and  ourselves. 

Divide  right.       ^ '"'*'  .'^'""^  rig'i'  «^er  Virtue  is  supreme.     The 

f.     TT-         .^'    ""^  *''^  "«^'  t°  ^''•ect  and  to  form  Virtue 
after  lis  per  ect  will.     He  has  a  right  to  thanks  a"d  prS 
for  virtues  and  pure  characters,  formed  under  His  law  and    n 
fluenc.    He  also  is  the  Protector  and  Rewarder  of  goodne" 
How  often  has  persecuted  Virtue  been  compelled  to  look"" 
yond  contemporaries  to  Him  ! 

PuWc.  .  f  •  -P"'^''«  authority  has  no  direct  invasive 

fl,»  K      fl.      "f  ,  *'''''■  ^''^"^-     ^'  ^^«  «°  indirect  right  to 
he    enefi  s  and  glories  resulting  to  society,  from  the  Xtu 

o.  Its    members.     It  has,  consequently,   a    right    to  punish 


BIGHT  OF  virtue:    OFFENCES   AGAINST. 


163 


Individual. 


injuries   to  Tirtue.     It  has   the  obligation  of  protecting  and 
defending  virtue,  and  that  of  rewarding  it  in  signal  instances. 

28.  The  individual  right  to  Virtue  is  full,  abso- 
lute, unlimited.  Every  man  has  a  perfect  right 
to  adopt  and  exercise  the  best  moral  principles.  Tliis,  his 
rio-ht  in  regard  to  every  external  influence,  indicates  his  first 
duty  in  regard  to  himself 

29.  The  correspondent  obligation  in  the  indi-  correspondent 
vidual  is  all  which  requires  our  present  attention.  Obligations. 
The  obligation  resting  on  every  human  being  is  to  inflict  no 
injury  on  another's  virtue.  This  is  demanded  by  Justice. 
Charity  requires  more  than  this  negative  abstinence  from  wrong. 
It  calls  us  to  do  all  we  can  to  promote  the  virtue  and  improve 
the  cliaracter  of  our  neighbor.  This  obligation  is  among  those 
which  are  enforced  by  all  the  spheres  of  duty.  It  is  an  obli- 
gation in  view  of  the  relations  above  us,  since  we  thereby 
further  the  kingdom  of  God  among  men,  and  the  temporal 
welfare  of  society.  It  is  an  obligation  to  ourselves,  since,  in 
efforts  to  make  others  better,  we  improve  ourselves.  It  is  an 
obligation  to  others,  since  we  thus  respect  their  rights  and  pro- 
mote their  happiness  here  and  hereafter. 

30.  The  offences  against  the  virtue  of  another  offences : 
are  of  a  general  character,  or  of  special  enor-  c^eneral; 
mity. 

Those  of  a  general  character  consist  in  lessening  good  and 
stimulating  evil  principles  of  action.  We  lessen  good  prin- 
ciples by  destroying  another's  confidence  in  Eeligion  and  Mo- 
rality. We  stimulate  evil  principles  by  filling  the  imagination 
with  seductive  pictures  of  vicious  indulgence,  by  arousing  the 
evil  appetites  of  the  body  and  the  passions  of  the  mind,  by 
employing  others  as  instruments  and  associates  in  iniquity,  by 
presenting  evil  examples. 

31.  OSencea  of  special  enormity  are  Seduction  and  Adultery. 
In  Seduction  (so  far  as  the  word  designates  a 

special    crime)  the    female    is   unmarried.    In    *^ 
Adultery  each  of  the  parties  or  one  is  married. 


104: 


PRACTICAL  Ernies. 


TLese  cnmes  contain  all  tl.e  guilt  before  attributed  to  the 
g  era  offences.  Tl,e,  add  to  this  a  specific  turpitude  n 
both  .a  common  cr.me-that  of  unlawful  connection.  I^ 
both  .s  the  corruption  of  another's  virtue.  In  both  is  the  in 
fl.et,on  of  great  and  lasting  evils.  Eoth  are  crimes  git' 
God,  aga,nst  socet,  and  its  laws,  against  the  other  partfrd 

S:,^""''^{  1'"  ^'"'•"''^"•''   "'-  «Wi»-tiou    to  protect  the 
rights  so  .nvaded,  and  to  punish  their  infraction  by  law 
There  are  special  gradations  of  guilt  attached  to  ^ch  of 

hese  crnnes.     These  are  to  be  added  to  all  the  otherTonsid 
erafons,  when  ^e  are  estimating  each  of  the  crimes. 
Seduction.  ^^z/"   Seduction   these  specially  appear  bv 

w  .  ^  V     ,*^°"''*^^''''"g  the  female.    I„   her  youth   she  is 
tempted  by  her  seducer  through  affection,  flatt  ry,  pres  nt 
pronnses.    After  her  fall,  she  is  abandoned.     She  is  cu    off  a^ 
onee  from  reputable  society.    Her  good  name  is  g  A„ 

rlvf       ,      ,    .     ''  ''   ''^"""^^  ^''"^  *h«  -fl»ences  of  mo- 

eternal      She  has  no  hope.    Her  whole  life,  from  her  first 
te.nptat,on,  ,s  one  of  shame,  agony,  and  despaik 

The  man  who  inflicts  such  wrongs  and  sorrows  on  any 
human  bemg  is  evidently  guilty  of  a  crime  of  the  greate  I 
magnitude.  o'^^'^tesc 

Adultery.  /^-  A<^"ltery  adds  to  all  the  ascending  grades 

.  Su>lt  which  have,  been  stated,  peculiar  a.^<.ra- 

As  one,  Adultery  ,s  the  violation  of  a  vow,  of  the  marria..e- 
vow,  to  keep  only  to  the  other  party  so  long'as  both  sha    1  S 
Th  same  pnnc.ples  belong  to  it  as  to  the  oath.  (ch.  ii.,  49  to  57 
It  IS  ineffaceable  but  by  death,  (ch.  ii.,  55.  See  Rom.  i.  2,  3  )  So 

^ii"55;Thel"'^^^°""*^"'^  ^^  ^" '--  -^p'-' 

(Ch.  1.  55.)  The  other  and  special  aggravation  of  Adultery  is  the 
uncertainty  which  it  introduces  into  families  concerning  L 
ongm  of  children.    The  effects  on  the  justice  and  legSy  of 


DUTIES   REGARDING    VIRTUE   IN   OTHERS. 


165 


inheritances,  and  on  the  feelings  of  the  husband,  and  of  every 
member  of  the  family,  are  evident. 

From  offences  we  pass  to  duties. 

3i.  The  precept  forbidding  these  offences,  and 
inculcating  the  obligation  to  respect  the  virtue  of     ^^^' 
another  is  :  "  Thou  shalt  not  commit  Adultery."     Adultery  is 
selected  to  represent  all  the  offences,  as  including  the  guilt  of 
all. 

35.  Duties  belonging  to  another's  virtue  apply 
to  thoughts,  words,  and  actions.  ^  ^^  * 

In  the  thoughts  we  are  to  have  a  constant  and 
perpetual  wish  for  the  moral  purity  of  others.  °^^    ' 

This  wish  is  to  be  the  source  of  correspondent  actions.  Neg- 
atively we  'are  to  restrain  every  movement  of  the  natural  dis- 
position which  accompanies  transgression.  This  is  a  dispo- 
sition to  desire  that  others  may  do  the  same.  Men  look  fre- 
quently with  complacency  and  encouragement  on  the  sins 
which  they  like.  This  disposition  is  well  depicted  in  the 
words  :  "  Who  not  only  do  such  things,  but  have  pleasure  in 
them  that  do  them."  (Eom.  i.,  32.)  By  restraining  this  dis- 
position, the  evil  is  arrested  at  its  source. 

This  duty  to  respect  another's  virtue  is  to  be 
applied  to  words.     No  word  of  encouragement  is  * 

to  be  given  to  wrong-doing.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  to  be  re- 
buked. No  language  is  to  be  uttered  which  fosters  any  evil 
passion.  They  who  suggest  obscene  images,  and  impure 
thoughts  in  conversation,  have  done  something  to  corrupt 
another  mind,  and  are  so  far  guilty.  Such  is  the  negative  or 
passive  part  of  this  obligation.  Its  active  part  consists  in 
suitably  encouraging  all  those  under  one's  influence  to  preserve 
a  steadfast  adherence  to  moral  principle. 

This  duty  to  respect  another's  virtue  is  to  be 
applied  to  actions.  No  bad  example  is  to  be  set 
before  another.  Examples  are  contagious.  Evil  examples 
among  men  are  as  flames  among  combustibles.  The  active 
part  of  this  obligation  consists  in  efforts  to  promote  Virtue. 


In  Acts. 


w 


"^  PKACnCAL   ETHICS. 

Domestic  and  Sociai,  Kelations. 

Sr Eeilfon..  ,  ^^-  ^"'"^^t'"  K«l-'io"s  applj  to  the  family: 

bocial  Relations,  to  the  Benefactor  and  the  Friend. 
neir  pectdiar-         37.  The  peculiarity  of  these  relations,  as  distin- 
guished from   the  others,  consists  in  the  hidi 
degree  of  Charity  which  enters  them.     They  belong  to  the 
pr^ent  head,  since  Jnstiee  predominates  in  them.     The  duties 
which  we  owe  in  these  domestic  and  social  relations,  are  obli- 
gations in  us  correspondent  to  rights  in  others,  and,  therefore 
they  are  required  by  Justice.    But  though  Justice  dominates,' 
the  tender  dictates  of  Charity  rule  in  them  more  largely  than 
in  any  other  of  the  private  relations  of  mankind. 
Sni«.  ,^^-  ^'>«  '■^'I'^er  thus  sees  the  moral  principles 

which  he  should  carry  into  these  domestic  and 
social  relations. 

1.  JusTicK-You  must  have  a  constant  and  perpetual  will 
to  fulfil  every  obligation  demanded  by  every  right  in  the  mem- 
bers of  your  family,  and  in  yom-  benefactors  and  friends, 
(cn.  vii.) 

2.  CHAKm-.-You  must  preserve,  without  selfishness,  hatred 
or  mahce,  a  tender  affection,  and  an  active  good-will  towards 
them,  by  a  perpetual  sense  of  the  common  tie  which  binds 
you  to  them. 

DOMESTIC  RELATIONS. 

B«m«rtie.  ^^^-  ^*>'ne«tic   Natural   Eelations   include,  1. 

Those  between  husband  and  wife.    2.  Between 
parents  and  children.    3.  Between  children  of  the  same  family 
m  regard  to  each  other.    Those  between  master  and  servant 
are  conventional  domestic  relations. 

Kature  of  them.  ^-  These  domestic  relations  are  primarily  be 
Fact^in  th.  re-  tween  the  superior  and  inferior.  "  The  husband 
.T,  KM.  ^«  t\«  head  of  the  wife."  The  parents  are  above 
the  children.  The  elder  children  are  the  superiors  of  the 
younger.    The  servant  is  subjected  to  the  master.    Such  is  the 


DOMESTIC   KELATIOXS:   DUTIES. 


1G7 


primary  and  fundamental  relation  established  by  nature,  by 
divine  and  human  laws,  and  accepted  by  universal  consent. 

41.  But  subordinately,  and  by  the  dictates  of  Charity,  as 
well  as  of  Justice,  these  different  parties  are,  in  occasional  rela- 
tions, equal  to  each  other.  The  husband  and  wife  are  equally 
tlie  parents  of  the  children,  and  equally  entitled  to  honor  from 
them  and  from  each  other.  There  are  many  cases  where  the 
parents'  right  and  that  of  the  child  are  equal ;  and  many  where 
an  elder  child  has  no  superior  right  to  a  younger.  In  the 
presence  and  in  the  w^orship  of  God,  the  master  and  servant 
appear  as  equals.  Before  Him,  human  distinctions  disappear. 
"  The  rich  and  the  poor  meet  together ;  the  Lord  is  the  maker 
of  them  all." 

42.  Hence,  both  distributive    and   commuta-  Principleg. 

..       T     j_'  ^1  T    1  •       n    1  i-         1       Both  kinds  of 

tive  J  ustice  must  be  applied  in  all  domestic  rela-  justice  required 
tions.  As  a  superior  towards  those  beneath  you,  ^  ^^®°^' 
do  no  injustice  by  partiality  in  distributing  favors,  gifts,  or 
property.  Let  there  be  no  acceptance  of  persons.  As  hus- 
band, or  master,  as  elder  brother,  or  sister,  never  abuse  your 
superiority  for  the  infliction  of  pain,  through  word,  manner, 
or  deed.  Temper  all  by  Charity.  As  an  inferior,  render, 
without  envy,  or  pride,  or  ill-will,  what  is  due  to  those  who 
are,  in  some  relations,  superior.  In  reciprocal  Justice,  meet 
the  claims  of  wife,  child,  or  servant,  as  if  he  or  she  were  a 
stranger,  armed  with  the  full  authority  of  the  law. 

43.  The  duties  of  parents  and  children  have 
been  mentioned,  (ch.  ii.) 

44.  The  duties  of  husband  and  wife  result  from  marriage. 
Marriage  may  be  defined  a  strict  and  intimate 

union,  for  life,  sanctioned  by  divine  and  human  ^ 

law,  and  founded  on  mutual  esteem,  of  one  man  and  one 
woman,  in  one  family,  for  the  purpose  of  having  children,  edu- 
cating them  for  this  world  and  eternity,  and  for  promoting  the 
happiness  of  one  another.* 

♦  This  definition  is  principally  from  Beattio.    Moral  Science,  583. 


Duties. 


163 


PKACTICAL   ETUICS. 


SOCIAL   EKLATIONS  :    DUTIES. 


169 


JhLOes.  ^^-  ^'^'■'^'■^  marriage,  one  of  the  higl.est  obli- 

«r,<i  r.  .^''^'^It  "  ^"^  '■^'P^'''  "'^  proliibitions  of  divine 

and  human  law.    Here,  as  ever,  .ve  need  the  view  of    J 

46    The  reciprocal  duties,  after  marriage,  are  those  of  mutual 
affect-on  and  iidelitv     The  peculiar  duties  of  each,  as  sup     o 
and   nf  nor,  are,  on  the  husband's  part,  tenderness,  and  on  the 
^.fe's  honor     "Let  ever,  one  of  you  so  love  his  ;ife  ev  n 
himself,  and  the  wife  see  that  she  reverence  her  husband."    TlL 
common  fault  on  the  side  of  the  husband  is  bitterness.     "IIu  ! 
bands  love  jour  wives,  and  be  not  bitter  against  them."    That 
from  the  w.fe  is  disrespect  shown  in  his  presence,  by  langu to 
and  manner,  and,  in  his  absence,  by  speaking  evil  of  him      ° 
Connection  with      *^-  '^''•^''•^ '«  "<>  relation  of  life  where  duties  to 
d^.es  pertain,     otliers  are  more  directly  affected  by  those  belon..- 

fl,.  A     v"^  ^^  °"'^^'^'«^-     The  virtues  inculcated  under 

the  second  sphere  are  again  commended  to  his  or  her  attention 

ac   inTuttt^  !r'  '"  '^-"''''  ''^-     '''-  ^^'•*-  -S 

lif      WoVl  "  '  """"'■^  P'-^P^'-^^''^"  for  domestic 

Itue    r  '  •"^'""P^^^"-'  -  unrestrained  and  bitter 

anxiety,  idleness,  extravagance,  will  produce  their  daily  and 
darkening  consequences.  ^ 


SOCIAL   RELATIONS. 

Social  Eelation..   ^  ^\  ^°'"'^'  Relations,  as  here  regarded,  include 

benefactors  and  friends 
Jja.  W».       «.  To  „,.  rt„  I,„ 'confer  .  i^„^j, 

Lir  Thi    ,  ,        '"''  '^'"'•^  "•'  """"fW"''*  life,  to  hi. 
I^'l}-    TI.U  dut,  re,!,  ou  „.,i„„a  .-iU,  .„  „j^j  ,,^ 


The  opposed  vice  of  Ingratitude  is  sliown  both  in  words  and 
deeds;  in  words,  when  no  verbal  acknowledgments  are  ren 
dered ;  in  deeds,  when  no  returns  are  made. 

50.  Friendship  links  man  to  man  by  a  most 

,     .         m        1  1     •  J  i-  V.    To  the  Friend, 

sacred  tie.     Two  human  bemgs  are  drawn  to  each 

other  by  congeniality  of  nature.  They  hold  a  perpetual  com- 
munion of  thought  and  feeling.  There  are  two  bodies  but  one 
soul.  Such  a  relation  must  involve  duties.  The  friend  is  an 
adopted  brother  of  the  soul.  Hence  the  obligations  belonging 
to  the  ties  of  domestic  life  are  intensified  in  regard  to  him. 
Charity  must  act  in  a  constant  desire  for  his  happiness,  welfare, 
honor,  and,  above  all,  for  his  moral  and  spiritual  character. 
Justice  must  act  in  a  conscientious  purpose  to  utter  no  word, 
and  to  do  no  act  regarding  him  which  he  could  deem  an  injury. 
To  betray  his  confidence,  to  speak  of  that  which  he  gave  as  a 
secret,  to  utter  what  he  said  in  the  unrestrained  intimacy 
wherein  friends  think  aloud,  would  be  the  violation  of  Justice, 
as  well  as  of  Charity,  a  desecration  of  cne  of  the  most  appeal- 
ing ties  which  can  bind  one  human  being  to  another. 

51.  Friendship,  in  its  most  exalted  sense,  as  Friendship  com- 

,1  .  1  .  x"       •    J       'i-i,        •    J     nion  to  life,  tem- 

the  union  and  communion  oi  mind  with  mmd,  p^j.^^^  and  eter- 

extends  beyond  the  temporal  scene  to  the  eternal.  '^*^- 
Immortal  life  presents  the  purest  friendships.  But  the  highest 
friendship  of  which  man  is  capable  rises  above  all  created 
beings,  human  or  angelic.  It  is  friendship  with  God.  The 
communion,  as  it  is,  of  mind  with  mind,  it  may  be  commenced 
on  earth.  Abraham  "  was  called  the  friend  of  God."  Its  con- 
summation, however,  belongs  to  that  higher  life,  the  instruction 
for  which  we  leave  to  Theology. 

Having  regarded  the  Virtues,  and  thus  completed  the  first 
part  of  the  work,  we  come,  as  next  in  order,  to  the  Passions. 


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PAET   II. 


THE    PASSIONS. 


CHAPTER     X. 
DEFINITION;    DIVISIONS;    TREATMENT. 

1.  In  the  first  part  we  have  seen  the  Virtues  and  their  Con- 
trasts, under  the  three  natural  divisions  of  the  sphere  above  us, 

within  us,  and  around  us.     In  this  second  part 

Passions   tlifi 
we  consider  the  Passions.     With  the  Passions  subject  of  the 

we   must  inchide  the  disposfpions  of  men.     By  ^^"^"^^  P*^^' 
the  iatter  we  mean  those  prochvities  to  certain  "passions  which 
accompany  the  different  temperaments,  ages,  and  conditions 
among  mankind. 

2.  The  Passions  are  reo-arded  in  Ethics  for  ethi-  ^  ^  ^  . 

'->  now  regarded  in 

cal  purposes.  The  first  ethical  purpose  is  so  to  Ethics, 
moderate  them  in  ourselves  that  they  shall  not  hinder  the  ful- 
filment of  duties  and  the  attainment  of  virtues.  The  second 
ethical  purpose  is,  so  to  know  the  passions  in  others  that  we 
can  better  promote  their  welfare  and  happiness,  and  our  own. 
We  promote  their  welfare  by  having  such  power  over  their 
passions  that  we  can  guide  men  to  their  best  good.  This  is 
needed  by  the  true  philanthropist,  whether  acting  as  a  states- 
man, a  warrior,  or  a  private  person.  We  promote  the  happi- 
ness of  others  in  domestic,  social,  and  official  life,  by  such 
appreciation  of  the  momentary  passions  awakened  by  words, 
manners,  and  actions  that  we  conduct  ourselves  with  benevo- 
lent tact,  and  avoid  the  giving  of  unnecessary  pain.  This  is 
needed  by  the  true  gentleman  and  lady:  It  is  indispensable 
for  uniform,  perfected  courtesy.  We  promote  our  own  wel- 
fare and  happiness  by  guarding  our  interests.    As  already 


lU 


PBACnCAL   ETHICS. 


stated,  prudence  requires  the  knowledge  of  men.  For  tliis 
knowledge  we  must  understand  the  working  of  their  passions, 
o      jx.*v  2-  ^^*  when  the  Passions  have  been   thor- 

fieyond  Ethics, 

are  ezt.nsivo  ap-  oughly  studied  and  understood  for  Ethical  pur- 
pucations ;  as  in  4.1,      i  i    j  r  xi,  •  •     .       .. 

poses,  the  knowledge  01  them  gives  instruction 
in  many  of  the  great  provinces  of  the  Sciences  and  the  Arts  ; 
as   in    Ehetoric,  Esthetics,   Literature,   Political  Science,  the 

Art  of  War.    This  knowledge  gives  instruction 
'  in  Rhetoric  by  aiding  persuasion,  since  for  per- 

suasion the  emotions  must  be  awakened  or  subdued.     It  orives 

instruction  in  .^thetics  by  aiding  impressions 
Esthetics;  i  ..  .1.  .  -r-k      -r-i    .      . 

on  human  sensibilities.     By  Esthetics  we  simply 

mean  the  collective  principles  of  all  the  fine  arts  in  common. 
The  fine  arts  all  address  human  sensibilities,  and  the  knowl- 
edge of  these  sensibilities  must  guide  the  artist.  The  archi- 
tect of  a  magnificent  temple  seeks  to  awaken  admiration  and 
awe  in  every  beholder ;  the  historical  painter  now  addresses 
pity,  and  now  love.     It  is,  therefore,  subservient  to  Esthetics. 

It  aids  Literature  by  teaching  how  to  please  and 
'         move.     Tragedy  must  awaken  the  keen  interest 
of  pity  and  fear.     Comedy  must  move  to  laughter.     Romance 
must  stir  the  joyous,  the  mirthful,  and  the  tragic  feelings. 
Lyric  poetry  must  issue  from   emotions,  and  awaken   them. 
History  must  stir  us  with  the  passions  and  interests  of  an  age. 
For  such  ends  the  Passions  must  be  known.     Such  are  its  re- 
lations to  Literature.     This  knowledge  aids  in 
*  Political  Science,  by  teaching  how  to  control  the 
public  passions,  to  assuage  or  direct  them  when  excited,  or  to 
arouse  them  when    the    public   welfare  may  require.    The 
passions  act  in  the  masses  of  men  collectively,  as  they  do  in 
each  individual  bosom.     He   who    knows    them,   and   their 
working  in  one  man,  knows  them  in  multitudes.     By  such 
knowledge  measures,  laws,  and  declarations  can  be  directed 
with  prudence.     The  passions,  then,  must  be  regarded  in  Po- 
litical Science.    It  aids  in  the  Art  of  War.     To 
hold  troops  in  perfect  discipline,  and  to  educe 


PASSIONS   DEFINED. 


1^0 


from  them  the  highest  degrees  of  daring,  endurance,  and  effort, 
there  must  be  in  their  commander  both  an  understanding  of 
their  feelings,  and  skill  to  animate,  restrain,  and  direct.  A 
like  understanding  is  necessary  for  working  on  the  passions  of 
an  enemy  to  induce  desired  manoeuvres. 

Thus  extensive  are  the  applications  of  a  knowledge  of  the 
Passions.  Of  these  the  nearest  in  a  course  of  study  beyond 
Ethics  will  lie  in  Rhetoric  and  Literature.  The  reader,  there- 
fore, can  trace  this  subject,  conscious  of  these  extended  applica- 
tions, and  that  he  is  promoting  not  only  ethical,  but  rhetorical, 
literary,  and  general  purposes. 

4.  The  natural  treatment  of  the  Passions  ap-  Division  of  the 
pears  to  be  the  following  :     1.  Tlieir  definition  ;  Subject. 

2.  Their  divisions ;  3.  Their  treatment 

5.  Passions,  from  the  word,  are  conditions  of  ,.  «    ^^ 

.  Defined  from  the 

our  nature  m  which  we   are  passive.     We  are  Word. 

acted  on  by  something.  A  poisonous  snake  suddenly  arisino- 
in  the  path  awakens  the  passion  of  fear.  The  object  seen  pro- 
duces a  certain  natural  effect  in  the  feelings.  In  that  first 
-effect,  though  it  may  be  instantly  modified  by  another  passion 
and  by  reason,  we  are  passive. 

6.  Passions  (as  defined  from  the  thin^,  and  j,^n    .  ^     ^^ 

.  ^  »?        ^  Defined  from  the 

thus  troin  the  class)  are  emotions  from  the  vivid  Thing. 

perception  of  what  is  pleasing  or  painful,  directly  affecting 
the  body,  and  through  it  the  mind,  hy  creating  imaginations 
and  opinions,  lohich  impel  to  the  actions  that  are  congenial 
with  the  passion. 

We  may  form  a  good  understanding  of  them  by  following 
the  parts  of  this  definition. 

(1.)  They  2iXQ  emotions.     Emotions  are  the  class 
to  which  Passions  belong.     We  have  before  seen  pmbypart%f 
that  the  capacities  of  our  nature  exist  in  two  StiJn"^'' '*®^" 
conditions :  the  active  and  the  passive.    In  the  ^^-^  ^^^  ^^^^* 
active  condition  they  form  faculties  {facio,  I  do),  and  in  the 
passive,  emotions.    Thus  the  capacity  of  hearing  is  active  in 
attending  to  music  by  listening;  but  it  is  passive  in  the  emo- 


176 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


tion  of  pleasure  from  perfect  harmony.  They  are  named 
emotions  (^,  and  motus^  from  e-moveor^  I  am  moved  from)  be- 
cause they  are  motions  in  our  nature  from  one  condition  to 
another.  The  class  then  to  which  Passions  belong  is  that  of 
Emotions.  In  that  class  they  form  one  division.  The  other 
divisions  are  the  Affections  and  the  Appetites.  The  affections 
are  emotions  of  the  mind  simply.  An  example  is  the  love  of 
duty,  or  hatred  to  wrong,  or  the  love  of  God.  The  appetites 
are  emotions  of  the  body.  Tliey  are  common  to  man  with 
the  lower  animals.     Such  appetites  are  hunger  and  thirst.     In 


them  we  feel  pain, 
subject : 


The  foUowinor  tabular  view  condenses  the 


Human  Capa- 
cities: 


Active 


]  Faculties 


./•  ••  ^ 


Passive...  \  Emotions  : 


{Mental,  as  Reason,  Will,  Conscience. 
Corporeal,  as  Sensations. 
^  Semi-corporeal,  as  Fancy. 

Mental ]  Affections, 

Corporeal ]  Appetites, 

^  Semi-corporeal. .  ■]  Passions. 


(2.)  They  are   caused   by   vivid  perceptions, 
(2.)  The  Subject,   rpj^.^  ^^^.^  ^^  ^j^^  definition  shows  the  condition 

of  their  subject,"^  of  the  person  feeling  them.  One  in  love, 
fear,  hate,  or  anger,  has  lively  ideas.  If  we  wish  to  awaken  the 
passions  in  others,  this  vividness  of  perception  must  be  pro- 
duced. If  we  seek  to  subdue  them  in  ourselves  it  must  be 
lessened.  This  liveliness  of  thought  and  feeling  is  common, 
however,  to  the  passions,  with  the  affections  of  the  mind,  and 
the  appetites  of  the  body.  It  belongs  to  all  emotions.  Thus, 
in  the  affections  there  is  a  vivid  perception  of  good  and  evil. 
A  man  who  has  lost  his  friend  by  death,  feels  keenly  the  evil 

*  By  subject  is  meant  what  is  subjected.  The  subject  in  dissection  is  the  body 
dissected ;  the  subject  in  fever  is  the  person  subjected  to  fever ;  the  subject  of 
toothache  is  the  tooth  subjected  to  pain ;  the  subject  in  vision  is  the  eye,  and  the 
object  is  light ;  the  subject  in  hearing  is  the  ear,  and  its  object  is  sound.  For 
passions  the  subject  generally  is  the  man ;  specially,  the  animal  spirit,  as  distin- 
guished on  one  side  from  the  rational  soul,  and  on  the  other,  from  the  body,  as  it 
lives  in  slumber. 


DEFINITION   EXPLAINED  :  OBJECTS.  177 

of  his  loss.  One  stung  by  remorse  for  crime,  has  a  strong 
sense  of  the  evil  of  transgression.  These  are  emotions  of  the 
mind.  So  in  the  appetites,  there  is  a  like  perception.  A  per- 
son in  torturing  thirst  may  feel,  almost  to  madness,  the  delio-ht 
which  he  would  find  in  water.  The  dripping  bucket,  the  cool, 
transparent  fountain,  tlie  sparkling,  dashing  rill  of  other  times! 
may  live  in  his  imagination.  In  affections  we  may  share  with 
angels.  In  appetites  we  are  with  brutes,  as  we  are  in  the 
animal  passions.  But  in  all  these  emotions,  whether  in  the 
higher  or  lower  nature,  there  is  a  vivid  perception  of  good  or 
evil. 

(3.)  The  objects  so  perceived  are  pleasing  or 
painful.     This  part  of  the  definition  states  the      ^'  ^^®  ^^^^ 
objects^  of  the  Passions.     The  objects  include  what  is  pleasing 
or  painful  to  the  passions.     These  objects  are  personal,  or  not 
personal.     They    form    accordingly    two    principal    classes: 
1.  Forms  of  jjersonal  good  and  evil  which  cause  the  stronger 
passions;  2.  Qualities  agreeaUe  or  disagreeable,  which  p'^o- 
duce  the  slighter  passions.     The  first  are  personal,  concentra- 
ting  consciousness  on  self,  or  on  those  who  are  to  us  as  self. 
The  second  are  not  personal,  but  withdraw  consciousness  from 
self  to  the  external  object.     Examples  of  the  first  class  are 
Life  and  Death,  Health  and  Sickness,  Wealth  and  Poverty, 
Honor  and  Disgrace,   Friends  and  JSTeglect.      Such    objects 
cannot  be  referred  to  ourselves,  or  to  those  whom  we  love  as 
ourselves,  without  creating  a  strong  personal  interest.     They 
are  forms  of  personal  good  or  evil.     The  qualities  which  are 
agreeable  are  principally  Novelty,  Excellence  (as  Sublimity  or 
Beauty),  Grotesqueness.     Each  has  its  contrast.     We  shall  see 
afterward  the  lighter  passions,  such  as  Wonder,  Awe,  Admira- 
tion, and  Ridicule,  which  correspond  to  these  divisions. 

This  part  of  the  definition  is  common  to  the  Passions  with 

*  By  object  is  meant  that  to  which  the  action  of  any  subject  is  directed,  or 
from  which  any  action  is  received.  The  object  of  vision  is  light ;  of  hearing, 
sound;  of  smell,  odors;  of  conscience,  right;  of  the  will,  good;  of  reason,  truth! 
The  subject  is  subjected  to  action  put  under;  the  object  is  objected,  put  a-ainat 

12 


178 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


the  Affections  above  them,  and  the  Appetites  below  them. 
These  emotions  also  regard  what  is  pleasing  or  painful ;  the 
affections  what  is  so  to  the  mind,  the  appetites  what  is  so  to 
the  body. 

So  far  we  have  considered  what  is  common  'to  the  Passions, 
and  to  those  other  emotions,  by  viewing  the  class,  the  com- 
mon condition  of  the  subject,  and  the  general  nature  of  the 
objects  as  pleasing  or  painful.  The  next  parts  of  the  defini- 
tion pass  from  ResembUmces  to  Differences.  The  differences 
are  seen  in  the  effects  of  the  passions  on  the  body,  the  mind, 
the  actions. 

(i.)    Passions    directly  affect   the    Ijodij^   and 
ects:  throufjh  it  the  mind.     Here  commences  the  dif- 

ference between  the  passions  and  the  other  emotions.  We 
consider  their  effectj*,  and   begin  witli   effects   on   the   body. 

(a)  The  Passions  produce  some  bodily  change, 
n  0  y»  ^g  ^^.Q  g^,g  when  the  face  is  pale  from  fear,  or 
flushed  from  anger.  Thus  they  are  distinguished  from  the 
affections,  which  are  simply  mental,  and  act  serenely.  But 
passions  can  originate  in  thought.  We  can  become  angry, 
hopeful,  hating,  fearing,  by  trains  of  ideas  in  the  mind.  Thus 
passions  are  distinguished  from  appetites  which  originate  in 
the  body.  The  passions  act  upon  the  body  in  what  is  solid, 
fluid,  and  ethereal.  They  act  in  the  solid  parts  upon  the 
muscles.  Thus,  in  merriment,  the  muscles  of  the  mouth, 
nose,  and  eye  are  affected  in  a  manner  well  known  to  all.  By 
these  effects  on  the  muscles  the  sculptor  and  actor  can  present 
a  countenance  of  grief,  anger,  surprise,  joy,  reverence.  They 
act  in  fluids,  especially  upon  the  blood.  Thus  the  blood  is 
thrown  into  the  face  by  shame ;  out  of  it  by  fear ;  into  it 
by  sudden  and  bold  anger ;  out  of  it  by  anger  concentrated, 
and  vindictive.  They  act  upon  what  is  ethereal,  by  aftecting 
what  is  known  as  the  animal  spirits,  or  the  nervous  fluid,  or 
animal  life.  Under  these  names  is  iniplied  a  subtle  agent, 
mediating  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  and  between  both 
and  the  universe.     By  this  agency,  whatever  be  the  name 


BODILY    EFFECT   OF   PASSION. 


179 


given,  the  actions  of  the  mind  are  impressed  upon  the  nerves, 
the   muscles,  and  the  blood.*     This  ethereal  or  electric  fluid 
may  rise,  fall,  dilate,  contract.     Some  passions  carry  a  current 
upward.     This  is  the  effect  of  all  the  animating  passions,  as 
Joy,  Boldness,  Hope.     Hence  the  eye  fills  with  light,  the  blood 
ascends,  the  muscles  of  eye  and  lip  are  lifted,  and  in  the  voice 
the  key  is  sharper,  the  volume  greater.     Some  passions  carry 
this  vital  current  downward.     This  is  the  effect  of  the  depress- 
ing passions.  Sorrow,  Fear,  Despair.     The  eye  loses  its  lustre, 
the  countenance  falls,  the  lines  of  the  face  are  all  cast  down, 
the  blood  sinks  from  the  face,  and,  if  the  emotion  be  excessive, 
the  very  frame  is  cast  into  a  recumbent  posture.     Tlie  voice 
sinks,   and   comes  in  broken,   semitonic  movements.     Some 
passions  dilate.     This  is  the  effect  from  those  whose  objects 
are  great,  as  Reverence,  Admiration,  Wonder,  awakened  by 
things  or  thoughts  of  grandeur  and  sublimity.     The  eye  ex- 
pands, the  brow  is  open,  the  nostrils  dilate,  the  voice  becomes 
low  and  full.     Some  of  these  dilating  passions  are  accompa- 
nied with  a  movement  downward ;  and  hence  in  Reverence 
the  falling  of  the  eyebrow,  of  the  lower  lip,  and  of  the  voice. 
Some  are  accompanied  with  a  movement  upward.     Such  are 
the  animating  passions  when  kindled   by  great  objects ;   for 
example,  those  of  a  true  hero  in  the  hour  of  combat.     Some 
passions  contract.     This  is  the  effect  from  those  whose  objects 
are,  or  are  viewed  as  small  or  unworthy  :  Contempt,  Ridicule 
by  Mockery,  Envy,  Jealousy.     The  eye  contracts,  the  brows, 
nose,  mouth,  voice,  seem  drawn  in,  to  embody  the  littleness 
and   meanness  which   we  contemplate.     These  disagreeable 
emotions  are  combined  with   movements  upward.     But  con- 
traction in  the  animal  spirits  may  unite  with  downward  move- 
ments.    This  is  the  effect  in  emotions  gentle  and  subduing, 
the  contracted  character  of  the  expression  coming  not  so  much 
from  the  object  considered  as  from  the  feeling  of  the  person  ; 


♦  Consult  Des  Cartes'  Treatise  on  the  Passions  for  a  more  full  statement  of  this 
part  of  the  subject. 


\  - 


180 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


for  example,  in  Pitj,  Melancliolj,  gentle  aspirations,  desires  for 
purity  and  nobleness. 

The  four  simple  movements  are  combined  with  each  other 
in  various  ways,  according  to  the  object  of  the  passion,  or  the 
condition  of  the  person  who  is  the  subject.^  Such  is  the 
action  on  the  body. 

The  bodily  condition,  though  it  have  a  mental  origin,  reacts 
upon  the  mind.  It  is  a  law  of  Xature  that  mind  and  body 
shall  act  and  react  on  each  other,  reciprocally  and  perpetually. 
A  condition  of  the  mind  expresses  itself  in  the  body.  Tlie 
movements,  and  even  the  assumed  expressions  of  a  passion  in 
the  body  affect,  correspondentl}^  the  mind. 

{h.)  Passions  act  upon  the  mi/nd,  by  creating 
^  *  imaginations^  opinions^  and  desires.  From  their 
bodily  effect  we  thus  come  to  the  mental.  The  imagina- 
tion is  strongly  affected.  When  passions  are  warmly  excited, 
the  mind  is  occupied  with  images  belonging  to  the  passion. 
Thus  in  any  strong  desire  for  an  absent  object,  there  are 
mental  pictures  of  it  and  of  enjoyments  attending  it.  A  person 
apprehending  fire  sees  in  imagination  his  house  burning,  and 
one  full  of  fears  at  sea,  is  haunted  by  visions  of  shipwreck,  and 
one  near  a  precipice  imagines  a  fall.  This  is  the  case  with  all 
the  passions.  This  fact  is  to  be  remembered  when  we  seek  to 
allay  or  awaken  them  in  others,  or  to  control  them  in  our- 
selves. 

The  opinions  are  changed  by  the  Passions.  Angry,  we  form 
a  judgment  quite  different  from  that  of  our  calmer  moods. 
We  estimate  things,  actions,  persons  differently,  as  the  passions 
in  our  minds  are  different.  A  man  on  land,  saddened  by 
dangers  and  hardships  at  sea,  contemplates  a  voyage  with 
aversion.    The  same  man,  wearied  with  monotony,  and  worn 

♦  A  treatise  might  be  written  on  the  analogies  between  the  Passions  and 
Music.  The  sharps,  the  flats,  the  major  and  minor  modes  correspond  to  these  up- 
ward, downward,  expanding,  and  contracting  movements.  Certain  emotions  re- 
quire certain  Icinds  of  music,  and  reversely  the  music  awakes  the  correspondent 
emotion.     See  Plato's  Works,  and  Gardiner's  "  Music  of  Nature." 


EFFECT  OF  PASSION  ON  ACTIONS. 


181 


w,A  vexations  on  shore,  considers  it  as  full  of  attractions. 
Suffering  under  remorse,  caused  by  some  wrong  action,  we 
tlimk  we  can  never  again  be  guilty  of  it.    Placed  where  the 
passion    belonging  to  it  (as  revenge,   hate,   desire)  is  fully 
awakened,   we  view    the    same    action    as    most    desirable. 
Wrong  conduct  in  one  passionately  loved,  seems  right  or 
triflmg.^    The  same,  in  one  hated  or  envied,  appears  atrocious. 
What  is  true  of  individuals,  is  so  of  masses.     Tlie  public 
passions  in  a  community,  color  all  their  sentiments  concerning 
men  and  measures.     Such  is  the  effect  of  passion,  on  opinion! 
It  IS  that  which   is  prominent  in  a  rhetorical  view  of  the 
Passions.     Hence  Aristotle  in  his  Rhetoric  considers  them  aa 
"  feelings  accompanied  by  pleasure  and  pain,  which  change  the 
opinions."* 

^  It  is  here  that  the  word  Emotion  in  its  etymological  sense, 
IS  singularly  appropriate.  We  are  moved  from  one  judgment 
to  another. 

_  Such  are  the  mental  effects  of  the  Passions  on  the  imagina- 
tion and  the  opinions ;  we  have  thus  seen  their  internal  effects 
in  the  body  and  in  the  mind.     Next  is  their  external  effect. 

Tlie  external  effect  is  in  actions. 

(e.)  Passions  impel  to  the  actions  which  are 
congenial  with  them.      The  imaginations,  opin-  («•>«>» Actions, 
ions,  and  desires  awakened  by  them  unite  in  concentrated  in- 
fluence to  impel.     And  the  effect  of  that  impulse  is  some 
action  congenial  with  the  passion. 

The  man  overcome  by  fear  in  the  face  of  danger  finds  an 
impulse  to  fly,  running  into  his  feet.  The  action  of  flight 
follows.  One  aroused  by  violent  anger  feels  a  desire  to  strike 
impelling  his  hand,  and  a  desire  to  reproach  driving  his  tongue. 
Deeds  of  violence  or  words  of  insult  are  the  outward  effects. 
Under  hope,  the  young  and  aspiring  sailor  battles  with  the 
waves.  Under  jealousy,  Othello  murders.  Under  shame,  the 
supine  Athenians  aroused  by  Demosthenes  cry  out,  "  Let  us 
march  against  Philip ;  let  us  conquer  or  die !" 

*Aris..  Rliet.  ii  1. 


182 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Such  are  the  effects  of  the  Passions  on  the  hodj,  and  the 
mind,  and  in  actions.* 

We  have  thus  viewed  the  general  nature  of  the  Passions. 

7.  From  the  definition  we  can  perceive  that 

To  know  tliem,  ^      ^  ^  . 

see  Objects,  and     the  two  principal  matters  to  be  ever  regarded  in 

^  ^^  **  studying  the  Passions  are  their  objects  and  their 

Bnbjects.     Their  objects  are  things  and  persons  which  awaken 

,  .^  .  «  ^.   .     them.     Their  subiects  are  persons  feeling  them. 
In  their  Subjects,  .   *'  J  f, 

dispositions  to      Persons  as  subject  to  passions  are  classified  by 

their  dispositions.  Dispositions  to  the  passions 
are  universal,  particular,  and  momentary.  Universal  disposi- 
tions to  the  passions  are  those  which  belong  to  all  men  alike. 
Particular  dispositions  are  those  which  bel'ong  to  one  group  of 
men.  They  arise  from  natural  or  conventional  difierences. 
The  natural  differences  are  those  of  age  and  temperament. 
The  ages,  as  they  relate  to  the  passions,  are  youth,  maturity, 
old  age.  Tlie  temperaments  are  the  active  and  the  passive : 
the  active  including  the  choleric  and  sanguineous ;  the  passive, 
the  phlegmatic  and  melancholic.  The  conventional  differ- 
ences are  those  of  social  condition.  They  are  prosperity, 
mediocrity,  adversity ;  in  wealth,  station,  and  friends.  Thus  the 
young  are  more  disposed  to  hope,  the  old  to  fear,  the  choleric  to 
anger,  the  phlegmatic  to  vengeance,  the  prosperous  to  a  want 
of  pity,  the  disappointed  to  envy,  the  afilicted  to  indignation. 

The  momentary  dispositions  to  certain  passions  are  those 
produced  by  a  transitory  condition  of  body  or  mind.  A  mart 
when  under  the  influence  of  stimulants  has  a  stronger  proclivity 
to  certain  passions  than  when  he  is  unexcited.  One  in  pain  is 
irritable. 

To  understand  the  Passions,  therefore,  we  must  know  what 
objects  produce  them  both  in  persons  and  in  things,  and  also 


♦  Whoever  wishes  to  investigate  the  subject  of  the  Passions  more  extensively, 
will  find  them  treated  most  fully  in  their  Ethical  relations  by  Thomas  Aquinas, 
(Sum.  ii.,  1);  in  their  rhetorical  relations  by  Aristotle,  Rhetoric,  ii.,  2;  in  their 
effect. on  the  animal  spirits  by  Des  Cartes;  in  their  artistic  relations  for  artist  and 
actor  in  the  Encyclopedic  Methodique,  in  the  division  "  Beaux  Arts." 


PASSIOi^S.  OBJECTS   DIMDED. 


183 


Division. 


wliat  are  tfie  dispositions,  universal,  particular,  and  momentary 
in  their  subject.  Such  knowledge  is  necessary  for  dealing  with 
passion  in  ourselves  and  others.  Thus,  to  guard  against 
violent  anger  in  ourselves  we  must  prevent,  if  we  can,  the  cir- 
cumstances which  cause  it,  and  avoid  being  in  the  dispositions 
of  mind  or  body  which  incline  to  it.  To  awaken  hope  in 
others,  to  allay  resentment,  to  subdue  revenge,  to  awaken  to 
pity,  to  enkindle  shame,  we  must  seek  to  destroy  adverse  dis- 
positions in  those  who  are  to  be  moved,  and  to  present  both 
the  things  and  persons  which  are  the  natural  objects  of  the 
Emotion  felt  by  us  and  desired  in  the  persons  addressed. 

8.  Having  defined  the  Passions,  we  have  an- 
swered the  question ;  what  are  they  ?     We  are 
next  to  see  what  are  their  kinds.     We  thus  proceed  from  defi- 
nition to  division. 

9.  The  rule  for  making   their  simpler   divi-  Method  for 
sions  is  to  follow  the  divisions  of  their  objects,  division. 

We  therefore  recapitulate,  and,  at  the  same  time,  give  more 
fully  the  divisions  of  the  oljecfs  of  the  Passions. 

10.  The  objects,  as  before  shown,  are  pleasing  Divisions  of 
and  painful.  Objects  pleasing  and  painful  are  the  Objects, 
divided  into  those  personal  and  those  not  personal.  Those 
w^hich  are  personal  are  forms  of  good  and  evil  strongly  affect- 
ing ourselves,  directly  or  through  others.  Those  which  are 
not  personal  are  qualities  in  things,  agreeable  or  disagreeable, 
acting  more  gently,  by  giving  a  certain  degree  of  pleasure  or 
the  reverse. 

11.  These  qualities  are  Novelty,  Excellence,  Grotesque- 
NESS,  with  their  respective  contrasts,  Commonness,  Imperfec- 
tion, Decorousness.  Excellence  requires  a  farther  division. 
Excellence  may  be  considered  as  greater  than  the  beholder, 
and  form  Sublimity,  or  as  in  proportion  to  him,  and  form 
Beauty.  Their  evident  contrasts  are  Lowness  and  Ugliness. 
These  are  divisions  of  the  ohjects  of  the  Passions. 

12.  The  divisions  of  the  Passions  correspond  to  SmsK tSe 
those  of  the  objects.    Passions  are  personal  or  not  P**"®^* 


184 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


PERSONAL   PASSIONS. 


185 


j)er8onal.  The  j>€rsonal  are  those  which  have jpersonal  good  (/r  evil 
for  their  object^  and  which  are  thus  strangest  in  their  action, 
Passions  not  personal  are  those  which  do  not  have  personal 
good  or  evil  for  their  object^  hut  mdy  certain  qualities  which 
form  emotions  less  violent  than  those  from  the  personal  pas- 
sions. 

The  Hon-  ^^-  '^^^^  emotion  correspondent  to  novelty  is 

personal.  "WoxDER ;   tliat   to   sublimity  is  Awe;    that  to 

beauty  is  Admiration  ;  that  to  grotesqueness  is  a  Sense  of 
THE  Ludicrous.  The  contrast  of  wonder  is  Tedium,  which  is 
weariness,  from  what  is  too  conmion  and  familiar;  that  of  awe 
is  Contempt,  the  emotion  belonging  to  what  is  low  or  trivial; 
that  of  admiration  is  Disgust,  the  feeling  awakened  by  what 
is  ugly.  The  contrast  to  a  sense  of  the  ludicrous  is  the  Ab- 
*sence  of  Humor,  an  insensibility  to  the  ordinary  causes  of 
inirthfulness. 

These  lighter  emotions  require  no  farther  consideration. 
Ethical  nde  re-  ^^-  ^^^^  before  leaving  them,  we  should  ob- 
gardmg  them,  g^j.^,^  g,  good  Ethical  rule,  wliich  arises  from  the 
distinction  of  passions  into  the  personal  and  non-personal.  It- 
is,  that  we  should  carr}^  into  social  and  domestic  life,  the  second 
class,  the  non-personal,  and  not  the  first,  or  personal.  The 
emotions  which  are  not  personal,  those  in  which  we  most  forget 
self,  sweeten  and  brighten  intercourse  with  others.  Reversely, 
the  person  who  carries  a  strong  self-concentration  everywhere, 
with  every  personal  passion  alive  in  him,  is  unsuited  to  enjoy 
or  be  enjoyed,  to  appreciate  propriety  in  others,  or  to  observe 
it  in  his  own  behavior.  The  non-personal  emotions  are  all  of 
them  sources  of  social  pleasure.  The  enjoyment  of  novelty, 
admiration  of  the  beautiful,  and  reverence  for  the  sublime  in 
nature,  art,  and  character,  amusement  with  the  grotesque  in 
incidents  and  narratives,  these  joined  with  kindly  and  self-for- 
getting affections,  are  found  by  experience  to  make  intercourse 
delightful.  But  the  clouds  and  storms  of  that  intercourse  are 
mostly  from  the  obtrusion  of  those  personal  passions,  to  which 
we  now  return. 


15.  Of  the  two  classes,  the  Personal  Passions  The  Personal 
require  a  more  full  consideration,  both  because  of  i^assions:  their 
their  strength  and  of  their  diffusion.     Thev  are  ^^^'''' 

60  Strong  as  to  produce  great  effects  in  individuals  and  the 
public.  They  are  so  diffused,  that  within  us,  thought,  feelino-, 
purpose,  character,  are  affected  perpetually  by  them,  and  exter- 
nally, words,  actions,  manners,  all  feel  their  sway. 

16.  To  understand  all  the  Personal  Passions,  a  in,  - 
tamiliar  fact  should  be  recalled  to  the  attention,  thetic  action. 

It  is  that  we  can  regard  others  as  if  they  were  ourselves,  and 
consequently  extend  our  personal  passions  to  them.  A  mother, 
by  a  sick  child,  will  experience  sorrow,  hope,  fear,  as  if  the 
sickness  were  her  own.  A  good  man  will  pity  the  suffering 
of  a  worthy  fellow-man,  from  the  sense  of  a  common  tie  and 
common  principles.  All  these  personal  passions  then  are  to 
be  considered  as  liable  to  this  extension,  to  this  sympathetic 
action. 

17.  The  Personal  Passions  are  divided  into  the  Division  of  the 
simple  and  the  complex.   The  complex  are  merely  ^eJ^sonai  Pas- 
those  which  are  not  simple,  but  made  by  combi-  ci^lex"^^  ^' 
nations.     When  we  know  the  simple,  we  are  prepared  to  under 
stand  the  others. 

18.  The  simple  Personal  Passions  are  general  or  special,    Tlie 
general  are  eight:  Love  and  Hate;  Desire  and  sij^p^^  ^^^ 
Aversion  ;  Hope  and  Fear  ;  Jor  and  Sorrows  e^al  or  special. 
They  are  general  because  they  have  for  their  objects,  not  this 
or  that  special  good  or  evil  thing,  but  any  good  or  any  evil. 

19.  These  general  simple  Passions  are  distin- 
guished, each  from  the  others,  by  their  objects,  knobby S?^®' 
Good  or  evil  is  viewed  by  every  person,  absolutely  ^®*^^^' 

or  relatively.  Eelatively  and  by  position,  it  is  absent  from  him 
or  present  with  him.  If  absent,  it  is  viewed  as  without  or 
with  intervening  obstacles.  To  these  divisions,  correspond  the 
simple  general  personal  passions.  The  passions  correspondent 
to  good  and  evil  absolute,  are  Love  and  Hate  :  to  them  absent 
simply,  Desire    and  Aversion:    to  them  absent,  but  with 


186 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


PERSONAL   PASSIONS   SIMPLE. 


187 


obstacles  intervening,  Hope  and  Fear:  to  them  present,  Joy 
and  Sorrow.     This  is  simplified  by  a  tabular  view : 


Personal 

Passions 

simple 

are 

from 
Good  or 

EvU. 


j  Love, 


Absolute  (i.  e.,  the  object  regarded  simply  in  itself). .  -j  ^^j^ 

rWithout  obstacles. .  |  ^^^oif. 

[with  obstacles j  Fear!  * 

(Joy, 
\  Sorrow. 


r  Absent. . 


Relative;  in 
position. 


I 


Present. 


Love. 


^.     ,     .       ,        20.  This  view  can  be  well  established  in  the 
Simple  view  of 

them  as  stages     reason  and  memory  by  regarding  passion  as  a 

movement  to  an  attractive  object,  and  noting  the 
natural  stages  of  that  movement.  The  tendency  to  move  i& 
from  love:  the  movement  begins  in  desire:  it  continuet 
through  obstacles  by  hope :  it  reaches  tlie  object  and  its  fruition 
in  joy.     Love  and  Hate  are  the  fountains. 

21.  Of  all  these.  Love  demands  the  fullest  discussion. 

The  term  Love  is  used  in  this  language  both  in 
a  universal  and  particular  signification.  By  the 
former  it  includes  an  affection,  an  appetite,  and  a  passion. 
Love  as  an  affection  belongs  to  the  mind,  to  the  higher  prin- 
ciples of  our  nature.  Such  is  the  love  of  God,  or  the  love  ot 
country,  or  the  highest  love  of  friendship.  Love  as  an  appetite 
belongs  to  the  body.  Such  is  the  love  of  animals  for  their 
mates  and  their  oftspring.  Love  as  b. passion,  is  partly  mental 
and  partly  physical.  It  is  applied  to  persons  and  to  things. 
An  example  of  it  applied  to  persons  is  a  man  or  woman  in 
love.  An  example  of  it  applied  to  things  is  a  passion  for 
money,  for  praise,  for  glory,  and  for  like  objects  of  human 
pursuit.  The  special  personal  passions,  to  be  afterwards  con- 
sidered, are  examples  of  love  for  things.  In  love  universally, 
and  including  the  affection,  the  appetite,  and  the  passion, 
are  two  common  elements,  the  one  being  the  passiv^e  and 
the  other  the  active  condition  of  the  emotion.  The  first  is 
the  appreciation  of  good  in  the  object  loved.     The  other  is 


the  wish  to  bestow  good  on  the  object  loved.*  Thus  in  the 
affection  of  love  to  the  Deity  there  is,  passively,  a  sense  of  His 
unspeakable  perfection,  and  there  is  actively  a  will  to  serve 
and  to  glorify  Him.  In  the  affection  of  love  of  country,  there 
is  a  sensibility  to  the  charm  of  the  native  land,  and  there  is  a 
willingness  to  do,  dare,  and  suffer  for  the  public  benefit.  In  the 
affection  of  friendship,  there  is  appreciation  of  the  sweetness 
of  the  tie,  and  there  is  also  a  constant  wish  to  do  good  to  the 
friend.  As  it  is  in  the  affection  so  it  is  in  the  appetite.  In 
the  love  of  animals  for  their  mates  and  offspring,  there  is 
sensibility  to  the  attraction  of  the  object  loved,  and  there  is  a 
readiness  to  gratify  and  to  defend.  These  two  elements  enter 
also  into  love  as  a  passion,  the  present  subject.  And  so  we  see 
that  in  love  universally,  the  object  is  some  good,  apprehended 
to  be  possessed,  or  wished  to  be  bestowed.  All  love  implies 
complacency  and  favor.  The  contrasts  appear  in  Hate,  which 
includes  repulsion  and  malevolence. 

(1.)  love  as  a  passion,  therefore,  includes  both  elements. 
In  love,  as  a  passion  for  things,  the  first  element  predominates. 
The  second  appears  incidentally  and  in  a  very  low  degree,  since 
the  passion  is  selfish.  For  example,  one  impassioned  for 
power  may  wish  his  child  to  possess  the  same.  Love  as 
applied  to  things,  is  accordingly  a  pleasing  passion,  arising 
from  sensibility  to  the  attraction  of  some  congenial  personal 
good,  and  from  a  vivid  perception  of  it.  The  miser  lifts  the 
cover  of  his  golden  hoard,  and  gloats  over  the  glittering  heaps, 
because  of  his  intense  love  of  money. 

(2.)  In  Love  as  a  passion  applied  to  persons,  the  second 
element  predominates,  that  of  a  wish  to  bestow  good  on  the 
loved  person.  There  is  the  previous  condition  of  mind  belong- 
ing to  the  passion  for  a  thing  to  be  possessed.  But  beyond 
and  above    this,   there  is  also  a  wish  to  promote  the    hap- 


*Amor  concupiscentm,  amor  amiciiioB;  the  distinction  of  the  older  writers  and 
scholastics.  St.  Thorn.  Aq.,  ii,  1,  Ques.  26,  art.  4.  I  differ  from  them  in  their  lim- 
itation  of  this  distinction  to  the  passion. 


188 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Fear. 


Hope. 


piness  of  the  object  loved.  When  this  latter  element  of 
benevolence  is  in  highest  degree,  love  rises  from  the  range  of 
passion  towards  the  glory  of  an  affection  and  a  principle. 
It  is  the  willing  of  good  for  another.  It  is  favor,  good-will, 
disinterestedness,  and  differs  from  universal  Charity,  only  in  its 
limitations.  When  this  disinterested  element  is  in  lower  dejrree, 
love  sinks  to  a  selfish  passion.  Persons  receive  from  us  the  emo- 
tions belonging  to  things.     We  love  them  for  our  pleasure. 

22.  Fear  is  a  painful  passion  from  the  lively 
perception,  in  the  imagination,  of  coming  evil. 

Tlie  evil  must  be  of  some  magnitude,  distinct  and  imminent 
We  must  include  in  our  perceptions  causes  real  or  imaginary, 
sufficient  to  produce  the  evil  feared. 

23.  Hope  is  the  reverse  of  Fear.  It  is  a  per- 
ception of  adequate  causes  of  coming  good,  mak- 
ing the  imagination  to  behold  the  good  as  near,  and  evils  as 
being  destroyed  or  as  being  far  away. 

[The  officer  must  deal  with  these  passions  in  the  force  under 
his  command,  and  often  also  in  the  public  mind.] 

24.  The  other  simple  and  general  Passions  require  little  more 
Degrees  in  the  elucidation  in  this  limited  course.  It  is  only  to  be 
simple  general,  remarked  that  all  the  simple  passions  exist  in 
various  degrees.  Love  may  grow  to  mad  infatuation  ;  Hate 
to  diabolic  malice;  Joy  to  ecstasy;  Sorrow  to  agony,  and 
Aversion  to  deadly  antipathy.  As  obstacles  lessen,  Hope  rises 
into  confidence,  and  Fear  diminishes  into  diffidence.  As 
obstacles  increase  moderately,  confidence  becomes  boldness, 
and  as  they  increase  immoderately.  Fear  passes  into  despond- 
ency. When  they  are  insuperable,  the  mind  moves  from 
despondency  to  despair.  [It  is  well  for  a  military  man  to 
appreciate  these  varying  degrees  of  hope  and  fear  since  he  will 
find  them  among  troops.] 

25.  Such  are  the  simple  general  Passions.  Before  passing 
from  them  to  the  special  and  the  complex,  the  reader  should 
observe  how  the  former  underlie  all  the  latter.  And  in  the 
former,  the  simple  and  general,  he  should  see  which  are  the 


SOURCES   ARE   IN   LOVE   AND   HATE. 


189 


corner-stones,  since  he  thus  learns  how  to  deal  with  passions  ia 
himself  and  others. 

26.  These  simple  general  Passions  enter  into 
all  the  special  and  all  the  complex,  mixed  pas-  g'^^ltw 
sions.     Thus  in  any  special  passion,  as  Avarice,  i»  the  special 
there  is  first  the  love  of  money,  then  desire  for  it,  *°^  *'^°'P^®''- 
then  hope,  then  joy,  as  in  the  case  of  the  miser.     In  approba- 
tiveness,  the  love  of  praise  inclines  to  it,  there  is  a  desire  for 
praise,  hope  for  praise,  joy  in  praise.     So  it  is  clearly  in  the 
mixed  or  complex  passions,  since  they  are  but  combinations  of 
the  simple.     Anger  for  example,  as  we  shall  see,  is  a  combina- 
tion of  grief  and  desire;   grief  from   some  infliction  given, 
desire  to  bestow  infliction  in  return. 

27.  As  these  simple  general  Passions   are  at 

the  basis  of  all  the  others,  so  they  in  turn  have  last  to  Lov^Ind 
two  which  are  primary  and  fundamental.     These  ^^*^' 
are  Love  and  Hate.     Love  and  Hate  are  the  origin  of  all  the 
rest.     They  are  primary,  being  the  dispositions  which  prepare 
for  all  the  rest.     Without  them  the  others  could  not  exist.     If 
one  had  no  love  he  could  have  no  desire  for  any  thing,  nor  hope 
nor  enjoyment,  since  he  would  be  without  the  primary  sensi- 
bility on  which  all  the  others  depend. 

28.  From    this  fact    arises   an  Ethical    rule. 

Limit  and  regulate  your  attachments  and  aver-  ^^^^^  "le- 
sions.    Each  new  sensibility  which  you  permit,  exposes  you  to 
the  inroads  of  a  train  of  passions.     The  love  of  money,  for  ex- 
ample, must  bring  all  its  attendant  sensibilities  and  cravings. 
Hatred  to  labor  or  learning  has  its  train  of  consequences. 

29.  The  same  fact  teaches  where  to  begin  in  dealing  with  the 
passions  of  others.  The  commencement  is  in  the  perception 
of  what  they  love  and  dislike.  Thence  come  their  suscepti- 
bilities and  iDassions. 

30.  Next  in  the  personal  class  are  the  simple  simple 
special  Passions.     The  special  passions  are  those  *P^°^*^- 
which  are  directed  upon  some  specific  hind  of  good  or  evil. 
They  are  as  various  as  the  things  to  which  they  apply. 


190 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


All  are  not 
enumerated. 


Prominent  taken. 


31.  All  of  the  miscellaneous  need  not  be  enu- 
merated here.     An  example  would  be  Avarice, 
the  love  of  money. 

Those  which   are  prominent   and  important 
have  for  their  objects  Reputation,  Superiority, 
and  Infliction  of  Suffering. 

.  32.  The  passions  belonging  to  Reputation  are 

A  clSSlOIlS  HXiacCL  %  r 

with  love  of         the  Love  ot  Approbation,  Shame,  Impudence. 

By  Reputation  is  meant  the  good  opinion  of 
us  in  other  men,  whether  latent  in  thought  as  esteem,  or 
manifested  by  words  in  praise,  or  by  deeds  in  honors. 
Love  of  Approbation  is  sensibility  to  any  of  these:  it  is  a 
lively  perception  of  good  in  esteem,  praise,  or  honor,  more  es- 
pecially in  the  two  latter.  Shame  is  sorrow  from  the  loss  of 
this  good,  and  from  the  existence,  in  its  place,  of  contempt. 
Impudence  is  insensibility  to  shame.  These  passions  should 
be  understood  by  all  who  wish  to  govern  passions  in  theip- 
selves  or  others.  In  the  military  profession  the  soldier's  sen- 
sibility to  reputation  can  be  skilfully  used  Jboth  for  discipline 
and  victory.  Napoleon  appeals  to  it  in  his  proclamations.  In 
governing  men  it  is  important  to  understand  who  are,  and 
who  are  not,  sensible  to  shame.  Homer  describes  Ulysses 
stopping  the  army  before  Troy,  when  it  started  to  go  home, 
by  appeals  to  a  sense  of  shame  in  those  who  could  feel  it, 
and  by  sound  blows  on  those  who  were  shameless.*  He  who 
governs  others,  and  must  punish  or  reward  in  administering 
justice  or  discipline,  should  adapt  his  measures  to  his  men. 
"With  love  of  ^^*  The  passions  belonging  to  Superiority  are 

Superiority:  Emulation  and  Jealousy.  A  competition  exists 
or  is  supposed  between  ouVselves  and  others  for  something 
which  we  deem  good.  Superiority  is  the  surpassing  of  com- 
petitors in  the  attainment  of  this  good.  An  example  is  victory 
in  a  foot  race.  Emulation  is  hope  for  this  superiority  for  our- 
selves.    Jealousy  is  the  fear  tliat  others  may  attain  it.     The 


*  Homer's  Iliad.  Book  2. 


SPECIAL   PASSIONS  :    CRUELTY. 


191 


distinction  of  emulation  from  envy  will  appear  subsequentlj^ 
[Of  these,  Emulation  can  be  used  with  much  effect  in  military 
administration.  The  commander  can  arouse  one  body  of  men 
by  tlie  deeds  of  another.] 

34.  The  passion  belonging  to  the  Infliction  of  ^^^  infliction 
Suffering  is  Cruelty.  This  is  distinct  from  Re-  of  Suffering, 
venge,  which  implies  the  previous  reception  of  some  injury, 
and  which  inflicts  for  retaliation.  But  cruelty  is  a  simple  spe- 
cial passion.  It  is  pleasure  in  witnessing  suffering.  Savages 
encircling  the  victim  subjected  to  torture  at  the  stake  and  by 
fire,  love  and  delight  in  the  spectacle.  The  slow  agonies  of 
the  sufferer  seem  to  give  the  beholders  a  kind  of  intoxication. 
Among  refined  and  civilized  nations  persecutors  have  mani- 
fested the  same  gratification  from  the  same  object.  Cruelty 
may  appear  as  blood-thirstiness,  or  as  delight  in  torture.  Thirst 
for  blood  is  a  desire  for  indiscriminate  destruction  of  life.  It 
is  awakened  when  unresisted  slaughter  has  begun.  It  is  mani- 
fested by  troops  in  pursuit  after  a  defeated  enemy,  and  also 
in  the  sack  of  a  town.  It  is  shown  by  whole  populations  in 
revolutions.  In  the  massacres  at  Paris  and  at  Lyons,  during 
the  great  Revolution  of  France,  mere  blood-thirstiness,  with 
no  rational  object,  was  exhibited  as  a  purely  blind  animal 
instinct.  Delight  in  torture  is  less  indiscriminate.  It  selects 
individual  victims,  and  individualizes  their  sufferings  and  the 
grades  of  them,  one  by  one,  as  a  miser  counts  his  gains  to  the 
minutest  fraction.  A  high  dignitary  of  England,  in  times  not 
very  far  remote,  had  a  lady  of  the  court  subjected  to  torture, 
and,  dissatisfied  with  the  slow  movements  of  the  executioner 
put  his  own  hand  to  the  instrument  to  wrench  the  limbs  apart 
more  vigorously.* 

Cruelty  is  closely  allied  to  fear.  A  common  device  for 
exciting  whole  bodies  of  men  to  deeds  of  cruelty  is  to  spread 
panics  among  them.  It  was  b/this  means  that  the  population 
of  Paris  was  stimulated  to  execute  the  massacres  of  Septem- 
ber, and  to  acquiesce  in  the  daily  executions  by  the  guillotine. 

♦Hume. 


192 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


The  most  exaggerated  terrors  were  first  difiiised.  Fear  extin- 
guished pity,  and  incited  to  cruelty.  When  destruction  had 
begun,  blood-thirstiness  was  formed.  So  intimate  is  the  con- 
nection of  fear  with  this  passion  tliat  it  has  given  rise  to  the 
proverb:  Cowards  are  always  cruel. 

[In  military  direction  this  passion  is  to  be  repressed  among 
troops.  It  is  unfavorable  to  discipline,  and  to  all  rational 
purposes  proposed  by  war.  Troops  must  do  simply  that  which 
is  commanded,  but  no  more.] 

T  nsition  from  ^^'  ^^  1^^^'^  seen  the  simple  special  Passions, 
•impie  to  complex.  Leaving  both  divisions  of  the  simple,  we  now 
come  to  the  complex.  The  complex  Passions  appear  in  a  tab- 
uhir  view  wiiich  follows. 


IS 


►1  -i  a  2  B  c  ?;■ 

?  ^  S 


P     S3       , 


P3    5J    Z_j 


EX.  p. 


SS 


§ 


^  o 


o 


3-; 

o 


irt-   Qj 

o  p 
2".  <^ 
O  o' 
P   3 


,•/,•,•,-,•,•,•,§:    g 


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o 

3 


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so 

o 


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o 
crq  3 

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o 

d 

P 


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e 


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o 

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194 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


COMPLEX  passions:  now  classified. 


195 


Complex  eirn-  ^^-  ^^^^  complex  Passions  are  those  whicli  are 

merated.  j^qi  simple.     They   are   ten.     Five  regard  evil. 

They  are  Indignation,  Anger,  Pity,  Revenge,  Remorse.  Five 
regard  good.  They  are  Satisfaction,  Gratitude,  Gratulatiou, 
Envy,  Exultation. 

Made  complex  ^^'  ^^  understand  and  classify  them,  we  are 

by  combinations^,  ^q  observe  that,  as  being  not  simple,  but  complex, 
In  Object  or  Sub-  ^^^^J  ^^^  ^^^  made  by  some  kind  of  combinations. 
J®^*'  Tiie  combinations  are  principally  in  the  objects 

considered  by  the  passions.     The  combinations  are  subordi- 
iiately  in  the  suhject  feeling  the  emotions,  and  combining  in  one 
movement  some  of  the  primary  and  general  passions :  Love  or 
Hate,  Desire  or  Aversion,  Hope  or  Fear,  Joy  or  Sorrow. 
Those  of  the  ^8-  The  combinations  regarding  the  objects  are 

Object.  principal,  and  form  the  great  distinction  of  this 

whole  group  of  complex  from  the  simple  passions.  This  dis- 
tinction is  to  be  carefully  noted  by  all  who  wish  to  know,  to 
govern,  and  to  manage  the  passions  in  themselves  or  in  other 
persons. 

p^g  J.  ,  .  '  The  great  distinction^  then^  of  the  complex  Pas- 
porunt  distinc-  sions  IS,  that  they  combine  ethical  sentiments  with 

the  olements  of  passion.  The  ethical  sentiment 
which  they  specially  interweave  is  that  of  Justice.*  They 
regard  good  and  evil  in  self  and  in  others,  as  worthily  or 
unworthily,  deservedly  or  undeservedly  received.  The  words 
good  and  ei^il^  express  the  pathetical  element.  The  words 
deserved  and  undeserved^  the  ethical.  In  the  movements  of 
these  passions  there  is  a  lively  perception,  though  often  erro- 
neous, of  that  equality  which,  as  has  been  shown,  is  the  aim 
of  Justice.  There  is  in  them  a  craving  for  an  equilibrium 
between  desert  on  the  one  side,  and  the  good  or  evil  on  the 
other.     When  the  good  or  evil  is  deserved,  we  conceive  that 

*  Though  I  am  ordinarily  inclined  to  leave  to  the  uninvited  observation  of  man- 
kind and  to  the  slow  appreciation  of  time,  such  improvements  as  I  may  suggest 
in  different  subjects,  I  cannot  but  invite  attention  to  this.  I  deem  it  of  great  im- 
portance. 


the  equilibrium  is  existing;  and,  when  undeserved,  that  the 
equilibrium  is  wanting.     Thus  we  have  Indignation  when  any 
great  good  or  evil  is  bestowed  unworthily.     In  reading  a  tale, 
we  have  satisfaction  when  all  the  characters  receive  according 
to  their  deserts.     In  Envy,  we  deem  our  successful  competitors 
less  worthy  than  ourselves,  and  we  desire  to  strip  them  of  their 
advantages  and  reduce  them  to  an  equality  with  us.     In  Re- 
venge, we  deem  the  suffering  which  we  inflict  as  an  equivalent 
to  the  injuries  which  we  have  received.     So  it  is  with  the  rest. 
Since  this  ethical  element  of  Justice  enters  into  these  com- 
plex passions,  every  one  who  governs  men  in  military,  political, - 
judicial,  industrial,  social,  or  other  relations,  should  remember 
the  inevitable  effect  of  every  act  of  injustice  in  awakening 
human  passions.     In  this  respect,  as  in  others,  the  strictest 
principle  is  the  highest  prudence.     Perfect  justice  prevents  and 
subdues  passions.     It  creates  and  lives  in  serenity.     The  worst 
tumults,  military  and  civil,  which  history  records,  have  come 
from  real  or  supposed  injustice. 

39.  For  a  general  view  of  the  first  table,  we  Explanation  of 

observe  that  *      the  First  Table. 

^  The  complex  Passions  are  classified  from  their  objects,  by 
eimply  combining  the  elements  with  the  persons.  The  elements 
are  pathetical  or  ethical.  The  pathetical  are  good  and  evil ; 
the  ethical  are  the  presence  or  absence  of  desert.  The  persons 
are  others  or  ourselves.  By  carrying  out  these  combinations, 
we  have,  not  a  specific  but  a  general  view  of  the  complex  pas- 
sions. The  combinations  arc  reduced  under  three  heads.  1. 
Good  or  evil  befalling  others.  2.  Good  bestowed  on  others  or 
ourselves.     3.  Evil  inflicted. 

Indignation  and  Satisfaction  are  general  sentiments. 

40.  For  a  general  view  of  the  second  table  we  Explanation  of 
observe  that  the  Second. 

In  classifying  them  by  the  condition  of  the  subject,  the  per- 
son feeling  them,  we  consider  the  simple  general  passions 
which  enter  them.  All  the  simple  general  passions  spring,  as 
we  have  seen,  from  Love  and  Hate.    Love  is  the  origin  for^'cor- 


19^ 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


ti 


Taken,  one  by 
one. 


First  group. 


Indignation. 


respondent  desires,  hopes,  and  joys ;  Hate  for  aversions,  fears, 
and  griefs. 

Five  of  the  ten  passions  imply  Love.  They  are  Satisfaction, 
Pity,  Gratulation,  Gratitude,  Exultation.  Five  imply  Ilate, 
They  are  Indignation,  Hevenge,  Anger,  Remorse,  Envy.  Again, 
the  reader  sees  that,  in  dealing  with  the  passions  in  himself 
and  others,  he  must  keep  his  attention  ever  on  the  primary 
loves  and  hatreds.  They  are  the  fountain  of  the  stream,  the 
germ  of  the  plant. 

41.  From  this  general  view  we  come  to  each 
separately,  following  the  order  of  position  in  the 
first  table. 

In  the  first  group  are  two :  Indignation  and 
Satisfaction. 

42.  The  sight  of  good  or  evil  befalling  others 
unworthily,  and  wholly  undeserved  by  them,  pro- 
duces in  a  beholder  Indignation.  In  indignation  there  is  hate 
in  some  degree  to  the  cause  of  the  wrong,  felt  to  persons,  and 
even  to  things.  There  is  aversion  to  the  coui-se  of  conduct 
which  inflicted*the  wrong,  and  there  is  grief  at  witnessing  the 
wrong,  and  in  the  case  of  evil,  the  sufi*ering.  Thus  indigna- 
tion would  be  aroused  by  the  spectacles  so  often  witnessed  in 
the  history  of  despotic  empires.  An  upright  and  able  digni- 
tary, who  has  committed  no  fault,  is  disgraced,  reduced  to  pov- 
erty, imprisoned,  tortured,  slain,  and  his  innocent  kindred  are 
subjected  to  similar  and  successive  disasters.  An  unworthy 
man  is  raised  from  obscure  station,  and  lifted  above  the  nobles 
of  a  kingdom,  in  wealth,  power,  and  the  ensigns  of  rank. 
The  contemporary  beholder  or  the  distant  reader  feels  indigna- 
tion. 

43.  Satisfaction  is  simply  the  contrasted  emo- 
tion.    It  is  awakened  by  the  spectacle  of  men 

getting  precisely  what  we  think  they  deserve.  Imagine  a  his- 
tory nearly  the  reverse  of  the  previous  examples.  A  wise, 
patriotic,  and  able  statesman,  long  neglected,  is  elevated  to 
power  by  his  sovereign.     A  wicked,  unworthy,  and  cruel  miu- 


Satisf  action. 


envy:  pity:  revenge:  angeb. 


197 


ister  is  reduced  and  punished.  There  would  be  love  to  the 
authors  of  the  measure,  admiration  of  the  policy,  desire  that  it 
might  be  pursued,  and  joy  in  the  equality  between  what  was 
deserved  and  what  was  received. 

Indignation  and  Satisfaction  are  not  only  caused  by  inten- 
tioiial  acts  from  men,  but  also  by  accidental  circumstances. 

44.  Indignation  and  Satisfaction  enter  into  tlie  ^  ,    . 
*,^.,,   •    •  .         .      ,  Selation  of  these 

remammg  passions  m  the  two  otlier  groups.     For  to  the  others. 

example,  there  is  a  certain  degree  of  Indignation  in  Envy. 
But  when  they  become  intense,  they  are  distinct,  separated 
passions.  They  are  named  in  the  table  as  general,  because  iu 
their  moderated  action  they  underlie  the  others.  This  fact  is 
of  great  practical  value  for  directing  the  management  of  pas- 
sions in  one's  own  person,  or  in  otlier  men.  If  even  the  lighter 
movements  of  Indignation  and  Satisfaction  are  awakened"",  the 
foundation  is  laid  for  the  others. 

45.  In  the  second  group  are  four :  Pity,  Ee- 
venge,  Anger,  Eemorse.  Second  Group: 

The   sight   of  evil    inflicted   on  others,  when 
mostly  undeserved  by  them,  awakens  Pity.     Tli^e  ^*^' 
evil  must  be  real,  more  than  trifling,  and  inflict  injury  and 
pain.-^     It  must  be  in  great  part,  but  not  wholly,  undeserved. 
A  great  evil,  wholly  undeserved,  would  cause  pure  Indigna- 
tion ;    and  if  wholly  deserved.   Satisfaction.      Hence,   skilful 
writers  of  tragedies  and  of  tragic  tales,  aiming  to  move  Pity, 
present  their  heroes  or  heroines  as  suffering  in  part  by  their 
own  minor  faults  or  mistakes.     There  is  enough  goodness  in 
the  character  to  awaken  interest,  but  not  such  an  entire  free- 
dom  from  error  as  to  put  Indignation  above  Pity.     Pity  is 
thus,  in  part,  a  reduced  Indignation.     But  Indignation,  as   a 
distinct,   intense  emotion,   may  overpass   Pity,  and   take  its 
place.     He  who  wishes   to  produce  Indignation   may  begin 
with  Pity  as  preparatory.     Mark  Antony,  over  Csesar's  body, 
first  awakens  Pity,  and  then  passes  beyond  it,  on  the  thermom- 
eter, to  mere  Indignation.*    But  he  who  wishes  to  draw  the 

*  Aris.,  Rhet.,  b.  2.  |  Shakspeare's  Drama  of  Julius  Caesar. 


^  ri 


198 


PRACTICAL    ETHICS. 


tears  of  Pitj,  must  not  ascend  so  high  as  Indignation.  Those 
who  "  pile  on  the  agony,"  to  use  the  expressive  language  of 
common  life,  may  make  men  indignant  at  wrong,  but  not 
soften  them  to  Pity.  Having  thus  distinguished  Pity  from 
intense  Indignation,  we  can  regard  the  simple  passions  which 
interweave  their  activity  in  its  movements.  There  is  love  for 
the  suffering  person  ;  there  is  sorrow  at  the  sight  of  his  suffcr- 
in*^' ;  there  is  desire  to  relieve  him.  Tliere  is  also  a  certain 
fear  lest  the  same  evils  might  happen  to  ourselves,  or  to  those 
connected  with  us.  The  capacity  for  feeling  Pity  depends, 
indeed,  on  the  idea  that  we  or  ours  might  have  a  like  visit- 
ation. Desperate  men  are  pitiless  over  suffering,  as  hoping 
nothino:.  Confident  and  successful  men  are  insolent  to  the 
suffering,  as  fearing  nothing.  But  the  fear  must  not  be  ex- 
cessive, otherwise  it  extinguishes  Pity.  Those  excessively 
timid  are  as  pitiless  as  the  over-bold.  Beside  these  combina- 
tions, distinctive  of  Pity,  are  the  subdued  elements  that  enter 
Indignation :    the   dislike,   aversion,   and  grief  produced  by 


wrong. 


46.  Evil  inflicted  by  ns  on  others,  and  de- 
Eevenge;  served  by  them  as  retaliation  for  injuries  done 
by  them  to  ourselves,  is  the  object  contemplated  by  Revenge. 
It  must  be  considered  as  deserved  for  injuries  which  we,  or 
ours,  have  received,  since  otherwise  it  is  the  sentiment  of  Satis- 
faction. Satisfaction  is  felt  when  any  man  receives  the  evil 
which  we  think  he  deserves  for  any  wrong  to  any  one.  But 
the  spirit  of  Vengeance  is  met  when  the  other  party  receives 
the  evil  he  deserves  for  wrongs  done  to  us  or  ours.  Vengeance 
is  more  fully  met  when  we  ourselves  inflict  those  evils.  Ke- 
venge  is  thus  a  species  of  Satisfaction.  It  includes  hate,  a 
desire  to  punish,  and  joy  in  both  the  suffering  and  requital. 

47.  Evil  inflicted  on  ourselves  by  another,  in- 
^^®'*  tentionally,  and  without  any  perception  on  our 
part  that  we  deserve  it,  will  cause  Anger.  It  is  not  necessary 
that  the  evil  be  great.  It  is  enough  that  our  feelings  are 
pained,  and  that  the  person  with  whom  we  are  angry  has  dis- 


EEMORSE  :    ENVY. 


199 


regarded  those  feelings  by  negative  neglect  or  positive  oppo- 
sition. This  consciousness  of  the  want  of  personal  consider- 
ation is  prominent  in  Anger.  The  simple  passions  it  includes 
are  Grief,  Momentary  Aversion,  and  Desire  for  Revenge— de- 
sire to  inflict  suffering  by  word  or  deed  in  return.  Anger  is  a 
modified  Indignation,  being  accompanied  by  a  sense  of  evil, 
undeserved.  But  Indignation  as  a  separate  passion  is  perma- 
nent, while  Anger  is  transitory,  and  softened  by  time.  The 
immediate  remedy  for  Anger  is  the  removal  of  its  cause.  The 
cause  being  intentional  disregard,  Anger  is  pacified  by  show- 
ing the  absence  of  intention  in  the  person  supposed  to  offend.* 

48.  Evil  inflicted    on    ourselves,    and  wholly 
deserved,  causes  Remorse.     Remorse,  as  an  emo-  ^®°^°^s®- 
tion,  is  distinct  from  Repentance.     The  simple  passions  which 
appear  in  Remorse  are  momentary  hatred  of  self  for  wrong 
conduct,  aversion  to  that  conduct,  and  grief  under  the  evils 
which  it  has  wrou£:ht. 

49.  In  the  third  group  are  four  :  Envy,  Gratu- 

lation.  Gratitude,  Exultation.  Third  Group: 

Good  obtained  by  otliers,  and  specially  by  our  equals  and 
competitors,  not  appearing  to  our  imaginations  to  be  deserved 
by  them,  is  an  object  causing  Envy. 

Envy,  therefore,  is  sorrow  from  the  perception 
of  advantages  possessed  by  equals  and  competi-  ^^^'' 
toi-s.     It  is  distinct  from  Emulation.     In  Emulation  we  wish 
to  obtain  for  ourselves,  but  in  Envy  we  are  indignant  that 
others  possess.     Envy  being  accompanied  by  lower  degrees  of 
Indignation   has   the   simple  passions  which   accompany   the 
latter.     There  are  in  Envy  hatred  to  the  person  envied ;  sor- 
row, because  of  the  good  possessed ;  and  desire  to  deprive  him 
of  it.     Envy  attends  the  aspiring.     It  is  stronger  and  more 
enduring  in  proportion,  as  the  disposition  is  more  mean  and 
base.     Emulation  belongs    to    nobler   natures.     Whoever  is 
tempted  to  Envy  should  turn  it  into  a  generous  Emulation. 


♦Aristotle,  Rhet.,  b.  2. 


J 


200 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


50.  Good  bestowed  on  others,  and  appearing 
rat       on ;       ^^  ^^  ^^  |^^  deserved  by  them,  is  the  object  of 

Gratulation.  By  this  we  mean  joy  for  the  good  of  others. 
It  is  sympathy  with  "  those  who  do  rejoice."  It  includes  love 
to  the  other,  and  pleasure  in  his  prosperity,  and  desire  that  it 
may  continue.  It  is,  in  many  particulars,  opposed  to  Envy  ; 
the  former  being  joy,  and  the  latter  sorrow,  caused  by  the 
same  thing — the  good  of  another.  Gratulation  is  expressed 
})y  words,  deeds,  and  manners  in  congratulations. 

51.  Good  bestowed  on  ourselves  by  another, 
^^^®'           and  not  deserved  by  us  through  any  claim  of 

justice,  is  the  object  of  the  emotion  of  Gratitude.  Gratitude, 
as  a  principle,  has  been  considered  before.  It  is  now  spoken 
of  as  a  practical  and  instinctive  emotion.  It  includes  love  to 
the  benefactor,  joy  in  the  benefit,  and  a  desire  to  make  return. 
It  is  a  contrast  to  Hevenge — the  latter  including  a  desire  to 
return  evil  for  evil.  Gratitude  is  higher  in  proportion,  as  the 
benefit  is  greater,  as  the  necessities  relieved  are  more  pressing, 
and  as  the  intention  of  the  person  obliging  us  appears  more 
disinterested,  and  more  exclusively  directed  to  our  own  happi- 
ness. If  the  benefactor  obliged  ns  for  some  personal  advan- 
tage, or  with  no  special  personal  interest  in  ns,  the  emotion  is 
less  lively.  If  the  good  received  were  due  to  us  by  a  claim  of 
justice,  there  is  not  Gratitude,  but  Satisfaction.  Thus  we  are 
not  grateful  for  the  payment  to  us  of  a  debt.  We  are  simply 
satisfied. 

52.  Good  bestowed  on  us,  and,  to  our  imagina- 
tion, wholly  deserved,  awakens  Exultation.     It 

includes  love  to  self,  approbation  of  conduct  past,  hope  for  the 
future,  and  joy,  both  from  the  good  received,  and  from  a  sense 
of  its  fitness.  An  example  is  the  reception  of  some  honor  for 
Trhicli  we  liave  long  toiled,  and  which  we  think  "  befitting  for 
lis,"  in  view  of  actions,  sufierings,  and  abilities.  Napoleon, 
crowned  Emperor,  after  his  magnificent  public  services  to 
France,  and  with  his  consciousness  of  power,  might  have  felt 
exultation. 


Exultation. 


MOVEMENTS    OF   PASSIOXS  :    TREATMENT. 


201 


53.  We  have  thus  traced  the  complex  passions. 

W,  1  ,  11,.  Movements  in 

e  iiave  seen,  as  we  traced  them,  their  inter-  Mind  have  been 

nal  and  mental  movements— first,  in  the  simple,  '^°^'^^^^^^- 

and  then  in  the  complex. 

54.  If  we  now  wish  to  consider  those  effects  «  ^  • 

JzL3veinents  m 
and  expressions  of  them  in  the  hody,  wliich  are  tneBody. 

regarded  by  the  artist,  the  actor,  and  the  orator,  we  shall  find 
ourselves  led,  with  Des  Cartes,  to  that  ethereal  fluid  in  man, 
which  mediates  between  mind  and  body,  and  between  both 
and  the  universe,  a  fluid  which  he  names  Animal  Spirit. 

All  their  effects  on  the  countenance,  frame  and  voice,  result 
from  their  primary  action  on  these  animal  spirits.  It  is  sulfi- 
»  cient,  in  this  brief  view  of  them,  to  say  that  those  which  have 
good  for  their  object  tend  to  expand  and  elevate,  and  those 
which  have  evil  for  their  object  tend- to  depress  and  contract. 
Love,  Hope,  Joy,  Desire,  are  examples  of  the  former :  Hate, 
Fear,  Sorrow,  Aversion,  of  the  latter.  We  can  trace  an  analy- 
sis of  Anger  in  the  lines  of  the  face. 

We  have  thus  defined  and  divided  the  Passions.  Here, 
therefore,  terminates  so  much  of  this  subject  as  regards  their 
nature  and  action. 

55.  After  the  definition  and  division   of  the  Transition  from 
Passions  follows  their  treatment.  paS^t^lhek 

56.  The  treatment  of  the  Passions  is  for  our-  Treatment. 
selves  or  others.  pl^f'^^'*^" 

57.  Their  treatment  for  ourselves  requires,  principally,  their 
goveiifiment, 

58.  We   are   to  govern    them   through   their  (jove  nment  of 
causes  directly,  or  through  their  effects  indirectly.  ^^^  Passions. 
The  attainment  thus  produced  is  that  of  Self-control. 

59.  We  govern   them  directly  through  their  Through  their 
causes,  by  directing  action  to  the  suhject  or  olject  causes. 

60.  We  act  upon  the  subject  ourselves,  lefore^  or  in  the 
time  of  their  movement.  We  act  lefore  by  subduing  the  dis- 
positions which  incline  us  to  them.  We  act,  at  the  time^  by 
moderating  their  violence,  through  reason  and  conscience.    We 


202 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


Boles. 


act  upon  the  object  by  neutralizing  its  influence  upon  the  feel- 
ings ;  and  this,  by  removing  it  or  ourselves  from  it ;  or  by 
extinguishing  our  perceptions  of  it. 
Several  rules  thus  result. 

{a.)  Itules  regarding  the  preceding  disposition 
of  tlie  subject  are  these : 
(1.)  Limit  your  objects  ofp^trsuit  to  those  €0711- 
erai  state  of     mended  hy  religion  and  hy  the  highest  morality. 
This  rule  is  for  the  universal  disposition  (ch.  iii.). 
We  have  seen  that  the  springs  of  all  the  Passions  are  in  Love 
and   Aversion.      (27.)      If  these  could    be    destroyed,    there 
could  be  no  Emotion.     As  these  are  lessened,  susceptibilities 
to  emotions  are  lessened.     Each  new  attachment  brings  its  own 
train  of  new  sensibilities,  its  aversions,  desires,  hopes,  fears, 
disappointments.     Limiting  the  objects  of  desire,  you  reduce 
your  dispositions  to  be  moved.     "What  Bcethius  says  of  the 
clear  light  of  truth,  may  be  applied  to  the  clear  light  of  tran- 
quillit}^  in  a  steadfast  mind  : 

Tu  quoqiie  si  vis  lumine  claro 
Cernere  venim,  gaudia  pelle, 
Pelle  timorera  :  niibila  mens  est, 
Vinctaque  fraenis  hiec  ubi  regnant.* 

(2).   Observe  and  subdue  the  peculiar  tendencies 
2d :  for  special    ^q  particular  passions^  resulting  from  your  age^ 

temperament,  and  social  condition.     This  rule  is 
for  the  particular  disposition. 

3d-  for  momen-  (^0  -^^  not  voluntanly permit  any  bodily  con- 
tary  dispositions,  dition  which  predisposes  to  excitement ;  and,  when 
body  or  mind  are  thus  predisposed^  impose  a  most  watchful 
restraint.     This  rule  is  for  momentary  dispositions. 

Such  are  the  rules  for  ourselves,  in  our  habitual  dispositions, 
before  the  movements  of  passion. 

(5.)  The  next  rule  regards  the  actual  movement,  the  time  of 
their  occurrence. 

♦  If  you  wish  to  see  truth  in  clear  light,  drive  out  joys  and  fears :  where  these 
Bway,  the  mind  is  clouded,  &c. 


RULES  FOR   GOVERNING   PASSIONS. 


203 


(4.)  At  the  tiine  when  you  are  agitated  by  ariy  ^^y^.  for  the  time 
evil  passion,  instantly  apply  your  reason  and  o^  Passion. 
conscience  to  the  formation  of  those  trains  of  thought  which 
will  subdue  it. 

The  very  name,  passion,  implies,  as  we  have  seen,  passivity. 
We  are  acted  on  in  anger,  grief,  terror,  and  the  like.     All  men 
know  by  experience  this  fact,  and  that  passions  are  not  voli- 
tions.    With  the  cold   remains   of  our  dearest   friend   lying 
before  us,  we  could  not,  at  will,  bid  sorrow  depart.     Seeing 
our   ship,   now  recovering,  and   now   driving  towards  a  lee 
sliore,  we  could  not  avoid  the  vivid  alternations  of  hope  and 
fear.     In  "  Eobinson  Crusoe"  is  a  lively  description,  probably 
drawn  from  some  true  narrative,  of  the  emotion  manifested  by 
those  who  had  been  rescued  from  a  burning  vessel.    The  transi- 
tion from  fear  and  despair  to  joy  can  be  imagined.     Men  can- 
not, by  mere  will,  prevent  such  emotions.     From  this  fact  is 
drawn  an  erroneous  moral  conclusion  :  that  we  have  no  power 
over  them,  are  not  morally  accountable  for  their  effects.     But, 
as  passions  can  be  aroused  by  thoughts  and  images,  so  they  cau 
be  subdued  by  counteracting  thoughts  and  images,  which  we 
voluntarily  produce.      We  cannot  feel   gratitude   by  merely 
willing,  but  we  can  reflect  on  the  kindness  of  the  benefactor, 
his  personal  consideration,  the  value  of  the  benefit,  till  grati- 
tude arises.     We  can  thus  subdue  or  form  an  emotion,  by  the 
direction  of  our  thoughts.     To  this  work  we  can  apply  the  will. 
A  man  in  terror  may  reflect,  and  make  his  fear  at  least  mod- 
erate and  reasonable.    We  have  control,  then,  over  the  thoughts 
which  will  moderate  the  passions,  and  are  to  this  extent  ac- 
countable.    Hence  the  rule. 
These  are  rules  for  the  subject. 

(c)  The  next  rule  is  for  neutralizing  the  influence  of  the  object. 
(5.)  Banish  from  your  presence  or  perception  g^j^.  ^j.  ^j^^  q^,. 
the  external  object,  whose  influence  you  do  not  J®*^*. 
wish  to  feel. 

The  external  objects  causing  the  Passions  are  the  things  and 
persons  surrounding  us.    These  act  too  strongly  on  our  feelings. 


204 


PEACTICAL   ETHICS. 


KEVEKSE   government:    FKOM   EFFECTS. 


205 


IP 


m 


f! 


•K 


If  these  be  removed,  tlie  mind  may  be  unaffected.     Tims  tlie 
proverbial  remedy  for  love  to  a  person  is  absence.     Those  who 
are  removed   from   the  occasions*  for   revenge,   indignation, 
cupidity,  envy,  anger,  and  the  like  are  freed  from  the  violent 
and  wrong  emotions  which  they  would  otherwise  experience. 
Where  we  cannot  remove  the  object  from  us,  or  ourselves  from 
it,  we  are  then  to  prevent  perceptions  of  it  through  the  senses 
or  the  mind.     We  have  seen  that  passions  are  caused  by  lively 
perceptions.     To  obstruct  the  latter  is  to  touch  the  cause.     Of 
all  the  organs  of  sense,  the  eye  is  to  be  particularly  guarded. 
Thus  a  man  climbing  a  precipice  should  not  look  to  the  depth 
below  him  if  he  would  avoid  fear.     He  who  is  in  his  first 
eno'ao'ement  should  not  look  to  the  dead  and  wounded.     He 
who  would  check  the  beginnings  of  loves  and  desires  must  turn 
away  his  eyes.     The  same  rule  extends  to  the  perceptions  of  the 
mind.     We  are  to  divert  the  attention  from  that  whose  influ- 
ence we  do  not  wish  to  feel.    By  cutting  off  or  lessening  the 
bodily  and  mental  perceptions  we  touch  the  cause,  since  Pas- 
sions according  to  the  definition  are  "Emotions  caused  by 
vivid  lively  perceptions." 
These  rules  thus  far  have  related  to  the  cause. 
{d,)  That  which  follows  belongs  to  the  effect. 
6th  •  for  the  (^0  -^^^^'^^  ^^  ^^  ^^^  ^f  your  power  the  effects 

Effects.  and  expressions  of  the  passion  excited  which  you 

wish  to  subdue. 

As    we    may    govern    the    passions    directly 

^ou^their      through  their  cause,  so  we  may  reversely  through 
Effects.  ^i^gjr  effects.    These  effects  ire,  as  before  shown, 

in  the  body,  the  mind,  the  voluntary  actions.  The  effects  in 
the  body  are  on  the  muscles  of  countenance  and  frame,  on  the 
blood,  on  the  vital  spirits,  and  through  the  latter  on  the  eye 
and  the  tones  of  the  voice.  All  these  bodily  effects  make  up 
the  expressions  of  the  passions,  the  signs  by  which  men  detect 
or  depict  them.  The  effects  on  the  mind  have  been  considered 
under  a  previous  rule.  The  effects  on  the  voluntary  actions 
♦  In  Shakspeare's  ♦'Poems"  the  effect  from  "occasion"  is  finely  stated. 


are  in  words  and  deeds.     Over  many  of  these  effects  we  have 
direct  control,  through  the  exercise  of  a  strong  will.     Skilful 
diplomatists  negotiating  a  treaty  of  peace  never  betray  the 
emotions  which  they  feel.     Kapoleon,  Metternich,  and  Tallev- 
rand   were  striking  examples  in   modern   times.     ]N'apoleon, 
wlien  he  desired,  could  be  wholly  impenetrable.     Agitated  he 
could  at  will  assume  the  stony  gaze  of  a  statue.     The  same 
power  over  the  expression  is  shown  by  professed  gamblers,  and 
by  men  who  are  known  as  "  keen  at  driving  bargains."     Such 
examples  prove  that  when   men  will,  they  can   govern   the 
bodily  effects  of  the  passions.     It  is  also  evident  that  we  can 
eontiX)l  our  words  and  deeds.     If  we  will,  we  can  be  silent,  and 
abstain  from  all  personal  movement.     There  is  even  a  partial 
power  over  the  imagination.     A  man  can  create  an   image 
adverse  to  that  which  the  passion  he  feels  is  calling  up.     To 
the  lively  pictures  of  enjoyment  in  guilty  pleasures,  he  can 
oppose  another  vision  of  himself  disgraced,  ruined,  agonized. 
We  have  then  power  over  the  effects.     Now  in  the  Passions, 
causes  and  effects  act  reciprocally,  as  already  stated,  on  each 
other.     By  subduing  the  effect  we  may  partially  subdue  the 
cause.     It  is  a  law  of  nature  that  by  the  effects  and  expressions 
of  a  passion  we  can  act  in  ourselves  on  the  passion  itself.    If 
it  be  excited,  and  we  prevent  all  expression  of  it  we  obtain 
control  over  it.     If  it  be  excited,  and  we  suffer  its  violent  ex- 
pression  we  increase  it.     An  angry  man   rises  higher  and 
higher  in  his  rage  as  he  storms  on  in  words  and  deeds.     One 
in  fear  may  "talk  himself,"  as  the  saying  is,  into  an  agony  of 
terror.     This  law  of  nature  extends  so  far  that  by  assuming 
the  expression  of  any  passion  we  create  a  tendency  to  feel  it.* 
We  may  then  govern  the  passions  through  their  effect,  and 
hence  the  rule  given  is  practicable  and  useful. 

Des  Cartes,  in  his  remarkable  Treatise  on  the  Passions,  has 
applied  this  rule  especially  to  the  effects  on  the  animal  spirits. 
If  a  passion  throw  the  spirits  downward,  and  hence  drive  the 
blood  from  the  face  and  heart,  then  by  voluntary  effort  impel 

*  Burke. 


V       ' 


206 


PRACTICAL   ETUICS. 


blood  into  the  face,  and  life  into  the  eye.     Put  on  the  expres- 
sion of  the  passion  opposed  to  that  which  is  getting  an  unwel- 
come  mastery.      Tliat    great    philosopher    has    shown   in    a 
delicate  analysis  the  aid  thus  given  to  a  man  over  himself. 
(e.)  The  remaining  rule  ascends  to  the  cause  of  causes,  to 

God  Himself. 

7tii :  for  aid  from      (7.)    Unite  religion^  morals^  and  ^personal  will 

the  Power  of  pow-    ..  ^      j      7^        v     7 

era,  for  constant  mj-coniroL 

Christianity  presents  religious  truth,  and  divine  influence 
and  prayer,  as  aids  by  which  man  may  overcome  the  passions 
which  are  sinful.  The  elements  are  light,  power,  prayer. 
Eevelation  implies  and  presupposes  those  moral  principles 
which  proceed  from  nature  and  reason.  Keligion  and  morals 
are  ineffectual  without  the  individual's  co-operation.  The 
individual  must  work  within  him  and  above  him,  within  by 
subjugating  himself,  above  by  communion  with  the  Deity. 
The  founder  of  Christianity  says  for  the  one  "  Watch,"  and 
for  the  other  'Tray."  Primarily,  therefore,  there  must  be 
religion,  subordinately  morals,  perpetually  a  good-will. 

Such  are  considerations  for  the  treatment  of  passions  in  owr- 

selve^. 

Treatment  of  61.  The  treatment  of  passions  in  others  requires 

Passions ^noth-    ]^nowledge  of  the  actual  passions  of  men,  and  the 

edge.  2.  Uses,     uses  of  that  knowledge. 

Knowledge  of  ^2.  For  knowledge  of  the  passions  of  men,  we 

Dispositions.        must  understand   the  universal,  particular,  and 

momentary  dispositions  of  the  beings  around  us.     This  is  to 

be  attained  by  Observation.     To  Observation  must  be  added 

Keflection.     These  means  for  knowledge  are  in  the  possession 

of  every  one. 

(1.)  Observe  the  movements  of  the  Passions  in 
yourself.  Their  general  action  is  similar  in 
others. 

(2.)  Observe  what  objects  others  pursue  and  dislike.    You 
have  thus  a  key  to  character. 

We  have  seen  that  all  the  Passions  begin  in  Love  and  Hate. 


Four  Sules. 


HOW   TO   STUDY   THE   PASSIONS   IN  OTHERS. 


207 


All  the  emotions  of  any  person  come  from  his  primary  attach- 
ments and  aversions.  This  is  found  to  be  as  universal  in  expe- 
rience as  it  is  consistent  in  theory.  One  is  avaricious.  He 
has  then  the  train  of  passions  which  accompany  the  love  of 
money.  He  can  be  influenced  through  money.  One  is  luxu- 
rious. He  has  those  which  attend  the  love  of  pleasure.  Uni- 
versally, the  prominent  peculiarities  of  the  individual  are  known 
trom  his  objects  of  pursuit.  The  rule  given  is  founded  on  this 
fact. 

(3.)  Observe  the  particular  dispositions  belonging  to  various 
ages,  temperaments,  and  conditions.  A  full  analysis  will  not 
be  attempted.  Some  examples  may  show  the  reader  how  to 
observe. 

The  young  are  disposed  in  the  Passions  not  personal,  to 
admiration  and  to  pleasantry.     They  are  inclined  in  the  per- 
sonal simple  Passions  to  love  and  desire,  especially  in  the 
pleasures  of  the  senses ;  to  hope,  because  they  see  a  larger 
future  than  past;  to  confidence,  from  their  limited  experience; 
to  intensity,  in  grief  and  enjoyments.     In  the  special  Passions 
they  have  little  cupidity,  being  inclined   to  generosity,  and 
more  easily  moved  by  honor  than  self-interest.     They  are  sen- 
sible to  approbation,  and  to  shame.     They  delight  in  supe- 
riority,  and  are  thus  emulous,  and  in  a  degree  jealous  of  rivals. 
They  are  often  cruel,  but  from  a  want  of  reflection  which 
makes  them  unconscious  of  the  pain  inflicted.    They  are  brave, 
even  to  delight  in  danger.     Coming  to  the  complex  Passions, 
they  are  especially  liable  to  anger,  being  keenly  alive  to  the 
shadow  of  an  intentional  insult.     They  are  more  inclined  to 
this  than  to  revenge.    Their  moral  sentiments  being  unper- 
verted  by  contact  with  human  wickedness,  they  believe  men 
worthier  than  they  are,  and  hence  are  credulous,  and  thus 
inclined  to  indignation  and  pity.     They  are  liable  to  envy,  but, 
from  generosity  of  feeling,  easily  convert  it   to   emulation. 
Tlieir  remorse  is  keen  when  conscious  of  faults  committed. 
They  are  sympathetic  and  grateful. 
Let  the  reader  now  reflect,  in  like  manner,  on  the  old  and 


208 


PKACTICA.L   ETHICS. 


the  mature ;  and  on  the  peculiar  dispositions  of  the  different 

sexes. 

Certain  temperaments  have  proclivities  to  particular  passions. 
The  choleric  are  inclined  to  anger  ;  the  sanguine  to  hope,  admi- 
ration, and  sensuous  love ;  the  phlegmatic  to  settled  aversions, 
envies,  and  slow  revenge ;  the  melancholic  to  sadness,  fear,  and, 
when  fanatical,  to  cruelty.  Let  the  reader  classify  human 
beings  by  their  temperaments  and  conceive  in  detail  their  ten- 
dencies. 

So,  in  conditions,  he  should  reflect  on  the  natural  sentiments 
of  one  newly  rich,  of  one  suddenly  poor ;  of  a  man  in  great 
place  or  in  great  reputation ;  of  one  ever  successful  or  ever 
unfortunate ;  of  one  in  unclouded  prosperity  or  in  the  deep 
Borrows  of  affliction. 

(tt.)  Observe  the  signs  of  emotions  in  frame,  face,  eye,  tone 
of  voice,  movement,  and  in  men  who  uniformly  conceal  their 
feelings,  the  ^notions  which  are  evidently  assumed. 

Thus  the  present  and  momentary  feeling  may  be  penetrated. 
By  such  observations  and  reflections  we  promote  a  knowledge 
of  the  Passions  and  prepare  for  their  uses. 

63.  The  uses  of  this  knowledge  are  social  and 
general,  rhetorical,  public. 

(1.)  The  social  and  general  use  of  this  knowledge 
is  in  the  formation  of  social  and  universal  tact. 
Tact  signifies,  by  its  derivation,  delicacy  of  touch  (tango, 
tactum,  to  touch).  It  is  a  nice  discernment  applied  to  the  feel- 
ings of  others.  Knowing  their  feelings,  we  can  avoid  giving 
them  pain  or  disgust.  Thus,  there  will  be  Courtesy  and  Eefine- 
ment.  We  also  adapt  words  and  manners  to  them  in  the 
observance  of  Decorum. 

Tact  is  necessary  for  social  and  domestic  duties.  It  can  be 
acquired  and  increased  by  one's  own  care.  Not  restrained  by 
principle,  it  may  degenerate  into  insincerity  and  cunning. 

(2.)  The  rhetorical  uses  consist  in  arousing  or 
Ehetorical.  allaying  the  Passions.     We  must  know,  1st,  how 

persons  become  disposed  to  certain  passions ;  2d,  what  things 


Uses. 


Social. 


HOW  TO  USE  THIS   KNOWLEDGE!   TKANSITION.  209 

awaken  those  passions ;  3d,  what  kinds  of  persons  are  specially 
susceptible,  and  in  connection  with  what  kinds  of  things.*  At 
the  time  of  moving  others  we  must  feel  them  ourselves.t 
The  particulars  belong  to  Ehetoric. 

(3.)  The  public  uses  are  military  and  non-mili- 
tary. Public. 

(«.)  In  the  military  profession  the  first  require- 
ment for  governing  the  passions  of  other  men  is  ^^^**^- 
to  govern  our  own. 

The  second  is  to  prevent  them  by  justice,  wisdom,  and  kind- 
ness,  in  administration. 

The  third  is  to  preserve  ever  the  highest  discipline  and  the 
best  moral  condition  in  the  force  commanded. 

The  fourth  is  to  apply  force  and  punishment  promptly  to  the 
passions  which  must  be  repressed. 

(^.)  The  non-military  uses  are  in  the  origina- 
ting and  executing  of  public  laws  and  measures,  ^^'^■""^ta'y- 
^  We  have  thus  seen  in  the  Passions  their  defini- 
tion, divisions,  and  treatment.  Transition. 
From  them  we  now  pass  to  the  leading  and  destructive  vices. 


♦  Aristotle,  Rhetoric,  b.  2. 

t  Si  vis  me  flere,  dolendum  est  tibl— JSor. 


9 


I' 


PART    III. 


THE   DEADLY   YigES. 


CHAPTER     XI. 


THE    VICES:  CORPOREAL;    SEMI-MEXTAL;    MENTAL. 

1.  In  this  Third  Part  we  consider  the  leading 

AND  DESTRUCTIVE  YicEs.  In  the  First,  we  be^an  ^^^J®*^*- 
with  the  Yirtues,  and  traced  them  in  their  glorious  develop- 
ments. Now,  reversely,  we  look  at  the  great  Yices,  and  trace 
the  streams  from  those  poisoned  f(  u  i tains.  In  the  First,  we 
learned  what  we  should  cherish  most.  In  this  subject,  we  see 
what  we  should  shun  most. 

2.  Bj  the  "leading  and  destructive  Yices," 

those  are  meant  which  have  been  found  by  ex-  Dw^ctive* 
perience  most  pernicious  among  mankind.  ^^^^' 

3.  Of  these,  three  may  be  considered  as  cor- 
poreal—Lust,  Drunkenness,  Eage  ;  two  as  semi-  ^^^"®^s- 
mental— Avarice  and  Envy  ;  two  as  mental— Self-Exaltation 
and  Negligence.  In  the  first  group,  are  lusts  of  the  flesh ;  in 
the  second,  lusts  of  the  eye ;  in  the  third,  the  pride  of  life. 
Six  are  positive  and  active.  The  seventh  is  negative.  The 
seven  present  the  great  moral  and  religious  dangers  for  men. 


Lust. 


4.  Lust  is  bodily  desire  unrestrained  by  reason 
and  by  the  laws  of  Nature,  Society,  and  the 
Deitv. 


I 


Lost: 


214 


Its  Species; 


Its  Effects. 


PRACTICAL   ETHIC8. 


Some  of  its  special  sins  are  Whoredom,  Adul- 
tery,  Seduction,   Incest,   and    oflfences    against 

nature. 
Abandonment  to  this  vice  produces  in  the 

mind,  the  loss  of  mental  and  moral  energy,  in- 
considerateness,  rashness,  inconstancy  of  purpose,  irreligion, 
seliishness,  dejection,  despair.  It  causes  in  the  body,  weakness 
and  disease ;  in  the  reputation,  disgrace ;  in  the  fortune,  waste 


Drunkenness. 

5.  Drunkenness  is  a  temporary  privation  of 
Drunkeimasi :  reason,  a  short  madness  produced  by  the  immod- 
erate use  of  some  intoxicating  substance. 

Its  eiFects  are  the  excitement  of  every  evil 
Effects.  passion  in  one's  nature.     It  stimulates  to  every 

sin.  In  the  thoughts,  it  suggests  all  kinds  of  wickedness.  In 
the  words,  it  induces  the  betrayal  of  secrets,  and  the  exhibi- 
tions of  folly,  obscenities,  curses,  scurrilities.  When  habitual, 
it  brings  ruin,  temporal,  and  eternal;  the  loss  of  peace,  of 
reputation,  of  friendships,  of  fortune,  of  health,  of  heaven. 
A  kindred  vice  is  Gluttony, 


Bage. 

6.  Kage  is  immoderate  anger,  a  desire  for  im- 
***^®*  mediate  vengeance. 

Its  effects  are  witnessed  in  domestic  and  social 
Effects.  ij^^^  .^  ^i^g  words  and  deeds  of  violence  which 

are  followed  by  so  much  shame,  and  often  by  incurable  dis- 
asters. It  produces  a  momentary  insanity,  a  deadness  to  the 
dictates  of  reason  and  propriety.  It  causes  quarrels,  strife, 
clamor,  blasphemy,  insults,  and  in  every  beholder,  contempt 
for  the  person  who  has  so  little  control  of  himself. 

Drunkenness  and  immoderate  anger  are  sources  of  the  greater 
miseries  in  domestic  life. 


ANGER,  revenge,  AVARICE.  215 

Anger,   as    a  momentary  passion,   occurring 
Trithout   the  assent  of   the   will,   and  brought  if  Anger, 
instantly  under  the  application  of  reason   and  ^^*^^«^°^- 
conscience,  has  been  before  considered   under  the  Passions. 
The  subject  now  regarded  is  dis.tinct.     It  is  the  voluntary, 
habitual  sin.     The  person  oflfending  uses  neither  previous  pre- 
cautions, nor  immediate  control,  but  abandons  himself  to  im- 
moderate anger  and  fits  of  rage.     He  justifies  them  or  is  morally 
indifferent  about  their  occurrence.    The  distinction  between 
the  passion  and  the  sin  is,  that  the  former  exists  without  of 
against  will,  the  latter  with  the  consent  of  the  will. 

7.  A  congenial  sin  is  Eevenge.  It  is  a  con- 
tinued desire  for  prospective  vengeance.  It  ^'  ^^®^ff®- 
differs  from  the  former  transgression  in  the  circumstance  of 
time.  Both  seek  the  same  object,  but  Eage  in  the  present, 
Eevenge  in  the  future.  In  Eevenge,  the  will  is  constantly 
giving  consent  during  the  pursuit  of  vengeance.  It  is  accord- 
ingly a  voluntary  act,  a  sin.  The  natural  impulse  for  retalia- 
tion arising  in  the  mind  but  ever  repressed  through  principle, 
presents  an  example  of  Eevenge  as  a  passion  arising  in  a 
virtuous  mind. 

The  effects  of  Eevenge  darken  the  history  of  Effects  of 
individuals,  of  families,  of  communities,  and  of  Bevenge. 
nations,  from  the  first  murder  by  Cain  to  the  present  hour. 
It,  singly,  can  break  up  society,  since  retaliations  form,  from 
their  nature,  an  endless  series.  It,  singly,  can  prevent  tribes 
from  coalescing  into  nations,  as  we  see  in  the  Indians  of  North 
America. 


Avarice. 

8.  Avarice  is  immoderate  desire  for  money ; 
habitual  love  of  it,  for  the  pleasure  of  possessing.  -^^»^"«- 

Its  effects  are  such  that  Inspiration  has  said  of 
it,  the  love  of  money  is  the  root  of  all  evil.    It 
produces,  (a.)  the  Violation  of  Engagements ;  (5.)  Fraud ;  (c.) 


Effects. 


216 


PEACTICAL  ETHICS. 


enyy:  its  effects. 


217 


Deception ;  ((^.)  Perjury;  {e.)  Disquietude;  (/.)  Extortion;  (^.) 
Hardness  of  Heart.  These  may  come  from  other  causes.  But 
Avarice  will  directly  produce  them. 

(a.)  The  Violation  of  Engagements  is  the  betrayal  of  trust 
reposed.     Treason,  in  its  old  and  general  sense,  is  the  proper 
title.     Such  betrayal  may  apply  to  persons,  to  places,  to  things 
movable,  to  secrets.     Examples  of  it  to  persons  are  the  betrayal 
by  a  friend  of  his  associate,  by  a  citizen  of  his  country.     He  is 
guilty  of  it  who  incites  to  conspiracy,  sedition,  and  rebellion, 
in  civil,  or  to  mutiny  in  military  relations.     He  is  guilty  of  it 
who  violates,  in  solemn  transactions,  promises  to  an  enemy. 
Examples  of  it  as  referred  to  places,  are  yielding  up  fortifica- 
tions, camps,  cities,  positions,  provinces  to  the  public  enemy. 
The  act  of  Arnold  in  the  war  of  the  American  Kevolution, 
betraying  the  key  of  the  defence  for  gold,  is  an  instance. 
Examples  of  it,  in  things  movable,  are  disclosing  the  places  of 
deposit  for  money,  jewels,  valuables  of  varied  kinds,  deeds, 
charters,  titles  intrusted  to  one's  care.      Examples  of  it  as 
regards  secrets,  are  the  utterance  by  public  men,  of  the  secrets 
of  the  State ;  by  military  officers,  of  military  counsels ;  by  un- 
worthy clergymen,   of   disclosures    made  to  them,  in   their 
spiritual  capacity ;  by  friends,  of  the  revelations  which  flowed 
in  the  sweetness  of  intimacy.     All  these  public  and  private 
treasons  may  be  committed  for  money,  and  usually  have  been 

from  that  motive.    . 

{h.)  Fraud  is  a  cunning  devising  of  means  to  obtain  gain  by 

cheating. 

(c.)  Deception  is  the  crafty  use  of  false  or  ambiguous  signs 
in  words  or  things,  to  obtain  profit  through  a  false  impression. 

(d.)  Perjury  is  deception  through  an  oath. 

(e.)  Disquietude  is  torturing  anxiety  for  money,  from  an  un- 
reasonable fear  of  privation  in  the  future. 

(/.)  Extortion  is  the  wrenching  of  money'  from  the  poor 
and  inferiors,  through  sufferings,  threats,  and  privations,  by 
those  in  wealth  and  authority. 

The  chief  minister  of  a  prince  so  enlightened  as  Justinian, 


filled  the  imperial  coffers  with  an  overflowing  revenue,  and 
made  a  colossal  fortune  by  exactions  and  cruelties  seldom 
equalled.*  Men  who  have  the  poor  for  tenants,  give  frequent 
examples  of  cruel  extortions. 

(ff.)  Hardness  of  Heart  is  an  insensibility  to  suffering  and 
want,  with  unwillingness  to  extend  relief  by  gift,  and  is  a 
result  from  the  tenacious  love  of  money. 

Envy. 

9.  Envy,  as  a  passion,  may  arise,  and  will  be  Enw-Distinc- 
repressed  in  the  mind  of  a  virtuous  man.     It  tion  of  the  Pas- 

,  ,       .  T.      Ml   1  sion  from  the  Sia* 

may  arise  because  he  is  a  man.     it  will  be  re- 
pressed because  he  is  a  man  of  principle. 

Envy,  as  a  sin,  is  a  constant  will  to  deprive  another  of  the 
good  which  he  possesses,  because  his  happiness  is  regarded  as 
our  own  evil. 

The  forms  of  good  which  awaken  Envy  are  ^i^jj^t  things 
Ptiches,  Power,  Authority,  Offices,  Marks  of  <»^se  Envy.  • 
Honor,  Celebrity,  Popularity,  the  Favor  of  Superiors,  the 
Praise  of  Equals,  the  Respect  of  Inferiors,  Outward  Splendor, 
Beauty,  Learning,  Eloquence,  Yirtue,  even  Sanctity  itself, 
with  all  those  things,  whatever  they  may  be,  which,  in  the 
estimate  of  men,  confer  any  distinction  above  others. 

The  effects  of  Envy  are  Hatred  and  Malice 
in  the  mind.  These  produce  joy  in  the  suffer- 
ings of  others,  and  spite  against  them  for  their  prosperity. 
These  sentiments  come  forth  in  words,  through  calumny,  in 
their  absence,  by  evil  suggestions  and  perpetual  detraction ; 
and,  in  their  presence,  through  taunts,  reproaches,  and  marks 
of  contempt.  They  come  forth  in  actions,  though  endeavors 
to  inflict  injuries  upon  them,  or  to  thwart  insidiously  their 
designs. 

It  can  reatiily  be  seen  that  where  Envy  is,  as  it  is  with 
many  an  habitual  sentiment,  it  will  cover  life  with  transgres- 
sions and  miseries. 

♦  See  Gibbon. 


Its  Effects. 


i 


218 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


INDIVIDUALISM  :    ITS   CONSEQUENCES. 


219 


Self-Szaltation : 


Self-Exaltation. 

(Commonly  classified  as  Pride.) 

10.  Self-Exaltation  or  Self-Conceit  is  a 
folly  and  a  vice,  arising  from  an  exaggerated 
sense  of  personal  superiority.  It  is  known  in  Theology  as 
Pride.  The  virtues  opposed  to  it  are,  on  the  one  side,  Self- 
Keverence,  and  on  the  other  (not  in  the  popular,  but  in  the 
theological  meaning  of  the  term),  Humility. 

For  a  more  distinct  view  of  this  folly  and  vice  we  must  dis- 
tinguish it  from  the  opposed  virtues  ;  and,  to  do  this,  must 
move  for  a  moment  in  the  direction  of  Theology,  and  of  the 
theoretical  part  of  Ethics. 

Those  habitual  dispositions  are  virtues  for  men 

Beasons  why  it  i       «  i  i 

is  a  Folly  and  a  which  conform  to  the  facts  that  surround  men. 
leading  Vice.  ^  ^^^  -^  ^  point  in  a  scale  of  organized  exist- 
ence. Above  him,  in  the  natural  order,  are  the  Deity  and 
the  created  Universe,  invisible  and  visible,  in  the  ascending 
degrees  of  being ;  and  also  men  with  their  varied  endowments 
from  nature  or  condition.  Above  him,  in  the  social  order,  is 
the  public  Society,  of  which  he  is  a  part,  with  all  its  gradu- 
ated diversities.  Whoever  looks  at  this  order  sees  his  natural 
place.  Whoever  compares  himself  w^th  his  obligations  per- 
ceives his  great  imperfection,  and  thus  sees  his  moral  place. 
The  recognition  of  that  true  place  is  Humility,  which,  there- 
fore, is  a  virtue.  But  also  each  man  is  morally  a  being  of 
great  capacities,  made  for  high  destinies,  and  the  subject  of 
wonderful  provisions  and  promises  from  the  Deity.  Confor- 
mity to  this  fact  is  Self-Reverence.  It,  too,  is  a  virtue.  A 
man  reveres  himself  for  the  honor  put  on  his  nature  by  its 
Maker.  But  Self-Exaltation,  that  is,  Pride,  ignores  the  excel- 
lence above  and  around  the  person,  contemplates  a  fantastic 
excellence  within  him,  and  honors  him  not  for  what  he  may 
become  by  a  Divine  power,  but  for  what  he  is  supposed  to  be. 
Thus'Pride  is  justly  regarded  as  a  folly  and  a  vice,  and  named 


by  theologians,  the  queen  of  sins,  and  the  root  of  vices.*  It 
is,  then,  opposed  equally  to  a  true  Self-Reverence  and  a  true 
Humility. 

Coming  from  this  momentary  but  necessary  diversion  to  its 
effects  :  they  are,  Individualism,  with  its  consequences.  These 
consequences  are,  {a.)  Disobedience;  (5.)  Boasting;  {c.)  Hy- 
pocrisy ;  (d,)  Contention ;  {e.)  Obstinacy ;  (/.)  Discord  ; 
ig.)  Rage  for  Novelties. 

Individualism    is    the    inordinate    exaltation  its  primary 
of  the  individual  in  his  interests,  opinions,  and  Effect, 
volitions,  against  the  established  order  of  Nature,  Society,  and 
God. 

An  example  of  it  in  opinions  is  a  man  disregarding  all  the 
established  standards  of  truth  and  duty,  and  saying,  with  the 
Grecian  sophists,  "What  I  think  right  is  right,  and  what  I  think 
true  is  true,  because  the  individual  man  is  the  sole  measure  for 
what  is  true  and  right."  Another  like  instance  is  a  child  re- 
fusing to  obey  the  parent,  because  its  sentiments  differ  from 
those  expressed  in  the  command.  An  example  of  it  in  inter- 
ests is  a  man  or  body  of  men  demanding  that  the  measures  of 
a  corporation,  the  laws  of  a  community,  the  movements  of  an 
army,  the  policy  of  a  country,  shall  be  directed  for  his  or  their 
sole  benefit,  and  that  thus  the  public  good  shall  be  sacrificed 
for  that  of  individuals.  Sparta  sacrificing  all  Greece  to  Persia 
in  the  peace  of  Antalkidas;f  the  Grecian  cities  forgetting 
Hellenic  welfare  for  Philip's  gold  ;  the  factions  of  Jerusalem 
fighting  among  themselves  when  Titus  was  before  the  walls ; 
the  Germanic  Confederation  opening  Germany  to  Napoleon 
for  individual  advancement ;  legislators  making,  annulling, 
changing,  rejecting  laws,  not  in  view  of  the  public  welfare, 
but  for  private  purposes — these  suggest  themselves  from  among 
throngs  of  examples. 

*  St.  Greg.,  lib.  31 ;  Moral.,  cap.  17,  and  lib.  34,  cap.  18. 
f  I  agree  with  Grote  in  the  proper  spelling  and  pronunciation  for  these  Grecian 
names. 


220 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


(a.)  Disobedience  is  voluntary  transgression  of 
viduaiism  in  the  command  of  some  superior  authority.  It  is 
man  ormasaes.  ^jj-ected  both  against  laws  and  persons.  Tliis 
proceeds  directly  from  self-exaltation,  and  from  individualism 
in  opinion  and  will. 

(J.)  BoAs-nNG  is  expressed  exultation,  by  which  one  claims 
falsely  what  he  does  not  deserve ;  or,  indecorously  and  immod- 
erately, what  he  does  deserve.  It  may  be  and  is  extended  from 
and  by  the  individual  to  his  family,  occupation,  city,  region, 
country,  race,  from  a  consciousness  that  he  is  thus  praising  him- 
self.    In  all  its  applications  it  is  pride. 

((?.)  IIypockisy  is  a  word  transferred  from  the  actors  of  Greek 
theatres,  who  wore  a  mask.  It  is  feigning  to  be  what  one  is 
not.  Especially  it  is  the  assuming  of  a  false  appearance  of 
virtue  or  religion.  It  is  the  desire  to  exalt  one's  self  in  the 
opinion  of  others,  even  at  the  sacrifice  of  truth.  It  is  then 
a  combination  of  pride  with  deception ;  of  an  inner  sin  with 

an  outward. 

{d)  Contention  is  a  clamorous  and  rancorous  opposition  to 
truth,  accompanied  by  revilings  of  persons.  It  proceeds  from 
the  same  source  as  Obstinacy.  We  defend  opinions,  not  because 
they  are  right  and  true,  but  because  they  are  our  own.  It  is 
Bhown  in  conversation,  and  on  a  more  open  theatre,  in  con- 
troversies of  all  kinds,  political,  scientific,  moral,  religious. 
Uniformly,  where  arguments  fail,  abuse  supplies  their  place. 
It  proceeds,  like  the  others,  from  pride,  and  is  joined  with  the 
sin  of  hate  to  one's  neighbor.  Contention,  as  the  term  is  here 
used,  is  mostly  an  offence  in  words. 

{e)  Obstinacy  is  unreasonable  firmness  in  opinion  Or  pur- 
pose, only  because  it  is  one's  own :  adherence  to  it,  however 
■unsound,  with  persistent  rejection  of  others'  counsels,  however 
reasonable.  This  also  proceeds  from  the  inordinate  exaltation 
of  self,  and  is  an  effect  of  pride. 

(/.)  Discord  is  kindred  with  Contention,  being  its  fruit  in 
action.  Discord  is  a  disruption  of  the  bonds  which  unite  us  to 
others,  through  dissension  and  alienation,  caused  by  some  dis- 


negligence:  its  divisions. 


221 


crepancy  between  us  and  them.  In  the  political  body  it  is 
sedition  ;  in  the  ecclesiastical,  schism ;  in  the  domestic,  divorce 
or  separation.  Discords  proceed  from  the  same  cause  with  the 
sins  immediately  preceding.  There  is  an  obstinate  adherence 
by  one  or  both  parties  to  that  which  has  been  willed.  There 
is  a  refusal  to  make  the  sacrifices  which  may  be  clearly 
demanded  by  the  love  of  God,  of  man,  and  of  peace.  Dis- 
cord proceeds  from  pride,  and  from  the  absence  of  love  to  God 
and  our  neighbor. 

{g.)  Rage  for  Novelties  is  a  desire  to  create  or  encourage, 
for  the  increase  of  personal  importance,  and  not  for  the  general 
good,  innovations  in  what  is  established  by  time  and  consent. 
A  true  discoverer  or  inventor  is  a  public  benefactor.  He  who 
introduces  a  real  improvement  promotes  and  may  design  the 
general  welfare.  Such  men  usually  are  modest.  But  this  vice 
looks  to  self  alone,  disregards  the  interests  of  men,  and  desires 
innovations — though  needless  and  injurious — to  be  made,  for 
personal  notoriety  and  influence. 

11.  Negligence  is  habitual  disregard  of  the 
purposes  and  duties  of  life.  KegUgence : 

The  Latin,  or,  more  correctly,  the  Greek  word,  commonly 
employed  by  moralists,  gives  the  primary  idea.  The  Latin  is 
acedia.  This  is  from  the  Greek,  aicridia.  The  latter  is  from 
a,  not^  and  «;r)dor,  care.  It  is  carelessness :  the  refusal  to  give 
that  care  which  the  purposes  and  duties  of  life  demand. 

Negligence  is  manifested  in  Recklessness,  Supineness,  Indo- 
lence, Inactivity. 

In  some  it  appears  as  Recklessness,  a  temporary  desperation. 
Those  who  are  saddened,  mortified,  disappointed,  are  often 
tempted  to  throw  themselves  away.  Wounded  pride  most  fre- 
quently induces  this  state  of  mind.  The  young  and  ardent 
often  become  thus  reckless,  and  neglect  every  duty.  In  others 
this  neglect  appears  as  Supineness ;  a  disposition  to  dislike  that 
most  which  it  is  most  necessary  to  do.  In  others  it  appears  ad 
a  state  of  mind  specially  caused  by  licentious  indulgence,  as 
Indolence  and  Inactivity.    Neglects  of  preparation,  before  the 


222 


PKACnCAL   ETHICS. 


Effects. 


profession,  and  of  opportunities,  after  it  is  entered,  are  great 
causes,  in  temporal  pursuits,  of  want  of  success.  Neglect  of 
religion  and  its  duties  is  a  principal  cause  of  men's  failure  to 
receive  its  benefits.  Neglect,  then,  is  one  of  the  leading  and 
dan  onerous  vices.  Though  negative  in  its  character,  yet, 
whether  as  Kecklessness,  Snpineness,  Indolence,  or  Inactivity, 
in  temporal  and  eternal  relations,  it  is  the  source  of  neglect  of 
duty  ;  it  is  a  cause  of  ruin  here  and  hereafter. 

Its  eficcts  are  the  following :  1.  Spite  against 
others.  The  neglectful  person  blames  every  one 
but  himself.  2.  An  abject  temper.  The  neglectful  man  loses 
confidence  in  his  own  powers,  and  by  expecting  failure  pro- 
duces it.  3.  Torpor.  He  is  unmoved  by  commands,  warnings, 
counsels,  appeals.  4.  The  wandering  of  imagination  on  illicit 
pleasures.     This  attends  the  reckless,  the  supine,  and  the  idle. 

12.  As  we  review  all  these  vices,  it  will  be  seen 
Becapituiation.  ^^^^  ^Yiqj  are  what  we  have  named  them  :  leading 
and  destructive.  Each  one  of  them  may  bring  on  all  the  sins 
known  among  men.  Each  may  cause  the  greatest  disasters. 
This  is  true  of  lust,  of  drunkenness,  of  the  irascible  passions. 
To  what  crimes  may  not  men  be  led  by  rage  and  revenge ! 
Avarice  is  the  root  of  all  evil,  as  we  have  learned  from  Scrip- 
ture. Envy  can  poison  the  whole  character  and  induce  crime. 
Pride  produces  that  long  train  of  effects  enumerated.  Neglect, 
the  privation  of  all  duty  and  all  right  endeavor,  brings  misery  by 
the  rejection  of  all  means  for  happiness,  and  invites  sins  to  enter, 
because  the  mind  is  unoccupied.  The  reader  thus  sees  the 
rocks  of  danger  which  through  life  he  is  most  carefully  to  shun. 

We  have  thus  filled  up  the  outline  proposed  for 
Conclnfion.  Practical  Ethics.    In  the  First  Part  we  considered 

Duties  and  Virtues;  in  the  Second,  Passions;  in  this  last  part, 
the  Capital  Vices.  May  the  virtues  be  attained,  the  passions 
governed,  the  vices  banished.  Morals  will  assist  for  the  par- 
tial attainment  of  these  purposes.  But  he  who  wishes  them 
completely  must  look  beyond  the  handmaid  to  the  mistress ; 
from  Morals  to  Theology. 


CJONCLUSION. 


223 


The  next  subjects  in  this  division  of  the  course,  are  Ethical 
Science,  and  Jurisprudence  ;  first,  in  the  common  elements  of 
both ;  secondly,  in  the  principles  belonging  to  each. 

These  subjects,  belonging  to  a  more  advanced  stage  of 
instruction,  will  naturally  take  a  less  didactic  form  than  that 
which  has  been  adopted  in  the  present  treatise,  and  appear  in 
the  form  of  Lectures. 


n 


